Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Use this forum to discuss the philosophy of science. Philosophy of science deals with the assumptions, foundations, and implications of science.
Locked
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Consul wrote: January 20th, 2020, 8:07 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 7:30 pmOn my view, classes, concepts, predicates and a resemblance to paradigmatic particulars all analyze to the same thing. We could say that they're superficially different in that predicates could be looked at purely as text strings or sounds in the context of sentences and concepts are mental states, for example, and text strings and mental states are not identical, but then we lose any semantic connotation of predicates. Essentially, all four of those things are ways of talking about concepts.
As for the ontology of concepts:

QUOTE:
"There are three main views on the nature of concepts:

(i) Mental representations: concepts are mental particulars that are the constituents of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. As such, concepts are internal symbols with representational properties.2

(ii) Abstract entities: concepts are abstract (i.e., non-spatio-temporal) entities that are the constituents of propositions (e.g., Fregean senses).3

(iii) Abilities: concepts are cognitive abilities or capacities—e.g., the ability to draw certain inferences, classify objects based on perceptions, or react to stimuli in various ways.4

2 Advocates include Fodor (1975, 1987, 1998, 2004) and Carruthers (1996, 2000).
3 Advocates include Peacocke (1992), Zalta (2001), and Chalmers (2011).
4 Advocates include Evans (1982), Dummett (1993), Brandom (1994), and Millikan (2000)."

(Scharp, Kevin. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 35)
QUOTE-END

Also see: Concepts: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/

In cognitive science, concepts in sense 1 usually aren't regarded as linguistic objects, and hence aren't equated with linguistic predicates. (However, items in "the language of thought" are para-linguistic, i.e. distinct from but analogous to linguistic items.)

Concepts in sense 2 are abstract objects which are the nonlinguistic meanings or senses of linguistic predicates. Predicates qua linguistic types are abstract objects too, whereas predicates qua linguistic tokens are concrete (mental or physical) objects.

Classes/sets are abstract objects that are often regarded as extensions of concepts (in sense 1 or 2), but others think they exist independently of concepts.

Classes/sets are different from (mereological) sums/fusion, because the former aren't identical to their members (taken together), whereas the latter are identical to their parts (taken together).
The right answer is that concepts are what you list as (1), and that predicates (with semantics attached to them), classes and resemblance to paradigmatic particulars (for some reason you misread me as saying that the mereological category is included here--I was lumping the resemblance nominalism category with it rather) are all simply concepts.
Atla
Posts: 2540
Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Atla »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 6:29 pm
Atla wrote: January 20th, 2020, 11:36 am The "constant first person view" you can observe, and the qualia you can observe, aren't restricted to animal brains.
Based on?
Based on the fact that there's no known way how animal brains would produce them. Nor should they do that in principle either.
It's common to fall into such basic traps with physicalism, and then miss out on the whole issue with consciousness.
Nor are there mental and physical things at all.
What are the alternate (or at least the third) ontological categories you'd propose?
No categories.
True philosophy points to the Moon
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Atla wrote: January 21st, 2020, 1:16 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 6:29 pm

Based on?
Based on the fact that there's no known way how animal brains would produce them. Nor should they do that in principle either.
It's common to fall into such basic traps with physicalism, and then miss out on the whole issue with consciousness.
How would that suggest that mentality occurs elsewhere, so that it's not restricted to animal brains? You'd need evidence of it occurring elsewhere.
What are the alternate (or at least the third) ontological categories you'd propose?
No categories.
So would you say whatever phenomena you have in your ontology "occur nowhere"?
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Consul »

Atla wrote: January 21st, 2020, 1:16 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 6:29 pmWhat are the alternate (or at least the third) ontological categories you'd propose?
No categories.
Do you seriously believe the world (in itself) is just an indistinct blob, an "amorphous lump" (M. Dummett), a "formless, kindless, no differences, no similarities, noumenal 'blah'" (C. B. Martin)?

