Materialism is nonsensical

[Consul]

If by an "all-inclusive theory of Materialism" you mean the theory that nothing exists except material entities and processes, then you'd be right; what I'd said would not be consistent with such a theory. But I'm not an exponent of an "all-inclusive theory of Materialism," so understood. There are all kinds of non-material existents, notably experiential phenomena. Indeed, in a sound ontology those phenomena, not material entities, are the "first order realities." I'm a "theoretical monist/materialist," i.e., one who holds that materialist theory adequately explains phenomena --- not one who holds that material existents are the only existents there are.

George Berkeley uses "materialism" to refer to the doctrine that matter or material substance exists, which is different from the reductionist/eliminativist doctrine that only matter or material substance exists. Immaterialism is the contrary doctrine (defended by Berkeley) that matter or material substance does not exist. In Berkeley's sense of the term, substance dualists are materialists, and materialism is compatible with abstractism (the doctrine that there are abstract immaterial entities).

A contemporary of Berkeley, Christian Wolff, defines materialism more narrowly:

"Materialistae dicuntur philosophi, qui tantummodo entia materialia, sive corpora existere affirmant."
—
"Those philosophers are called materialists who affirm only the existence of material entities or bodies."

(Wolff, Christian. Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata…. Frankfurt, 1734. p. 24, §33)

Thus defined, materialism excludes both substance dualism and abstractism.

I take "material" to refer to entities which have mass and a definite spatial "footprint" (but not a definite temporal footprint. Nothing prevents an undisturbed material entity from existing eternally).
Things non-material are any things X denotable and distinguishable from things not-X which do not satisfy the above definition of "material."

You may distinguish between material physical entities and immaterial physical entities; but calling photons immaterial is misleading in the debate materialism vs. antimaterialism, because nobody thinks contemporary materialism is refuted by the existence of photons.

There are no "metaphysical" entities, substances, processes, events, etc., BTW. Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy concerned with clarifying fundamental concepts. It is not an adjective applicable to things, material or non-material.

Metaphysics is not to be equated with hyperphysics! The adjective "metaphysical" can mean "of or relating to the part of philosophy called metaphysics", and it can mean "hyperphysical" in the sense of "above or beyond what is physical, nonphysical, supernatural". Substance spiritualists (à la Berkeley), substance dualists, non-naturalistic property dualists, and abstractists all believe in the existence of hyperphysical entities.

[Consul]

It should have been sufficiently clear for quite a while that I am using "object" (or "thing") in the narrow ontological sense, in which it is neither true that anything whatever is an object (or thing), nor that "object" is synonymous with "object of perception/imagination/cogitation/…". So to call something an object in the narrow ontological sense is to say that it belongs to a particular non-all-encompassing ontological category. Of course, speaking or thinking of nonexistent objects doesn't entail any ontological commitment to them.
…
It's very unfortunate that the words "object" and "thing" are used in two extremely different ontological senses, which circumstance causes confusion and misunderstanding. I'd love to have an unequivocal special term for the intended narrow ontological category whose closest relative is "substance", but I haven't yet succeeded in finding a suitable one.

For example, the term "individual" ("individuum") may seem suitable at first glance, but if properties aren't universals but particulars, they count as individuals without being objects or things (in the narrow ontological sense). Morever, some philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and Peter Strawson use the noun "individual" in the broadest ontological sense; so there is still the same problem of one ontological term being used in two extremely different senses.

Objects in the narrow ontological sense are (individual) subjects in the original ontological (and non-psychological, or not exclusively psychological) sense of "subject", in which it is used synonymously with "substance" or "substratum". In this sense, objects are fundamental, final individual subjects of attributes (properties or relations).

"Objects, i.e., the non-attribute subjects of attributes."

(Mertz, D. W. On the Elements of Ontology: Attribute Instances and Structure. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016. p. 73)

[Consul]

Objects in the narrow ontological sense are (individual) subjects in the original ontological (and non-psychological, or not exclusively psychological) sense of "subject", in which it is used synonymously with "substance" or "substratum". In this sense, objects are fundamental, final individual subjects of attributes (properties or relations).

Objects qua subjects fall under sortal concepts expressed by count nouns (e.g. "cat", "dog"), so they are countable.

