There's also a relevant distinction between nominalism about properties simpliciter and nominalism about properties qua universals, because the latter doesn't include the former. You can consistently be an antirealist about properties qua universals and a realist about properties qua particulars (called modes or tropes).
Magical thinking in science and philosophy
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
I'm a minimalist by the way. Property-talk doesn't imply that one is positing universals.Consul wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 7:51 pmThere is still the ontological question of whether the truthmakers of truths about ways things are involve a category of entities called properties, which is answered in the negative by nominalists/antirealists about them.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 5:08 pmRe matter necessarily having properties, that should be very simple to understand. Anything that exists (matter or not) is going to have some set of characteristics, some set of ways that it is, some set of ways that it interacts with other things, etc. Those are properties.
By the way, there are different versions of property nominalism:
QUOTE:
1. "Class Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be members of the same class of particulars." (p. 136)
2. "Concept Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to fall under the same concept." (p. 137)
3. "Mereological Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be parts of the same aggregate of particulars." (p. 138)
4. "Predicate Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for the same predicate to apply to them." (pp. 138-9)
5. "Resemblance Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for them to have a sufficient resemblance to some paradigm particular(s)." (p. 139)
"Besides the five versions of Nominalism already outlined, we should perhaps include a sixth: Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism. I have in mind those philosophers who refuse to countenance universals but who at the same time see no need for any reductive analyses of the sorts just outlined. There are no universals but the proposition that a is F is perfectly all right as it is. Quine's refusal to take predicates with any ontological seriousness seems to make him a Nominalist of this kind." (p. 16)
(Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals & Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.)
QUOTE-END
From a nominalist perspective, "Anything that exists (matter or not) is going to have some set of particular characteristics, some set of particular ways that it is, some set of particular ways that it interacts with other things, etc. Those are properties."
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
Re.The distinctions as Armstrong makes them, by the way, I wouldn't say that there's really a difference between 1, 2, 4 and 5, and 3 doesn't seem to be coherent.Consul wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 7:51 pmThere is still the ontological question of whether the truthmakers of truths about ways things are involve a category of entities called properties, which is answered in the negative by nominalists/antirealists about them.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 5:08 pmRe matter necessarily having properties, that should be very simple to understand. Anything that exists (matter or not) is going to have some set of characteristics, some set of ways that it is, some set of ways that it interacts with other things, etc. Those are properties.
By the way, there are different versions of property nominalism:
QUOTE:
1. "Class Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be members of the same class of particulars." (p. 136)
2. "Concept Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to fall under the same concept." (p. 137)
3. "Mereological Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be parts of the same aggregate of particulars." (p. 138)
4. "Predicate Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for the same predicate to apply to them." (pp. 138-9)
5. "Resemblance Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for them to have a sufficient resemblance to some paradigm particular(s)." (p. 139)
"Besides the five versions of Nominalism already outlined, we should perhaps include a sixth: Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism. I have in mind those philosophers who refuse to countenance universals but who at the same time see no need for any reductive analyses of the sorts just outlined. There are no universals but the proposition that a is F is perfectly all right as it is. Quine's refusal to take predicates with any ontological seriousness seems to make him a Nominalist of this kind." (p. 16)
(Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals & Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.)
QUOTE-END
-
- Posts: 2540
- Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
Ah that's what you meant, I didn't think of that one.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 5:04 pmI said this very simply in my first post in the thread: "Matter isn't nothing. Matter necessarily has properties." So no one is claiming that "mind comes from nothing."
Mental stuff is something extra, that is supposed to emerge out of material properties. (No one knows how or why that would happen.) We get more than the sum of the parts, maybe we even get something of a deifferent nature, in other words we got something out of nothing.
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
On my view, and on the views of physicalists (or identity theorists) in general, mentality isn't something extra. It's is the properties of a specific sort of matter (the matter that makes up brains), in particular sorts of structures (again, in the structures that we find in brains), undergoing certain sorts of processes (which we find in functioning brains).Atla wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 11:16 amAh that's what you meant, I didn't think of that one.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 5:04 pm
I said this very simply in my first post in the thread: "Matter isn't nothing. Matter necessarily has properties." So no one is claiming that "mind comes from nothing."
Mental stuff is something extra, that is supposed to emerge out of material properties. (No one knows how or why that would happen.) We get more than the sum of the parts, maybe we even get something of a deifferent nature, in other words we got something out of nothing.
That's not to say that it's impossible that mentality could be a property of any other material, in any other structure, undergoing any other sort of process, but we don't as yet have a good reason to believe that it occurs anywhere except for animal brains.
-
- Posts: 2540
- Joined: January 30th, 2018, 1:18 pm
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
Yeah yeahTerrapin Station wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 11:24 amOn my view, and on the views of physicalists (or identity theorists) in general, mentality isn't something extra. It's is the properties of a specific sort of matter (the matter that makes up brains), in particular sorts of structures (again, in the structures that we find in brains), undergoing certain sorts of processes (which we find in functioning brains).Atla wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 11:16 am
Ah that's what you meant, I didn't think of that one.
