The Philosophical Virtue of Certitude Shifting

[Leontiskos]

Good philosophers must speak with varying levels of certitude. This is because argument is the movement from more-certain premises to less-certain conclusions (cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics). If one is to discourse and dialogue fruitfully they must recognize and convey the fact that they hold one thing with less certitude, another with more. Growth in knowledge and wisdom becomes impossible without this recognition.

Ideally, when two or more people argue or discuss some topic there should be a dance of certitude occurring. In an argument the certitude of one should grow as the certitude of their opponent diminishes, like the ebb and flow of waves as they roll across the sea. In a collaborative discussion the certitude of each collaborator should ebb and flow together as they traverse various common quandaries and solutions. This ideal process will occur most readily when interlocutors are equals, possessing similar philosophical competency.

It is reasonable to hold differing levels of certitude because the certitude of a conclusion ought to correspond to the evidence in favor of that conclusion, and not all conclusions are supported by the same level of evidence. This is especially true when we consider the fact that knowledge specialization occurs among humans. For example, the structural engineer’s knowledge of the structural integrity of bridges will be more certain than the common person’s, and less certain than the engineer’s non-specialized knowledge, such as his confidence in the security of his banking website.

When someone fails to hold differing levels of certitude and speaks apodictically at all times, their peers will tend to ignore them. This is because they are behaving in an irrational and socially ungraceful manner, and are not helpful to those who are seeking truth.

Finally, throughout our lives and especially during philosophical discussions our levels of certitude ought to shift! If we are listening and thinking then our conclusions and the certitude which attaches to those conclusions will shift as we encounter new evidence and arguments. This ability to aptly “downshift” or “upshift” our epistemological transmission is a philosophical virtue! It requires honesty, humility, courage, and a commitment to the truth.

The commonly opposed vice is intransigence and unchanging apodicticity, and this vice results from a covetousness or pride with respect to our own opinions. That is, the vice of intransigence occurs when we are so fond of our own opinions that we become unable to change them, even in the light of new evidence or better arguments. This is a subtle vice that occurs not only among the rash and uninitiated, but also among those who attain a high degree of proficiency and certitude in one specialized area, but then mistakenly transfer that certitude to other areas where it is in no way warranted.

I find that many people become trapped in this intransigence, whether out of habit, boredom, cynicism, pride, or a lack of access to different ideas and outlooks. There are various ways to nourish the virtue, some of which include: reading books written a long time ago, reading outside of your own tradition, taking a break from philosophical discussion so that you can return with fresh ears, considering a difficult philosophical problem or controversy, or reading a giant from your own tradition to remind yourself that you are still a beginner who is ignorant of a great many things.

[Stoppelmann]

Good philosophers must speak with varying levels of certitude. This is because argument is the movement from more-certain premises to less-certain conclusions (cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics). If one is to discourse and dialogue fruitfully they must recognize and convey the fact that they hold one thing with less certitude, another with more. Growth in knowledge and wisdom becomes impossible without this recognition.

I think we experience the same in general conversations, especially on social media, where people pretend to know everything for sure. So, it's no wonder when it enters into philosophical debates as well.

Ideally, when two or more people argue or discuss some topic there should be a dance of certitude occurring. In an argument the certitude of one should grow as the certitude of their opponent diminishes, like the ebb and flow of waves as they roll across the sea. In a collaborative discussion the certitude of each collaborator should ebb and flow together as they traverse various common quandaries and solutions. This ideal process will occur most readily when interlocutors are equals, possessing similar philosophical competency.

Above all, I think both (all) sides should recognise that their insights usually come from other minds, in my case often wiser minds, and I present how I have understood them. I like the idea of a dance to tease out the truth. How often it has been fruitful to gather thoughts into an open round and then pick out the best. That is, you collect, you sort and then you come to a conclusion. I am not so sure that it should be compared to ebb and flow, that is too often perceived as an experience of loss, but perhaps as a contribution to the bonfire, where everyone contributes their best, and the flame (or the result) shows how bright we have all become. Those who have only small logs to contribute should be respectful, that's true, but everyone benefits from the outcome.