What about nominalism about attributes, according to which there are concepts or predicates, but no attributes?
If attribute nominalism is true, then objects aren't subjects of attributes, but only subjects of concepts or predicates. Attribute nominalists do not deny that objects fall under concepts, or that predicates are true of them, but merely that those concepts or predicates represent real attributes.

There is also a set-theoretic reductionism about attributes, according to which properties or relations exist, but they are sets of objects or, in the case of relations, of n-tuples of objects. For example, the property of being a dog is the set of all dogs, and having the property of being a dog means being a member of the set of dogs; so subjecthood is equated with set membership.

[Consul]

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy concerned with clarifying fundamental concepts.

Analyzing and clarifying (fundamental) concepts is certainly part of doing metaphysics/ontology; but (fundamental) concepts aren't its (primary) subject matter, because its (primary) subject matter is existence or reality (itself) rather than our conceptual representations of it. Metaphysics isn't linguistics, and ontology isn't psychology!

[GE Morton]

Of course their complexity implies that the analysis is difficult to carry out, but it is more than that. Chance, randomness, is involved, and the best way to explain such systems is using indeterministic models. In indeterministic models, the concept of linear causation of non-stochastic, deterministic systems, simply doesn't apply.

What you're saying here is that discrete-time random processes cannot exist, but that would invalidate the existence of Markov chains, which are well-established in scientific literature:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete- ... rkov_chain
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov_chain

• The Markov property states that the conditional probability distribution for the system at the next step (and in fact at all future steps) depends only on the current state of the system, and not additionally on the state of the system at previous steps.

That argument is circular, because to say that an event is random is to say nothing more than that it is unpredictable. But it is only unpredictable because we can't specify its cause. That inability doesn't entail that it has no cause. "Randomness" and "random processes" are not causal phenomena. Nor are they substitutes or alternatives for causes; they are just admissions that we don't know what caused the event. When we don't we rely on statistical approximations, such as Markov analyses.

BTW, in deterministic models only the current state of the system determines the succeeding state. The effects of all previous states are embodied in the current state.

Sure, no one says we should not study things making simplified models and reducing the set of variables, most of the time that's all we can do. The problem is to make the actual operation of those systems reducible to those variables. Good research is being done when we find a link between physical stimuli of neurons and some type of conscious phenomena, and there's no reason to doubt that the neural networks are involved in conscious processes, but when one says "the neural networks are the cause of the conscious process", one is conveying the notion that it is a closed and deterministic system, which most likely it is not, or at least not describable in terms of linear causation models.

Conceiving consciousness as a "process" is somewhat misleading, as it suggests a series of sequential events resulting in some output, or product. But it is just a general term for denoting a plethora of more-or-less independent phenomenal effects and events. For many of those effects/events the deterministic model works very well. Not so well for others, because the variables are too numerous and hold their states too briefly.

[Consul]

Conceiving consciousness as a "process" is somewhat misleading, as it suggests a series of sequential events resulting in some output, or product. But it is just a general term for denoting a plethora of more-or-less independent phenomenal effects and events. For many of those effects/events the deterministic model works very well. Not so well for others, because the variables are too numerous and hold their states too briefly.

Nicholas Rescher distinguishes between…

QUOTE:
"Modes of process:

The key distinction between productive and transformative processes may be set out as follows:

* product-productive processes that produce actual products that can themselves be characterized as things or substances (for example, manufacturing processes that produce pencils or automobiles, seed germinations that produce plants)

* state-transformative processes that merely transform states of affairs in general, paving the way for further processes without issuing in particular things or states thereof (for example, windstorms or earthquakes).

This distinction is important for present purposes because process philosophy is characterized by its insistence on the fundamentality of transformative processes, with their potential detachment from substantial things."

(Rescher, Nicholas. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. New York: SUNY Press, 1996. p. 41)
:QUOTE

Consciousness qua process is a state-transformative process rather than a product-productive one.

[Belindi]

Conceiving consciousness as a "process" is somewhat misleading, as it suggests a series of sequential events resulting in some output, or product. But it is just a general term for denoting a plethora of more-or-less independent phenomenal effects and events. For many of those effects/events the deterministic model works very well. Not so well for others, because the variables are too numerous and hold their states too briefly.

