Why Did Life and the Processes of Evolution Occur?

[Sy Borg]

Again, incompleteness of the fossil record is not a hole in the theory of evolution. Since fossilisation is rare, missing links are normal and expected. The details of the picture are not perfectly clear, but what the whole image shows is indisputable, specially when considering not only the fossil evidence, but modern genetics as well. There's little doubt that we are related to other primates and we have common ancestors.

Nicely put.

The only issues I have with evolution are a couple of concepts. first, I don't care for the Gouldian "evolution is not a tree but a bush". If that was true, the events of the last billion years would have played out very differently IMO. The progression has happened, despite occasional examples of species losing previously evolved features when they are no longer needed. The general trend has well and truly been established.

Further, I think the hard division between "life" and "not life" is less ontic than influenced by the biological reality of death. That is, there is a hard line between life and death for us humans, so we assume it to be universal. This hard division between chemistry and biology was not always the case, in much the same way as the hard division we see today between humans and other animals was not the case for early Homo sapiens.

To that end, consider LUCA. When LUCA first developed the qualities that would qualify it as "life", the difference between it and its closest biochemical peers would have been slight.

No doubt, the capacity for entities that qualify as biology to actively sustain themselves and sustainably reproduce is technically a "hard emergence". Yet, when LUCA emerged, there would have been a number of complex biochemical processes that were very close to qualifying as life, eg. cells with a basic metabolism and RNA that split via mitosis, but the daughter cells were not viable. Such complex "near-life" structures may not be possible today; perhaps being consumed before they could complexify in the current hyper-competitive biological milieu.

[Count Lucanor]

Science provides a high degree of certainty...

That's the thing I'm trying to get at, when I mention the misuse or redefinition of words. A "degree of certainty" is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Certainty is the end-point, not a point/position on the way to it. All points on the way to the end-point are uncertain. How could it be otherwise?

For a moment, I thought my limited English skills had failed me again. So I had to look it up, but that meant bad news for your argument that "degree of certainty is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms":

How to express levels of certainty

You can use different levels of certainty to indicate your level of confidence in the strength of your claim and that of others.

To decide on your level of certainty, ask yourself these three questions:

How certain am I of my claim?
How narrowly or broadly do I want my claim to apply?
What hedging words do I use?
You can imagine these levels of certainty as a ‘certainty barometer’, ranging from low to moderate to high (Lingard, 2020, p. 108):

Rhetorical Functions in Academic Speaking: Expressing degrees of certainty

It is important when you are speaking to show how sure you are about something. In other words, you need to show the degree of certainty.

Expressing Degrees of Certainty: Present Time

Expressing Degrees of certainty refers to how sure we are. What we think the chances are that something is true. If we are sure something is true in the present, we don’t need to use a modal. For example, if I say, ‘John is sick.’ I am sure; I am stating a fact that I am sure is true. My degree of certainty is 100%.

[Count Lucanor]

Can you give me links or examples and explain how that could be? Because it doesn't make sense to me that something emerges from more fundamental parts but isn't ontologicalically reducible ('reverse engineerable') to what it emerges from.

I know Searle claims experience is causally reducible but not ontologically reducible to brain processes - again I don't get it, how can this make sense?

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them, which is not to say that we cannot identify the parts. Emergentism is about what arises out of complexity, reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

[Gertie]

Can you give me links or examples and explain how that could be? Because it doesn't make sense to me that something emerges from more fundamental parts but isn't ontologicalically reducible ('reverse engineerable') to what it emerges from.

I know Searle claims experience is causally reducible but not ontologically reducible to brain processes - again I don't get it, how can this make sense?

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them, which is not to say that we cannot identify the parts. Emergentism is about what arises out of complexity, reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Right,  novel properties emerge from complex interactions  of parts which don't themselves have those properties.   

For physicalism the ontological fundamental existents include forces which 'act on' or otherwise explain the interactions of material parts, which result in the novel properties.  So what emerges that way imo  must be in principle similarly ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental matter.   Physicalism says that's all there is. Whether it's heat applied to H2O molecules to form a gas, or human neural interactions resulting in conscious experience.

So imo physicalist emergence which isn't ultimately  ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental stuff is incoherent. Or am I missing something? 

[Pattern-chaser]

Science provides a high degree of certainty...

That's the thing I'm trying to get at, when I mention the misuse or redefinition of words. A "degree of certainty" is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Certainty is the end-point, not a point/position on the way to it. All points on the way to the end-point are uncertain. How could it be otherwise?

