The Rules of the Game

[Ecurb]

An article in this week's New Yorker is about a new book by Michael Strevens, an NYU philosopher of science. Here's a link:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020 ... eally-work

The article discusses how Strevens thinks neither Popper nor Kuhn got it right as to how science works. Indeed, "science" sought multi-disciplanry, over-reaching philosophies, until the 1600s, when Newton confessed he had no idea what gravity was, but he had a good idea about how the universe conformed to its laws.

Strevens postulates the "iron rule" of science: "If (scientists) are to participate in the scientific enterprise, they must unconver or generate new evidence to argue with." Compared to Popper or Kuhn, this seems obvious. It "isn't intellectual, but procedural". "The iron rule is focused not on what scientists think, "Strevens writes, "But on the arguments they can make in their official communications." Scientists, Strevens asserts, don't share philosophic approaches. Indeed, they argue about theories, try to support or disprove them, and in the attempt generate new data. It is this generation of new data that comprises the scientific enterprise, Strevens asserts, and although it is driven by theoretical frameworks, the production of new data is what actually drives science forward. Smart, ambitious academics have their own motives, theoretical ideas, etc., but the "iron rule" is what drives progress.















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[Jack D Ripper]

Here is a bit from the article that I found particularly interesting (some of which you have already quoted):

They are constrained by a central regulation that governs science, which he calls the “iron rule of explanation.” The rule is simple: it tells scientists that, “if they are to participate in the scientific enterprise, they must uncover or generate new evidence to argue with”; from there, they must “conduct all disputes with reference to empirical evidence alone.” Compared with the theories proposed by Popper and Kuhn, Strevens’s rule can feel obvious and underpowered. That’s because it isn’t intellectual but procedural. “The iron rule is focused not on what scientists think,” he writes, “but on what arguments they can make in their official communications.” Still, he maintains, it is “the key to science’s success,” because it “channels hope, anger, envy, ambition, resentment—all the fires fuming in the human heart—to one end: the production of empirical evidence.”

Strevens arrives at the idea of the iron rule in a Popperian way: by disproving the other theories about how scientific knowledge is created. The problem isn’t that Popper and Kuhn are completely wrong. It’s that scientists, as a group, don’t pursue any single intellectual strategy consistently. Exploring a number of case studies—including the controversies over continental drift, spontaneous generation, and the theory of relativity—Strevens shows scientists exerting themselves intellectually in a variety of ways, as smart, ambitious people usually do. Sometimes they seek to falsify theories, sometimes to prove them; sometimes they’re informed by preëxisting or contextual views, and at other times they try to rule narrowly, based on the evidence at hand.

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020 ... eally-work

I think he is right that scientists do not all follow one way of thinking about the problems they consider, nor do individual scientists always follow the same approach in all of the things that they do in science.

[Steve3007]

So, judging by the article that was cited in the OP, the book seems to be an argument for empiricism and the diligent collection of experimental data. In the context of Quantum theory, it's an advocacy of "shut up and calculate".

[Pattern-chaser]

It is this generation of new data that comprises the scientific enterprise, Strevens asserts, and although it is driven by theoretical frameworks, the production of new data is what actually drives science forward. Smart, ambitious academics have their own motives, theoretical ideas, etc., but the "iron rule" is what drives progress.

But, but, but ... it is the "motives, theoretical ideas, etc." that drive the creative endeavours that result in "new data", isn't it?

[Ecurb]

But, but, but ... it is the "motives, theoretical ideas, etc." that drive the creative endeavours that result in "new data", isn't it?

That's the author of the article's theory, although he has an antipathy for lab work that may not be shared by all scientists.

One point I don't hear about much: lab reports are "histories". So to the extent that science has been elevated over history as a path to knowledge (for example forensic evidence is seen as more trustworthy than eye witness testimony in court) this may ignore the fact that written reports about experiments ARE histories.

[Jack D Ripper]

It is this generation of new data that comprises the scientific enterprise, Strevens asserts, and although it is driven by theoretical frameworks, the production of new data is what actually drives science forward. Smart, ambitious academics have their own motives, theoretical ideas, etc., but the "iron rule" is what drives progress.

But, but, but ... it is the "motives, theoretical ideas, etc." that drive the creative endeavours that result in "new data", isn't it?

When someone produces evidence that you can see, what the person was thinking or feeling is unimportant to its usefulness. Some scientist might be trying to prove one thing, and so looks for and produces evidence regarding the matter, but it may turn out that the evidence proves the opposite of what the scientist wanted. Or, alternatively, it could be that the scientist wanted to prove what the evidence proves. Or it might be that the evidence really proves something unrelated to the interests of that particular scientist. Which thing the scientist wanted to prove does not matter; what matters is what evidence is presented. It is the evidence that is discovered or created that is what others can use; the motives and feelings of the scientist do not matter for that. If a scientist believes that magic pixies move subatomic particles about (which is why they behave so strangely), but that scientist nevertheless produces useful evidence, that useful evidence is what matters. No one will even know about the pixie beliefs unless the scientist (unwisely) talks about it.