Nicholas Rescher distinguishes between…

QUOTE:
"Modes of process:

The key distinction between productive and transformative processes may be set out as follows:

* product-productive processes that produce actual products that can themselves be characterized as things or substances (for example, manufacturing processes that produce pencils or automobiles, seed germinations that produce plants)

* state-transformative processes that merely transform states of affairs in general, paving the way for further processes without issuing in particular things or states thereof (for example, windstorms or earthquakes).

This distinction is important for present purposes because process philosophy is characterized by its insistence on the fundamentality of transformative processes, with their potential detachment from substantial things."

(Rescher, Nicholas. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. New York: SUNY Press, 1996. p. 41)
:QUOTE

Consciousness qua process is a state-transformative process rather than a product-productive one.

Can we differentiate between one state-transformative process and another without also at some stage of the regress posit a product- productive process?
For instance to take your example of a seed germination, or a seed's germinating, this 'event' did not happen unless the water event, the sunlight event, and the no-predator event also did not happen. The water event did not happen unless rain fell , the sunlight event did not happen if the seed was in deep shade, the no-predator event did not happen if a cat had killed the mouse. And so on. We must conclude that a) there is process and b) reification is part of the process.

Process itself is temporal and ceases when the view from eternity is applied at which juncture there is no differentiation between transformation and production.

[3017Metaphysician]

SB!


Using your logic, you are replacing God dunnit with Materialism dunnit.

Keep trying!

I suspect you have not paid attention to science, other than as some black-boxed bogey to "free thinkers". Anyone even vaguely familiar with science and the scientific method will say they don't know, not that "materialism dunnit", especially since the current physical laws break down a Planck time after the Big Bang.



Whatever, I think it is logical to imagine that all processes probably have a physical substrate. That's how things seem to work in this reality in which we live. It's frivolous to claim materialism to be "ridiculous".

Sure, there might be magic men hiding in outer or inner space, but there might also be flying spaghetti monsters. One can hypothesise freely, but one must also appreciate that it's guesswork at this stage. Further, material things are taken for granted. They are remarkable, especially the objects that we encounter. Most of reality is space, radiation, ethereal fields and dust so any object, even an asteroid, is very special.

The universe as revealed by science should not be treated as dull or substandard in any way. If one can drag one's attention away from human argy-bargy and human self-absorption and actually pay attention to nature - from the Earth's core to outer space - it is mind-boggling in almost every way imaginable. It seems a shame to paste a simian-style consciousness on to nature, which is basically self worship via a conduit IMO.

SB!

Gosh SB you may need an intervention here. Your disgruntlement is like a cancer on the human condition. I won't offer Einstein's theory about science and religion (the human condition) because it will only make you look bad, and that's not my intent. (BTW, some may not know how philosophically intuitive he really was-wish I could have met him.)

Essentially, you are replacing God dunnit with material-matter dunnit for some reason that only you can answer (you seem to default to this in other subject matter/discourse for some reason). It's not really difficult. For materialism to be completely successful, it needs to at the very least, demonstrate not only all of the relationships between mind and matter (causal interactions between quality and quantity/properties of the mind/inanimate to animate, and so on), but must demonstrate where material matter came from ex nihilo.

Think of it this way, if you are like Consul and you arbitrarily deny certain tenets of physical science, you are left with biology to make your case. At that point, all you have are genetically coded, complex instructions and chemicals that produce life from matter. That's at least one reason why you must demonstrate the nature of material existence. Because in that material existence itself, lies those instructions. Or said another way, in that hunk of matter you must find the seed that produces a human, or some other set of complex instructions that provide for evolutionary self-organized, self-directed propagation. Until then, materialism by itself, remains nonsensical. At best, it's a half-theory.

There's no getting around it... , is there? Feel free to prove me wrong.

What you claim is unrelated to Einstein's theories and ideas, so I would advise against co-opting him to support your points, because Einstein's work only undermines your unsubstantiated beliefs. Rather, you seem closer to Bohr's camp, although it's generally held today that Einstein won that debate.

