Assigning number values to none existent things

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Consul
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 1:39 pmI don't think a numerical truth such as "The number of US states is 50" implies that there (really) is such an entity as the number 50.
Note that there is a distinction between numbers as nonlinguistic mathematical entities and numerals as linguistic entities (purporting to represent numbers); so the existence of numerals doesn't entail the existence of numbers (as abstract mathematical objects).
However, there is a further distinction between tokens and types of numerals: Numeral-tokens are concrete (mental or physical) objects, whereas numeral-types are abstract (nonmental and nonphysical) objects. Numeral-types are as (ontologically) abstract as numbers, but there is still a difference between them insofar as the former are (arguably) language-dependent and the latter are not. (By saying so, I'm not implying that there really are abstract numeral-types and numbers.)
Ontological realists about numbers needn't regarded them as (abstract) objects, because they can regard them alternatively as (universal) properties: the property of being one/two/three/…
However, if number-properties are regarded as Platonic, transcendent universals, they are ontologically abstract too. They are ontologically concrete only if they are regarded either as Aristotelian, immanent universals or as immanent property-particulars.

David Armstrong, who acknowledges immanent universals in his ontology, objects that pure number-properties such as being twelve are mathematical abstractions from number-involving physical quantities such as being twelve kilograms in mass. According to him, a pure number-property such as being twelve is a "false abstraction" that isn't instantiated by any plurality of things—as opposed to "impure" number-properties such as being twelve kilograms in mass, which are instantiated by pluralities of microphysical things.

Let's assume for the sake of the argument that there (really) are such items as pure or impure number-properties. Are nonexistent things among the things which can have such properties? For example, do Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson together have the property of being two despite the fact that they both don't exist (have never existed)?

(I can say truly that Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson are two fictional persons without thereby implying that there really are such numerical properties as the property of being two; but, as I say above, I presuppose their existence just for the sake of the argument.)

This raises the general ontological question as to whether nonentities/nonexistents (can) have any properties at all, including number-properties (numerical properties).

The Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong is famous for his independence principle, according to which Sosein (essence) doesn't entail Dasein (existence)—except for the Dasein (existence) of the Sosein (essence) itself—such that nonexistent objects or persons can have (possess/exemplify/instantiate) properties just like existent ones:

QUOTE:
"…Das alles ändert nichts an der Tatsache, dass das Sosein eines Gegenstandes durch dessen Nichtsein sozusagen nicht mitbetroffen ist. Die Tatsache ist wichtig genug, um sie ausdrücklich als das Prinzip der Unabhängigkeit des Soseins vom Sein zu formulieren[.]"

"…All that doesn't alter the fact that the being-so (Sosein) of an object is not affected by its non-being, so to speak. The fact is important enough to formulate it explicitly as the principle of the independence of being-so from being."
[© my translation from German]

(Meinong, Alexius. Über Gegenstandstheorie. In Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie, edited by Alexius Meinong, 1-50. Leipzig: Barth, 1904. p. 8 )
:QUOTE

Richard Routley (aka Richard Sylvan) accepts Meinong's principle with his neo-Meinongian theory of objects or "items" called "non(e)ism".

Decide for yourself!—but, as far as I'm concerned, I strongly reject Meinong's principle, simply because I think it is ontologically incoherent!
Properties (real ones, not unreal semantic "shadows" of concepts or predicates) are "adherences" or "inherences", which is to say that it is part of their essence that there exists something to or in which they adhere or inhere, with nonexistent objects not being possible substrata of properties qua adherences or inherences.
For in the case of nonentities/nonexistents there simply isn't anything to or in which properties can adhere or inhere; and the idea of an unhad or unborne (unpossessed/unexemplified/uninstantiated) property makes no coherent ontological sense either. Therefore, nonentities lack properties in general and (pure or impure) number-properties in particular.

Of course, according to some ghost story, there may be some mass of ectoplasm with the properties of having a volume of 50cm3 and of weighing 100mg; but, as I already said, what exists only according to some fiction, doesn't exist at all.

QUOTE:
"The position arrived at – hereafter called (basic) noneism, also spelt and pronounced “nonism” – is thus neither realism nor nominalism nor conceptualism. It falls outside the false classifications of both the ancient and modern disputes over universals, since these classifications rest upon an assumption, the vulgar prejudice Reid refers to, which noneism rejects.

