Free Will: What Does it Mean and Signify for Moral Responsibility?

[GE Morton]

Well, the doctrine of modern philosophy is that the two terms are not interchangeable. Ethics recognizes the naturalistic fallacy, previously called Hume's guillotine or half a dozen other things, and 'inner virtues' as unprovable premises not worth arguing about in normative ethics, because theu are based on beliefs that can reach no final conclusion on necessary truth without assuming some religious foundation.

Who expresses or promotes that "doctrine"?

The two terms have been interchangeable throughout the history of philosophy. Aristotle's work on the topic is entitled, Nichomachean Ethics; Spinoza's Ethics; Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, etc. As many others titled their works with morals, e.g., Kant (Metaphysics of Morals); Bentham (Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation); William James (The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life); John Dewey (Reconstruction in Moral Conceptions), etc.

There is some distinction between the concepts in popular discussions, with "morals" or "morality" referring to personal behavior, and "ethics" reserved for codified rules governing specific activities, e.g., legal ethics, medical ethics, business ethics, etc.

The subject matter has always been a conceptual mess, however, due in large part to conflating or confusing ethics (moral principles and rules (deontology) with the theory of value (axiology). Those are two different subjects with only a tenuous relationship between them.

[ernestm]

Well, the doctrine of modern philosophy is that the two terms are not interchangeable. Ethics recognizes the naturalistic fallacy, previously called Hume's guillotine or half a dozen other things, and 'inner virtues' as unprovable premises not worth arguing about in normative ethics, because theu are based on beliefs that can reach no final conclusion on necessary truth without assuming some religious foundation.

Who expresses or promotes that "doctrine"?

The two terms have been interchangeable throughout the history of philosophy. Aristotle's work on the topic is entitled, Nichomachean Ethics; Spinoza's Ethics; Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics; G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, etc. As many others titled their works with morals, e.g., Kant (Metaphysics of Morals); Bentham (Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation); William James (The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life); John Dewey (Reconstruction in Moral Conceptions), etc.

There is some distinction between the concepts in popular discussions, with "morals" or "morality" referring to personal behavior, and "ethics" reserved for codified rules governing specific activities, e.g., legal ethics, medical ethics, business ethics, etc.

The subject matter has always been a conceptual mess, however, due in large part to conflating or confusing ethics (moral principles and rules (deontology) with the theory of value (axiology). Those are two different subjects with only a tenuous relationship between them.

Moore was the origin of the new paradigm. What you call the 'popular' position is the accepted position in modern philosophy, which now regards philosophers prior to Moore archaic. That's not to say ethics doesn't acknwoledge Aristotle and Kant coudl be right, and there are some very interesting books on neo-Aristotleianism that restate Aristotle in modern terms. Such positions are included in the ethical domain as 'normative ethics, the opposition of which is descriptive ethics. One might note that distinction isn't new either, it derives from Hume.' The point is, Hume's guillotine is rather established as unavoidable now, but Moore allows truth evaluation of ethical statements regardless.

[GE Morton]

Moore was the origin of the new paradigm. What you call the 'popular' position is the accepted position in modern philosophy, which now regards philosophers prior to Moore archaic.

Again, accepted by whom?

That's not to say ethics doesn't acknwoledge Aristotle and Kant coudl be right, and there are some very interesting books on neo-Aristotleianism that restate Aristotle in modern terms. Such positions are included in the ethical domain as 'normative ethics, the opposition of which is descriptive ethics.

"Descriptive ethics" is what anthropologists do, not philosophers.

"Normative Ethics or Prescriptive Ethics: the study of moral problems which seeks to discover how one ought to act, not how one does in fact act or how one thinks one should act."

https://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/types.html

(Note how he describes normative ethics as "the study of moral problems").

One might note that distinction isn't new either, it derives from Hume.' The point is, Hume's guillotine is rather established as unavoidable now, but Moore allows truth evaluation of ethical statements regardless.

What Moore was doing is metaethics --- and doing it badly. "Good" or "goodness" is not a "non-natural primitive property." It is not a property at all, of anything. It is a pseudo-property --- a term denoting some external fact about a thing that we transform verbally into a property of the thing. In the case of "good," the fact that someone desires or approves of the thing so described, or finds it useful for some purpose of his. It is a purely subjective term denoting that relation between a person and the thing.

