There is no strong emergence

[Gertie]

Bahman

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am If you look at the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on emergence, you need to have a good while to spare.   Lots of peeps have different thoughts on it which can't be boiled down to simple definitions unfortunately.   My advice - pack  tea and biscuits, and hope to make it to the other end  not too much more confused. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/     I failed. 

I did read the article two times in the past and I have to say that it is too dense and technical for me. All articles in SEP are like this.

Me too.  It does show that there are different views on what we call 'strong' emergence tho.  Your function based interpretation  isn't the only one.  And I have issues with 'function' talk which goes beyond physical cause and effect, especially when it comes to mind as strong emergence, which is what I went into later.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am So here's how I see it, with regard to functionalism.

For reference, SEP's intro to Functionalism in philosophy of mind -

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century.

I'd start by saying that function is a human concept which when it refers to systems with no subjects is a term of art which sorta anthropomorphises them.  Unless there is some underlying teleological aspect of the universe, which I don't believe needs to be invoked to explain how the universe works.

So if we say eg an acorn's function is to grow into an oak tree, then we're giving that acorn a purpose it doesn't itself have.  The acorn simply follows the laws of nature, with no thought for its purpose or how it functionally goes about it. That might be true that an acorn does not have any subjective experience but that does not mean that its behavior is not a function of the properties of its parts.

Think of a car. A car is not a wheel, engine, etc. A car as a whole is something that has a special behavior and this behavior is a function of the properties of parts.

OK, can you unpack that? 

Because I can describe why a car has the behaviour of travelling from A to B in physicalist terms of cause and effect.  And I can say a car's  function/role  is to travel from A to B, for me, a human with goals which entail travelling from A to B. 

And I can say an acorn growing into an oak tree in terms of physicalist cause effect without any functional role  being involved in terms of goals.

I don't think these are trivial or pedantic differences, if like me, you believe function infers a related goal, and only subjects have goals. If subjects are involved (eg designing a car), functional emergence, ie having a role in achieving a goal,  can occur.

But if mind is a case of a radically different emergent property  from non-minded stuff, then we need to look for other non-minded cases in nature.  But typically non-minded natural cases like water and acorns are ontologically reducible according to our current physicalist understanding of how matter in motion works. Where-as mind in principle may not be.

'Function' is a red herring.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am So imo the question of emergence becomes an ontological one concerning physical processes - unless experiencing subjects with purposes are involved, who can conceive of goals and functional means to achieve them. Human made machines have functions, nature doesn't.

I don't think it is only a matter of subjective experience and purpose. The behavior of a car also is a function of the properties of its parts. So we are dealing with weak emergence in the case of cars.

Cars moving from A to B can simply be explained in terms of physical processes, without invoking the concept of 'function' as anything but that, making it redundant.

But when humans design cars to move from A to B they perform a function for us.

Can you unpack the function of an acorn's parts, which isn't just a description of its physical processes (its parts in motion).


I'm making the point that if you mean simply that the parts in motion are 'function', then your take on strong and weak emergence in the OP boils down to both being parts in motion with physical causal properties doesn't it?   Which is fine. But I'd suggest that when it comes to mind as an emergent property of brain activity, there's a different type of weak v strong distinction being made.  Which is that weak emergence is explicable in terms of our physicalist ontological model, like acorns and ocean waves, but phenomenal experiential properties aren't as far as we can tell.  Hence the Hard Problem.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am Physicalist ontological emergence makes sense to me as the flip side of ontological reductionism (a reverse engineering). Any higher level emergent property of a system should be ontologically reducible to its lower level properties.  We can see this type of emergence in nature, such as water's wetness, or its  abillity to be gas, liquid or solid, or the effects of wave erosion on a shoreline.  All reducible to the properties of H2O molecules in motion.  This type of emergence is no challenge to physicalism.  It's just stuff acting according to the laws of nature, like the acorn. We don't need to introduce the concept of function to explain it.

I agree. That being said that the properties of water, pressure in form of gas for example, are functions of properties of parts. So we are dealing with weak emergence again.