By far the fullest working out of these noneist themes – which are firmly grounded in commonsense but tend to lead quickly away from current philosophical “commonsense” – is to be found in the work of Meinong, especially in Meinong’s theory of objects, central theses of which include these:

M1. Everything whatever – whether thinkable or not, possible or not, complete or not, even perhaps paradoxical or not – is an object.

M2. Very many objects do not exist; and in many cases they do not exist in any way at all, or have any form of being whatsoever.

M3. Non-existent objects are constituted in one way or another, and have more or less determinate natures, and thus they have properties. In fact they have properties of a range of sorts, sometimes quite ordinary properties, e.g. the oft-quoted golden mountain is golden. Given a subdivision of properties into (what may be called) characterising properties and non-characterising properties, further central theses of Meinong’s can be formulated, namely:

M4. Existence is not a characterising property of any object. In more old-fashioned language, being is not part of the characterisation or essence of an object; and in more modern and misleading terminology, existence is not a predicate (but of course it is a grammatical predicate). The thesis holds, as we shall see, not merely for “exists”, but for an important class of ontological predicates, e.g. “is possible”, “is created”, “dies”, “is fictional”.

M5. Every object has the characteristics it has irrespective of whether it exists; or, more succinctly, essence precedes existence.

M6. An object has those characterising properties used to characterise it. For example, the round square, being the object characterised as round and square, is both round and square.

Several other theses emerge as a natural outcome of these theses; for example:

M7. Important quantifiers, in fact of common occurrence in natural language, conform neither to the existence nor to the identity and enumeration requirements that classical logicians have tried to impose in their regimentation of discourse. Among these quantifiers are those used in stating the preceding theses, e.g. “everything”, “very many”, and “in many cases”. A similar thesis holds for descriptors, for instance for “the” as used in “the round square”.

The theory of objects – or of items, to use a more neutral term – to be outlined integrates, extends, and fits into a logical framework, all the theses introduced from the Epicureans, from Reid and especially from Meinong."
(pp. 2-4)

"A theory of items – which is what noneism aims at – is a very general theory of all items whatsoever, of those that are intensional and those that are not, of those that exist and those that do not, of those that are possible and those that are not, of those that are paradoxical or defective and those that are not, of those that are significant or absurd and those that are not; it is a theory of the logic and properties and kinds of properties of all these items."
(p. 7)

"There is a very widespread assumption, implicit in most modern philosophical theories, which settles the truth-values of very many of these statements, namely the Ontological Assumption (abbreviated as OA), according to which no (genuine) statements about what does not exist are true. Alternatively, in a more careful formal mode formulation, the OA is the thesis that a non-denoting expression cannot be the proper subject of a true statement (where the proper subject contrasts with the apparent subject which is eliminated under analysis into logical or canonical form).

It is the rejection of the Ontological Assumption that makes a proper theory of items possible and begins to mark such a genuinely nonexistential theory offfrom standard logical theories. According to the OA – to state the Assumption in a revealing way that exponents of the Assumption cannot (readily) avail themselves of – nonentities are featureless, only what exists can truly have properties. All standard logical theories are committed, usually through the theory of descriptions they incorporate, to some version of the Ontological Assumption."
(pp. 28-9)

"Philosophers of almost all persuasions seem to agree that statements whose (proper) subject terms do not have an actual reference somehow fail. But though these philosophers agree that such statements fail they disagree on how to characterise this failure. According to the strongest affirmation of the featurelessness of nonentities, that of the early Wittgenstein and of Parmenides, such statements are not just meaningless, they can’t even be made or uttered; according to Plato such statements are nonsense; according to Strawson they are not truth-valued; and Russell, as well as standard logic, tells us that they are all false. The lowest common denominator of these pervasive positions is given by the following formulation of the Ontological Assumption: it is not true that nonentities ever have properties; it is not true that any nonentity has a genuine property."
(p. 30)

"The Ontological Assumption – and thereby all the positions alluded to – was explicitly repudiated by Meinong’s and Mally’s Independence Thesis, namely