[Jack D Ripper]

But, but, but ... it is the "motives, theoretical ideas, etc." that drive the creative endeavours that result in "new data", isn't it?

That's the author of the article's theory, although he has an antipathy for lab work that may not be shared by all scientists.

One point I don't hear about much: lab reports are "histories". So to the extent that science has been elevated over history as a path to knowledge (for example forensic evidence is seen as more trustworthy than eye witness testimony in court) this may ignore the fact that written reports about experiments ARE histories.

Unlike the case of eye-witness testimony, which often is unreliable due to the stress of the situation and not being particularly prepared to witness something, in the case of lab reports, that is the kind of thing that can be rechecked by others. If one scientist gets a particular result from an experiment, and every other scientist who tries the same experiment but gets different results, people conclude that the one has made a mistake about the matter. That ability to recheck the data is what elevates science over typical history, in which there is no ability to recheck what happened.

This, of course, is because scientists are not interested in simply knowing what happened at one place and at one time; they are interested in regularities, what happens when certain conditions are meet. So the things that scientists are interested in can be rechecked, but with some historical fact, say Napoleon losing the battle at Waterloo, we cannot rerun the battle to see if he really lost.

[Ecurb]

u


Unlike the case of eye-witness testimony, which often is unreliable due to the stress of the situation and not being particularly prepared to witness something, in the case of lab reports, that is the kind of thing that can be rechecked by others. If one scientist gets a particular result from an experiment, and every other scientist who tries the same experiment but gets different results, people conclude that the one has made a mistake about the matter. That ability to recheck the data is what elevates science over typical history, in which there is no ability to recheck what happened.

This, of course, is because scientists are not interested in simply knowing what happened at one place and at one time; they are interested in regularities, what happens when certain conditions are meet. So the things that scientists are interested in can be rechecked, but with some historical fact, say Napoleon losing the battle at Waterloo, we cannot rerun the battle to see if he really lost.

That's true, although nothing is actually repeatable (only approximately repeatable). In addition, lots of scientific, recorded information is not experimental but observational (think of naturalists observing animal behavior, for example).

You make a good point, but lab reports remain histories, and Newton could see further than his predecessors by standing on their shoulders through reading those histories. MY point is that science relies on history, although history does not rely on science. Does this give history some sort of epistomological precedence? I don't know. But it seems to be a question worth asking.

[Steve3007]

One point I don't hear about much: lab reports are "histories". So to the extent that science has been elevated over history as a path to knowledge (for example forensic evidence is seen as more trustworthy than eye witness testimony in court) this may ignore the fact that written reports about experiments ARE histories.

In what sense does preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony constitute elevating science over history?

As far as I can see, preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony simply amounts to preferring information about the past recorded outside brains to information about the past recorded inside brains. I presume that preference would be based on an assessment of the reliability, or otherwise, of brains as recording devices. I don't really see how that relates to relative elevations of science and history.

[Jack D Ripper]

... MY point is that science relies on history, although history does not rely on science. ...

No, that is quite wrong. History relies on science. When evaluating some historical account, like, for example, The Histories by Herodotus, in which he describes, among other things, giant ants, no one takes that seriously as an accurate description, due to science telling us that there are no giant ants. There may have been an animal that was mistaken for giant ants, but there were no giant ants. We know that because of science, not because of history devoid of science.

And when evaluating the lliad and the Odyssey, again, science tells us that the miraculous stories are impossible, and so we don't take them seriously as accurate histories. Though there may have been a war that happened, or a series of wars that happened, between the Greeks and Trojans, no one takes the particular stories of the gods being involved seriously, nor the fabulous tales of Odysseus' journey home, excepting only those who believe in that particular religion.

There is also carbon dating of artifacts, etc., which, again, is the application of science to history.

So, science informs history. History without science is a bunch of ridiculous stories that no reasonable person would believe. A good history always involves a careful and reasoned evaluation of the evidence, which necessarily involves a good amount of science.

[Ecurb]

In what sense does preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony constitute elevating science over history?

As far as I can see, preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony simply amounts to preferring information about the past recorded outside brains to information about the past recorded inside brains. I presume that preference would be based on an assessment of the reliability, or otherwise, of brains as recording devices. I don't really see how that relates to relative elevations of science and history.

HIstory involves mainly accounts of events derived from witnesses (hence its similarity to eye wtness testimony). Archaeology is a sort of "science" of the human cultural past.

I think eye witness accounts were once the sin qua non of testimony; now forensic evidence is. I don't doubt it may be a step in the right direction, but it's reasonable to wonder about the cultural forces that have led us to this point. I think some modern people trust archaeology more than history, because it is more scientific. Trust, but verify, I suppose. But we should recognize that forensic evidence in court, or archaeological evidence about the past, is subject to interpretation. Although the shards of pottery exist, as does the .38 Smith and Wesson, inferences drawn from that "fact" are never quite so certain.

[hegel]

... MY point is that science relies on history, although history does not rely on science. ...