 You could just skip the words ''functions of'' in that sentence and it wouldn't change the meaning.  Because it doesn't add anything. The real issue with mind which 'strong emergence' addresses in philosophy of mind is regarding the ontological reducibility to matter in motion according to our current understanding of physicalism. No-one has yet found an in principle way physical matter in motion could result in mind. Physicalists claim it must be, because that's all which exists. So in lieu of an explanation they say it must be emergent in a different way to that which we see and can explain in nature. They call this ''strong'' emergence. In reality the term isn't explanatory, it's a place-holder for what they hope to be the eventual physicalist explanation.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am Strong emergence tends to be invoked in cases involving experiencing subjects. And in particular consciousness itself, in philosophy of mind.  Because conscious experience isn't apparently ontologically reducible to the physical activity of neurons acting according to the laws of nature. Some suppose  conscious experience must 'emerge' this way  because of neural correlation. But our physicalist model doesn't explain how, even in principle,  physical processes could account for this,  doesn't even account for consciousness at all in its model of the universe and how it works. To me this signifies 'strong emergence' in that case is a place-holder for an actual physicalist explanation - which some consider to be beyond physicalism to explain, and some think it at least  presents a uniquely 'hard problem' for physicalism. I agree.

That is the problem of physicalism and I agree with it.

Right.  It's an issue of ontological reducibility. Physicalism is saying mind must somehow be reducible to its physical parts in motion, but we don't even in principle know how, so we'll we'll call it 'strong emergence'.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am In the case of consciousness and functionalism, we can say evolution is a functionalist explanation for consciousness.  Consciousness emerged in order to help us survive and reproduce. Our optical systems evolved in order to help us do this, as did all our brain functions, this is why consciousness exists  in a functional sense, that's its role in our body's system. That's fine, but leaves the how of it unexplained.
 
A common example of this used by functionalists is to look at pain, which they claim is ontologically reducible to the firing of C-fibres. And the function of C fibres firing is   to prompt us to remove ourselves from the source of injury and survive. A sound evolutionary functional explanation.    But how do they deal with the 'how'? Some functionalists  say consciousness simply is the physical behaviour of C fibre neurons reacting to physical stimuli  in order to physically remove us from dangerous situations - and the phenomenological experience of pain is an illusion.  'Illusion' here meaning either the phenomological 'what it is like' experience of pain doesn't really exist at all, or isn't what we think it is.  The 'doesn't really exist' eliminativism is bonkers, the 'isn't what we think it is' i(n terms of folk psychology), denies the knowledge inherent in direct experience, but can have more nuanced interpretations.

The link between functionalism and physical processes/behaviour is therefore strong. Some forms of identity theory suggest, from what I can make of it, is that pain literally is C fibres firing and other physical behaviours saying ''ouch'' or retreating from the stimulus.  They are basically saying the behaviour of taking of a headache pill   is what a headache is.  Again bonkers, because   I'm pretty sure via my direct experience that I take a headache pill because I feel pain in my head.   But unless you see functionalism in such ways, it offers no explanatory value when it comes to consciousness imo.  And I suspect it's the belief that physicalism must somehow explain consciousness which leads to patently daft and tortured thinking. 

So if functionalism is  out as a satisfactory function-based explanation for the emergence of consciousness, we're back to ontological emergence/reductionism.  Where 'strong emergence' simply means conscious experience  must be a physicalist phenomenon,  but  can't even offer a way explain it, currently at least.  A hard problem as Chalmers says.

Functionalism is a monist materialist theory and I agree that it does not answer how consciousness emerges from neural activity.

Yep it's a red herring, a dodge which tries to save physicalism from the Hard Problem.

I believe in a new version of substance dualism in which there are two substances namely minds and Quidia (Quidia=mental what-it-is-ness whereas Qualia=mental what-its-like-ness). Mind in this theory is an irreducible substance with the ability to experience Quidia, process the information that it perceives, and cause Quidia. I have a lot to say about this theory, including arguments for the existence and irreducibility of the mind but that is sort of off-topic. The moral point of the story is that experience in this model is the ability of the mind.

You might find Searle's biological naturalism hypothesis interesting, he claims mind is not ontologically reducible to brain activity, but is causally reducible.  (A position I personally have probs with but it's a theoretical workaround I suppose)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism

[Count Lucanor]

It does change something. It shows that you created a dichotomy by way of definitions and then you denied the dichotomy using those very same definitions.