(III) That an item has properties need not, and commonly does not, imply, or (pre)suppose, that it exists or has being. Thus statements ascribing features to nonentities may be used, and are used, without involving any existential or ontological commitment. (The basic independence thesis)"
(p. 31)

"The Independence Thesis, that items can and do have definite properties even though nonentities…"
(p. 37)

(Routley, Richard. Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. [1980.] Vol. 1 of The Sylvan Jungle. Edited by Maureen Eckert. Cham: Springer, 2018.)
:QUOTE
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 4:06 pm
GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 1:42 pm"Thing" is the universal noun; everything denotable is a "thing." Because the extension of that term is so broad you have to be careful when speaking of "things" to specify to just what category of things you're referring, if that is not clear from context.
You are right insofar as the noun "thing" can be and often is used so broadly and ontologically indifferently that in this sense it is true that everything is a thing; but there is also a narrower ontological sense, in which it is not true that everything is a thing, because some entities or items are nonthings—in the sense that they don't belong to the narrowly defined ontological categories object, substance, or body.
Quite right. In the commonly used and understood broad sense, everything is a "thing." In the commonly used and understood narrow sense, only physical objects (objects having mass and a spatiotemporal location) are "things." In the most general sense a "thing," like an "existent," is anything denotable with a term and about which we can convey useful information via propositions.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

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Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 6:32 pm QUOTE:
"…Meinong’s theory of objects, central theses of which include these:

M1. Everything whatever – whether thinkable or not, possible or not, complete or not, even perhaps paradoxical or not – is an object.

M2. Very many objects do not exist; and in many cases they do not exist in any way at all, or have any form of being whatsoever.
…"
(pp. 2-4)

"There is a very widespread assumption, implicit in most modern philosophical theories, which settles the truth-values of very many of these statements, namely the Ontological Assumption (abbreviated as OA), according to which no (genuine) statements about what does not exist are true. Alternatively, in a more careful formal mode formulation, the OA is the thesis that a non-denoting expression cannot be the proper subject of a true statement (where the proper subject contrasts with the apparent subject which is eliminated under analysis into logical or canonical form).…"
(pp. 28-9)

"…The lowest common denominator of these pervasive positions is given by the following formulation of the Ontological Assumption: it is not true that nonentities ever have properties; it is not true that any nonentity has a genuine property."
(p. 30)

(Routley, Richard. Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. [1980.] Vol. 1 of The Sylvan Jungle. Edited by Maureen Eckert. Cham: Springer, 2018.)
:QUOTE
In Meinong's Gegenstandstheorie (theory of objects), the (German) noun "Gegenstand" ("object") is used in the broadest sense—in the same broadest sense in which "thing" is often used. In this sense, everything is an object or thing. But, as a I already mentioned in a previous post, there is also a narrow ontological sense of these terms, in which it is not the case that everything is an object or thing.

Routely prefers the term "item" as a synonym of "object" and "thing" used in the broadest sense; and "item" is actually preferable, because—as opposed to "object" and "thing"—there is no established distinction between a broad and a narrow ontological sense of it that could cause a similar confusion or misunderstanding.

Object: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/

Speaking of (potential) confusion or misunderstanding: As for what Routley calls "the Ontological Assumption", whether nonentities are (really) substrates/subjects of properties and whether there are truths about them (true sentences mentioning or referring to them) are two different questions! Of course, if there are truths about nonexistents (true sentences mentioning or referring to nonexistents), their truthmakers must be existents rather than the nonexistents thought or talked about, since what doesn't exist cannot make any proposition or statement true.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by GE Morton »

3017Metaphysician wrote: September 1st, 2022, 3:21 pm
GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 2:49 pm
Yes. The meaning of "zero" is equally clear.
Are you sure? What is so clear about numbers? Are they concrete? Can you touch them?
The meaning of a term is "clear" if it is well-defined. Terms for numbers are also concrete --- a concrete term is one which denotes something specific, rather than a property which may be applicable to many things. No "touching" is required.
We're confused, first you said there are no metaphysical abstract's that exist, now you are suggesting they do exist?
Er, no, I did not say that. I said there are no abstract things "in the world," i.e., external to our minds:

"Abstract things only exist in the realm of concepts, and in the terms we invent for denoting those concepts. There are no "abstract things" in the world (which is why we can't see them)."

viewtopic.php?p=421475#p421475

I also said there is nothing "metaphysical" about them.

