It is said that in causality effect can precede cause, what does this mean for freewill?LuckyR wrote:No. Determinism states that for every antecedent state there is a single resultant state. No decision making (as the result will always be the same). When you "decide" to have pancakes for breakfast, that is an illusion, based on your state when the idea of breakfast popped into your head, it was always going to be pancakes, even if you pondered eggs. The decision was an illusion within your mind.Whitedragon wrote: Can decision making be part of determinism? In other words is determinism reactant to multiples, does it exist in things or is it a universal force that has a unique effect on everything?
If you "choose" to have eggs tomorrow, that is because your state tomorrow is different than today, consistent with eggs. Not a different choice, a different state of mind.
Freewill as a retrospect
- Whitedragon
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
- LuckyR
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
Free will supposes that for a single antecedent state that multiple resultant states can follow. What determines the particular resultant state is decision making, or choosing. Various factors are known to influence the choice, but ultimately there will be a component of choice, typically less than 100% (the remainder being influencing factors)Whitedragon wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 2:39 amIt is said that in causality effect can precede cause, what does this mean for freewill?LuckyR wrote:No. Determinism states that for every antecedent state there is a single resultant state. No decision making (as the result will always be the same). When you "decide" to have pancakes for breakfast, that is an illusion, based on your state when the idea of breakfast popped into your head, it was always going to be pancakes, even if you pondered eggs. The decision was an illusion within your mind.Whitedragon wrote: Can decision making be part of determinism? In other words is determinism reactant to multiples, does it exist in things or is it a universal force that has a unique effect on everything?
If you "choose" to have eggs tomorrow, that is because your state tomorrow is different than today, consistent with eggs. Not a different choice, a different state of mind.
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
[/bco]
Can we say that freewill is rather an awareness of our actions? I'm writing this as it may have seemed in the thread that I'm against determinism, I'm not. If freewill is awareness rather than control, awareness influences the retrospect. After determinism had happened we can reflect on the action and the event impacts our retrospect which could relate how determinism influences us. We are also not Islands and our awareness / freewill, can from it's retrospect, now be influenced by our awareness, make determinism take another course, such as internal adjustment by determinism or seeking out others with better awareness and experience.
Does determinism effect everybody in the same way, does it effect one individual the same time every time? If not awareness played a part. When I write about retrospect I write about memory, experience and knowledge that's forever changing.
What kind of role does awareness play in determinism? Is awareness a late choice, making the choice after the event has occurred, but using it as a retrospect as to not repeat "mistakes." I'm not for an in the moment choice, I'm for retrospect, still honouring determinism.
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
We do see that physical brain processes correlate with mental states. So there is a basic problem for the notion of the mental causation required for free will, because we have an, in principle, physicalist explanation for what brains do. That explanation would talk about things like photons bouncing off an apple and hitting the brain;s visual receptors, which causally interact with internal physical brain processes, and eventually interact with with physical motor systems which cause you to pick up the apple and eat it. That looks like it provides an in principle complete, physically determined explanation for why you had no choice but to eat the apple, and you experiencing seeing the apple, experiencing feeling hungry, experiencing anything, is unnecessary and redundant. There was no choice, there is no free will, it's just a story we tell ourselves about why we eat apples and do everything else.
There are arguments for and against that type of physicalist deterministic account which leaves no room for free will and makes pondering decisions, reflecting/retrospecting on past outcomes, etc, irrelevant in a physically determined universe. And as I said, physics doesn't account for conscious experience in its model. We don't understand the mind-body relationship, which might mean we need to re-think physicalist determinism as a complete account for every action. The existence of conscious agency, if it's real, might be telling us to do exactly that.
Now if we put that aside and accept that mental causation is real, that mentally deciding has real physical causal effects, there will be lots of factors which go into any particular behaviour. Retrospecting is one of them. I can be aware that apples taste good, are good for me and satisfy hunger. But again if we look at what the correlated brain is up to at any particular moment of decision making, there are countless neural connections firing all over the place, all somehow related to what my conscious experience ends up being. So any mental causation, any choice, will be correlated (directly or indirectly) to all these things going on too. Simple psychological explanations won't capture that inconceivable neural complexity, but we can still usefully say knowing apples taste good is significant, as is being hungry, as is not having other current psychological priorities, etc.
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
Thank you,Gertie wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 4:27 am The way I see it the notion of determinism relies on the notion of causality, which we arrived at by looking at how the physical world works. Physics. In that framing, an event can be caused or random, but physics doesn't address mental causation or free will, this is simply not part of the physicalist model of the universe, what it's made of and how it works.
