There is no strong emergence

[Pattern-chaser]

...Therefore, E adheres to/inheres in w = a + b neither wholly nor partly; so E doesn't adhere to/inhere in w = a + b at all, in which case there is no such emergent property E that is had by w!

This looks to me like more over-complication. Let's try to keep this simple.

Let's assume an entity, E, with parts P₁ – P_N (but we'll just call the parts "P", for typing convenience). Let's further assume that P is a complete list of E's parts.

Any property or attribute that E exhibits is dependent (only) on P. This remains true even if we look more closely at P, and realise that it is really a hierarchy of parts, with each comprising a collection of smaller parts.

This leads us to recognise that 'emergence' simply describes properties of E that 'emerge' from it, or from P. As E = P, it doesn't matter which way round we express it. The only difference between strong and weak 'emergence', as I see it, is the fuzziness of the dividing line between strong and weak.

[Pattern-chaser]

This leads us to recognise that 'emergence' simply describes properties of E that 'emerge' from it, or from P. As E = P, it doesn't matter which way round we express it. The only difference between strong and weak 'emergence', as I see it, is the fuzziness of the dividing line between strong and weak.

On reflection, I'm not sure my final sentence makes proper sense.

We use "emergence" to describe properties, often unexpected properties, that a whole might have. The unexpectedness is down to us looking at the parts, and not seeing how a particular property 'emerges' from those parts.

Properties that clearly depend on the parts don't phase us at all. It's only when the whole appears to have properties that the parts do not, that we get confused, and start talking of "emergence".

The more surprising an emergent property is, the more likely we are to call it "strong" emergence. This requires that we invent a new term — weak emergence — to describe properties that we consider less surprising. Emergence is not so much a real thing, as it is a function of our understanding of wholes, and so forth.

Everything is a network is a common saying in software, but it applies almost universally. In this case, the parts, P, are the nodes of the network. And the often-forgotten (by reductionism and reductionists) connections are what give rise to "emergent" phenomena, I suspect. As true scientists, and therefore reductionists, we are surprised when we discover a property that is not very dependent on P, but more on C, the connections, the inter-relationships between the nodes (P). So we invent a new term to argue about: "emergence".

[Samana Johann]

By touch (of ignorance) properties arise. Yet ignorance isn't, doesn't weak at all, or good householder?

[Count Lucanor]

The behavior of the system is the result of its properties.

Not necessarily. As you can see in the provided definition of a system, it is surrounded and influenced by its environment. This is specially important for open systems, which are precisely the ones which tend to exhibit emergence.

Of course, you need a stimulus in order to have a response from a system. The behavior of the system however is the result of its properties and stimulus to be more precise.

But stimulus then operates as an external force outside the system, or, looking at it in another way, there are many systems interacting with each other in contingent, unpredictable ways. The behavior of the system is then not reducible to the properties of its elements. In all cases, however, systems work as such because their properties, processes, behaviors, etc., are a function of something else: their parts and other systems. And we can always see a system as a sub-system.

A system to me could be a physical object or even a new thought. Our new thoughts (the system) are the result of (or function of) other previous thoughts (the parts).

But that is not consistent with the strict definition of a system.

Previous thoughts are not parts of new thoughts. Here we can see what I said before: the confusion between systems, sets and mereologically composite objects.

Think of Socrates's example: 1) Socrates is a man, 2) All men are mortal, and 3) Therefore Socrates is mortal. (3) is the result of (1) and (2). What is (3) if it is not a system?

Sorry, but that doesn't look like a system to me, except if you want to reduce it all to a syllogism, in which case the content of it (the concept, the thought) becomes irrelevant.

[Consul]

This leads us to recognise that 'emergence' simply describes properties of E that 'emerge' from it, or from P. As E = P, it doesn't matter which way round we express it. The only difference between strong and weak 'emergence', as I see it, is the fuzziness of the dividing line between strong and weak.

On reflection, I'm not sure my final sentence makes proper sense.

We use "emergence" to describe properties, often unexpected properties, that a whole might have. The unexpectedness is down to us looking at the parts, and not seeing how a particular property 'emerges' from those parts.

Properties that clearly depend on the parts don't phase us at all. It's only when the whole appears to have properties that the parts do not, that we get confused, and start talking of "emergence".