It is reasonable to hold differing levels of certitude because the certitude of a conclusion ought to correspond to the evidence in favor of that conclusion, and not all conclusions are supported by the same level of evidence. This is especially true when we consider the fact that knowledge specialization occurs among humans. For example, the structural engineer’s knowledge of the structural integrity of bridges will be more certain than the common person’s, and less certain than the engineer’s non-specialized knowledge, such as his confidence in the security of his banking website.

When someone fails to hold differing levels of certitude and speaks apodictically at all times, their peers will tend to ignore them. This is because they are behaving in an irrational and socially ungraceful manner, and are not helpful to those who are seeking truth.

Of course, it is difficult to constantly emphasise how ignorant you are and still present your thoughts with conviction. I think we have to be able to speak (write) with certainty, but it is the attitude that is important. Those who do not allow themselves to be contradicted will, as you say, eventually be ignored, but there should not be an atmosphere like a football match in which one comes out the winner – as has happened again and again throughout history.

Finally, throughout our lives and especially during philosophical discussions our levels of certitude ought to shift! If we are listening and thinking then our conclusions and the certitude which attaches to those conclusions will shift as we encounter new evidence and arguments. This ability to aptly “downshift” or “upshift” our epistemological transmission is a philosophical virtue! It requires honesty, humility, courage, and a commitment to the truth.

The commonly opposed vice is intransigence and unchanging apodicticity, and this vice results from a covetousness or pride with respect to our own opinions. That is, the vice of intransigence occurs when we are so fond of our own opinions that we become unable to change them, even in the light of new evidence or better arguments. This is a subtle vice that occurs not only among the rash and uninitiated, but also among those who attain a high degree of proficiency and certitude in one specialized area, but then mistakenly transfer that certitude to other areas where it is in no way warranted.

Yes, indeed. To speak of virtue in the modern day is quite brave, but you are right. I have noticed over the years how opinions once full of conviction change after all and it may be that age has helped me see my folly, but it has also been the change of approach (which I should use more often) towards the Socratic midwifery that has assisted me most in my profession, but is a little difficult to implement in a forum, especially if my discussions partner is across the Atlantic in different time zones. The one-on-one discussion is also the most fruitful in my opinion, unless the process of collecting-sorting-conclusion is used.

I find that many people become trapped in this intransigence, whether out of habit, boredom, cynicism, pride, or a lack of access to different ideas and outlooks. There are various ways to nourish the virtue, some of which include: reading books written a long time ago, reading outside of your own tradition, taking a break from philosophical discussion so that you can return with fresh ears, considering a difficult philosophical problem or controversy, or reading a giant from your own tradition to remind yourself that you are still a beginner who is ignorant of a great many things.

I think there is pride at work here, as well as the other attributes you mention, but especially in a written forum, a certain anonymity encourages those. It is indeed a problem, but even the civil tone of discussion (I confess to not being innocent) is endangered by the fact that we are not facing each other. I find the points you make are very valuable and should be taken to heart by all engaged in discussion

[Leontiskos]

Good philosophers must speak with varying levels of certitude. This is because argument is the movement from more-certain premises to less-certain conclusions (cf. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics). If one is to discourse and dialogue fruitfully they must recognize and convey the fact that they hold one thing with less certitude, another with more. Growth in knowledge and wisdom becomes impossible without this recognition.

I think we experience the same in general conversations, especially on social media, where people pretend to know everything for sure. So, it's no wonder when it enters into philosophical debates as well.

True, but it is worth noting that in a technical sense if one were not able to hold different propositions with different levels of certitude, they would be unable to form syllogisms and learn new knowledge. Now of course even children do this naturally, but recognizing the process and how it works aids our ability to learn and progress in knowledge.

Ideally, when two or more people argue or discuss some topic there should be a dance of certitude occurring. In an argument the certitude of one should grow as the certitude of their opponent diminishes, like the ebb and flow of waves as they roll across the sea. In a collaborative discussion the certitude of each collaborator should ebb and flow together as they traverse various common quandaries and solutions. This ideal process will occur most readily when interlocutors are equals, possessing similar philosophical competency.