Can you cease with the false quotes and attributions?
But how are erroneous and dysfunctional ontologies relative to concrete things?
They give rise to mistaken notions of what is and is not concrete, and also to category mistakes, i.e., applying predicates applicable to one ontological category to subjects belonging to another.
Anyway, we're confused again. We have two problems. Now you are suggesting you have 'fallacious' (ad hominem fallacies) neuron's?
Oh, I think you know by now why that is a silly question, but since your dysfunctional ontology implies that, you're compelled to ask it.
Er, why do you persist in ascribing that silly phrase, invented by you and used only by you, to me?
It's actually the other way around.
Huh? You're claiming that is my phrase or claim? Can you cite the post where I used that phrase or made that claim?
Remember you had told us that neuron's exclusively cause angry behavior? Let's see, these are the corresponding conclusions one can draw from your previous argument that all material things (neurons) cause human behavior, like the incitement of violence, anger, having properties and qualities of intellect and so on. Here are your simple 'categorical errors' :

All humans are sentient
All neuron's are in humans
Therefore, all neuron's are sentient

Hence, we can reasonably infer you have angry neuron's that are causing you to incite violence. No?
Er, no. The premises of your "argument" above are both false, the conclusion does not follow from them, and neither the premises nor the conclusion, nor your claim about "angry neurons" "can be inferred" from the proposition that neurons cause human behavior. Your statements above don't even qualify as an argument; it is just gibberish.
And they certainly are angry too :P
Enjoy your romp in the metaphysical weeds!
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

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GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 6:35 pm
Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 4:06 pmYou are right insofar as the noun "thing" can be and often is used so broadly and ontologically indifferently that in this sense it is true that everything is a thing; but there is also a narrower ontological sense, in which it is not true that everything is a thing, because some entities or items are nonthings—in the sense that they don't belong to the narrowly defined ontological categories object, substance, or body.
Quite right. In the commonly used and understood broad sense, everything is a "thing." In the commonly used and understood narrow sense, only physical objects (objects having mass and a spatiotemporal location) are "things." In the most general sense a "thing," like an "existent," is anything denotable with a term and about which we can convey useful information via propositions.
Bodies are things in the narrow ontological sense, but not all things in the narrow ontological sense are bodies. For example, if immaterial abstract things such as sets or immaterial concrete things such as souls exist, they are things in the narrow ontological sense, but not bodies in the even narrower ontological sense. Bodies are material concrete things. (Concrete things are material or immaterial, physical or mental, whereas all abstract things are immaterial and nonmental.) Concreteness and materiality/physicality are necessary conditions for being a body, but are they also sufficient? Spatially unextended point-particles are concrete and material, but are they properly called bodies given their lack of spatial extension? In the narrowest sense, bodies are spatially extended, i.e. three-dimensional, material concrete things.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 4:16 pm
No, fictional existence isn't a form of existence but simply nonexistence—no matter whether the fictional object or person in question is a fictional material/physical one or a fictional immaterial/nonphysical one. Whatever exists only according to some fiction just does not exist at all.
Your last sentence there is self-contradictory. Something that "exists only according to some fiction" obviously exists in some sense. The statement relies on an assumption that only physical existents are "real" existents. But our world and language are full of non-physical but "real" existents, e.g., laws, rules, theories, ideas, fantasies, delusions, qualia, moods and feelings, etc. etc. It would be false to claim that love, or the rules of grammar, or quantum theory are not "real" or don't exist.

Anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists. We just have to avoid imputing properties applicable to one category of existents to those belonging to another category, and thus confusing ourselves about to which category they belong.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

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GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 7:17 pmEr, no, I did not say that. I said there are no abstract things "in the world," i.e., external to our minds:

"Abstract things only exist in the realm of concepts, and in the terms we invent for denoting those concepts. There are no "abstract things" in the world (which is why we can't see them)."

viewtopic.php?p=421475#p421475

I also said there is nothing "metaphysical" about them.
What about the metaphysics/ontology of concepts?