No. Einstein certainly wasn't a "disgruntled" 'anti-theist' (as you seem to be) but that's okay, I'm not telling you what to believe or not believe. You just need to support your claim. (Sorry but you keep defaulting to this grudge thing.) And his metaphysical theories about science recognized the limitations thereto. But back to your 'materialism dunnit' thing, of course, the materialist' needs to explain everything in terms of material events. Hume had an issue with 'substance' and causation, as you may or may not know. And his sentiment was ironically similar to Davies' with respect to the clueless nature of it all, not to mention its arbitrariness. Nonetheless, Einstein only mirrored such sentiment:

The belief in an external world independent of the observing subject lies at the foundation of all natural science. However, since sense-perceptions only inform us about this external world, or physical reality, indirectly, it is only in a speculative way that it can be grasped by us. Consequently our conceptions of physical reality can never be final. We must always be ready to change these conceptions, i.e. the axiomatic basis of physics, in order to do justice to the facts of observation in the most complete way that is logically possible.

If you are claiming 'materialism dunnit', the burden is yours to explain all of material reality. Make the case that its exclusive existence is " logically possible", if you are able.


Materialism is already extraordinarily successful. You point to knowledge gaps, as if immediate success in all areas was the only test of an idea. Just because science is still being performed does not mean that it's failed. Theists make this mistake over and over, and no amount of correction ever seems to get it through to them that science is a work in progress, not a competing dogma to their religious beliefs.

Not sure why you are presenting that dichotomy, but as I say, I'll go with it, if you must. And so if you wish to argue against 'God dunnit', then you must substantiate your 'Materialism dunnit'. Or would you rather acquiesce to 'I don't really know'?

I note that theism has many more gaps than science, but you give them a free pass. Why? My guess is that theists tell you what you want to hear - that you will live forever.

Again, a 'disgruntlement' of some sort there. What kind of "gaps" are you referring to?

So, it is not me ignoring aspects of science, but you. Do not adopt beliefs without sufficient evidence - Science 101. You have not reached that benchmark. Materialism may ultimately turn out to be wrong, but it is clearly not "nonsensical", given the established evidence thus far. It's a fairly logical inference.

It is nonsensical as an exclusive attempt at explaining everything in terms of material events. Think of it this way, if we knew where matter came from, well, then you'd have some-thing! Otherwise we are back to talking trees... .

I remain open to new concepts and I don't consider myself to be a materialist, but I respect the concept because it is largely logical and reasonable, given the evidence. I have not seen better alternatives, but they may lie in the future.

Sure. I've always said it's about both quality and quantity. But as they say, not everything that counts can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts.

Otherwise, I agree with Davies:

1. The concept of [material] causation is not very well defined in fundamental physics. When it comes down to individual particles, what causes what doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense.
2. We don't know how to incorporate mental processes into our scientific descriptions of the world.


Please share any theories or philosophy that's germane, or make some case that your 'Materialism dunnit' is logically necessary in explaining everything, corresponding with all material events.

[GE Morton]

Consciousness qua process is a state-transformative process rather than a product-productive one.

Nah. It doesn't "transform" anything either.

[GE Morton]

Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy concerned with clarifying fundamental concepts.

Analyzing and clarifying (fundamental) concepts is certainly part of doing metaphysics/ontology; but (fundamental) concepts aren't its (primary) subject matter, because its (primary) subject matter is existence or reality (itself) rather than our conceptual representations of it. Metaphysics isn't linguistics, and ontology isn't psychology!

" . . . because its (primary) subject matter is existence or reality (itself) rather than our conceptual representations of it."

Nope. That is only the subject matter of some metaphysical theories. "Metaphysics" embraces those and other theories, all of which aim at clarifying such concepts as "existence," reality," "substance," etc. It's subject matter is the concepts denoted by those terms.

[GE Morton]

You may distinguish between material physical entities and immaterial physical entities; but calling photons immaterial is misleading in the debate materialism vs. antimaterialism, because nobody thinks contemporary materialism is refuted by the existence of photons.

Whether it is refuted depends upon how "materialism" is defined (per the alternatives you mention). Per my definition it is not refuted by the existence of photons. As covered earlier, I take "physicalism" to embrace all of the entities and forces contemplated by the physical sciences, which includes material entities and numerous non-material entities and phenomena. Most of these entities are theoretical constructs, and are "real" if postulating them confers some explanatory power upon the theory. The only entities (objects, states-of-affairs) we can deem "real" a priori, pre-theoretically, are experiential phenomena.

