Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Steve3007
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:If the parts have non-zero size, then size isn't the same thing simply as the distance between parts. We have to include the size of the parts, right?
Your saw my mention of tolerance, yes?
Say that you had an indivisible part that was a 1-meter sphere. And then you had another indivisible 1-meter sphere suspended 1 centimeter away. The size of that system wouldn't be a 1-centimeter length, would it?
If by "indivisible" you meant "cannot be considered to be composed of sub-parts" then the measurement tolerance would be 1 metre. If an object has no sub-parts then its size can't be measured. To do so would be to note the relative positions of sub-parts.

So I guess that system's length would be 1.01 metres +/- 1 metre.

You introduced measurement earlier. I asked this:

What would constitute an accurate measurement in your view? Would it be measuring the distances between literal points? It can't be, can it? Measurement is something that happens in the real world and points don't exist in the real world. They're abstract concepts.



In the original example of yours which kicked off this thread of conversation, if it is meaningful to consider an object that is growing then it seems obvious to me that this means that parts on one side of that object are moving away from parts on the other side. That's what growth means. And if they are doing that then they have speed. If you're talking about a single-part object which is the only thing in the universe then it's not physically meaningful to speak of it growing or having a size.

That's what I think, anyway.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Steve3007 wrote: July 7th, 2020, 9:17 am If an object has no sub-parts then its size can't be measured.

Where in the world are you getting this from?

If you have an indivisible/not-composed of parts 1 meter sphere you can't measure the sphere? Why not?
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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The collapse of the wave function is a game played in the XHV. The ten-dimensional phenomenology stream is constructed using the indestructible contents. It may be intelligent. By intelligent I mean able to regenerate by using the algorithm to replace structures that are missing. It could constitute the basic cell of the bigger intelligent stream. Only if it escapes the Big Freeze or Crunch.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Gertie wrote: July 7th, 2020, 6:33 am
Consul wrote: July 5th, 2020, 3:14 pm Regarding the structure of matter or space/spacetime, there are four options:

1. point-based&continuous (with an infinite number of matter-points or space-points in any given volume or region of space)

2. point-based&discrete (with a finite number of matter-points or space-points in any given volume or region of space)

3. point-free&continuous (with no matter-points or space-points in any given volume or region of space, and with no non-0D matter-"granules" or space-"granules" in any given volume or region of space)

4. point-free&discrete (with no matter-points or space-points in any given volume or region of space, but with a finite number of non-0D matter-"granules" or space-"granules" in any given volume or region of space)
Apologies if you've already covered this.

What does the ''point'' in ''point-based'' refer to?
It refers to zero-dimensional objects.
Gertie wrote: July 7th, 2020, 6:33 amAnd what is the current scientific theory of the most fundamental nature of the universe?
There is no such thing. Of course, there are the standard model, relativity theory, and quantum mechanics; but what the fundamental, ultimate nature or structure of the universe is is still an open question.
Gertie wrote: July 7th, 2020, 6:33 amI've seen the notion of wave fields 'collapsing' into material particles with specific locations, but I don't understand what they are thought to be waves or fields of?

If you could explain in simple lay terms that would be great - I am a simple lay person!
There are so-called collapse theories in quantum physics. What is said to "collapse" is the wave-function, which isn't a physical field in 3D space but a mathematical field in the higher-dimensional 3N configuration space. But what about (the local distribution of) matter in physical 3D space? Two different ontologies have been developed for collapse theories: flash ontology & matter-density ontology.

(Remark: John Bell coined the phrase "local beable". A local beable is a local material/physical entity in physical 3D space/spacetime.)

1. According to flash ontology, the presence of matter or material objects in 3D space (as that which corresponds physically to the collapse of the mathematical wave-function) consists in the (rare and sparse) occurrence of point-events called flashes:

QUOTE>
"The GRW [Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory] dynamics for the quantum state can be conjoined with several different postulates about local beables, thereby creating several different physical theories. Our rather glib talk of the GRW theory has been inaccurate. So far, I have presented only the GRW dynamics for the quantum state. We must now consider alternative ways to fill out the theory with local beables.