Above all, I think both (all) sides should recognise that their insights usually come from other minds, in my case often wiser minds, and I present how I have understood them. I like the idea of a dance to tease out the truth. How often it has been fruitful to gather thoughts into an open round and then pick out the best. That is, you collect, you sort and then you come to a conclusion. I am not so sure that it should be compared to ebb and flow, that is too often perceived as an experience of loss, but perhaps as a contribution to the bonfire, where everyone contributes their best, and the flame (or the result) shows how bright we have all become. Those who have only small logs to contribute should be respectful, that's true, but everyone benefits from the outcome.

I agree that there will be a collective benefit when the society is able to recognize and integrate wisdom. This is not always the case, especially in the short term, as can be seen in Socrates' execution. Yet on a micro scale I think the ebb and flow is correct. If one's certitude is not ebbing and flowing they will not be engaged in true philosophical pursuits. And yes, the ebbing really is an experience of loss or reduction. When you realize that you do not know as much as you thought you did, and you respond by forfeiting your certitude, you have surely gone through an experience of loss. Being able and willing to experience this loss is extremely important.

It is reasonable to hold differing levels of certitude because the certitude of a conclusion ought to correspond to the evidence in favor of that conclusion, and not all conclusions are supported by the same level of evidence. This is especially true when we consider the fact that knowledge specialization occurs among humans. For example, the structural engineer’s knowledge of the structural integrity of bridges will be more certain than the common person’s, and less certain than the engineer’s non-specialized knowledge, such as his confidence in the security of his banking website.

When someone fails to hold differing levels of certitude and speaks apodictically at all times, their peers will tend to ignore them. This is because they are behaving in an irrational and socially ungraceful manner, and are not helpful to those who are seeking truth.

Of course, it is difficult to constantly emphasise how ignorant you are and still present your thoughts with conviction. I think we have to be able to speak (write) with certainty, but it is the attitude that is important. Those who do not allow themselves to be contradicted will, as you say, eventually be ignored, but there should not be an atmosphere like a football match in which one comes out the winner – as has happened again and again throughout history.

I think it is right to say that ideally philosophy should be a common pursuit, where the aim is truth rather than eristic.

Finally, throughout our lives and especially during philosophical discussions our levels of certitude ought to shift! If we are listening and thinking then our conclusions and the certitude which attaches to those conclusions will shift as we encounter new evidence and arguments. This ability to aptly “downshift” or “upshift” our epistemological transmission is a philosophical virtue! It requires honesty, humility, courage, and a commitment to the truth.

The commonly opposed vice is intransigence and unchanging apodicticity, and this vice results from a covetousness or pride with respect to our own opinions. That is, the vice of intransigence occurs when we are so fond of our own opinions that we become unable to change them, even in the light of new evidence or better arguments. This is a subtle vice that occurs not only among the rash and uninitiated, but also among those who attain a high degree of proficiency and certitude in one specialized area, but then mistakenly transfer that certitude to other areas where it is in no way warranted.

Yes, indeed. To speak of virtue in the modern day is quite brave, but you are right. I have noticed over the years how opinions once full of conviction change after all and it may be that age has helped me see my folly, but it has also been the change of approach (which I should use more often) towards the Socratic midwifery that has assisted me most in my profession, but is a little difficult to implement in a forum, especially if my discussions partner is across the Atlantic in different time zones. The one-on-one discussion is also the most fruitful in my opinion, unless the process of collecting-sorting-conclusion is used.

I also find one-on-one conversations to be the most fruitful. Are you saying that you most prefer in-person discussion, or that you simply prefer formats where continuous conversation is possible and there are not hours-long gaps between each communication?

I find that many people become trapped in this intransigence, whether out of habit, boredom, cynicism, pride, or a lack of access to different ideas and outlooks. There are various ways to nourish the virtue, some of which include: reading books written a long time ago, reading outside of your own tradition, taking a break from philosophical discussion so that you can return with fresh ears, considering a difficult philosophical problem or controversy, or reading a giant from your own tradition to remind yourself that you are still a beginner who is ignorant of a great many things.