No, that is quite wrong. History relies on science. When evaluating some historical account, like, for example, The Histories by Herodotus, in which he describes, among other things, giant ants, no one takes that seriously as an accurate description, due to science telling us that there are no giant ants. There may have been an animal that was mistaken for giant ants, but there were no giant ants. We know that because of science, not because of history devoid of science.

And when evaluating the lliad and the Odyssey, again, science tells us that the miraculous stories are impossible, and so we don't take them seriously as accurate histories. Though there may have been a war that happened, or a series of wars that happened, between the Greeks and Trojans, no one takes the particular stories of the gods being involved seriously, nor the fabulous tales of Odysseus' journey home, excepting only those who believe in that particular religion.

There is also carbon dating of artifacts, etc., which, again, is the application of science to history.

So, science informs history. History without science is a bunch of ridiculous stories that no reasonable person would believe. A good history always involves a careful and reasoned evaluation of the evidence, which necessarily involves a good amount of science.

I don't think anyone ever thought The Ililad was a history. Everyone from Greeks to today know it is a story. I don't see how science has anything relevatn to say about Homer.

[Sculptor1]

In what sense does preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony constitute elevating science over history?

As far as I can see, preferring forensic evidence to eye witness testimony simply amounts to preferring information about the past recorded outside brains to information about the past recorded inside brains. I presume that preference would be based on an assessment of the reliability, or otherwise, of brains as recording devices. I don't really see how that relates to relative elevations of science and history.

HIstory involves mainly accounts of events derived from witnesses (hence its similarity to eye wtness testimony). Archaeology is a sort of "science" of the human cultural past.

I think eye witness accounts were once the sin qua non of testimony; now forensic evidence is. I don't doubt it may be a step in the right direction, but it's reasonable to wonder about the cultural forces that have led us to this point. I think some modern people trust archaeology more than history, because it is more scientific. Trust, but verify, I suppose. But we should recognize that forensic evidence in court, or archaeological evidence about the past, is subject to interpretation. Although the shards of pottery exist, as does the .38 Smith and Wesson, inferences drawn from that "fact" are never quite so certain.

On the face of it you might like to think that forensics are more likley to give a better testimony, yet the history of forenisic testimony is littlered with the miscarraiges of justice.
Not only because there is a tendancy to value "objective" methid over witness statements, but for the fact that forensics can be; wrong; faked; offer results seemingly to convict but without care can be irrelevant without careful understanding; inadequate; disputable; and contensious.

Don't be Irish on a train playing cards.

[Ecurb]

No, that is quite wrong. History relies on science. When evaluating some historical account, like, for example, The Histories by Herodotus, in which he describes, among other things, giant ants, no one takes that seriously as an accurate description, due to science telling us that there are no giant ants. There may have been an animal that was mistaken for giant ants, but there were no giant ants. We know that because of science, not because of history devoid of science.

And when evaluating the lliad and the Odyssey, again, science tells us that the miraculous stories are impossible, and so we don't take them seriously as accurate histories. Though there may have been a war that happened, or a series of wars that happened, between the Greeks and Trojans, no one takes the particular stories of the gods being involved seriously, nor the fabulous tales of Odysseus' journey home, excepting only those who believe in that particular religion.

There is also carbon dating of artifacts, etc., which, again, is the application of science to history.

So, science informs history. History without science is a bunch of ridiculous stories that no reasonable person would believe. A good history always involves a careful and reasoned evaluation of the evidence, which necessarily involves a good amount of science.

We all know that some historical accounts are incorrect, as are some scientific theories. So what?

Most Classicists used to believe that the Iliad was utterly unhistorical, until "science"(the archaeological discovery of Troy) suggested that it may indeed have been based on fact.

Your method of evaluating historical accounts is, like that of most modernists, based on a worship of science. Science dosen't tell us (indeed, can't tell us) that giant ants never existed, or that Ares and Athena never battled it out before the walls of Troy. Like you, I don't believe in giant ants or Greek Gods, but that's because of my Naturalist prejudices. The scientific approach would, of course, be to keep an open mind, and accept or reject evidence. Is the supernatural "impossible"? To the scientist, if it was shown that Lazarus actually WAS raised from the dead, that would be one more NATURAL piece of data to enter into the system. So in that sense the supernatural is impossible. If miracles really happen, they ain't "supernatural".

Histories remain histories even when they are incorrect about some things. Science may help us substantiate or refute history (think of the endless searches for Noah's Ark attempting to do just that), but history does not DEPEND on it. Anyone can tell his story, a history. They've been doing it long before modern science was developed, and science could not have developed without it.

[Jack D Ripper]

I don't think anyone ever thought The Ililad was a history. ...

Many ancient Greeks wrote as if they believed the story was true. Believing in the ancient Greek religion would help make the story seem more believable than not believing in the ancient Greek religion.

Just like many Christians have often taken the Bible stories to be history, whereas not being a Christian tends to make one more likely to be skeptical of the virgin birth, turning water into wine, etc.

Religious texts typically seem ridiculous to those who do not believe in the religion in question. That is, ridiculous if someone takes them as true instead of as fiction.