When John Bell presented the theory in his article “Are There Quantum Jumps?” he was precise about the local beables he was positing. It is a surprising choice for the material occupants of space-time, which has since become known as the flash ontology.
It is best to let Bell speak for himself:

There is nothing in this theory but the wavefunction [Bell uses the term “theory” to refer to the mathematical formalism, as will become clear]. It is in the wavefunction that we must find an image of the physical world, and in particular of the arrangement of things in ordinary three-dimensional space. But the wavefunction as a whole lives in a much bigger space, of 3N-dimensions. It makes no sense to ask for the amplitude or phase or whatever of the wavefunction at a point in ordinary space. It has neither amplitude nor phase nor anything else until a multitude of points in ordinary three-space [i.e., an N-particle configuration] are specified. However, the GRW jumps (which are part of the wavefunction, not something else) are well localized in ordinary space. Indeed each is centered on a particular space- time point (x, t). So we can propose these events as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the theory. These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events at definite places and times in the real world (as distinct from the many purely mathematical constructions that occur in the working out of physical theories, as distinct from things that may be real but not localized, and as distinct from the ‘observables’ of other formulations of quantum mechanics, for which we have no use here). A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events. As a schematic psychophysical parallelism we can suppose that our personal experience is more or less directly of events in particular pieces of matter, our brains, which events are in turn correlated with events in our bodies as a whole, and they in turn with events in the outer world.

Bell’s flash ontology proposes that the localized material content of space-time is not particles with continuous trajectories, nor continuously distributed fieldlike entities, nor vibrating strings, but rather point events. These points, whose locations correspond to the centers of the Gaussians of the GRW collapses, are scattered quite sparsely through space-time. Recall that an individual electron only suffers a GRW hit once in 10,000,000 years. So according to this theory, overwhelmingly most of the electrons associated with your body make no localized mark on space-time at all in the course of your entire life. They are all reflected in the wavefunction of your body, but nothing in physical space directly indicates their existence.

What, then, would this “galaxy of flashes” look like? Leaving the protons and neutrons (and hence quarks) aside, there are about 10^28 electrons in a human body. That means, just from the electrons, about 10,000,000,000,000 flashes in a single second.
The distribution of these flashes in space would trace out a quite detailed human form. There would be much less to this form in space than we commonly believe, but more than enough to define everything that we take to happen at macroscopic scale. The state of our brains (i.e., the flashes in our brains) would be reliably correlated with this distribution via the same physical mechanism, and thereby we can come to know what is happening around us.

But while the number and density of flashes is sufficient for a finely detailed spatial distribution at the macroscopic scale, it is quite paltry at a microscopic scale. There are about 40,000,000,000,000 cells in a human body, so (at the very rough scale of this estimate) only a few GRW collapses occur per cell per second. The distribution of flashes in space associated with a human body, then, would carry a lot of information about location, shape, and motion at macroscopic scale but almost nothing at the scale of individual cells. Of course, if we go about looking at a cell through even a regular optical microscope, the magnification process would entangle the wavefunction of the individual cell with macroscopic aspects of the equipment (or of the brain of the observer), and the “invisible” parts of the cell would automatically become registered in the GRW flashes.

This tremendous mismatch between what we think is going on spatially in a cell and what is going on according to this theory is extremely disconcerting. Indeed, the flash version of the GRW theory borders on a physical realization of a Cartesian demon, with the wavefunction playing the role of the deceiver orchestrating things. The physics predicts and explains the distribution of objects in space at the macroscopic scale in a way that renders our usual understanding of the goings-on at microscale completely wrong. But since ultimately all our empirical evidence for the theory must exist at the macroscopic scale, the theory still counts as empirically impeccable. Any revulsion toward it is conceptual rather than empirical.