Mental stuff is something extra, that is supposed to emerge out of material properties. (No one knows how or why that would happen.) We get more than the sum of the parts, maybe we even get something of a deifferent nature, in other words we got something out of nothing.
That's not to say that it's impossible that mentality could be a property of any other material, in any other structure, undergoing any other sort of process, but we don't as yet have a good reason to believe that it occurs anywhere except for animal brains.
The "constant first person view" you can observe, and the qualia you can observe, aren't restricted to animal brains. Nor are there mental and physical things at all.
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
Based on?
What are the alternate (or at least the third) ontological categories you'd propose?Nor are there mental and physical things at all.
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
There's a difference because classes/sets, concepts, (mereological) sums/fusions, and predicates are different things.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 8:35 pmRe.The distinctions as Armstrong makes them, by the way, I wouldn't say that there's really a difference between 1, 2, 4 and 5, and 3 doesn't seem to be coherent.Consul wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 7:51 pmQUOTE:
1. "Class Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be members of the same class of particulars." (p. 136)
2. "Concept Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to fall under the same concept." (p. 137)
3. "Mereological Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or to have the same relation, is for them to be parts of the same aggregate of particulars." (p. 138)
4. "Predicate Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for the same predicate to apply to them." (pp. 138-9)
5. "Resemblance Nominalism. The reductive doctrine that for particulars to have the same property, or have the same relation, is for them to have a sufficient resemblance to some paradigm particular(s)." (p. 139)
"Besides the five versions of Nominalism already outlined, we should perhaps include a sixth: Ostrich or Cloak-and-dagger Nominalism. I have in mind those philosophers who refuse to countenance universals but who at the same time see no need for any reductive analyses of the sorts just outlined. There are no universals but the proposition that a is F is perfectly all right as it is. Quine's refusal to take predicates with any ontological seriousness seems to make him a Nominalist of this kind." (p. 16)
(Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals & Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.)
QUOTE-END
As for 3, it's not incoherent but inadequate.
QUOTE:
"At this point we may take brief note of the heroic doctrine which I have called Mereological Nominalism. It tries to give an account of what it is for a thing to have a property not in terms of classes but of aggregates, a is F if and only if a is a part (proper or otherwise) of the aggregate of all the Fs. Bochenski (1956, p. 47) appropriately calls it the "bit" theory, a is F because it is a bit of the great F thing. The theory must be distinguished from that crude version of the theory of Forms which puts a bit of the Form F in each particular which is F (see Plato, Parmenides, 131 b-c),an over-literal form of universalia in rebus. Mereological Nominalism admits only particulars, standing to each other in the relation of part and whole. The obvious advantage of the theory is that it avoids appeal to an ontology of classes. Its obvious disadvantage is that, while it is a necessary condition of as being F that a is a part of the aggregate of Fs, it is not, in general, sufficient. It has some plausibility to say that each part of the aggregate of white things is white. But it is false that each part of the aggregate of things having the mass of one kilogram has the mass of one kilogram. Most of such parts have a different mass. This is the case for most properties, and, scientific investigation may perhaps reveal, even for all properties. Again, there can be few if any relations such that, given the aggregate of the things related by that n-adic relation, any n parts of that aggregate will be related by that same relation. But even in the case of a putative property such as whiteness, it is clear that the theory is inadequate. To mention only one difficulty, it is not the case that a white thing derives its whiteness from being a part of the great white aggregate. Rather, inspection reveals, it belongs to the aggregate of white things because it is white."
(Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals & Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. pp. 34-5)
QUOTE-END
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
On my view, classes, concepts, predicates and a resemblance to paradigmatic particulars all analyze to the same thing. We could say that they're superficially different in that predicates could be looked at purely as text strings or sounds in the context of sentences and concepts are mental states, for example, and text strings and mental states are not identical, but then we lose any semantic connotation of predicates. Essentially, all four of those things are ways of talking about concepts.Consul wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 7:22 pmThere's a difference because classes/sets, concepts, (mereological) sums/fusions, and predicates are different things.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 8:35 pm Re.The distinctions as Armstrong makes them, by the way, I wouldn't say that there's really a difference between 1, 2, 4 and 5, and 3 doesn't seem to be coherent.
As for 3, it's not incoherent but inadequate.
QUOTE:
"At this point we may take brief note of the heroic doctrine which I have called Mereological Nominalism. It tries to give an account of what it is for a thing to have a property not in terms of classes but of aggregates, a is F if and only if a is a part (proper or otherwise) of the aggregate of all the Fs. Bochenski (1956, p. 47) appropriately calls it the "bit" theory, a is F because it is a bit of the great F thing. The theory must be distinguished from that crude version of the theory of Forms which puts a bit of the Form F in each particular which is F (see Plato, Parmenides, 131 b-c),an over-literal form of universalia in rebus. Mereological Nominalism admits only particulars, standing to each other in the relation of part and whole. The obvious advantage of the theory is that it avoids appeal to an ontology of classes. Its obvious disadvantage is that, while it is a necessary condition of as being F that a is a part of the aggregate of Fs, it is not, in general, sufficient. It has some plausibility to say that each part of the aggregate of white things is white. But it is false that each part of the aggregate of things having the mass of one kilogram has the mass of one kilogram. Most of such parts have a different mass. This is the case for most properties, and, scientific investigation may perhaps reveal, even for all properties. Again, there can be few if any relations such that, given the aggregate of the things related by that n-adic relation, any n parts of that aggregate will be related by that same relation. But even in the case of a putative property such as whiteness, it is clear that the theory is inadequate. To mention only one difficulty, it is not the case that a white thing derives its whiteness from being a part of the great white aggregate. Rather, inspection reveals, it belongs to the aggregate of white things because it is white."