QUOTE:
"[Quine's] is most aptly characterized not as a one-category ontology – the one category being ‘thing’ in the broadest possible sense, or ‘entity’ – but rather as a no-category ontology. On Quine’s view, all that we can ever do is to disagree about how to describe what there is, not over the nature of what there is to be described.
But a no-category ontology is an incoherent ontology, I believe. For either it maintains that what there is is many, or that what there is is one, or that what there is is neither many nor one. As I have already explained, my own view is that the only coherent position is that although reality is one, it contains multiplicity, so that what there is is many. Quine himself seems to suppose so too, for he holds that “to be is to be the value of a variable” and seems to be committed to the multiplicity of such values. Pythagoreanism would certainly respect the principle that what there is is many: many mathematical objects, including all the numbers. But Quine also espouses the dictum “No entity without identity” (…) and in some sense that must be correct too. For how can there be multiplicity where there is neither identity nor distinctness? There can only be many if each of the many is a one that is identical only with itself and distinct from each of the rest. However, a no-category ontology leaves no scope for any real difference between one and many nor between identity and distinctness. Given his no-category ontology, Quine’s one-word answer to the question “What is there?” – “Everything” – is misleading to the extent that it suggests that what there is is determinately and objectively either one or many. For the Quinean, all questions concerning “how many” things there are and which things are identical with or distinct from one another have to do with how we describe reality, not with what reality contains prior to or independently of our attempts to describe it. Thus Quine is implicitly quite as committed to the “amorphous lump” conception of reality as Michael Dummett is explicitly committed to it (…). Both of them are anti-realist metaphysicians in the fullest sense of the term, because the distinction between an utterly formless ‘something’ and nothing at all is a distinction without a meaningful difference. Indeed, in the end they are both nihilist metaphysicians, because there is no coherent way for them to exempt us and our descriptions of or thoughts about reality from the annihilating acid of their anti-realism."

(Lowe, E. J. "An Essentialist Approach to Truth-Making." In Truth and Truth-Making, edited by E. J. Lowe and A. Rami, 201-216. Stocksfield, Acumen: 2009. pp. 205-6)
QUOTE-END
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Consul »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 8:15 pmThe right answer is that concepts are what you list as (1), and that predicates (with semantics attached to them), classes and resemblance to paradigmatic particulars (for some reason you misread me as saying that the mereological category is included here--I was lumping the resemblance nominalism category with it rather) are all simply concepts.
You may say so, but that's an expression of antirealism (rather than of reductive realism) about predicates, classes/sets, and sums/fusions.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Consul wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 12:26 am
Terrapin Station wrote: January 20th, 2020, 8:15 pmThe right answer is that concepts are what you list as (1), and that predicates (with semantics attached to them), classes and resemblance to paradigmatic particulars (for some reason you misread me as saying that the mereological category is included here--I was lumping the resemblance nominalism category with it rather) are all simply concepts.
You may say so, but that's an expression of antirealism (rather than of reductive realism) about predicates, classes/sets, and sums/fusions.
Yes. Predicates, classes/sets are not real (not objective/extramental) things.

Aside from that, why can't you get straight that I said something different about the mereology category?
Atla
Posts: 2540
Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Atla »