No, I am not denying the dichotomy when I use other definitions. The dichotomy still exists but definitions are different.

The way you defined the terms of the dichotomy leads you to conclude one of those terms is not possible, which is evidently a circular argument based on the definitions at the starting point. You have made your point an analytic argument, but it has pretensions of a synthetic argument with ontological consequences, I mean, it's supposed to say something about the world, but it doesn't.

The story is long but the moral point of the story as I can tell you is that people believe in two sorts of emergence, weak like cars, and strong like consciousness. The property of a car for example is a function of the properties of parts so we are dealing with weak emergence. In fact, we have many many entities that show weak emergence so we cannot simply say that there is no emergence. Strong emergence as I argue does not exist so you cannot find an example of it.

Do you have anything to support your claim that “people believe in two sorts of emergence”? Maybe you just believe that, but I believe otherwise, so…

Yes, the literature is so extensive on this subject.

OK, I got confused by your phrasing that "people believe". In any case, even if the distinction between weak and strong emergence is very common among scholars, your definitions of them are not.

To be precise a weak emergence is a phenomenon in which a system has a property that its parts don't have and the property of the system is a function of the properties of parts. The strong emergence is a phenomenon in which a system has a property that its parts don't have and the property of the system is not a function of the properties of parts.

A system, by definition, implies the interrelation between the parts and the whole, in other words, it makes all systems a function of their parts. Otherwise it would not be a system. Can you show a real system where the parts are not interconnected to the whole? That's why your definition ends up cancelling strong emergence, but at the price of denying emergence in any system.

[Bahman]

Bahman

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am If you look at the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on emergence, you need to have a good while to spare.   Lots of peeps have different thoughts on it which can't be boiled down to simple definitions unfortunately.   My advice - pack  tea and biscuits, and hope to make it to the other end  not too much more confused. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/     I failed. 

I did read the article two times in the past and I have to say that it is too dense and technical for me. All articles in SEP are like this.

Me too.  It does show that there are different views on what we call 'strong' emergence tho.  Your function based interpretation  isn't the only one.  And I have issues with 'function' talk which goes beyond physical cause and effect, especially when it comes to mind as strong emergence, which is what I went into later.

Ok, let's see.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am So here's how I see it, with regard to functionalism.

For reference, SEP's intro to Functionalism in philosophy of mind -

Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century.

I'd start by saying that function is a human concept which when it refers to systems with no subjects is a term of art which sorta anthropomorphises them.  Unless there is some underlying teleological aspect of the universe, which I don't believe needs to be invoked to explain how the universe works.

So if we say eg an acorn's function is to grow into an oak tree, then we're giving that acorn a purpose it doesn't itself have.  The acorn simply follows the laws of nature, with no thought for its purpose or how it functionally goes about it. That might be true that an acorn does not have any subjective experience but that does not mean that its behavior is not a function of the properties of its parts.

Think of a car. A car is not a wheel, engine, etc. A car as a whole is something that has a special behavior and this behavior is a function of the properties of parts.

OK, can you unpack that? 

Because I can describe why a car has the behaviour of travelling from A to B in physicalist terms of cause and effect.  And I can say a car's  function/role  is to travel from A to B, for me, a human with goals which entail travelling from A to B. 

A car that is moving from A to B can move fast or slow which depends on (or is a function of) how much you push the accelerator (gas pedal) and what gear you use. The car's trajectory could be curved or straight which depends on (or function of) how you move the steering wheel. Etc. So carness is a property that tells you how the car behaves that depends on how you push the accelerator, what gear you use, how you move the steering wheel, etc.

And I can say an acorn growing into an oak tree in terms of physicalist cause effect without any functional role being involved in terms of goals.

I am not an expert in biology but I believe that the behavior (the growth) of an acorn is a function of the properties of its parts too.

I don't think these are trivial or pedantic differences, if like me, you believe function infers a related goal, and only subjects have goals. If subjects are involved (eg designing a car), functional emergence, ie having a role in achieving a goal,  can occur.

I think I made it clear what I mean by function in the example of car.