[ernestm]

Moore was the origin of the new paradigm. What you call the 'popular' position is the accepted position in modern philosophy, which now regards philosophers prior to Moore archaic.

Again, accepted by whom?

That's not to say ethics doesn't acknwoledge Aristotle and Kant coudl be right, and there are some very interesting books on neo-Aristotleianism that restate Aristotle in modern terms. Such positions are included in the ethical domain as 'normative ethics, the opposition of which is descriptive ethics.

"Descriptive ethics" is what anthropologists do, not philosophers.

"Normative Ethics or Prescriptive Ethics: the study of moral problems which seeks to discover how one ought to act, not how one does in fact act or how one thinks one should act."

https://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/types.html

(Note how he describes normative ethics as "the study of moral problems").

One might note that distinction isn't new either, it derives from Hume.' The point is, Hume's guillotine is rather established as unavoidable now, but Moore allows truth evaluation of ethical statements regardless.

What Moore was doing is metaethics --- and doing it badly. "Good" or "goodness" is not a "non-natural primitive property." It is not a property at all, of anything. It is a pseudo-property --- a term denoting some external fact about a thing that we transform verbally into a property of the thing. In the case of "good," the fact that someone desires or approves of the thing so described, or finds it useful for some purpose of his. It is a purely subjective term denoting that relation between a person and the thing.

The point is, descriptive ethics can still be evaluated by formal logic, because it is based on rules, so you are incorrect to state it is not part of philosophy.

I see you are very good at finding quotes to substantiate your perspective, but what you reveai in your statements is that you've learned philosophy by accepting other opinions as truth because you read them, rather than actually understand it yourself. The same is true of your statements on intelligent design, so I will clarify this.

If you wanted to challenge my statement, the first thing you would say is that Kant did not invent the argument. The teleological argument for God's existence goes back to Epictectus and Cicero, and during empirical philosophy was advocated as 'the watchmnaker analogy' by Paley, In the 1980s, YECs knowing that people don't read theology any more did a con game and tried to pretend they made up the term intelligent design. You'll see all types of crap about what they claimed on Wikipedia.

The issue of 'disposition' still exists scientifically because there is not sufficient evidence that some complex strutures could evolve by chance. You can spend alot of time arguing about it, but the point is, it remains a statistical evaluation determined by belief and is not resolvable by science or philosophy.

[GE Morton]

The point is, descriptive ethics can still be evaluated by formal logic, because it is based on rules, so you are incorrect to state it is not part of philosophy.

Oh? How? "Descriptive ethics" is an empirical pursuit, an inventory and characterization of the moral rules prevalent in a given culture or other group, usually along with some theorizing about how they evolved in that group. It is sociology.

I see you are very good at finding quotes to substantiate your perspective, but what you reveai in your statements is that you've learned philosophy by accepting other opinions as truth because you read them, rather than actually understand it yourself.

Well, I learned philosophy by pursuing degrees in it. But what are you suggesting I don't understand?

The same is true of your statements on intelligent design, so I will clarify this.

If you wanted to challenge my statement, the first thing you would say is that Kant did not invent the argument.

That is off-topic in this thread.

[Sculptor1]

Free Will and Determinism do not change a thing.
They have no relevance to moral responsibility.

Determinists punish the person to deter, and incarcerate to cause change and seek solutions to recidivism.

Free will believers punish and incarcerate people who willfully and free chose to become criminals, to keep them from their liberty.

The only difference might be that determinists believe in causation and therefore rehabilitation and "correctionalism"; whereas free willers are more likely to consider criminals as willfully unreformable.

[ernestm]

The point is, descriptive ethics can still be evaluated by formal logic, because it is based on rules, so you are incorrect to state it is not part of philosophy.

Oh? How? "Descriptive ethics" is an empirical pursuit, an inventory and characterization of the moral rules prevalent in a given culture or other group, usually along with some theorizing about how they evolved in that group. It is sociology.

I see you are very good at finding quotes to substantiate your perspective, but what you reveai in your statements is that you've learned philosophy by accepting other opinions as truth because you read them, rather than actually understand it yourself.

Well, I learned philosophy by pursuing degrees in it. But what are you suggesting I don't understand?