The more surprising an emergent property is, the more likely we are to call it "strong" emergence. This requires that we invent a new term — weak emergence — to describe properties that we consider less surprising. Emergence is not so much a real thing, as it is a function of our understanding of wholes, and so forth.

Everything is a network is a common saying in software, but it applies almost universally. In this case, the parts, P, are the nodes of the network. And the often-forgotten (by reductionism and reductionists) connections are what give rise to "emergent" phenomena, I suspect. As true scientists, and therefore reductionists, we are surprised when we discover a property that is not very dependent on P, but more on C, the connections, the inter-relationships between the nodes (P). So we invent a new term to argue about: "emergence".

The first problem is that the very concept of emergence has been defined differently by different philosophers/scientists.

QUOTE>
"One immediate conclusion that my work establishes is that even a careful critic such as Kim is plausibly mistaken in his widely shared talk of “the” concept of emergence, for there are a plethora of distinct notions of emergence springing both from philosophical debates as well as the rich array of scientific usages. And I show that there are hidden battles even over how many tenable notions of emergence there actually are, and such disputes are masked by talk of “the” concept. We therefore need to be aware that the contested nature of various notions of emergence means there is a very tangled terminology. For example, the terms “Weak” and “Strong” are used in existing debates to refer to differing (and sometimes even incompatible) notions.

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 174)
<QUOTE

For example, here are Gillett's own definitions:

(Note that he doesn't equate ontological emergence with strong emergence, which most philosophers do!)

QUOTE>
"* Emergence, Ontological – A property instance F is Ontologically emergent only if property instance F is a property of a higher-level individual, F is not realized, and F is determinative.

* Emergence, Qualitative – A property instance F is Qualitatively emergent only if it is a property of a composed individual not had by any of the constituents of this individual.

* Emergence, Strong – A property instance F is Strongly emergent only if F is a property of a composed individual, F is realized by the properties of the individual’s constituents, and F is determinative. (One of the main contentions of the book is that a property instance F is Strongly emergent if and only if F is a property of a composed individual realized by the properties of the constituents of this individual and F machretically determines some of the powers contributed by its realizers.)

* Emergence, Weak – A property instance F is Weakly emergent only if it is a property of a composed individual that is realized by the properties of the constituents of the individual but such that the laws/ explanations/theories about F cannot be derived/ predicted from the laws/ explanations/theories about the realizers of F."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 358)

"Basically, a W[eakly]-emergent property instance is realized, but also has certain semantic and/or epistemic features. In particular, the law statements, and/or explanations, and/or theories, that hold of a W-emergent property cannot be derived, computed, or predicted from the laws, explanations, and/or theories that hold of its realizers."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 177)

"Realization – The compositional relation between property/ relations instances posited in the sciences and their compositional explanations."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 361)
<QUOTE

So to say that an ontologically emergent property of a system is "non-realized" is to say that it isn't composed of or constituted by any groups of properties of or/and relations between the system's elements. That is to say, it is a compositionally simple, i.e. non-complex/non-structural, property of a system. If the existence of such emergent properties is impossible due to the insolubility of the bearer problem (as described by me in previous posts), then ontological emergentism (thus defined) can be ruled out a priori.

I have no problem with Gillett's ontologically innocuous concepts of qualitative emergence and weak emergence. His concept of strong emergence (≠ ontological emergence as defined by him) is idiosyncratic insofar as it includes the postulation of a questionable form of downward (higher-to-lower-level) influence he calls "machretic determination", which I tend to reject.

[Consul]

I have no problem with Gillett's ontologically innocuous concepts of qualitative emergence and weak emergence.

…as long as they aren't applied to ontologically emergent qualities!

[Pattern-chaser]

We use "emergence" to describe properties, often unexpected properties, that a whole might have. The unexpectedness is down to us looking at the parts, and not seeing how a particular property 'emerges' from those parts.

Properties that clearly depend on the parts don't phase us at all. It's only when the whole appears to have properties that the parts do not, that we get confused, and start talking of "emergence".

The more surprising an emergent property is, the more likely we are to call it "strong" emergence. This requires that we invent a new term — weak emergence — to describe properties that we consider less surprising. Emergence is not so much a real thing, as it is a function of our understanding of wholes, and so forth.