At the start of our investigations, we remarked that physics is the science of matter in motion, that the theory of space-time structure provides the arena for the motion, and that quantum theory should provide the detailed structure of the matter inhabiting space-time. Up until now, we have discussed many experiments that quantum theory must account for, all described (of necessity) at the macroscopic scale. But if the behavior of matter at the macroscopic scale is nothing but the cumulative behavior of its microscopic parts, then a completed rigorous physics should specify what those microscopic local elements are and how they behave. The GRW flash theory is our first complete example of how such a physics might be constructed."

(Maudlin, Tim. Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. pp. 111-4)

"We have already noted that the GRW hits are quite sparse for individual “particles”: most “particles” will not suffer a hit in the entirety of human history. But according to Bell’s proposed set of local beables – since denominated the flash ontology – the only time anything associated with the “particle” exists in space-time is when there is such a hit, such a collapse of the wave-function. So according to the flash ontology, most of the “particles” in your body will leave no mark at all in space-time throughout your lifetime. The collection of local beables in this theory is very sparse indeed."

(Maudlin, Tim. Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity. 3rd ed. Malden, MA. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. p. 236)

"In short, there is nothing wrong with collapses per se, but a collapse theory needs to give an account of the collapses – both the when and the how – in straightforward physical terms, with no mention of “measurement.”

The GRW theory achieves this feat for non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The general form of the theory is so simple and transparent that one cannot but be amazed that it took over half a century to discover. To the when question, the GRW theory answers: from time to time. More precisely, in the original version of the theory each fundamental particle has a fixed probability per unit time of suffering a GRW collapse or “hit.” The probability for each particle is extremely low: a single particle will experience a collapse on average only once in 108 years. Over the course of all recorded human history, less than 1 percent of particles will have suffered “hits.” The chance of any smallish collection of particles (less than a million) experiencing a hit over the course of a laboratory experiment is negligibly small. This would explain why experiments done on individual particles or small collections of atoms would not yield direct evidence of collapses. The GRW theory solves the problem of specifying the circumstances of collapse by cutting the Gordian knot: there are no circumstances that can either promote or delay a collapse. Instead, one needs a new constant of nature that specifies the mean time between collapses. This constant is subject to some empirical constraints, but at present the value of 10^8 years is compatible with all observations.

As to the question of how, GRW asserts that the effect of a collapse is to localize the wave-function of the hit particle in space. Mathematically, this is achieved by multiplying the wave-function, expressed as a function of space, by a Gaussian (bell curve). Once again, a new constant of nature is required, specifying the shape of the Gaussian, and once again there is at present a range of values compatible with observation. The original GRW paper chooses a width of the Gaussian as about 10^-5 cm, rather larger than the size of an atom but much smaller than a red blood cell. The main requirement is that the Gaussian be narrow enough to resolve any macroscopic ambiguity in the location of a particle. We will return to this topic directly, but let’s first pause to consider what has been accomplished so far.

The source of the measurement problem in standard quantum theory is the appearance of the concept of measurement in the fundamental axioms of the theory. Those axioms specify the dynamics of the wave-function of a system. The GRW dynamics for the wave-function, in contrast, are fully specified without any mention, direct or oblique, of measurements. Most of the time, the wave-function of a small collection of particles evolves in accordance with the usual deterministic linear dynamics (Schrödinger’s equation). The deviations from this evolution, the “hits,” occur at random, with fixed probability per unit time. The locations of the hits are also at random, but they are more likely to be centered at locations where the squared amplitude of the wave-function is higher. The effect of a hit on the wavefunction is always the same: multiplication by a Gaussian function that is rather narrow at macroscopic scale."

(Maudlin, Tim. Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity. 3rd ed. Malden, MA. Wiley-Blackwell, 2011. pp. 226-7)
<QUOTE

2. According to matter-density ontology, the presence of matter or material objects in 3D space (as that which corresponds physically to the collapse of the mathematical wave-function) consists in local spikes in space-pervading matter-density fields, i.e. in tiny regions of space where the value of the matter density is or becomes extremely high. (So the matter-density ontology could alternatively be called field-spike ontology.)