[Consul]

Consciousness qua process is a state-transformative process rather than a product-productive one.

Nah. It doesn't "transform" anything either.

Consciousness qua process is a series of changing conscious states.

QUOTE:
"Process should here be construed in pretty much the usual way — as a sequentially structured sequence of successive stages or phases. Three factors accordingly come to the fore:
1. That a process is a complex — a unity of distinct stages or phases. A process is always a matter of now this, now that.
2. That this complex has a certain temporal coherence and unity, and that processes accordingly have an ineliminably temporal dimension.
3. That a process has a structure, a formal generic format in virtue of which every concrete process is equipped with a shape or format."

(Nicholas Rescher: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum ... hilosophy/)

"A process is an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally. Such a process need not necessarily be a change in an individual thing or object but can simply relate to some aspect of the general 'condition of things'—for example, a change in the temperature or in the purchasing power of money."

(Rescher, Nicholas. Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. p. 22)

"A process is a series of changes with some sort of unity, or unifying principle, to it. Hence, 'process' is to 'change' or 'event', rather as 'syndrome' is to 'symptom'."

(The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 760)

"A process is a course of change with a direction and internal order, where one stage leads to the next."

(The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig London: Routledge, 2005. p. 851)

"Change in general may be defined as the variation of properties (whether of things or of regions of space) over time."

(The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig. London: Routledge, 2005. p. 122)

"Process. An occurrent entity that exists in time by occurring or happening, has temporal parts, and always depends on at least one independent continuant as participant."

(Arp, Robert, Barry Smith, and Andrew D. Spear. Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. p. 183)

"You could think of events and processes as state transitions. An object's coming to be in a particular state, the object's coming to possess a certain property, would be an event. Finally, a process would be a sequence of events."

(Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. p. 75)

"Process. A sequence of events."

(Blackburn, Simon. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 294)
:QUOTE

[3017Metaphysician]

Consciousness qua process is a state-transformative process rather than a product-productive one.

Nah. It doesn't "transform" anything either.

Consciousness qua process is a series of changing conscious states.

QUOTE:
"Process should here be construed in pretty much the usual way — as a sequentially structured sequence of successive stages or phases. Three factors accordingly come to the fore:
1. That a process is a complex — a unity of distinct stages or phases. A process is always a matter of now this, now that.
2. That this complex has a certain temporal coherence and unity, and that processes accordingly have an ineliminably temporal dimension.
3. That a process has a structure, a formal generic format in virtue of which every concrete process is equipped with a shape or format."

(Nicholas Rescher: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum ... hilosophy/)

"A process is an actual or possible occurrence that consists of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination: an orchestrated series of occurrences that are systematically linked to one another either causally or functionally. Such a process need not necessarily be a change in an individual thing or object but can simply relate to some aspect of the general 'condition of things'—for example, a change in the temperature or in the purchasing power of money."

(Rescher, Nicholas. Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. p. 22)

"A process is a series of changes with some sort of unity, or unifying principle, to it. Hence, 'process' is to 'change' or 'event', rather as 'syndrome' is to 'symptom'."

(The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, edited by Ted Honderich, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 760)

"A process is a course of change with a direction and internal order, where one stage leads to the next."

(The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig London: Routledge, 2005. p. 851)

"Change in general may be defined as the variation of properties (whether of things or of regions of space) over time."

(The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward Craig. London: Routledge, 2005. p. 122)

"Process. An occurrent entity that exists in time by occurring or happening, has temporal parts, and always depends on at least one independent continuant as participant."

(Arp, Robert, Barry Smith, and Andrew D. Spear. Building Ontologies with Basic Formal Ontology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015. p. 183)

"You could think of events and processes as state transitions. An object's coming to be in a particular state, the object's coming to possess a certain property, would be an event. Finally, a process would be a sequence of events."

(Heil, John. Philosophy of Mind: A Contemporary Introduction. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2013. p. 75)

"Process. A sequence of events."

(Blackburn, Simon. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 294)
:QUOTE

Good point. Being a big fan of process philosophy myself it is certainly consistent with the physical universe being in a constant state of flux. Along with brain states (one's constant flow of thoughts/stream of consciousness) of both quantity and quality, it corresponds nicely... .