Everything is a network is a common saying in software, but it applies almost universally. In this case, the parts, P, are the nodes of the network. And the often-forgotten (by reductionism and reductionists) connections are what give rise to "emergent" phenomena, I suspect. As true scientists, and therefore reductionists, we are surprised when we discover a property that is not very dependent on P, but more on C, the connections, the inter-relationships between the nodes (P). So we invent a new term to argue about: "emergence".

The first problem is that the very concept of emergence has been defined differently by different philosophers/scientists.

QUOTE>
"One immediate conclusion that my work establishes is that even a careful critic such as Kim is plausibly mistaken in his widely shared talk of “the” concept of emergence, for there are a plethora of distinct notions of emergence springing both from philosophical debates as well as the rich array of scientific usages. And I show that there are hidden battles even over how many tenable notions of emergence there actually are, and such disputes are masked by talk of “the” concept. We therefore need to be aware that the contested nature of various notions of emergence means there is a very tangled terminology. For example, the terms “Weak” and “Strong” are used in existing debates to refer to differing (and sometimes even incompatible) notions.

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 174)
<QUOTE

For example, here are Gillett's own definitions:

(Note that he doesn't equate ontological emergence with strong emergence, which most philosophers do!)

QUOTE>
"* Emergence, Ontological – A property instance F is Ontologically emergent only if property instance F is a property of a higher-level individual, F is not realized, and F is determinative.

* Emergence, Qualitative – A property instance F is Qualitatively emergent only if it is a property of a composed individual not had by any of the constituents of this individual.

* Emergence, Strong – A property instance F is Strongly emergent only if F is a property of a composed individual, F is realized by the properties of the individual’s constituents, and F is determinative. (One of the main contentions of the book is that a property instance F is Strongly emergent if and only if F is a property of a composed individual realized by the properties of the constituents of this individual and F machretically determines some of the powers contributed by its realizers.)

* Emergence, Weak – A property instance F is Weakly emergent only if it is a property of a composed individual that is realized by the properties of the constituents of the individual but such that the laws/ explanations/theories about F cannot be derived/ predicted from the laws/ explanations/theories about the realizers of F."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 358)

"Basically, a W[eakly]-emergent property instance is realized, but also has certain semantic and/or epistemic features. In particular, the law statements, and/or explanations, and/or theories, that hold of a W-emergent property cannot be derived, computed, or predicted from the laws, explanations, and/or theories that hold of its realizers."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 177)

"Realization – The compositional relation between property/ relations instances posited in the sciences and their compositional explanations."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 361)
<QUOTE

So to say that an ontologically emergent property of a system is "non-realized" is to say that it isn't composed of or constituted by any groups of properties of or/and relations between the system's elements. That is to say, it is a compositionally simple, i.e. non-complex/non-structural, property of a system. If the existence of such emergent properties is impossible due to the insolubility of the bearer problem (as described by me in previous posts), then ontological emergentism (thus defined) can be ruled out a priori.

I have no problem with Gillett's ontologically innocuous concepts of qualitative emergence and weak emergence. His concept of strong emergence (≠ ontological emergence as defined by him) is idiosyncratic insofar as it includes the postulation of a questionable form of downward (higher-to-lower-level) influence he calls "machretic determination", which I tend to reject.

You can't seem to break free of complexity, can you? You write at considerable length, using words like "machretic"!, apparently with the intention of making the issue seem unmanageably — or 'unimaginably'? — complex.

Emergence is not that complex. It is interesting, and it is not trivial, but it doesn't require so many long words, or even as many words, as you care to employ. Knife-edge precision — if that is what it is? — is not worth that price, IMO.

[Gertie]

Bahman

To try to cut to the chase -

Gertie wrote: ↑March 7th, 2023, 1:41 pm I'm making the point that if you mean simply that the parts in motion are 'function', then your take on strong and weak emergence in the OP boils down to both being parts in motion with physical causal properties doesn't it? Which is fine. But I'd suggest that when it comes to mind as an emergent property of brain activity, there's a different type of weak v strong distinction being made.  Which is that weak emergence is explicable in terms of our physicalist ontological model, like acorns and ocean waves, but phenomenal experiential properties aren't as far as we can tell.  Hence the Hard Problem.