The same is true of your statements on intelligent design, so I will clarify this.

If you wanted to challenge my statement, the first thing you would say is that Kant did not invent the argument.

That is off-topic in this thread.

Because by definition, descriptive ethics define rules. Therefore, one can evaluate whether any action is in accordance with the rules or not with formal logic.

Have you actually studied formal logic ?

[GE Morton]

Because by definition, descriptive ethics define rules. Therefore, one can evaluate whether any action is in accordance with the rules or not with formal logic.

Whether an action accords with a rule or does not --- e.g., whether a driver is speeding (exceeding the speed limit) --- is an empirical question, not a logical one.

[Gertie]

I have often wondered about this ever since I wrote an essay at school on the question, are criminals born or made? To some extent, it involves the nature vs nurture debate alongside the issue of free will. Genes may be significant and hormones, alongside psychosocial aspects of life. Certain experiences, like trauma may lead to post traumatic stress disorder, as some 'damage.

However, the question of free will fits into this and, I have been reflecting on this after reading, 'Free Will', by Sam Harris (2012). He states,
'There is no question what human beings can imagine and plan for the future, weigh competing desires, etc. and losing this would greatly diminish this. External and internal pressures of various kinds can be present while a person plans and acts_ and such pressures determine our sense of whether he is morally responsible for his his behaviour. However, these factors have nothing to do with free will.'
This strikes me as a tricky area of how to view moral action?

So, I am wondering about the connection between free will and moral agency. I am posting it in the general philosophy section because it is about free will rather than simply about ethics and morality. The issue of free will is complex and Harris argues that it is abstract, saying,
'In the philosophical literature, one finds three approaches. Both determinism and libertarianism hold that if our behaviour is fully determined by background causes, free will is an illusion....Determinists believe that we live in such a world, while libertarians(no relation to the political philosophy that goes by its name) imagine that human agency can rise above the plane of physical causation'.

I find this issue difficult in terms of the nature of reflective agency and where the issue of moral responsibility fits into this. On one hand, it may be hard to see human beings as victims of circumstances but it is complex, because human agency arises in the context of those circumstances and the mental states which correspond. Any thoughts?

I think the first bridge we have to cross in understanding if free will exists, and what it might actually mean, lies in understanding the mind-body relationship. 

Unfortunately we don't understand it.  So we're left with what seems to make most sense bearing in mind that limitation. 

There are arguments I find compelling on both sides about whether free will can exist. 

Against free will is the issue of over-determinism.  If the physical processes of our brains truely correlate with our experiential states, and if the physical processes alone can fully account for our behaviour, there doesn't seem to any room for mental choice or causation.

On the other hand, the functional correspondence of our experiential states in terms of utility are the sort of fit you'd expect to see if we did have mental agency.  From our basic mental reward system which motivates us to stay alive and maintain homeostasis, to the ability to conceptualise abstractly, imagine consequences, weigh up pros and cons, plan, prioritise, control impulses and so on.  Can it be mere epiphenomenal coincidence that our conscious experience looks incredibly useful?  Seems unlikely to me.

Those two both look like knock out arguments, but appear to contradict each other, so I don't know if they get us any further.

Regardless, the thing is there's no real option of just switching off/ignoring  your conscious experience and becoming an  epiphenomenal passenger waiting for your physical brain to do stuff.  In day to day life you have to at least act as if you have choice and agency.   At that point you can take into account how much freedom psychological factors leave open, if any.  As you say, genes, hormones and life experience will factor into our psychology (mirrored by patterns of neural connectivity, some of which will manifest as conscious experience, and some will remain unconscious, but might still play a part in our behaviour and choices, in a 'sub-conscious' way).

The conscious part we at least feel we have some agency over, and that has moral connotations. A responsibility to try to do the right thing. Bearing in mind, as you say, that moral culpability can be complicated in terms of the underlying influences at play.

[ernestm]

Because by definition, descriptive ethics define rules. Therefore, one can evaluate whether any action is in accordance with the rules or not with formal logic.

Whether an action accords with a rule or does not --- e.g., whether a driver is speeding (exceeding the speed limit) --- is an empirical question, not a logical one.

So no empirical observations are available to evaluation by formal logic.