"The ontology of concepts:
1.1 Concepts as mental representations
1.2 Concepts as abilities
1.3 Concepts as abstract objects"


Concepts: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/

If concepts are mental representations or mental abilities, they are ontologically concrete entities, including so-called abstract concepts (abstract ideas). And if they are (reified) meanings or senses of predicates, they are ontologically abstract.

Abstract Objects: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abstract-objects/
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

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GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 7:37 pm
Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 4:16 pm
No, fictional existence isn't a form of existence but simply nonexistence—no matter whether the fictional object or person in question is a fictional material/physical one or a fictional immaterial/nonphysical one. Whatever exists only according to some fiction just does not exist at all.
Your last sentence there is self-contradictory. Something that "exists only according to some fiction" obviously exists in some sense. The statement relies on an assumption that only physical existents are "real" existents. But our world and language are full of non-physical but "real" existents, e.g., laws, rules, theories, ideas, fantasies, delusions, qualia, moods and feelings, etc. etc. It would be false to claim that love, or the rules of grammar, or quantum theory are not "real" or don't exist.

Anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists. We just have to avoid imputing properties applicable to one category of existents to those belonging to another category, and thus confusing ourselves about to which category they belong.
No, my denial that fictional existence is a form of existence doesn't presuppose that all entities or realities are physical ones.

No, what exists only according to some fiction exists in no sense (of "to exist"). Fictional objects are nothing but nonexistent objects of thought or imagination, and there is nothing self-contradictory about saying so.

No, it is not the case that "anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists," because many things we meaningfully think or talk about, mention or refer to have no form of being, existence, or reality whatsoever. They are just not there, being nowhere and nowhen!
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

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Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 7:55 pmNo, it is not the case that "anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists," because many things we meaningfully think or talk about, mention or refer to have no form of being, existence, or reality whatsoever. They are just not there, being nowhere and nowhen!
Do you seriously think Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson are to be counted among the people who lived in Victorian England?
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by 3017Metaphysician »

GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 7:17 pm
3017Metaphysician wrote: September 1st, 2022, 3:21 pm
GE Morton wrote: September 1st, 2022, 2:49 pm
Yes. The meaning of "zero" is equally clear.
Are you sure? What is so clear about numbers? Are they concrete? Can you touch them?
The meaning of a term is "clear" if it is well-defined. Terms for numbers are also concrete --- a concrete term is one which denotes something specific, rather than a property which may be applicable to many things. No "touching" is required.
We're confused, first you said there are no metaphysical abstract's that exist, now you are suggesting they do exist?
Er, no, I did not say that. I said there are no abstract things "in the world," i.e., external to our minds:

"Abstract things only exist in the realm of concepts, and in the terms we invent for denoting those concepts. There are no "abstract things" in the world (which is why we can't see them)."

viewtopic.php?p=421475#p421475

I also said there is nothing "metaphysical" about them.

Can you cease with the false quotes and attributions?
But how are erroneous and dysfunctional ontologies relative to concrete things?
They give rise to mistaken notions of what is and is not concrete, and also to category mistakes, i.e., applying predicates applicable to one ontological category to subjects belonging to another.
Anyway, we're confused again. We have two problems. Now you are suggesting you have 'fallacious' (ad hominem fallacies) neuron's?
Oh, I think you know by now why that is a silly question, but since your dysfunctional ontology implies that, you're compelled to ask it.
Er, why do you persist in ascribing that silly phrase, invented by you and used only by you, to me?
It's actually the other way around.
Huh? You're claiming that is my phrase or claim? Can you cite the post where I used that phrase or made that claim?
Remember you had told us that neuron's exclusively cause angry behavior? Let's see, these are the corresponding conclusions one can draw from your previous argument that all material things (neurons) cause human behavior, like the incitement of violence, anger, having properties and qualities of intellect and so on. Here are your simple 'categorical errors' :

All humans are sentient
All neuron's are in humans
Therefore, all neuron's are sentient

Hence, we can reasonably infer you have angry neuron's that are causing you to incite violence. No?
Er, no. The premises of your "argument" above are both false, the conclusion does not follow from them, and neither the premises nor the conclusion, nor your claim about "angry neurons" "can be inferred" from the proposition that neurons cause human behavior. Your statements above don't even qualify as an argument; it is just gibberish.
And they certainly are angry too :P
Enjoy your romp in the metaphysical weeds!
GE!