Well, I think we have to agree with a definition of mind. I already gave my definition of mind in substance dualism. What is your definition of mind?

By ''mind'' here I'm referring to  phenomenal experiential states. I assume you agree?

Rather than get bogged down with  the term ''function'', would you agree that the issue of emergence re the mind-body problem  is that substance monist  physicalists argue tha mind must be an ontologically emergent property of brains (the parts) in motion? And therefore ontologically reducible to brains in motion? 

Where-as substance dualists believe that phenomenal experience isn't ontologically reducible to material stuff in motion (brain activity), but rather that phenomenal experience is a fundamental substance?

If so, then the problem for physicalists is that the current physicalist model cannot explain how phenomenal experience can in principle ontologically emerge from matter in motion.  And this is why it's called 'Strong Emergence' in philosophy of mind.  Unlike say the parts of a car being able to move from A to B, which can be explained by physicalism's model of material parts in motion.

[Bahman]

The behavior of the system is the result of its properties.

Not necessarily. As you can see in the provided definition of a system, it is surrounded and influenced by its environment. This is specially important for open systems, which are precisely the ones which tend to exhibit emergence.

Of course, you need a stimulus in order to have a response from a system. The behavior of the system however is the result of its properties and stimulus to be more precise.

But stimulus then operates as an external force outside the system, or, looking at it in another way, there are many systems interacting with each other in contingent, unpredictable ways.

The behavior of the systems is predictable unless one takes the free will into the consideration.

The behavior of the system is then not reducible to the properties of its elements.

The behavior of the system is reducible to the properties of its parts and the stimulus. That is true since the properties of the system are reducible to the properties of parts and the behavior of the system is the result of the properties of the system and the stimulus.

In all cases, however, systems work as such because their properties, processes, behaviors, etc., are a function of something else: their parts and other systems. And we can always see a system as a sub-system.

Yes.

[Bahman]

Bahman

To try to cut to the chase -

Gertie wrote: ↑March 7th, 2023, 1:41 pm I'm making the point that if you mean simply that the parts in motion are 'function', then your take on strong and weak emergence in the OP boils down to both being parts in motion with physical causal properties doesn't it? Which is fine. But I'd suggest that when it comes to mind as an emergent property of brain activity, there's a different type of weak v strong distinction being made.  Which is that weak emergence is explicable in terms of our physicalist ontological model, like acorns and ocean waves, but phenomenal experiential properties aren't as far as we can tell.  Hence the Hard Problem.

Well, I think we have to agree with a definition of mind. I already gave my definition of mind in substance dualism. What is your definition of mind?

By ''mind'' here I'm referring to  phenomenal experiential states. I assume you agree?

This definition is correct only in the monist physicalist point of view. In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

Rather than get bogged down with  the term ''function'', would you agree that the issue of emergence re the mind-body problem  is that substance monist  physicalists argue tha mind must be an ontologically emergent property of brains (the parts) in motion? And therefore ontologically reducible to brains in motion?

Yes, that is what they believe.

Where-as substance dualists believe that phenomenal experience isn't ontologically reducible to material stuff in motion (brain activity), but rather that phenomenal experience is a fundamental substance?

In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

If so, then the problem for physicalists is that the current physicalist model cannot explain how phenomenal experience can in principle ontologically emerge from matter in motion.  And this is why it's called 'Strong Emergence' in philosophy of mind.  Unlike say the parts of a car being able to move from A to B, which can be explained by physicalism's model of material parts in motion.

Yes, I agree.

[Gertie]

Bahman

To try to cut to the chase -

Gertie wrote: ↑March 7th, 2023, 1:41 pm I'm making the point that if you mean simply that the parts in motion are 'function', then your take on strong and weak emergence in the OP boils down to both being parts in motion with physical causal properties doesn't it? Which is fine. But I'd suggest that when it comes to mind as an emergent property of brain activity, there's a different type of weak v strong distinction being made.  Which is that weak emergence is explicable in terms of our physicalist ontological model, like acorns and ocean waves, but phenomenal experiential properties aren't as far as we can tell.  Hence the Hard Problem.