I think there is pride at work here, as well as the other attributes you mention, but especially in a written forum, a certain anonymity encourages those. It is indeed a problem, but even the civil tone of discussion (I confess to not being innocent) is endangered by the fact that we are not facing each other. I find the points you make are very valuable and should be taken to heart by all engaged in discussion

Yes, I agree that anonymity and the lack of face-to-face contact tends to create many problems. A forum like this also deals with the difficulty of wide cultural and religious divergence, not to mention different schools of philosophy.

The other thing, which I did not mention in the OP, is the matter of "ad hominem" certitude. There is a subtle sense in which the ad hominem mentality is correct, insofar as we really ought to alter our certitude and the way we receive arguments depending on who we are talking to. If I am speaking with someone I know to be a solid philosopher then I should reduce my own certitude and be more receptive to her words, and more willing to read deep into the arguments and give them the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if I am speaking with someone I know to be unintelligent, then the opposite will hold true. The same could be said with regard to experts and non-experts in some field of knowledge. Although this isn't politically correct, it is true, and I have found it to be essential in navigating the internet where one might encounter a hundred different individuals in a single day.

Thanks for your thoughts!

[Stoppelmann]

I agree that there will be a collective benefit when the society is able to recognize and integrate wisdom. This is not always the case, especially in the short term, as can be seen in Socrates' execution. Yet on a micro scale I think the ebb and flow is correct. If one's certitude is not ebbing and flowing they will not be engaged in true philosophical pursuits. And yes, the ebbing really is an experience of loss or reduction. When you realize that you do not know as much as you thought you did, and you respond by forfeiting your certitude, you have surely gone through an experience of loss. Being able and willing to experience this loss is extremely important.

Which would be another example of virtue, as you mentioned before.

I think it is right to say that ideally philosophy should be a common pursuit, where the aim is truth rather than eristic.

Watching the way social media invades the public debate with controversy rather than the pursuit of truth, we are moving further away from our ability to engage in debate for the common good. Especially in debates about wealth in society for example, we can see that even if there is a clear problem to be solved, dogmatic positions are adopted rather than both sides accepting that a compromise is needed, because the truth of the matter runs through the middle of the debate. The pursuit of wisdom and ability to ascertain the intricacies of a situation is lost and may in the end lead to a Solomonic verdict, just to force the hand of one side.

I also find one-on-one conversations to be the most fruitful. Are you saying that you most prefer in-person discussion, or that you simply prefer formats where continuous conversation is possible and there are not hours-long gaps between each communication?

I am in Germany and find that very often, even if a conversation starts in Europe, when Americans (or Australians for that matter) enter the discussion, much goes on before I am awake, and the flow of discussion depends a lot on the “opportune moment” in which to say something. Exchanges I have had with individuals have, regardless of where they are situated, been more fruitful for both sides. However, it is probably the same for Americans and Australians if a discussion breaks loose in Europe – which happens less often.

The other thing, which I did not mention in the OP, is the matter of "ad hominem" certitude. There is a subtle sense in which the ad hominem mentality is correct, insofar as we really ought to alter our certitude and the way we receive arguments depending on who we are talking to. If I am speaking with someone I know to be a solid philosopher then I should reduce my own certitude and be more receptive to her words, and more willing to read deep into the arguments and give them the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if I am speaking with someone I know to be unintelligent, then the opposite will hold true. The same could be said with regard to experts and non-experts in some field of knowledge. Although this isn't politically correct, it is true, and I have found it to be essential in navigating the internet where one might encounter a hundred different individuals in a single day.

Yes, you are right. Pointing out that someone hasn’t the ability to engage in the discussion whilst asserting unbending opinions is a problem, but here too, I think that midwifery can be helpful, but if not, it is down to pointing the lack of ability out, even if it is declared ad hominem.

Thanks for your thoughts!

Thank you for engaging with me.

[Moreno]

It is reasonable to hold differing levels of certitude because the certitude of a conclusion ought to correspond to the evidence in favor of that conclusion, and not all conclusions are supported by the same level of evidence.

I would add to this that certainty varies subjectively also. There's liklihood and there's certainty. And I, at least, find that my feelings of certainty vary on many issues vary over time.

When someone fails to hold differing levels of certitude and speaks apodictically at all times, their peers will tend to ignore them. This is because they are behaving in an irrational and socially ungraceful manner, and are not helpful to those who are seeking truth.