Sure. Be happy to go back to the Searle thread and copy/past your quote where you said material neuron's exclusively cause all human behavior. I understand your struggles with multitasking, so let's take one at a time and parse the last one first. Feel free to quickly correct your own premises so that we can draw some sort of a logical conclusion or inference to your argument (s).

1. Are you now claiming humans are not 'sentient'?
2. Are you now claiming material neuron's in themselves, do not cause human behavior?
3. And are you now claiming neuron's have no qualities of consciousness?

Of course, the cooresponding relationships to abstract numbers (Metaphysics) indeed are germane to our conciousness, and our cognitive perceptions of them.
“Concerning matter, we have been all wrong. What we have called matter is energy, whose vibration has been so lowered as to be perceptible to the senses. There is no matter.” "Spooky Action at a Distance"
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by Halc »

Commenting on a few early comments in the topic.
Whitedragon wrote: August 26th, 2022, 6:59 am If we take a notion of something that doesn't exist, example, no matter or energy might have existed in zero-t conditions, can we say that the E =mc^2 is zero for E and m, or are we prohibited from asigning a number value to something that doesn't exist, and what would this mean for c?
At the instant of the big bang, things are singular and E, m, and c are essentially undefined.
Energy/momentum/etc. are not conserved in an expanding metric, so one cannot say that the universe of shortly after the big bang had comparable values to today. It is also questionable if the total energy of the universe (sum of both positive and negative energies) is/was greater than zero, but if it is zero, would you subsequently say that it doesn't exist?
We say that t is zero in zero t. By this argument, does it mean time exists
Yes. Zero is just a sync point and can be assigned anywhere. I cannot buy into zero meaning nonexistence. One's altitude is zero at sea level, which doesn't mean that things at sea level don't have a location.
Pattern-chaser wrote: August 26th, 2022, 11:22 am To assign a number value, we must first have something to assign it to.
For instance, I don't buy this. We can assign 7 to the number of years one attends at Hogwarts despite the lack of existence of Hogwarts or pupils.
Pattern-chaser wrote: August 26th, 2022, 12:57 pmIf zero-t is 'before time', then all bets are off. What would that even mean?
Totally agree with this.

There might be physics on the other side of the big bang, but it seems unlikely that time or velocity or distance as we know them are meaningful there.
The Beast wrote: August 26th, 2022, 2:24 pmAxiom. Two objects cannot occupy the same space.
Seems to be at least in need of some constraints then. My liver and my torso occupy the same space. OK, that's arguably the same thing, one being a component of the other. But your axiom is also classical. In quantum mechanics, an object doesn't occupy space, it simply has a probability of being measured at various locations in space, and more than one object has a probability of being measured at any given location in space, which doesn't violate your classical axiom, but it sure gets close.
Whitedragon wrote: August 26th, 2022, 3:12 pmCan we create a universe?
This is a category error. Creation is something that occurs in time to an object, by rearranging existing energy/material into a new configuration. It implies something containing the material from which it is made, which contradicts most definitions of 'universe'.
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by 3017Metaphysician »

Halc wrote: September 1st, 2022, 8:30 pm Commenting on a few early comments in the topic.
Whitedragon wrote: August 26th, 2022, 6:59 am If we take a notion of something that doesn't exist, example, no matter or energy might have existed in zero-t conditions, can we say that the E =mc^2 is zero for E and m, or are we prohibited from asigning a number value to something that doesn't exist, and what would this mean for c?
At the instant of the big bang, things are singular and E, m, and c are essentially undefined.
Energy/momentum/etc. are not conserved in an expanding metric, so one cannot say that the universe of shortly after the big bang had comparable values to today. It is also questionable if the total energy of the universe (sum of both positive and negative energies) is/was greater than zero, but if it is zero, would you subsequently say that it doesn't exist?
We say that t is zero in zero t. By this argument, does it mean time exists
Yes. Zero is just a sync point and can be assigned anywhere. I cannot buy into zero meaning nonexistence. One's altitude is zero at sea level, which doesn't mean that things at sea level don't have a location.
Pattern-chaser wrote: August 26th, 2022, 11:22 am To assign a number value, we must first have something to assign it to.
For instance, I don't buy this. We can assign 7 to the number of years one attends at Hogwarts despite the lack of existence of Hogwarts or pupils.
Pattern-chaser wrote: August 26th, 2022, 12:57 pmIf zero-t is 'before time', then all bets are off. What would that even mean?
Totally agree with this.