Consul wrote: January 21st, 2020, 11:27 pm Do you seriously believe the world (in itself) is just an indistinct blob, an "amorphous lump" (M. Dummett), a "formless, kindless, no differences, no similarities, noumenal 'blah'" (C. B. Martin)?
No, and your question is ridiculous
True philosophy points to the Moon
Atla
Posts: 2540
Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Atla »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 21st, 2020, 4:27 pm How would that suggest that mentality occurs elsewhere, so that it's not restricted to animal brains? You'd need evidence of it occurring elsewhere.
It's nonsensical to call qualia + the first person view "mentality".
There is also no scientific evidence connecting them to animal brains, so people shouldn't act like there was. We can merely observe subjectively that they are happening there.
So would you say whatever phenomena you have in your ontology "occur nowhere"?
That's a bit vague
True philosophy points to the Moon
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Atla wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:09 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 21st, 2020, 4:27 pm How would that suggest that mentality occurs elsewhere, so that it's not restricted to animal brains? You'd need evidence of it occurring elsewhere.
It's nonsensical to call qualia + the first person view "mentality".
There is also no scientific evidence connecting them to animal brains, so people shouldn't act like there was. We can merely observe subjectively that they are happening there.
So would you say whatever phenomena you have in your ontology "occur nowhere"?
That's a bit vague
When were you going to get to the part of something suggesting that mentality occurs elsewhere?
Atla
Posts: 2540
Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Atla »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:15 pm
Atla wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:09 pm
It's nonsensical to call qualia + the first person view "mentality".
There is also no scientific evidence connecting them to animal brains, so people shouldn't act like there was. We can merely observe subjectively that they are happening there.


That's a bit vague
When were you going to get to the part of something suggesting that mentality occurs elsewhere?
When you quote me saying that "mentality occurs elsewhere".
True philosophy points to the Moon
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Atla wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:16 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:15 pm

When were you going to get to the part of something suggesting that mentality occurs elsewhere?
When you quote me saying that "mentality occurs elsewhere".
"The "constant first person view" you can observe, and the qualia you can observe, aren't restricted to animal brains."

"Aren't restricted to" means that it occurs elsewhere (in addition, at least)
Atla
Posts: 2540
Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Atla »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:24 pm
Atla wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:16 pm
When you quote me saying that "mentality occurs elsewhere".
"The "constant first person view" you can observe, and the qualia you can observe, aren't restricted to animal brains."

"Aren't restricted to" means that it occurs elsewhere (in addition, at least)
So you can't quote me calling those things "mentality".
True philosophy points to the Moon
User avatar
Consul
Posts: 6036
Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
Location: Germany

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Consul »

Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 11:19 am
Consul wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 12:26 amYou may say so, but that's an expression of antirealism (rather than of reductive realism) about predicates, classes/sets, and sums/fusions.
Yes. Predicates, classes/sets are not real (not objective/extramental) things.
If there weren't even concrete (mental or physical) tokens of linguistic predicates, we couldn't have written our posts, since these abound with predicate-tokens.

Antirealism (eliminativism/nihilism): Xs don't exist.
Reductive realism: Xs do exist but they are identical to Ys.
Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 11:19 amAside from that, why can't you get straight that I said something different about the mereology category?
So you're not a mereological nihilist denying that two or more (simple) things ever compose something, i.e. that there are wholes which are sums/fusions of two or more things?
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Consul wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:41 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 11:19 am Yes. Predicates, classes/sets are not real (not objective/extramental) things.
If there weren't even concrete (mental or physical) tokens of linguistic predicates, we couldn't have written our posts, since these abound with predicate-tokens.
Did you read the parenthetical in what you quoted from me?
User avatar
Terrapin Station
Posts: 6227
Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
Location: NYC Man

Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy

Post by Terrapin Station »

Atla wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:28 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: January 22nd, 2020, 1:24 pm

"The "constant first person view" you can observe, and the qualia you can observe, aren't restricted to animal brains."

"Aren't restricted to" means that it occurs elsewhere (in addition, at least)
So you can't quote me calling those things "mentality".
Oy vey. I'm asking you for the evidence you're appealing to in saying that "The 'constant first person view' you can observe, and the qualia you can observe" occur elsewhere.
Locked

Return to “Philosophy of Science”

2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise

Entanglement - Quantum and Otherwise
by John K Danenbarger
January 2023

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul

Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness

Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023

The Unfakeable Code®

The Unfakeable Code®
by Tony Jeton Selimi
April 2023

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are

The Book: On the Taboo Against Knowing Who You Are
by Alan Watts
May 2023

Killing Abel

Killing Abel
by Michael Tieman
June 2023

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead

Reconfigurement: Reconfiguring Your Life at Any Stage and Planning Ahead
by E. Alan Fleischauer
July 2023

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021