For a moment, I thought my limited English skills had failed me again. So I had to look it up, but that meant bad news for your argument that "degree of certainty is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms":

How to express levels of certainty

Nice quotes. But they also say this (taken from your 1st link):

In academic communication, writers rarely express their claims with absolute certainty. In order to indicate that an issue has more than one answer or interpretation, you need to use cautious or tentative language. We call this ‘expressing uncertainty’.

When you express uncertainty through cautious or tentative language, you as a writer demonstrate that you are aware of the range of possible interpretations. You also demonstrate your critical thinking skills by recognising that information is debatable and open to further questioning.

Cautious language used to ‘soften’ your claims is known as hedging. You can employ hedging to indicate the level of certainty you want to express, and make your statements sound well-reasoned.

If you look carefully, you (i.e. 'one') can find apparent support easily, just as you did, and as I just did too.

[Pattern-chaser]

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them...

A whole is often more than "the sum of its parts" because a network is more than a 'bagful' of nodes. A network comprises nodes and connections. Both are necessary, and the network cannot survive without either one. Emergentism arises out of the network, a consequence of its connections and its nodes, taken together, as a whole.

...reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Reductionism is a process of tearing indivisible wholes apart, into smaller 'parts' that are easier — for humans! — to understand in isolation. This plainly wrong and undesirable process is unavoidable for humans, because our minds simply cannot 'digest' the entire universe in one gulp. Our convenience and need is the only justification for this otherwise unjustifiable practice.

Wholes are rarely, if ever, "merely composed".

[Count Lucanor]

Can you give me links or examples and explain how that could be? Because it doesn't make sense to me that something emerges from more fundamental parts but isn't ontologicalically reducible ('reverse engineerable') to what it emerges from.

I know Searle claims experience is causally reducible but not ontologically reducible to brain processes - again I don't get it, how can this make sense?

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them, which is not to say that we cannot identify the parts. Emergentism is about what arises out of complexity, reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Right,  novel properties emerge from complex interactions  of parts which don't themselves have those properties.   

For physicalism the ontological fundamental existents include forces which 'act on' or otherwise explain the interactions of material parts, which result in the novel properties.  So what emerges that way imo  must be in principle similarly ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental matter.   Physicalism says that's all there is. Whether it's heat applied to H2O molecules to form a gas, or human neural interactions resulting in conscious experience.

So imo physicalist emergence which isn't ultimately  ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental stuff is incoherent. Or am I missing something? 

As I understand it, it is precisely the non-reducibility what makes it emergent. As I said before, being able to identify the parts and acknowledging that there's dependency of the parts in the emergence of the whole, is not the same as reducing the whole to its parts. As Pattern-Chaser explained, it "arises out of the network, a consequence of its connections and its nodes". Reduction implies dismissing the connections in favor of the nodes.

[Count Lucanor]

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them...

A whole is often more than "the sum of its parts" because a network is more than a 'bagful' of nodes. A network comprises nodes and connections. Both are necessary, and the network cannot survive without either one. Emergentism arises out of the network, a consequence of its connections and its nodes, taken together, as a whole.

...reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Reductionism is a process of tearing indivisible wholes apart, into smaller 'parts' that are easier — for humans! — to understand in isolation. This plainly wrong and undesirable process is unavoidable for humans, because our minds simply cannot 'digest' the entire universe in one gulp. Our convenience and need is the only justification for this otherwise unjustifiable practice.

I tend to agree with this.

Wholes are rarely, if ever, "merely composed".

That's why reductionism is often a failure.

[Count Lucanor]

Science provides a high degree of certainty...

That's the thing I'm trying to get at, when I mention the misuse or redefinition of words. A "degree of certainty" is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms. Certainty is the end-point, not a point/position on the way to it. All points on the way to the end-point are uncertain. How could it be otherwise?

For a moment, I thought my limited English skills had failed me again. So I had to look it up, but that meant bad news for your argument that "degree of certainty is a literal oxymoron, a contradiction in terms":

How to express levels of certainty

Nice quotes. But they also say this (taken from your 1st link):

In academic communication, writers rarely express their claims with absolute certainty. In order to indicate that an issue has more than one answer or interpretation, you need to use cautious or tentative language. We call this ‘expressing uncertainty’.