(Armstrong, D. M. Nominalism & Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals & Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978. pp. 34-5)
QUOTE-END
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
There's also a real difference between resemblance nominalism and "ostrich nominalism" (which doesn't provide any ontological analysis of predication).Consul wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 7:22 pmThere's a difference because classes/sets, concepts, (mereological) sums/fusions, and predicates are different things.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 8:35 pm Re.The distinctions as Armstrong makes them, by the way, I wouldn't say that there's really a difference between 1, 2, 4 and 5, and 3 doesn't seem to be coherent.
QUOTE:
"Ostrich Nominalism. This view, held by Quine, among others, maintains that there is nothing in virtue of which our thing is scarlet: it just is scarlet (Devitt 1980, 97). But many think that being scarlet cannot be a metaphysically ultimate fact, but that there must be something in virtue of which scarlet things are scarlet.
…
"Another version of Nominalism is Resemblance Nominalism. According to this theory, it is not that scarlet things resemble one another because they are scarlet, but what makes them scarlet is that they resemble one another. Thus what makes something scarlet is that it resembles the scarlet things. Similarly, what makes square things square is that they resemble one another, and so what makes something square is that it resembles the square things. Resemblance is fundamental and primitive and so either there are no properties or the properties of a thing depend on what things it resembles."
Nominalism in Metaphysics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nomi ... taphysics/
QUOTE-END
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
I'm a nominalist/antirealist about properties qua universals but an antinominalist/realist about properties qua particulars.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 8:21 pmI'm a [nominalist] by the way. Property-talk doesn't imply that one is positing universals.
- Terrapin Station
- Posts: 6227
- Joined: August 23rd, 2016, 3:00 pm
- Favorite Philosopher: Bertrand Russell and WVO Quine
- Location: NYC Man
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
How would you take properties as particulars to be "antinominalist"?Consul wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 7:36 pmI'm a nominalist/antirealist about properties qua universals but an antinominalist/realist about properties qua particulars.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 19th, 2020, 8:21 pmI'm a [nominalist] by the way. Property-talk doesn't imply that one is positing universals.
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
As for the ontology of concepts:Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 7:30 pmOn my view, classes, concepts, predicates and a resemblance to paradigmatic particulars all analyze to the same thing. We could say that they're superficially different in that predicates could be looked at purely as text strings or sounds in the context of sentences and concepts are mental states, for example, and text strings and mental states are not identical, but then we lose any semantic connotation of predicates. Essentially, all four of those things are ways of talking about concepts.
QUOTE:
"There are three main views on the nature of concepts:
(i) Mental representations: concepts are mental particulars that are the constituents of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. As such, concepts are internal symbols with representational properties.2
(ii) Abstract entities: concepts are abstract (i.e., non-spatio-temporal) entities that are the constituents of propositions (e.g., Fregean senses).3
(iii) Abilities: concepts are cognitive abilities or capacities—e.g., the ability to draw certain inferences, classify objects based on perceptions, or react to stimuli in various ways.4
…
2 Advocates include Fodor (1975, 1987, 1998, 2004) and Carruthers (1996, 2000).
3 Advocates include Peacocke (1992), Zalta (2001), and Chalmers (2011).
4 Advocates include Evans (1982), Dummett (1993), Brandom (1994), and Millikan (2000)."
(Scharp, Kevin. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 35)
QUOTE-END
Also see: Concepts: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/
In cognitive science, concepts in sense 1 usually aren't regarded as linguistic objects, and hence aren't equated with linguistic predicates. (However, items in "the language of thought" are para-linguistic, i.e. distinct from but analogous to linguistic items.)
Concepts in sense 2 are abstract objects which are the nonlinguistic meanings or senses of linguistic predicates. Predicates qua linguistic types are abstract objects too, whereas predicates qua linguistic tokens are concrete (mental or physical) objects.
Classes/sets are abstract objects that are often regarded as extensions of concepts (in sense 1 or 2), but others think they exist independently of concepts.
Classes/sets are different from (mereological) sums/fusion, because the former aren't identical to their members (taken together), whereas the latter are identical to their parts (taken together).
- Consul
- Posts: 6043
- Joined: February 21st, 2014, 6:32 am
- Location: Germany
Re: Magical thinking in science and philosophy
Property-particulars (modes, tropes) aren't concepts or predicates but realities sui generis, which exist independently of concepts or predicates.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 20th, 2020, 7:42 pmHow would you take properties as particulars to be "antinominalist"?
2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month
Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023
Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023