I generally agree with your post. However to be fussy here, I kind of like it when people are blunt about their position. I don't think they need to qualify their position (unless they want to of course) especially in the beginning of some kind of dialogue. I do think that over a longer dialogue there will be times when it is polite and also helpful to say they are being polemical or that they are not speaking about 100% certainty.

Why would I say this? If I go to a lecture on many subjects, I find it clearer and more interesting if the idea is presented as simply true. The outlines of the idea, I find are clearer. If someone is a Marxist talking about history, say, I learn more and understand them more clearly and in a sense get to ride along in their beliefs (try them on) if they don't qualify all the time. I get to get a clear sense of the Marxist view of X for that time. Then perhaps I attend another lecture by someone else or have a discussion with someone with another economic view and immerse myself in that. I can sort out nuance and eclectic positions for myself later. I realize this may not be everyone's cup of tea.

If one presents something that is not so certain as certain AND this leads to being dismissive, condescending, not fully responding to critique and other problematic dialogue patterns, well that's a problem. And I recognize there can be correlation between those who speak in absolute and/or certain terms and those habits. But it's those habits that I have a problem with.

For me, let them lay out their model and position blunt and clear. As if that's it for them, period. Then deal with people in polite and respectful ways in a following dialogue. Yes, concessions are lovely. I think that's where I like to see something else. If I or someone else raises a good point and the person cannot see a perfect or good counter, it is great if they can concede the point or say that they need to think about this, etc. Heck, I don't mind if they say 'I am still certain it is correct.' As long as they can admit that they are not sure in the moment why the criticism fails or they have no good answer to a question at that time.

[Leontiskos]

It is reasonable to hold differing levels of certitude because the certitude of a conclusion ought to correspond to the evidence in favor of that conclusion, and not all conclusions are supported by the same level of evidence.

I would add to this that certainty varies subjectively also. There's liklihood and there's certainty. And I, at least, find that my feelings of certainty vary on many issues vary over time.

I agree. In fact certitude is an entirely subjective reality. There is no certitude apart from subjects, and each subject will have varying levels of certitude.

When someone fails to hold differing levels of certitude and speaks apodictically at all times, their peers will tend to ignore them. This is because they are behaving in an irrational and socially ungraceful manner, and are not helpful to those who are seeking truth.

I generally agree with your post. However to be fussy here, I kind of like it when people are blunt about their position. I don't think they need to qualify their position (unless they want to of course) especially in the beginning of some kind of dialogue. I do think that over a longer dialogue there will be times when it is polite and also helpful to say they are being polemical or that they are not speaking about 100% certainty.

Why would I say this? If I go to a lecture on many subjects, I find it clearer and more interesting if the idea is presented as simply true. The outlines of the idea, I find are clearer. If someone is a Marxist talking about history, say, I learn more and understand them more clearly and in a sense get to ride along in their beliefs (try them on) if they don't qualify all the time. I get to get a clear sense of the Marxist view of X for that time. Then perhaps I attend another lecture by someone else or have a discussion with someone with another economic view and immerse myself in that. I can sort out nuance and eclectic positions for myself later. I realize this may not be everyone's cup of tea.

I agree entirely. Constant qualifications about the strength of one's claims are both distracting, and unhelpful in that they inhibit the listener from entering into the other's mind and argument. Note though that the person who does this is in fact failing to speak with varying levels of certitude. Their speech conveys an unvarying level of certitude (which is in fact minimal).

I was warning against the vice of speaking "apodictically at all times." Presenting one's ideas with clarity and confidence is important, and it is different from unchanging apoditicity.

If one presents something that is not so certain as certain AND this leads to being dismissive, condescending, not fully responding to critique and other problematic dialogue patterns, well that's a problem. And I recognize there can be correlation between those who speak in absolute and/or certain terms and those habits. But it's those habits that I have a problem with.

I agree that those habits are problematic, but generally speaking I don't even require your "AND". Generally speaking, one should not present uncertain things as certain. I mean, perhaps in a lecture on abstruse theoretical possibilities one should, for the sake of argument, speak with "certitude." But I am hesitant to call this "certitude," for it seems to me more like clarity and concision of description. If a scientist is presenting a novel quantum theory he should describe the theory with clarity and confidence, but by this he need not convey that he believes his theory is certainly true.