But if mind is a case of a radically different emergent property  from non-minded stuff, then we need to look for other non-minded cases in nature.  But typically non-minded natural cases like water and acorns are ontologically reducible according to our current physicalist understanding of how matter in motion works. Where-as mind in principle may not be.

'Function' is a red herring.

Well, we have to agree with a definition of mind in order to see that my vocabulary of function works well for it.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am So imo the question of emergence becomes an ontological one concerning physical processes - unless experiencing subjects with purposes are involved, who can conceive of goals and functional means to achieve them. Human made machines have functions, nature doesn't.

I don't think it is only a matter of subjective experience and purpose. The behavior of a car also is a function of the properties of its parts. So we are dealing with weak emergence in the case of cars.

Cars moving from A to B can simply be explained in terms of physical processes, without invoking the concept of 'function' as anything but that, making it redundant.

But when humans design cars to move from A to B they perform a function for us.

The fact that humans are able to design and build a car shows that carness is a function of the properties of its parts.

I'm making the point that if you mean simply that the parts in motion are 'function', then your take on strong and weak emergence in the OP boils down to both being parts in motion with physical causal properties doesn't it? Which is fine. But I'd suggest that when it comes to mind as an emergent property of brain activity, there's a different type of weak v strong distinction being made.  Which is that weak emergence is explicable in terms of our physicalist ontological model, like acorns and ocean waves, but phenomenal experiential properties aren't as far as we can tell.  Hence the Hard Problem.

Well, I think we have to agree with a definition of mind. I already gave my definition of mind in substance dualism. What is your definition of mind?

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am Physicalist ontological emergence makes sense to me as the flip side of ontological reductionism (a reverse engineering). Any higher level emergent property of a system should be ontologically reducible to its lower level properties.  We can see this type of emergence in nature, such as water's wetness, or its  abillity to be gas, liquid or solid, or the effects of wave erosion on a shoreline.  All reducible to the properties of H2O molecules in motion.  This type of emergence is no challenge to physicalism.  It's just stuff acting according to the laws of nature, like the acorn. We don't need to introduce the concept of function to explain it.

I agree. That being said that the properties of water, pressure in form of gas for example, are functions of properties of parts. So we are dealing with weak emergence again.

You could just skip the words ''functions of'' in that sentence and it wouldn't change the meaning.  Because it doesn't add anything.

It adds something. When I say that the properties of an ideal gas are a function of the properties of parts I mean that the pressure, temperature, etc. can be written in terms of properties of parts which are the average speed and mass of atoms in the container.

The real issue with mind which 'strong emergence' addresses in philosophy of mind is regarding the ontological reducibility to matter in motion according to our current understanding of physicalism. No-one has yet found an in principle way physical matter in motion could result in mind. Physicalists claim it must be, because that's all which exists. So in lieu of an explanation they say it must be emergent in a different way to that which we see and can explain in nature. They call this ''strong'' emergence. In reality the term isn't explanatory, it's a place-holder for what they hope to be the eventual physicalist explanation.

I think we have to agree with a definition of mind.

Gertie wrote: ↑February 28th, 2023, 11:45 am In the case of consciousness and functionalism, we can say evolution is a functionalist explanation for consciousness.  Consciousness emerged in order to help us survive and reproduce. Our optical systems evolved in order to help us do this, as did all our brain functions, this is why consciousness exists  in a functional sense, that's its role in our body's system. That's fine, but leaves the how of it unexplained.
 
A common example of this used by functionalists is to look at pain, which they claim is ontologically reducible to the firing of C-fibres. And the function of C fibres firing is   to prompt us to remove ourselves from the source of injury and survive. A sound evolutionary functional explanation.    But how do they deal with the 'how'? Some functionalists  say consciousness simply is the physical behaviour of C fibre neurons reacting to physical stimuli  in order to physically remove us from dangerous situations - and the phenomenological experience of pain is an illusion.  'Illusion' here meaning either the phenomological 'what it is like' experience of pain doesn't really exist at all, or isn't what we think it is.  The 'doesn't really exist' eliminativism is bonkers, the 'isn't what we think it is' i(n terms of folk psychology), denies the knowledge inherent in direct experience, but can have more nuanced interpretations.