Well, I think we have to agree with a definition of mind. I already gave my definition of mind in substance dualism. What is your definition of mind?

By ''mind'' here I'm referring to  phenomenal experiential states. I assume you agree?

This definition is correct only in the monist physicalist point of view. In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

Rather than get bogged down with  the term ''function'', would you agree that the issue of emergence re the mind-body problem  is that substance monist  physicalists argue tha mind must be an ontologically emergent property of brains (the parts) in motion? And therefore ontologically reducible to brains in motion?

Yes, that is what they believe.

Where-as substance dualists believe that phenomenal experience isn't ontologically reducible to material stuff in motion (brain activity), but rather that phenomenal experience is a fundamental substance?

In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

If so, then the problem for physicalists is that the current physicalist model cannot explain how phenomenal experience can in principle ontologically emerge from matter in motion.  And this is why it's called 'Strong Emergence' in philosophy of mind.  Unlike say the parts of a car being able to move from A to B, which can be explained by physicalism's model of material parts in motion.

Yes, I agree.

OK.  So re the mind-body problem. 

It makes sense for physicalist substance monists to talk of strong emergence as a way of expressing the belief that phenomenal experience must somehow ontologically emerge from physical processes.  And here 'strong' signifies that the mechanism of emergence isn't currently explainable via the physicalist model.

How then would a substance dualist see the ontological role of emergence?

[Bahman]

Bahman

To try to cut to the chase -

Well, I think we have to agree with a definition of mind. I already gave my definition of mind in substance dualism. What is your definition of mind?

By ''mind'' here I'm referring to  phenomenal experiential states. I assume you agree?

This definition is correct only in the monist physicalist point of view. In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

Rather than get bogged down with  the term ''function'', would you agree that the issue of emergence re the mind-body problem  is that substance monist  physicalists argue tha mind must be an ontologically emergent property of brains (the parts) in motion? And therefore ontologically reducible to brains in motion?

Yes, that is what they believe.

Where-as substance dualists believe that phenomenal experience isn't ontologically reducible to material stuff in motion (brain activity), but rather that phenomenal experience is a fundamental substance?

In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

If so, then the problem for physicalists is that the current physicalist model cannot explain how phenomenal experience can in principle ontologically emerge from matter in motion.  And this is why it's called 'Strong Emergence' in philosophy of mind.  Unlike say the parts of a car being able to move from A to B, which can be explained by physicalism's model of material parts in motion.

Yes, I agree.

OK.  So re the mind-body problem. 

It makes sense for physicalist substance monists to talk of strong emergence as a way of expressing the belief that phenomenal experience must somehow ontologically emerge from physical processes.  And here 'strong' signifies that the mechanism of emergence isn't currently explainable via the physicalist model.

Yes, I agree.

How then would a substance dualist see the ontological role of emergence?

Are you talking about the ontological emergence of mind? If yes, then the answer is that there is no emergence since the mind is one of the fundamental substances in substance dualism.

[Consul]

You can't seem to break free of complexity, can you? You write at considerable length, using words like "machretic"!, apparently with the intention of making the issue seem unmanageably — or 'unimaginably'? — complex.

Emergence is not that complex. It is interesting, and it is not trivial, but it doesn't require so many long words, or even as many words, as you care to employ. Knife-edge precision — if that is what it is? — is not worth that price, IMO.

Given the ambiguity of "emergence", it needs to be clarified & precisified first what we are talking about, so as not to talk past each other. Conceptual clarification & precisification are part and parcel of doing (analytic) philosophy.

The adjective "machretic" and the corresponding noun "machresis" are technical terms coined and used by Gillett.

"Machresis, machretic determination – The non- productive determinative relation between composed and component entities such that
composed entities determine some of the powers of their components through role-shaping or role-constraining."

(Gillett, Carl. Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. p. 359)

[Gertie]

Bahman

To try to cut to the chase -


By ''mind'' here I'm referring to  phenomenal experiential states. I assume you agree?

This definition is correct only in the monist physicalist point of view. In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

Rather than get bogged down with  the term ''function'', would you agree that the issue of emergence re the mind-body problem  is that substance monist  physicalists argue tha mind must be an ontologically emergent property of brains (the parts) in motion? And therefore ontologically reducible to brains in motion?

Yes, that is what they believe.