Regarding your Marxist, if he is certain then let him present his ideas with certitude. Hopefully his certitude is well-founded and he has put in a great deal of work to arrive at it. If someone is apodictically certain about everything they say, then either they are omniscient or deeply confused.

For me, let them lay out their model and position blunt and clear. As if that's it for them, period. Then deal with people in polite and respectful ways in a following dialogue. Yes, concessions are lovely. I think that's where I like to see something else. If I or someone else raises a good point and the person cannot see a perfect or good counter, it is great if they can concede the point or say that they need to think about this, etc. Heck, I don't mind if they say 'I am still certain it is correct.' As long as they can admit that they are not sure in the moment why the criticism fails or they have no good answer to a question at that time.

Thank you, these are good points. I think we are on the same page.

[Leontiskos]

I think it is right to say that ideally philosophy should be a common pursuit, where the aim is truth rather than eristic.

Watching the way social media invades the public debate with controversy rather than the pursuit of truth, we are moving further away from our ability to engage in debate for the common good. Especially in debates about wealth in society for example, we can see that even if there is a clear problem to be solved, dogmatic positions are adopted rather than both sides accepting that a compromise is needed, because the truth of the matter runs through the middle of the debate. The pursuit of wisdom and ability to ascertain the intricacies of a situation is lost and may in the end lead to a Solomonic verdict, just to force the hand of one side.

I agree, and it seems that this is especially difficult for the younger generations who grew up in relative material ease, with fewer siblings. Compromises and limitations on one's will are unfamiliar to them. The technological mindset contributes as well, where technology seems to be making everything easier. That expectation of ease then unfortunately gets transferred into the political sphere, which is always a complex sphere. It is one place where dealing with humans and their complexities cannot be avoided.

I also find one-on-one conversations to be the most fruitful. Are you saying that you most prefer in-person discussion, or that you simply prefer formats where continuous conversation is possible and there are not hours-long gaps between each communication?

I am in Germany and find that very often, even if a conversation starts in Europe, when Americans (or Australians for that matter) enter the discussion, much goes on before I am awake, and the flow of discussion depends a lot on the “opportune moment” in which to say something. Exchanges I have had with individuals have, regardless of where they are situated, been more fruitful for both sides. However, it is probably the same for Americans and Australians if a discussion breaks loose in Europe – which happens less often.

Oh, interesting! I guess in America I am not as familiar with the problem. I do find that this forum is more asynchronous than most, and when I found it I was looking for a place with longer posts, more forethought, and less catering to smartphones. But I can definitely see what you are saying.

The other thing, which I did not mention in the OP, is the matter of "ad hominem" certitude. There is a subtle sense in which the ad hominem mentality is correct, insofar as we really ought to alter our certitude and the way we receive arguments depending on who we are talking to. If I am speaking with someone I know to be a solid philosopher then I should reduce my own certitude and be more receptive to her words, and more willing to read deep into the arguments and give them the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if I am speaking with someone I know to be unintelligent, then the opposite will hold true. The same could be said with regard to experts and non-experts in some field of knowledge. Although this isn't politically correct, it is true, and I have found it to be essential in navigating the internet where one might encounter a hundred different individuals in a single day.

Yes, you are right. Pointing out that someone hasn’t the ability to engage in the discussion whilst asserting unbending opinions is a problem, but here too, I think that midwifery can be helpful, but if not, it is down to pointing the lack of ability out, even if it is declared ad hominem.

Midwifery is definitely helpful. There were a few years when I felt I was improving at midwifery, but now with increasing time limitations I feel that I fail at it more often than not (and the time constraints exacerbate a lack of patience). Maybe some Plato is in order.

The other issue I have is that the midwife bears no children of her own, so to speak, and is apparently not challenged by equals. Too much midwifery leaves me pining for interlocutors who are capable of challenging me.

I am always on the lookout for in-person philosophy groups. They aren't so easy to find, but it can be great when you do find one.

Thanks for your thoughts!

Thank you for engaging with me.

You're welcome!