The link between functionalism and physical processes/behaviour is therefore strong. Some forms of identity theory suggest, from what I can make of it, is that pain literally is C fibres firing and other physical behaviours saying ''ouch'' or retreating from the stimulus.  They are basically saying the behaviour of taking of a headache pill   is what a headache is.  Again bonkers, because   I'm pretty sure via my direct experience that I take a headache pill because I feel pain in my head.   But unless you see functionalism in such ways, it offers no explanatory value when it comes to consciousness imo.  And I suspect it's the belief that physicalism must somehow explain consciousness which leads to patently daft and tortured thinking. 

So if functionalism is  out as a satisfactory function-based explanation for the emergence of consciousness, we're back to ontological emergence/reductionism.  Where 'strong emergence' simply means conscious experience  must be a physicalist phenomenon,  but  can't even offer a way explain it, currently at least.  A hard problem as Chalmers says.

Functionalism is a monist materialist theory and I agree that it does not answer how consciousness emerges from neural activity.

Yep it's a red herring, a dodge which tries to save physicalism from the Hard Problem.

I believe in a new version of substance dualism in which there are two substances namely minds and Quidia (Quidia=mental what-it-is-ness whereas Qualia=mental what-its-like-ness). Mind in this theory is an irreducible substance with the ability to experience Quidia, process the information that it perceives, and cause Quidia. I have a lot to say about this theory, including arguments for the existence and irreducibility of the mind but that is sort of off-topic. The moral point of the story is that experience in this model is the ability of the mind.

You might find Searle's biological naturalism hypothesis interesting, he claims mind is not ontologically reducible to brain activity, but is causally reducible.  (A position I personally have probs with but it's a theoretical workaround I suppose)  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism

Ok, thanks. I will read that shortly.

[Bahman]

It does change something. It shows that you created a dichotomy by way of definitions and then you denied the dichotomy using those very same definitions.

No, I am not denying the dichotomy when I use other definitions. The dichotomy still exists but definitions are different.

The way you defined the terms of the dichotomy leads you to conclude one of those terms is not possible, which is evidently a circular argument based on the definitions at the starting point. You have made your point an analytic argument, but it has pretensions of a synthetic argument with ontological consequences, I mean, it's supposed to say something about the world, but it doesn't.

The property of the system can be either a function of the properties of parts or not. There is no other option. Could we agree on this? Moreover, I deduced later that one of the emergencies is not possible in the second paragraph of OP.

The story is long but the moral point of the story as I can tell you is that people believe in two sorts of emergence, weak like cars, and strong like consciousness. The property of a car for example is a function of the properties of parts so we are dealing with weak emergence. In fact, we have many many entities that show weak emergence so we cannot simply say that there is no emergence. Strong emergence as I argue does not exist so you cannot find an example of it.

Do you have anything to support your claim that “people believe in two sorts of emergence”? Maybe you just believe that, but I believe otherwise, so…

Yes, the literature is so extensive on this subject.

OK, I got confused by your phrasing that "people believe". In any case, even if the distinction between weak and strong emergence is very common among scholars, your definitions of them are not.

Yes, some people use other definitions like weak emergence property is reducible to or deducible from the properties of parts. Some use other definitions. I found my definitions easy and exhaustive.

To be precise a weak emergence is a phenomenon in which a system has a property that its parts don't have and the property of the system is a function of the properties of parts. The strong emergence is a phenomenon in which a system has a property that its parts don't have and the property of the system is not a function of the properties of parts.

A system, by definition, implies the interrelation between the parts and the whole, in other words, it makes all systems a function of their parts.

What do you mean by the interrelation between parts and the whole? Do you mean that the property of the whole is a function of the properties of parts and vice versa?

Otherwise it would not be a system. Can you show a real system where the parts are not interconnected to the whole?

Again, what do you mean by the whole being interconnected to parts?

[Pattern-chaser]

Even if the whole W consists of two "intimately related, non-independent" things a & b, it is a pair of two different and distinct (non-overlapping) things; so the question is still how two different and distinct things can collectively have one simple and undivided property—how one simple and undivided property can adhere to or inhere in two different and distinct things a & b.

Consider your first sentence. It says "Even if X, NOT(X)". You cannot keep your personal conclusions out of the premises. This takes us nowhere.