QUOTE>
"The problem of local beables arises acutely for the GRW collapse theory in part because the construction of the theory tightly follows the structure of the quantum recipe. The recipe, in turn, provides clear mathematical expression only for the wavefunction and its smooth linear Schrödinger evolution. GRW replaces the vague “assign these probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurement when a measurement occurs” instruction of the recipe with sharp mathematics. But that mathematics still only deals with the dynamics of the wavefunction and, hence, of the quantum state that it represents. Since the quantum state is not a local beable, all this precision has no logical consequences for what the local beables of the theory might be. The only interpretive constraint we have adopted is that the wavefunction be informationally complete, so that the distribution in space-time of whatever local beables we happen to postulate must be determined by it. But this interpretational constraint still leaves a lot of latitude in constructing a theory. Bell’s flash ontology provides one way to complete the construction, using the discreteness and spatiotemporal location of the collapse centers as the key to the local beables. One might say that in the GRW theory, the collapses account for the “particlelike” aspect of the wave-particle duality, and the flash ontology makes use of this in postulating the local beables. But the discreteness of the collapses in time yields a corresponding sparseness of the flashes. Most of the time, there is literally nothing at all material that is localized in space-time.

It is equally natural, beginning with the wavefunction evolving by Schrödinger’s equation, to be impressed by the wavelike aspects of the quantum state and to seek a correspondingly wavelike local beable. As we have remarked, the wavefunction of a single spinless particle is a complex function on physical space-time, so it is easy enough to associate it with a local beable. In such a picture, a single electron in a Double Slit experiment literally spreads out in space, with some of it passing through each slit and the two parts coming together later to interfere. One problem with this picture is accounting for the localized individual mark that eventually forms on the screen. But if we supplement the Schrödinger dynamics with the GRW collapses, this problem seems tractable: When a GRW hit occurs, the spread-out electron gathers itself up in one place, with almost all the density suddenly concentrated within 10^-5 cm of the location where, in the flash ontology, a flash would have occurred. And as a substantial bonus, any other perfectly entangled electrons will experience a similar sudden contraction.

But so far, all this talk of the electron being spread out in space and then suddenly contracting in space is loose talk. The wavefunction of any system with more than one particle is not even mathematically a function over space: it is a function over configuration space. And similarly, the collapse and contraction are not in physical space but in the much higher-dimensional space. So it is not immediately obvious how to use the behavior of the wavefunction in a scheme for postulating a more wavelike local beable.

The problem, essentially, is that the structure of the wavefunction must somehow be projected down from configuration space into physical space, and then the theory must postulate a local beable corresponding to that projection. In such a theory, the GRW collapses will not correspond to the sudden creation of a pointlike local beable, as happens in the flash theory, but rather to a sudden change in the distribution of a continuously distributed beable.

In the nonrelativistic theory, there is an obvious and tempting way to define such a projection. The wavefunction is defined over configuration space, and the squared amplitude of the wavefunction forms, in the mathematical sense, a probability measure over the set of all possible configurations. If we ignore the suggestive word “probability” here, we can just say that the squared amplitude of the wavefunction defines a weighting of various configurations of particles. The natural suggestion, then, is to regard this weighting not as a probability but instead as a measure of how much of each particle is in each configuration. That is, if the squared amplitude of the wavefunction assigns a weight of .25 to a configuration in which a particular electron is on the left and a weight of .75 to a configuration in which that electron is on the right, then somehow .25 of the matter of the electron is on the left and the other .75 of the matter is on the right.

Since each possible configuration assigns an exact position to each particle, the weighting of the configurations can in this way be used to define a matter distribution for each particle. The matter of the particle literally gets smeared out over space. And as the wavefunction evolves in time, the matter distribution correspondingly evolves in time. This is a matter density local ontology of a GRW collapse theory.

