Consul wrote:Okay, let's try this one:
x is a physical entity =def x is part of the subject matter of physics (the basic science of matter-energy-space-time [MEST]), or x is causally-compositionally (mechanico-mereologically) realized by (complexes of) entities belonging to the subject matter of physics.
Again, in a fancy way, you're just essentially saying "the physical" is the stuff that physics is about. As I said, since physics is an empirical study of the patterns in observed phenomena, this seems to agree with what I said in the second paragraph of the OP. Fair enough. Glad we're in agreement. But, to me, that makes both Materialism and Physicalism problematic in ways that I'll explain later.
No, here I use "real" neither in the sense of "non-mental" or "mind-independent", nor in the sense of "non-abstract"/"concrete". In the "thin" sense, to be real is simply to exist.
Okay. Understood. You're using "real" to mean "exist". In that case, I agree with you when you say "everything that exists, is real" for the same reason that I would also agree with you if you said "everything that exists exists". (I wouldn't even need to know what "exists" means to agree to that.)
I agree with what he says about replacing the good old label "materialism" with "physicalism", and I also agree with what he says about supervenience.
I agree with some aspects of the things he says, but I'll deal with that in a separate post.