There is no "personal conclusion" in my premise! For no matter how strongly a and b are connected, the whole W = a + b they compose does consist of a pair of two different and distinct (non-overlapping) things, which as a whole cannot be the bearer of any simple and undivided property.

Your atoms are 'wholes', comprising quarks, etc. All the way up, through all the apparent 'wholes', to you, Consul, a human who is a 'whole', but also part of ... the entire universe, the 'ultimate' whole? Any and all of this chain of 'wholes' can be seen as distinct, even independent, if we choose to, but is this perspective a valuable one? Is it accurate? Is it useful? Is it helpful? I would answer "no" to all of those questions.

Your quibbling makes no difference to the essential and empirical truth, that wholes have properties that are most usefully or helpfully attached to, or associated with, the whole, not its constituent parts.

[Consul]

Your quibbling makes no difference to the essential and empirical truth, that wholes have properties that are most usefully or helpfully attached to, or associated with, the whole, not its constituent parts.

One needs to be very careful and precise here:

1. There are doubtless predicates which are true of wholes but not of any of their parts.
2. There are doubtless concepts which apply to wholes but not to any of their parts.
3. There are doubtless complex (structural) properties which are had by wholes but not by any of their parts.

As for 3, complex (structural) properties of wholes are ontologically reducible to simple properties of or/and simple relations between their basic parts; so they are not ontologically emergent.

The big question in the context of emergentism is whether there are ontologically emergent and irreducible properties of wholes: simple, i.e. non-complex, non-structural, properties of wholes which aren't had by any of their parts.

It is only the (possible) existence of such emergent properties which I have denied!

It follows that when a predicate is true of, or a concept applies to a whole but not of/to any of its parts, the truthmaker of the corresponding statement is not a fact involving an ontologically emergent property.

[Count Lucanor]

The property of the system can be either a function of the properties of parts or not. There is no other option. Could we agree on this? Moreover, I deduced later that one of the emergencies is not possible in the second paragraph of OP.

Yes, some people use other definitions like weak emergence property is reducible to or deducible from the properties of parts. Some use other definitions. I found my definitions easy and exhaustive.

What do you mean by the interrelation between parts and the whole? Do you mean that the property of the whole is a function of the properties of parts and vice versa?

Again, what do you mean by the whole being interconnected to parts?

I see that you, when dealing with emergence, refer only to "properties of a system". That is not necessarily wrong, but it's preferrable to talk about emergent phenomena, which points to not only properties, but processes, behaviors. There are several things that are composed of parts, such as sets, systems, and mereologically composite objects. Many times things are labeled using these terms interchangeably, so it would be a good idea to make the appropriate distinctions when referring to emergence. A system, for example, is defined like this:

"[...] a group of interacting or interrelated elements that act according to a set of rules to form a unified whole.[1] A system, surrounded and influenced by its environment, is described by its boundaries, structure and purpose and expressed in its functioning. Systems are the subjects of study of systems theory and other systems sciences.

Systems have several common properties and characteristics, including structure, function(s), behavior and interconnectivity." (Source: Wikipedia)

Evidently, if parts are interrelated to form a whole, then it is implied that in a system the whole is always a function of the parts. There isn't an option where systems aren't like that, but perhaps a set or a mereologically composite object can exist without the whole being a function of its parts. Also, systems tend to be dynamic, more complex, and that's what I usually identify with emergent phenomena.

[Bahman]

The property of the system can be either a function of the properties of parts or not. There is no other option. Could we agree on this? Moreover, I deduced later that one of the emergencies is not possible in the second paragraph of OP.

Yes, some people use other definitions like weak emergence property is reducible to or deducible from the properties of parts. Some use other definitions. I found my definitions easy and exhaustive.

What do you mean by the interrelation between parts and the whole? Do you mean that the property of the whole is a function of the properties of parts and vice versa?

Again, what do you mean by the whole being interconnected to parts?

I see that you, when dealing with emergence, refer only to "properties of a system". That is not necessarily wrong, but it's preferrable to talk about emergent phenomena, which points to not only properties, but processes, behaviors.

The behavior of the system is the result of its properties.