[Consul]

" . . . because its (primary) subject matter is existence or reality (itself) rather than our conceptual representations of it."

Nope. That is only the subject matter of some metaphysical theories. "Metaphysics" embraces those and other theories, all of which aim at clarifying such concepts as "existence," reality," "substance," etc. It's subject matter is the concepts denoted by those terms.

Ontology (qua metaphysica generalis) is part of metaphysics, and—yes—ontologists deal with semantic questions concerning the meaning of the concepts of existence and reality; but their primary subject matter is the categorial nature and structure of existence/reality.

By the way, it's metametaphysics (metaontology) which deals with the question of the subject matter of metaphysics (or ontology).

QUOTE:
"Metametaphysics =df The study of the foundations and methodology of metaphysics.

Here, ‘metaphysics’ is understood to encompass ontology, so metametaphysics will also involve the study of the foundations and methodology of ontology. Accordingly, metaontology is to be understood as a subspecies of metametaphysics."

(Tahko, Tuomas E. An Introduction to Metametaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. p. 5)

"Metaphysics is concerned with the foundations of reality. It asks questions about the nature of the world, such as: Aside from concrete objects, are there also abstract objects like numbers and properties? Does every event have a cause? What is the nature of possibility and necessity? When do several things make up a single bigger thing? Do the past and future exist? And so on.
Metametaphysics is concerned with the foundations of metaphysics. It asks: Do the questions of metaphysics really have answers? If so, are these answers substantive or just a matter of how we use words? And what is the best procedure for arriving at them—common sense? Conceptual analysis? Or assessing competing hypotheses with quasi-scientific criteria?"

(Manley, David. "Introduction: A Guided Tour of Metametaphysics." In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David J. Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 1-37. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 1)
:QUOTE

[Consul]

Ontology (qua metaphysica generalis) is part of metaphysics, and—yes—ontologists deal with semantic questions concerning the meaning of the concepts of existence and reality; but their primary subject matter is the categorial nature and structure of existence/reality.

By the way, it's metametaphysics (metaontology) which deals with the question of the subject matter of metaphysics (or ontology).

By saying that the subject matter of metaphysics/ontology is the fundamental nature and structure of existence/reality (itself) rather than the fundamental nature and structure of our conceptual representations of existence/reality, I'm speaking from that metametaphysical/metaontological perspective which may be called Aristotelian (categorial) realism—as opposed to Kantian (categorial) conceptualism.

Brian Carr distinguishes between Aristotelian categorial realism and Kantian categorial conceptualism. The problem with the latter is that it psychologizes ontology, with categorial ontology thereby being replaced by categorial psychology: The study of categories of being or existential categories is replaced by the study of categories of thinking or representational categories, such that the subject matter of categoriology is no longer existence or reality (itself) but our thought about it.

QUOTE:
"Metaphysics, in its minimal form, is the activity of categorial description. Its subject matter is the most fundamental aspects of the way we think about and talk about reality, the most fundamental features of reality as it presents itself to us. We divide the world into horses and trains, people and mountains, battles and towns, and a whole complex structure of different things; our language is the repository of this enormously rich furnishing of the world. But we can discern within this richness some overall divisions, between things and their properties, for example, or between events and the times and places in which they happen, and it is with the overall pattern of our categorising of elements of the world that metaphysics concerns itself. The basic divisions which our thought and talk about reality entail are the quarry of categorial describers."
(p. 2)

"[T]he important thing for us now is to stress that Kant is not going beyond thought to reality to find his categories. They are the fundamental forms of thought, embedded in the forms of judgement. This puts Kant in stark opposition to Aristotle, for whom the categories, however identified, were natural, real divisions among things in the world. I will put this opposition by saying that Aristotle was a categorial realist whereas Kant was a categorial conceptualist. A categorial realist is someone who takes the categories, which he seeks to describe, as marking real kinds to be found in the things which collectively make up reality, and so takes categorial description as indistinguishable from (or at least an important part of) the grand traditional task of metaphysics. For the categorial conceptualist, the task is to describe the fundamental features of our conceptual scheme, of our thought and talk about reality, with no assumption made about the way reality exists independently of that manner of thinking and talking."
(p. 6)

(Carr, Brian. Metaphysics: An Introduction. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987.)
:QUOTE