We do see that physical brain processes correlate with mental states. So there is a basic problem for the notion of the mental causation required for free will, because we have an, in principle, physicalist explanation for what brains do. That explanation would talk about things like photons bouncing off an apple and hitting the brain;s visual receptors, which causally interact with internal physical brain processes, and eventually interact with with physical motor systems which cause you to pick up the apple and eat it. That looks like it provides an in principle complete, physically determined explanation for why you had no choice but to eat the apple, and you experiencing seeing the apple, experiencing feeling hungry, experiencing anything, is unnecessary and redundant. There was no choice, there is no free will, it's just a story we tell ourselves about why we eat apples and do everything else.
There are arguments for and against that type of physicalist deterministic account which leaves no room for free will and makes pondering decisions, reflecting/retrospecting on past outcomes, etc, irrelevant in a physically determined universe. And as I said, physics doesn't account for conscious experience in its model. We don't understand the mind-body relationship, which might mean we need to re-think physicalist determinism as a complete account for every action. The existence of conscious agency, if it's real, might be telling us to do exactly that.
Now if we put that aside and accept that mental causation is real, that mentally deciding has real physical causal effects, there will be lots of factors which go into any particular behaviour. Retrospecting is one of them. I can be aware that apples taste good, are good for me and satisfy hunger. But again if we look at what the correlated brain is up to at any particular moment of decision making, there are countless neural connections firing all over the place, all somehow related to what my conscious experience ends up being. So any mental causation, any choice, will be correlated (directly or indirectly) to all these things going on too. Simple psychological explanations won't capture that inconceivable neural complexity, but we can still usefully say knowing apples taste good is significant, as is being hungry, as is not having other current psychological priorities, etc.
Is the problem also temporal considerations, do we need to bring temporal mechanics into the discussion? Also can someone tell me more about negative dimension and if it relates to the topic somehow as far as consciousness go?
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
There are some experiments being done based on Libet's crude early experiments trying to capture the timeline of mental decision making and physical brain processes. I'd say the nature of this type of experiment makes it hard to draw firm conclusions about free will, but should give pause for thought.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will
There's also some evidence from experiments with people with split brains which suggest that we make up explanations for our behaviour retrospectively on the hoof when asked why we did something, at least sometimes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zx53Zj7EKQE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9u6cQYcOHw
- Faustus5
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
I strongly suspect that confabulation--us spinning stories to create a sensible narrative about purely physical events and processes going on inside our bodies--plays a bigger role in consciousness than most people are aware of.
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
We might've found something we agree on
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
Fascinating, thank you,Gertie wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 6:13 am I don't understand time in a scientific way (and haven't heard of negative dimension), but I think Time must be related to change, stuff happening. Because in a completely static world, time would be meaningless. Causality is about why stuff happens, so obviously there's a connection there.
There are some experiments being done based on Libet's crude early experiments trying to capture the timeline of mental decision making and physical brain processes. I'd say the nature of this type of experiment makes it hard to draw firm conclusions about free will, but should give pause for thought.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience_of_free_will
There's also some evidence from experiments with people with split brains which suggest that we make up explanations for our behaviour retrospectively on the hoof when asked why we did something, at least sometimes.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zx53Zj7EKQE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u9u6cQYcOHw
I'd like to try and add to your post,
I've tried researching on negative dimension. Little is known about it, so I started asking my own question about it and consciousness. Regrettably I cannot add my thoughts about it to the thread, except to say that time and space would behave strangely in it if viewed from the third quadrant of the negative x- and y-axis past countible infinities for y and close to zero values for x. With a higher speed or infinite speed of causality the arrow of time may become none directional. I regret that I can't lay out the entire essay I wrote on it. Perhaps someone with a wider scientific background can pick something up in these lines.
The conclusion I draw is that if within the make up of the universe and ourselves such a dimension exists, causality is none directional and directional in others, if they function as one, what does that say about determinism?
The reason I include this is that we hold matter has volume, what happens to time and space in negative volume conditions and how does it affect causality? If the negative dimension is not apart from the universe, and interacts with other dimensions the question becomes, is determinism monodirectional?
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
How can you assume such a thing? Why two? And why contradictory?
Why are these two conditions mutually exclsuive? They must both apply, be true in order that your action is made based on free will. And you have correctly brought them in. Then, what do you mean by "in the same part of a choice"? It's kind of vague ... In fact, it doesn't make sense. Maybe this is why you infer that the conditions are mutually exclusive, which also makes no sense. I mean to me, at least. But it would be really interesting to know what you mean ...Suppose you are driving your car, and you come to a junction where you can (apparently) turn either left or right. Suppose you turn left. Was this an exercise of free will?
The answer is 'yes', provided two things are true:
(A) you could have turned right instead
(B) turning left was your choice, not something imposed on you or something that just happened to you by chance.