There are several things that are composed of parts, such as sets, systems, and mereologically composite objects. Many times things are labeled using these terms interchangeably, so it would be a good idea to make the appropriate distinctions when referring to emergence.

A system to me could be a physical object or even a new thought. Our new thoughts (the system) are the result of (or function of) other previous thoughts (the parts).

A system, for example, is defined like this:

"[...] a group of interacting or interrelated elements that act according to a set of rules to form a unified whole.[1] A system, surrounded and influenced by its environment, is described by its boundaries, structure and purpose and expressed in its functioning. Systems are the subjects of study of systems theory and other systems sciences.

Systems have several common properties and characteristics, including structure, function(s), behavior and interconnectivity." (Source: Wikipedia)

Evidently, if parts are interrelated to form a whole, then it is implied that in a system the whole is always a function of the parts. There isn't an option where systems aren't like that, but perhaps a set or a mereologically composite object can exist without the whole being a function of its parts.

That is not very evident when one can doubt it.

Also, systems tend to be dynamic, more complex, and that's what I usually identify with emergent phenomena.

The dynamic of a system is the result of its properties.

[Pattern-chaser]

Your quibbling makes no difference to the essential and empirical truth, that wholes have properties that are most usefully or helpfully attached to, or associated with, the whole, not its constituent parts.

One needs to be very careful and precise here:

1. There are doubtless predicates which are true of wholes but not of any of their parts.
2. There are doubtless concepts which apply to wholes but not to any of their parts.
3. There are doubtless complex (structural) properties which are had by wholes but not by any of their parts.

As for 3, complex (structural) properties of wholes are ontologically reducible to simple properties of or/and simple relations between their basic parts; so they are not ontologically emergent.

The big question in the context of emergentism is whether there are ontologically emergent and irreducible properties of wholes: simple, i.e. non-complex, non-structural, properties of wholes which aren't had by any of their parts.

It is only the (possible) existence of such emergent properties which I have denied!

It follows that when a predicate is true of, or a concept applies to a whole but not of/to any of its parts, the truthmaker of the corresponding statement is not a fact involving an ontologically emergent property.

This dissection seems unnecessary to me. There are properties of things that stem directly from those things. There are others that stem from the constituents of the things. It doesn't really matter whether these properties are rooted in X, or in X's components, or whatever. These properties, for the purposes of reasoning and understanding, sometimes appear to originate in the (whole) thing, rather than its parts. Other properties are more obviously emerging from one or more of the thing's parts. I may be rambling just a little, but that's the essence of it. Why complicate it with a surgical dissection?

The exactitude of the exact source of a given property is not helpful. That the property appears to — and acts as if it — originates from the parts, not the whole, is more than sufficient for our needs. That another property appears to — and acts as if it — originates from the whole, rather than its parts, is also more than sufficient for our needs.

[Count Lucanor]

The behavior of the system is the result of its properties.

Not necessarily. As you can see in the provided definition of a system, it is surrounded and influenced by its environment. This is specially important for open systems, which are precisely the ones which tend to exhibit emergence.

A system to me could be a physical object or even a new thought. Our new thoughts (the system) are the result of (or function of) other previous thoughts (the parts).

But that is not consistent with the strict definition of a system.

Previous thoughts are not parts of new thoughts. Here we can see what I said before: the confusion between systems, sets and mereologically composite objects.

[Bahman]

The behavior of the system is the result of its properties.

Not necessarily. As you can see in the provided definition of a system, it is surrounded and influenced by its environment. This is specially important for open systems, which are precisely the ones which tend to exhibit emergence.

Of course, you need a stimulus in order to have a response from a system. The behavior of the system however is the result of its properties and stimulus to be more precise.

A system to me could be a physical object or even a new thought. Our new thoughts (the system) are the result of (or function of) other previous thoughts (the parts).

But that is not consistent with the strict definition of a system.

Previous thoughts are not parts of new thoughts. Here we can see what I said before: the confusion between systems, sets and mereologically composite objects.

Think of Socrates's example: 1) Socrates is a man, 2) All men are mortal, and 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. (3) is the result of (1) and (2). What is (3) if it is not a system?

[Pattern-chaser]

Think of Socrates's example: 1) Socrates is a man, 2) All men are mortal, and 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. (3) is the result of (1) and (2). What is (3) if it is not a system?