There might be physics on the other side of the big bang, but it seems unlikely that time or velocity or distance as we know them are meaningful there.
The Beast wrote: August 26th, 2022, 2:24 pmAxiom. Two objects cannot occupy the same space.
Seems to be at least in need of some constraints then. My liver and my torso occupy the same space. OK, that's arguably the same thing, one being a component of the other. But your axiom is also classical. In quantum mechanics, an object doesn't occupy space, it simply has a probability of being measured at various locations in space, and more than one object has a probability of being measured at any given location in space, which doesn't violate your classical axiom, but it sure gets close.
Whitedragon wrote: August 26th, 2022, 3:12 pmCan we create a universe?
This is a category error. Creation is something that occurs in time to an object, by rearranging existing energy/material into a new configuration. It implies something containing the material from which it is made, which contradicts most definitions of 'universe'.
Halc!

Indeed. Obviously the practice of civil engineering would support your claim that's zero sea level is something, and not nothing. Others (like GE), with respect to the nature of existing things (Metaphysics ) and numbers, have erroneously suggested that the number zero is a 'non-existent' (for whatever that's supposed to mean) :P

Appreciate your insight.
“Concerning matter, we have been all wrong. What we have called matter is energy, whose vibration has been so lowered as to be perceptible to the senses. There is no matter.” "Spooky Action at a Distance"
― Albert Einstein
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Consul
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by Consul »

Halc wrote: September 1st, 2022, 8:30 pm
Pattern-chaser wrote: August 26th, 2022, 11:22 am To assign a number value, we must first have something to assign it to.
For instance, I don't buy this. We can assign 7 to the number of years one attends at Hogwarts despite the lack of existence of Hogwarts or pupils.
Unless existence is built into the concept of somethingness by definition, "…we must first have something to assign it to" is ambiguous between "…we must first have something existent to assign it to" and "…we must first have something existent or nonexistent to assign it to".

Given the distinction between nonlinguistic numbers and linguistic numerals (numerical symbols), we can certainly use the latter meaningfully in statements about fictional states of affairs such as "Students attend Hogwarts for seven years". (I read that Harry Potter and his two best friends didn't do so, because they blew off their senior year.) The interesting question is whether statements such as this one are true; and if they are, what makes them true given that Hogwarts and its students don't exist?
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 8:59 pmGiven the distinction between nonlinguistic numbers and linguistic numerals (numerical symbols), we can certainly use the latter meaningfully in statements about fictional states of affairs such as "Students attend Hogwarts for seven years". (I read that Harry Potter and his two best friends didn't do so, because they blew off their senior year.) The interesting question is whether statements such as this one are true; and if they are, what makes them true given that Hogwarts and its students don't exist?
We can easily get a true statement by adding the following prefix: "According to the Harry Potter stories, students attend Hogwarts for seven years." But the question is whether the statement "Students attend Hogwarts for seven years" alone is true.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Assigning number values to none existent things

Post by GE Morton »

Consul wrote: September 1st, 2022, 7:55 pm
No, my denial that fictional existence is a form of existence doesn't presuppose that all entities or realities are physical ones.

No, what exists only according to some fiction exists in no sense (of "to exist"). Fictional objects are nothing but nonexistent objects of thought or imagination, and there is nothing self-contradictory about saying so.
Think that through. If objects of thought don't exist, then of what are we speaking? By acknowledging or postulating an "object of thought" you per force assert its existence. You can say that nothing satisfying its description exists in the "external world" or within the scope of the laws of physics, but not that it "doesn't exist in any sense."
No, it is not the case that "anything we can denote with a term and usefully communicate about exists," because many things we meaningfully think or talk about, mention or refer to have no form of being, existence, or reality whatsoever. They are just not there, being nowhere and nowhen!
Of course they are somewhere --- wherever and whenever we think about them or talk about them. Do you really want to say thoughts, ideas, etc., don't exist?
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