When you express uncertainty through cautious or tentative language, you as a writer demonstrate that you are aware of the range of possible interpretations. You also demonstrate your critical thinking skills by recognising that information is debatable and open to further questioning.

Cautious language used to ‘soften’ your claims is known as hedging. You can employ hedging to indicate the level of certainty you want to express, and make your statements sound well-reasoned.

If you look carefully, you (i.e. 'one') can find apparent support easily, just as you did, and as I just did too.

I did look carefully and I did find support for my statement. You did not, as your claim that the expression "degrees of certainty" is an oxymoron, a contradiction, and therefore an invalid expression, turned out to be false: the expression is perfectly valid. The existence of degrees of uncertainty does not cancel degrees of certainty, just as the level of emptyness of a glass does not contradict its level of fullness, they are just complementary concepts.

[Agent Smyth]

Ask yerself

1. What is life?

2. Why is 1 a really unlucky number?

3. ? Left to the reader as an exercise.

[JackDaydream]

Ask yerself

1. What is life?

2. Why is 1 a really unlucky number?

3. ? Left to the reader as an exercise.

The question of what life is tricky because we come from the perspective of human life and its meaning. We have no idea what it may be like to be a dog, butterfly, a snake or a plant so our perspective is human centred. It even goes back to life in the womb, although this probably relates to emergence from the process of initial conception to maturity. The same applies at death as it is unknown at what point all consciousness fades, and that is of course making the assumption that it does. Brain death may be significant for thought but life and consciousness may not be entirely reduced to the brain, but distributed to other centres, such as the heart as a source of emotion.

I am not aware of number 1 being unlucky, but there may be different associations. For example, I have always seen number 13 or 6 as being considered unlucky, and this may be due to superstitions. However, numbers have often been taken seriously because they may represent patterns in nature and life itself, such as the divisions in the months and the zodiac as well as 7 days in a week. These categories seem to be fairly universal rather than arbitrary.

[Gertie]

Can you give me links or examples and explain how that could be? Because it doesn't make sense to me that something emerges from more fundamental parts but isn't ontologicalically reducible ('reverse engineerable') to what it emerges from.

I know Searle claims experience is causally reducible but not ontologically reducible to brain processes - again I don't get it, how can this make sense?

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them, which is not to say that we cannot identify the parts. Emergentism is about what arises out of complexity, reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Right,  novel properties emerge from complex interactions  of parts which don't themselves have those properties.   

For physicalism the ontological fundamental existents include forces which 'act on' or otherwise explain the interactions of material parts, which result in the novel properties.  So what emerges that way imo  must be in principle similarly ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental matter.   Physicalism says that's all there is. Whether it's heat applied to H2O molecules to form a gas, or human neural interactions resulting in conscious experience.

So imo physicalist emergence which isn't ultimately  ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental stuff is incoherent. Or am I missing something? 

As I understand it, it is precisely the non-reducibility what makes it emergent. As I said before, being able to identify the parts and acknowledging that there's dependency of the parts in the emergence of the whole, is not the same as reducing the whole to its parts. As Pattern-Chaser explained, it "arises out of the network, a consequence of its connections and its nodes". Reduction implies dismissing the connections in favor of the nodes.

But not if you include the forces which govern the connectivity of the nodes as fundamental (ontologically irreducible), as well as the matter/nodes themselves. Which physicalism does. Ontological reduction reduces to what is fundamental, and physicalism says both matter and natural forces are fundamental, right?

If I've got that right, Physicalism would have to say, I think, that 'connectivity and nodes' is just an abstract way of talking about ontological forces 'acting on' matter.

Without the fundamental forces resulting in the interactions of matter, presumably there would just exist static fundamental particles, no novel properties could arise, no emergence could happen. Whether it's water becoming a gas, or phenomenal experience arising from brain processes. So forces can't be excluded from ontological reduction or emergence, they're integral.

And hence I'm thinking there's no real weak/strong emergence distinction as such. It's just that usually physical interactions and new properties in nature can be understood as ontologically reducible, at least in principle. But notably not when it comes to emergent consciousness - hence the place-holder explanation of 'strong' emergence.

[Count Lucanor]

If something is emergent, as a whole it is more than the sum of its parts, it's more than just composed of them, therefore not reducible to them, which is not to say that we cannot identify the parts. Emergentism is about what arises out of complexity, reductionism is a process of reversing what is merely composed with very low level of complexity.