That's just about the most insane thing Ive read here, which is saying alot, considering you claim to have studied it in college. I have no idea how to respond to that, sorry.

[GE Morton]

Against free will is the issue of over-determinism.  If the physical processes of our brains truely correlate with our experiential states, and if the physical processes alone can fully account for our behaviour, there doesn't seem to any room for mental choice or causation.

On the other hand, the functional correspondence of our experiential states in terms of utility are the sort of fit you'd expect to see if we did have mental agency.  From our basic mental reward system which motivates us to stay alive and maintain homeostasis, to the ability to conceptualise abstractly, imagine consequences, weigh up pros and cons, plan, prioritise, control impulses and so on.  Can it be mere epiphenomenal coincidence that our conscious experience looks incredibly useful?  Seems unlikely to me.

If the correlation/correspondence of neural states and experiential states is tight enough, dependable enough, then it does no harm to say the mental state caused the action, because the experiential state implies the neural state. Moreover, it is informative to do so ---- because we have no immediate information about the underlying neural state, even our own. Saying, "I ordered a pizza because I felt hungry" is the only way we have of communicating to someone why we ordered the pizza. That feeling of hunger didn't cause the action, but it consistently parallels and represents the bodily and neural processes which did.

Regardless, the thing is there's no real option of just switching off/ignoring  your conscious experience and becoming an  epiphenomenal passenger waiting for your physical brain to do stuff.  In day to day life you have to at least act as if you have choice and agency. 

YOU still do have a choice --- YOU are both physical and mental. That organism made the choice. Whether we ascribe the act to the mental or physical aspect is irrelevant to questions of moral responsibility.

Good post!

[Gertie]

Against free will is the issue of over-determinism.  If the physical processes of our brains truely correlate with our experiential states, and if the physical processes alone can fully account for our behaviour, there doesn't seem to any room for mental choice or causation.

On the other hand, the functional correspondence of our experiential states in terms of utility are the sort of fit you'd expect to see if we did have mental agency.  From our basic mental reward system which motivates us to stay alive and maintain homeostasis, to the ability to conceptualise abstractly, imagine consequences, weigh up pros and cons, plan, prioritise, control impulses and so on.  Can it be mere epiphenomenal coincidence that our conscious experience looks incredibly useful?  Seems unlikely to me.

If the correlation/correspondence of neural states and experiential states is tight enough, dependable enough, then it does no harm to say the mental state caused the action, because the experiential state implies the neural state. Moreover, it is informative to do so ---- because we have no immediate information about the underlying neural state, even our own. Saying, "I ordered a pizza because I felt hungry" is the only way we have of communicating to someone why we ordered the pizza. That feeling of hunger didn't cause the action, but it consistently parallels and represents the bodily and neural processes which did.

Regardless, the thing is there's no real option of just switching off/ignoring  your conscious experience and becoming an  epiphenomenal passenger waiting for your physical brain to do stuff.  In day to day life you have to at least act as if you have choice and agency. 

YOU still do have a choice --- YOU are both physical and mental. That organism made the choice. Whether we ascribe the act to the mental or physical aspect is irrelevant to questions of moral responsibility.

Good post!

Thanks GE. Yeah the monist approach solves a lot of probs.

[3017Metaphysician]

I have often wondered about this ever since I wrote an essay at school on the question, are criminals born or made? To some extent, it involves the nature vs nurture debate alongside the issue of free will. Genes may be significant and hormones, alongside psychosocial aspects of life. Certain experiences, like trauma may lead to post traumatic stress disorder, as some 'damage.

However, the question of free will fits into this and, I have been reflecting on this after reading, 'Free Will', by Sam Harris (2012). He states,
'There is no question what human beings can imagine and plan for the future, weigh competing desires, etc. and losing this would greatly diminish this. External and internal pressures of various kinds can be present while a person plans and acts_ and such pressures determine our sense of whether he is morally responsible for his his behaviour. However, these factors have nothing to do with free will.'
This strikes me as a tricky area of how to view moral action?

So, I am wondering about the connection between free will and moral agency. I am posting it in the general philosophy section because it is about free will rather than simply about ethics and morality. The issue of free will is complex and Harris argues that it is abstract, saying,
'In the philosophical literature, one finds three approaches. Both determinism and libertarianism hold that if our behaviour is fully determined by background causes, free will is an illusion....Determinists believe that we live in such a world, while libertarians(no relation to the political philosophy that goes by its name) imagine that human agency can rise above the plane of physical causation'.