The local beables of the matter density theory have none of the peculiarities of the flash ontology. Every particle’s matter always exists and is distributed some way in space. In a Double Slit experiment, the matter density of the electron literally spreads out and passes through each of the slits like a water wave. (In the flash ontology, by contrast, absolutely nothing exists in the space between the two slits and the screen, except on the very, very, very rare occasion when the electron suffers a collapse in transit.) That distribution will never be pointlike in any respect: The GRW collapses tend to concentrate the matter density in certain finite regions but never at a point. The matter density at the microscopic scale may be somewhat more spread out and amorphous than one would have thought, but it will certainly not be sparse. And at macroscopic scale, as with the flash ontology, the matter distribution will correspond to what we believe about where things are. Or at least it does so subject to some caveats.

The main caveat was noticed early on and goes by the name “the tails problem.” The “tails” at issue are the infinitely extended, never-zero tails of the Gaussian that multiplies the wavefunction during a GRW hit. Since the tails are nowhere actually zero, the matter distribution after a hit is never driven to exactly zero anywhere by the hit. To take a concrete example, if a Schrödinger-cat-like macroscopic superposition (1/sqrt2) | right>e | detection>d + (1/sqrt2) | left>e | no detection>d suffers a GRW collapse, the collapse will drive one or the other components of the superposition almost to zero and therefore (given a matter density ontology) will concentrate almost all the matter into one configuration or the other.
That is, the post- hit state will be something like

(1 – e)^(1/2) | right> | detection> – (e)^(1/2) | left> | no detection>|

or (e)^(1/2) | right> | detection> – (1 – e)^(1/2) | left> | no detection>|.

Subsequent hits, which are almost certain to occur on the initially favored configuration, will reduce the stray matter density exponentially lower. But for all that, the low density of extraneous matter will always exist."

(Maudlin, Tim. Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019. pp. 115-8)
<QUOTE
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Consul
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Consul wrote: July 7th, 2020, 2:53 pmThere are so-called collapse theories in quantum physics. What is said to "collapse" is the wave-function, which isn't a physical field in 3D space but a mathematical field in the higher-dimensional 3N configuration space. But what about (the local distribution of) matter in physical 3D space? Two different ontologies have been developed for collapse theories: flash ontology & matter-density ontology.
An alternative label for the latter is mass-density ontology.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:If you have an indivisible/not-composed of parts 1 meter sphere you can't measure the sphere? Why not?
How would you measure it?
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:If you have an indivisible/not-composed of parts 1 meter sphere you can't measure the sphere? Why not?
I know how to measure an object with parts. I hold a ruler (another object with parts) to it. I look at which parts of the ruler align with which parts of the object. Are we talking about the same thing when we talk about a "part" of an object? I mean a section; a slice; a chunk. What do you mean?

As I've said before, in principle we can make those parts arbitrarily small. We can make them tend towards points. So, in principle, we can make our measurements arbitrarily accurate. But we can't make them 100% accurate in the real world because that would mean making the parts have zero size in the real world. 100% accurate measurement is an abstract concept in the same sense that a zero-size point is.

According to my use of the word "part" (which as far as I know is the standard one), if an object is growing, its left parts are moving away from its right parts. Its bottom parts are moving away from its top parts. etc. This all seem absolutely obvious to me and I can't see how there could possibly be any disagreement about it. Or I wouldn't in a normal everyday conversation.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Steve3007 wrote: July 7th, 2020, 3:53 pm
Terrapin Station wrote:If you have an indivisible/not-composed of parts 1 meter sphere you can't measure the sphere? Why not?
How would you measure it?
Nothing novel. You could use a tape measure for example.

Now, you're thinking that wouldn't work because?
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:Now, you're thinking that wouldn't work because?
When I measure something, I look at which parts of the ruler align with which parts of the object. Are we talking about the same thing when we talk about a "part" of an object? I mean a section; a slice; a chunk.


A note to remind me of the reason for this talk of parts: This sub-issue to the side-issue to the main topic seems to have started here:
viewtopic.php?p=361884#p361884

I'm trying to work out how you can coherently propose that an object, which you call a particle, is expanding, and thereby propose that there is movement of/in that object, but that there is no concept of speed and that no part of that object is moving relative to any other part.