Right,  novel properties emerge from complex interactions  of parts which don't themselves have those properties.   

For physicalism the ontological fundamental existents include forces which 'act on' or otherwise explain the interactions of material parts, which result in the novel properties.  So what emerges that way imo  must be in principle similarly ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental matter.   Physicalism says that's all there is. Whether it's heat applied to H2O molecules to form a gas, or human neural interactions resulting in conscious experience.

So imo physicalist emergence which isn't ultimately  ontologically reducible to fundamental forces acting on fundamental stuff is incoherent. Or am I missing something? 

As I understand it, it is precisely the non-reducibility what makes it emergent. As I said before, being able to identify the parts and acknowledging that there's dependency of the parts in the emergence of the whole, is not the same as reducing the whole to its parts. As Pattern-Chaser explained, it "arises out of the network, a consequence of its connections and its nodes". Reduction implies dismissing the connections in favor of the nodes.

But not if you include the forces which govern the connectivity of the nodes as fundamental (ontologically irreducible), as well as the matter/nodes themselves. Which physicalism does. Ontological reduction reduces to what is fundamental, and physicalism says both matter and natural forces are fundamental, right?

If I've got that right, Physicalism would have to say, I think, that 'connectivity and nodes' is just an abstract way of talking about ontological forces 'acting on' matter.

Without the fundamental forces resulting in the interactions of matter, presumably there would just exist static fundamental particles, no novel properties could arise, no emergence could happen. Whether it's water becoming a gas, or phenomenal experience arising from brain processes. So forces can't be excluded from ontological reduction or emergence, they're integral.

And hence I'm thinking there's no real weak/strong emergence distinction as such. It's just that usually physical interactions and new properties in nature can be understood as ontologically reducible, at least in principle. But notably not when it comes to emergent consciousness - hence the place-holder explanation of 'strong' emergence.

I'm not sure what your point is in relation to physicalism, reductionism and emergentism. If it is that physicalism allows for the reducibility of nature to fundamental elements, and that therefore for emergentism to be consistent with materialism necessarily implies reductionism to those fundamental elements, I disagree. Paraphrasing myself: ultimately, what physicalism entails is what constitutes the domain of the real: only the physical. To say that this is compatible with emergentism is not to say that the domain of the physical is only constituted by non-reducible entities, processes and relations. The complexity of the universe implies several layers of interactions between its elements, each one being understood as a local, particular domain on its own, and many of those will be reducible to other elements (chemical laws to fundamental laws of physics, for example), but not all of them in every level. And as a whole, considering the entire system of nature, comprised of many other systems, it is not reducible to the sum of those systems put side by side, but still constituted by the dynamic relations between all those systems. From a materialist point of view, consciousness belongs to a domain within biological systems, intertwined with other domains and material systems, so that given the appropriate combination of circumstances, it emerges from them. Laws of physics, chemistry, causal regularities, as well as contingency of open systems, are constitutive elements in that equation, at both complex and fundamental levels, which of course include the mechanical interactions and linear causal processes that operate in those levels, but that does not imply that consciousness is reducible, in other words, "is nothing more than" those basic interactions. Yes, it is physics, but it is more than physics. It is chemistry, but it is more than chemistry. It is biology, but is more than biology.

[Agent Smyth]

Ask yerself

1. What is life?

2. Why is 1 a really unlucky number?

3. ? Left to the reader as an exercise.

The question of what life is tricky because we come from the perspective of human life and its meaning. We have no idea what it may be like to be a dog, butterfly, a snake or a plant so our perspective is human centred. It even goes back to life in the womb, although this probably relates to emergence from the process of initial conception to maturity. The same applies at death as it is unknown at what point all consciousness fades, and that is of course making the assumption that it does. Brain death may be significant for thought but life and consciousness may not be entirely reduced to the brain, but distributed to other centres, such as the heart as a source of emotion.

I am not aware of number 1 being unlucky, but there may be different associations. For example, I have always seen number 13 or 6 as being considered unlucky, and this may be due to superstitions. However, numbers have often been taken seriously because they may represent patterns in nature and life itself, such as the divisions in the months and the zodiac as well as 7 days in a week. These categories seem to be fairly universal rather than arbitrary.

I'm with you in re life being hard/impossible (?) to define. I suppose it boils down to what a drosophilia does and what a pebble on the shores of lake Huron doesn't.

As for the number 1, you seem to have grasped its significance.