The conclusion of a syllogism?

[Consul]

One needs to be very careful and precise here:

1. There are doubtless predicates which are true of wholes but not of any of their parts.
2. There are doubtless concepts which apply to wholes but not to any of their parts.
3. There are doubtless complex (structural) properties which are had by wholes but not by any of their parts.

As for 3, complex (structural) properties of wholes are ontologically reducible to simple properties of or/and simple relations between their basic parts; so they are not ontologically emergent.

The big question in the context of emergentism is whether there are ontologically emergent and irreducible properties of wholes: simple, i.e. non-complex, non-structural, properties of wholes which aren't had by any of their parts.

It is only the (possible) existence of such emergent properties which I have denied!

It follows that when a predicate is true of, or a concept applies to a whole but not of/to any of its parts, the truthmaker of the corresponding statement is not a fact involving an ontologically emergent property.

This dissection seems unnecessary to me. There are properties of things that stem directly from those things. There are others that stem from the constituents of the things. It doesn't really matter whether these properties are rooted in X, or in X's components, or whatever. These properties, for the purposes of reasoning and understanding, sometimes appear to originate in the (whole) thing, rather than its parts. Other properties are more obviously emerging from one or more of the thing's parts. I may be rambling just a little, but that's the essence of it. Why complicate it with a surgical dissection?

The exactitude of the exact source of a given property is not helpful. That the property appears to — and acts as if it — originates from the parts, not the whole, is more than sufficient for our needs. That another property appears to — and acts as if it — originates from the whole, rather than its parts, is also more than sufficient for our needs.

Irreducible emergent properties of wholes (if there are any such properties) are different from but dependent on (rooted/grounded in) reducible structural properties of them; so emergent properties do not magically appear out of nothing, because their instantiations are caused by instantiations of structural properties. Therefore, from the perspective of emergentist materialism, there is a natural connection between higher-level emergents and their lower-level emergence bases.

What you call "surgical dissection" is ontological analysis: Those who postulate ontologically emergent properties of systems need to answer certain critical questions:

"My aim at present is simply to note that any conception of emergence is incomplete without an account of the bearers of emergent properties."

"[T]here is a problem about what exactly might bear an emergent property, something that appears not to have occurred to other proponents of emergence."

(Heil, John. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. pp. 28+29)

That is, once again, the crucial ontological question is how a nonsimple, i.e. composite/complex/compound, object as a whole can have simple emergent properties, given that the whole is fundamentally a complex of two or more (numerically) different and distinct (non-overlapping) simple objects.

Let's again analyze the simplest case: w = a + b.
w is said to have some emergent property E: Ew
It follows that E(a+b). But where exactly is E located in w = a + b?

* Does E wholly adhere to/inhere in a? No, since then it wouldn't be an emergent property of w, but a non-emergent property of a.

* Does E wholly adhere to/inhere in b? No, since then it wouldn't be an emergent property of w, but a non-emergent property of b.

* Does E partly adhere to/inhere in a and partly in b? No, since E doesn't have any parts due to being a simple, i.e. noncomposite, property. So E cannot have a divided location by having one part in a and another part in b.

Therefore, E adheres to/inheres in w = a + b neither wholly nor partly; so E doesn't adhere to/inhere in w = a + b at all, in which case there is no such emergent property E that is had by w!

[Bahman]

Think of Socrates's example: 1) Socrates is a man, 2) All men are mortal, and 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. (3) is the result of (1) and (2). What is (3) if it is not a system?

The conclusion of a syllogism?

That I know. I think (1) and (2) form a system and the property of the system that is a function of (1) and (2) (the result of (1) and (2)) is (3). What do you think?

[Pattern-chaser]

Think of Socrates's example: 1) Socrates is a man, 2) All men are mortal, and 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. (3) is the result of (1) and (2). What is (3) if it is not a system?

The conclusion of a syllogism?

That I know. I think (1) and (2) form a system and the property of the system that is a function of (1) and (2) (the result of (1) and (2)) is (3). What do you think?

I think "system" is quite the wrong word, but perhaps that is because I have not wholly digested the discussion you were having, that I interrupted? I think that perhaps "system" is a misleading term to use here?