I find this issue difficult in terms of the nature of reflective agency and where the issue of moral responsibility fits into this. On one hand, it may be hard to see human beings as victims of circumstances but it is complex, because human agency arises in the context of those circumstances and the mental states which correspond. Any thoughts?

At the risk of redundancy, this vid not only offers the 101, but briefly describes the materialist/determinist nonsense about molecules having Agency. I think GE subscribes to that nonsense, as somehow, he thinks neurons are determined 'thingies' causing all human behavior. Certainly, as physicist Carrol alludes, the metaphysical qualities of the Will itself, is much more than simply a collection of atoms and molecules... !!

[JackDaydream]

I have often wondered about this ever since I wrote an essay at school on the question, are criminals born or made? To some extent, it involves the nature vs nurture debate alongside the issue of free will. Genes may be significant and hormones, alongside psychosocial aspects of life. Certain experiences, like trauma may lead to post traumatic stress disorder, as some 'damage.

However, the question of free will fits into this and, I have been reflecting on this after reading, 'Free Will', by Sam Harris (2012). He states,
'There is no question what human beings can imagine and plan for the future, weigh competing desires, etc. and losing this would greatly diminish this. External and internal pressures of various kinds can be present while a person plans and acts_ and such pressures determine our sense of whether he is morally responsible for his his behaviour. However, these factors have nothing to do with free will.'
This strikes me as a tricky area of how to view moral action?

So, I am wondering about the connection between free will and moral agency. I am posting it in the general philosophy section because it is about free will rather than simply about ethics and morality. The issue of free will is complex and Harris argues that it is abstract, saying,
'In the philosophical literature, one finds three approaches. Both determinism and libertarianism hold that if our behaviour is fully determined by background causes, free will is an illusion....Determinists believe that we live in such a world, while libertarians(no relation to the political philosophy that goes by its name) imagine that human agency can rise above the plane of physical causation'.

I find this issue difficult in terms of the nature of reflective agency and where the issue of moral responsibility fits into this. On one hand, it may be hard to see human beings as victims of circumstances but it is complex, because human agency arises in the context of those circumstances and the mental states which correspond. Any thoughts?

At the risk of redundancy, this vid not only offers the 101, but briefly describes the materialist/determinist nonsense about molecules having Agency. I think GE subscribes to that nonsense, as somehow, he thinks neurons are determined 'thingies' causing all human behavior. Certainly, as physicist Carrol alludes, the metaphysical qualities of the Will itself, is much more than simply a collection of atoms and molecules... !!

It is possible that many people gloss over the nature of will in itself as the underlying aspect of motivation and purpose. It is interconnected with consciousness in its expression on the level of instinct in many sentient forms of life. The greater the degree of consciousness may give rise to a greater level of free will. Of course, the human being is not separate from other aspects of life and the environment but consciousness gives rise to reflective awareness which means having a more active role in the causal processes.

Julian Jaynes in his understanding points to visual representations initially, and language as significant in the development of culture and consciousness. Even though Dennett may not admit to the role of reflective consciousness he does point to the role of language in thinking. As far as I see, it is language which gives the potential for understanding and knowledge of one's own will and motivation, including aspects of subconscious choices.

The idea of the conscious and the subconscious are often ignored in favour of neuroscience. This may be because it is easier to measure these physically than the constituents of other models of the mind. Even though neurons involve chemical messages in the brain these are parts within systems. They may be altered by medication and are also influenced by how people interpret experiences in emotional life.

The cognitive behavioral psychologists recognise the role of beliefs in emotional experiences and behaviour. CBT in its approach recognises the potential to understand aspects of thinking which allows for modification of experience and a greater sense of agency The understanding of motivation and aspects is interconnected with intentionality, Cognitive behavioral science may come together with the phenomenological tradition of perception. Somehow, all these approaches, including physics may be blended together in understanding of how systems work and how human beings exist as parts of larger systems, but with a greater freedom of agency of influence through self awareness based on reflection.