Where-as substance dualists believe that phenomenal experience isn't ontologically reducible to material stuff in motion (brain activity), but rather that phenomenal experience is a fundamental substance?

In substance dualism, the mind is the substance that experiences.

If so, then the problem for physicalists is that the current physicalist model cannot explain how phenomenal experience can in principle ontologically emerge from matter in motion.  And this is why it's called 'Strong Emergence' in philosophy of mind.  Unlike say the parts of a car being able to move from A to B, which can be explained by physicalism's model of material parts in motion.

Yes, I agree.

OK.  So re the mind-body problem. 

It makes sense for physicalist substance monists to talk of strong emergence as a way of expressing the belief that phenomenal experience must somehow ontologically emerge from physical processes.  And here 'strong' signifies that the mechanism of emergence isn't currently explainable via the physicalist model.

Yes, I agree.

How then would a substance dualist see the ontological role of emergence?

Are you talking about the ontological emergence of mind? If yes, then the answer is that there is no emergence since the mind is one of the fundamental substances in substance dualism.

Right.

So lets consider  this  in ontological terms of what actually exists and is going on when we talk about the mind-body problem and emergence.

At the most basic system level, the universe-system, we can say fundamental stuff/substance exists as a brute fact (it has no explanation).  and is ontologically irreducible.  And when we talk about the properties of that fundamental substance  we're talking about  how it behaves/interacts. The properties of the universe-system are the parts of its fundamental substance(s) interacting. 

A substance monist would say everything can be explained in terms of the parts of the one fundamental substance interacting in different ways. This is what physicalism claims. In which case mind (phenomenal experience) is a property which manifests (emerges) when certain material parts interact in certain ways.  Like everything else we see in the universe.

But while physicalism can in principle explain pretty much all of these emergent properties in terms of ontological reduction (to fundamental forces acting on fundamental particles) it doesn't have an in principle way of reducing phenomenal experience in that way (according to its current model).  And this is what physicalist monists mean by strong emergence re the mind-body problem. That they can't yet explain it via their ontological model of what the world is made of and how it works. But assume there must be some such explanation.

Where-as the substance dualist position is that mind isn't ontologically reducible,  it too is a fundamental substance.

Now we can come up with all sorts of definitions of weak and strong emergence in different contexts (apparently lots of peeps do), but this is the way physicalists use the terms re the mind-body problem - 

In that context 'strong' emergence for physicalists means mind is ontologically reducible to physical stuff, it is an emergent  property of matter in motion, but is currently inexplicable according to the physicalist model.

I don't see how your OP counters that claim.

[Pattern-chaser]

And here 'strong' [emergence] signifies that the mechanism of emergence isn't currently explainable via the physicalist model.

Yes, I agree.

I'm not good with 'schools' of philosophy, in this case, Physicalism. But I can't see the need for a more complicated explanation than the network one I have already offered. Some attributes of a network obviously stem from one or more of its nodes. [In the network, the nodes are what are often called the 'parts', and the network itself is the 'whole'.] But some, apparently, don't.

This is because the functionality of the attribute concerned is more dependent on the connections than others. A complex web of connections in a network can result in attributes or properties that do not obviously emerge from the nodes. And of course we can all recognise that the important word there is "obviously". Because the properties we are considering here are dependent on the nodes, just as they depend on the connections too, but when that dependency is more complex, it becomes much more difficult for us to spot. And so we say that our models don't account for the attribute, but that's only because our models overlook connections, I think.

If we consider how a network of cells (i.e. me) possesses the attribute of being able to write English, it is very difficult to see how the cells might manage that. That may be down to the abstract distance between language and cells being too great for us to span, or it may be what we call emergence. I'm not sure. But if it's the former, there are other similar examples where the cause is emergence.

Am I fooling myself? Have I focussed on an apparent solution that is too simple, and doesn't fit? Maybe so, but I can't see it. I remember that it isn't the millions (?) of neurons in our brains that account for their complexity, it's the incredibly dense web of connections.

Actually, it's the two together, for without both nodes and connections, there can be no network. But it's worth concentrating on the connections, because we humans commonly ignore or discard them, simplistically believing that the network can be understood as a bag of unconnected parts (nodes). It can't, of course.