If the Earth was expanding such that its diameter was increasing at a rate of 1 metre per second, I'd say that the relative speed of the north pole with respect to the south pole was 1 m/s. Would you agree? If the Earth was one of these extended part-less objects that you're proposing, I presume you'd then say that it was still expanding but that the speed of one side of it relative to the other side no longer applied?
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Gertie wrote:I've seen the notion of wave fields 'collapsing' into material particles with specific locations, but I don't understand what they are thought to be waves or fields of?
They're waves that represent the probability of a detection at any given position in space. This is sometimes considered to constitute the error of talking about an abstract mathematical function as if it were a real thing. But, whether it describes the movements of water/air molecules or the probability of an event happening at a particular place, or anything else, a wave is always a mathematical function. It's just that with things like ripples on water or sound travelling through air, we tend to just say "that is a wave" rather than the longer but more precise "that is a physical phenomenon that can be described by the bit of mathematics called a wave function". So, if anywhere, the conflation of the abstract with the real happens when considering "classical" waves, due to sloppy language and/or the desire for brevity.

As with lots of mathematical functions, it turns out that wave functions can describe apparently diverse physical phenomena. None of that means that those wave functions are those physical phenomena.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Steve3007 wrote: July 8th, 2020, 4:07 am
When I measure something, I look at which parts of the ruler align with which parts of the object. Are we talking about the same thing when we talk about a "part" of an object? I mean a section; a slice; a chunk.
If an object is just one thing, especially so that it's indivisible, especially if it's homogeneous and has no "lumps," etc. , then it doesn't have parts. For example, an elementary particle, assuming there are such things (which of course logically there could be), has no parts.

I'm positing a one meter sphere that's indivisible, homogeneous, without "lumps," etc.

That you could look at it and mentally separate just a bit of it doesn't imply that it has parts. Hopefully that's not something you were thinking, but just in case, I'm mentioning it.

So I don't know, are we using "part" in the same way?
A note to remind me of the reason for this talk of parts:
The reason is the teeth-pulling of attempting to help you understand how motion can be different than speed (or at least the teeth-pulling of trying to get you to not pretend comprehension difficulties). I presented a single particle universe for that, and we're apparently still working on helping you visualize a single particle universe in which the single particle changes size. You initially suggested that a single particle can't have a size, because size is the "distance between parts" on your view, but I'm presenting a hypothetical universe that doesn't have multiple parts.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:The reason is the teeth-pulling of attempting to help you understand...
I regard it as teeth pulling from my side too. I didn't particularly want to get bogged down in this silly discussion of the definition of a part. I've told you clearly enough what I mean by that word. I tried to keep focused on the key points, as I see them, and I've described the parts of your position that I regard as incoherent. If you want to talk about them, let me know. If not, no worries.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Steve3007 wrote: July 8th, 2020, 6:25 am
Terrapin Station wrote:The reason is the teeth-pulling of attempting to help you understand...
I regard it as teeth pulling from my side too. I didn't particularly want to get bogged down in this silly discussion of the definition of a part. I've told you clearly enough what I mean by that word. I tried to keep focused on the key points, as I see them, and I've described the parts of your position that I regard as incoherent. If you want to talk about them, let me know. If not, no worries.
I hadn't the faintest suspicion that we were using the term "part" differently. You brought that notion up in a couple of your many attempts to not really address what I'm saying.

So we're not using "part" differently. If we have a one-meter sphere that's indivisible, homogeneous/non-lumpy, etc., then it has a size and hypothetically we could measure it, right? Even though what we'd be doing is not measuring the distance between parts, because there are not multiple parts in this case.
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:That you could look at it and mentally separate just a bit of it doesn't imply that it has parts.
One more try. In everything I've said so far, where it says "part" read "bit".

If an object is growing, then bits on one side of it are moving away from bits on the other side of it. Agreed, surely?
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Re: Can Physicalism be defined non-instrumentally?

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Terrapin Station wrote:You brought that notion up in a couple of your many attempts to not really address what I'm saying.
Obviously my reply to this is pot, kettle, black.
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Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021