[3017Metaphysician]

I have often wondered about this ever since I wrote an essay at school on the question, are criminals born or made? To some extent, it involves the nature vs nurture debate alongside the issue of free will. Genes may be significant and hormones, alongside psychosocial aspects of life. Certain experiences, like trauma may lead to post traumatic stress disorder, as some 'damage.

However, the question of free will fits into this and, I have been reflecting on this after reading, 'Free Will', by Sam Harris (2012). He states,
'There is no question what human beings can imagine and plan for the future, weigh competing desires, etc. and losing this would greatly diminish this. External and internal pressures of various kinds can be present while a person plans and acts_ and such pressures determine our sense of whether he is morally responsible for his his behaviour. However, these factors have nothing to do with free will.'
This strikes me as a tricky area of how to view moral action?

So, I am wondering about the connection between free will and moral agency. I am posting it in the general philosophy section because it is about free will rather than simply about ethics and morality. The issue of free will is complex and Harris argues that it is abstract, saying,
'In the philosophical literature, one finds three approaches. Both determinism and libertarianism hold that if our behaviour is fully determined by background causes, free will is an illusion....Determinists believe that we live in such a world, while libertarians(no relation to the political philosophy that goes by its name) imagine that human agency can rise above the plane of physical causation'.

I find this issue difficult in terms of the nature of reflective agency and where the issue of moral responsibility fits into this. On one hand, it may be hard to see human beings as victims of circumstances but it is complex, because human agency arises in the context of those circumstances and the mental states which correspond. Any thoughts?

At the risk of redundancy, this vid not only offers the 101, but briefly describes the materialist/determinist nonsense about molecules having Agency. I think GE subscribes to that nonsense, as somehow, he thinks neurons are determined 'thingies' causing all human behavior. Certainly, as physicist Carrol alludes, the metaphysical qualities of the Will itself, is much more than simply a collection of atoms and molecules... !!

It is possible that many people gloss over the nature of will in itself as the underlying aspect of motivation and purpose. It is interconnected with consciousness in its expression on the level of instinct in many sentient forms of life. The greater the degree of consciousness may give rise to a greater level of free will. Of course, the human being is not separate from other aspects of life and the environment but consciousness gives rise to reflective awareness which means having a more active role in the causal processes.

Julian Jaynes in his understanding points to visual representations initially, and language as significant in the development of culture and consciousness. Even though Dennett may not admit to the role of reflective consciousness he does point to the role of language in thinking. As far as I see, it is language which gives the potential for understanding and knowledge of one's own will and motivation, including aspects of subconscious choices.

The idea of the conscious and the subconscious are often ignored in favour of neuroscience. This may be because it is easier to measure these physically than the constituents of other models of the mind. Even though neurons involve chemical messages in the brain these are parts within systems. They may be altered by medication and are also influenced by how people interpret experiences in emotional life.

The cognitive behavioral psychologists recognise the role of beliefs in emotional experiences and behaviour. CBT in its approach recognises the potential to understand aspects of thinking which allows for modification of experience and a greater sense of agency The understanding of motivation and aspects is interconnected with intentionality, Cognitive behavioral science may come together with the phenomenological tradition of perception. Somehow, all these approaches, including physics may be blended together in understanding of how systems work and how human beings exist as parts of larger systems, but with a greater freedom of agency of influence through self awareness based on reflection.

Indeed neural activity does not correspond to neurons having self-awareness. Self-organization yes, self-awareness no. Hence the questions about where, how, who, when and why the information narrative exists as only being part of a matter narrative. Considering things that are innate and a priori like intuition and instinct, the answer is surely all part of that binary system (physical/metaphysical, conscious/subconscious, left brain/right brain, etc.). A complex binary system of two opposing things (Carrol reiterates that) yet dependent on each other for its existence.

So we are left with both/and, not either/or. All we can parse is its primacy. Accordingly, within the framework of living life, and cause and effect, we know that the qualitative properties of the (perceived freedom of) Will takes primacy. It causes us to do stuff. And those properties are both quantitative (material) and qualitative (immaterial). Afterall, the concept of the Will or even freedom itself is not something we can exclusively quantify. To this end, ala Carrol, I wonder which takes primacy, indeterminate forces or determinate one's? Which specification dominates or governs the behavior of things? Perhaps its situational depending upon its purpose...