Unfortunately, these conditions are mutually exclusive, and cannot both exist in the same part of a choice or action at the same time.
I believe that you have arrived to that conclusion because of the above mentioned vague, and most probably baseless, description. Nevertheless, according to your conclusion, I can assume that your post here is dictated by some force (constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor) and not done based on free will, which of course you lack (like everyone else for that matter). Is that right?Conclusion: free will is impossible in any universe, whether deterministic or not.
(BTW, all this reminds of Zeno's "Achilles paradox" and other paradoxes" (actually, sophisms), based on wrong assumptions and fallacies about time and space.)
- LuckyR
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
Nice summary. In your writings, what you call the retrospect is what I refered to as an influencer that is not quite a cause.Gertie wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 4:27 am The way I see it the notion of determinism relies on the notion of causality, which we arrived at by looking at how the physical world works. Physics. In that framing, an event can be caused or random, but physics doesn't address mental causation or free will, this is simply not part of the physicalist model of the universe, what it's made of and how it works.
We do see that physical brain processes correlate with mental states. So there is a basic problem for the notion of the mental causation required for free will, because we have an, in principle, physicalist explanation for what brains do. That explanation would talk about things like photons bouncing off an apple and hitting the brain;s visual receptors, which causally interact with internal physical brain processes, and eventually interact with with physical motor systems which cause you to pick up the apple and eat it. That looks like it provides an in principle complete, physically determined explanation for why you had no choice but to eat the apple, and you experiencing seeing the apple, experiencing feeling hungry, experiencing anything, is unnecessary and redundant. There was no choice, there is no free will, it's just a story we tell ourselves about why we eat apples and do everything else.
There are arguments for and against that type of physicalist deterministic account which leaves no room for free will and makes pondering decisions, reflecting/retrospecting on past outcomes, etc, irrelevant in a physically determined universe. And as I said, physics doesn't account for conscious experience in its model. We don't understand the mind-body relationship, which might mean we need to re-think physicalist determinism as a complete account for every action. The existence of conscious agency, if it's real, might be telling us to do exactly that.
Now if we put that aside and accept that mental causation is real, that mentally deciding has real physical causal effects, there will be lots of factors which go into any particular behaviour. Retrospecting is one of them. I can be aware that apples taste good, are good for me and satisfy hunger. But again if we look at what the correlated brain is up to at any particular moment of decision making, there are countless neural connections firing all over the place, all somehow related to what my conscious experience ends up being. So any mental causation, any choice, will be correlated (directly or indirectly) to all these things going on too. Simple psychological explanations won't capture that inconceivable neural complexity, but we can still usefully say knowing apples taste good is significant, as is being hungry, as is not having other current psychological priorities, etc.
- Whitedragon
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
There is cause and effect in perceiving something, then there is cause and effect in remembering something and also in analysing something. However if we have good evolved retrospect or memory about a situation and the situation isn't new, there is no analysis necessary. Is the causal effect of memory not faster than that of analysis?
For instance a child of three behaves differently to determinism in certain situations than an adult does, due to his or her experience, knowledge and memory.
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
You seem to have been confused by the structure of my post. In quoting my post back to me, you omit the four paragraphs which contain my argument, so it's hardly surprising if what remains makes no sense. Maybe it would help if I repeat my post with annotations that explain what each bit of it is doing, as follows:Alkis wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 12:34 pmHow can you assume such a thing? Why two? And why contradictory?
Why are these two conditions mutually exclsuive? They must both apply, be true in order that your action is made based on free will. And you have correctly brought them in. Then, what do you mean by "in the same part of a choice"? It's kind of vague ... In fact, it doesn't make sense. Maybe this is why you infer that the conditions are mutually exclusive, which also makes no sense. I mean to me, at least. But it would be really interesting to know what you mean ...Suppose you are driving your car, and you come to a junction where you can (apparently) turn either left or right. Suppose you turn left. Was this an exercise of free will?
The answer is 'yes', provided two things are true:
(A) you could have turned right instead
(B) turning left was your choice, not something imposed on you or something that just happened to you by chance.
Unfortunately, these conditions are mutually exclusive, and cannot both exist in the same part of a choice or action at the same time.
I believe that you have arrived to that conclusion because of the above mentioned vague, and most probably baseless, description.Conclusion: free will is impossible in any universe, whether deterministic or not.
====================================================================================================
Free will cannot exist, because it requires two contradictory things to be true at the same time. [This states, in general terms, what my argument is going to prove.]
Suppose you are driving your car, and you come to a junction where you can (apparently) turn either left or right. Suppose you turn left. Was this an exercise of free will? [This sets up a situation to use as an example in my argument.]
The answer is 'yes', provided two things are true:
(A) you could have turned right instead
(B) turning left was your choice, not something imposed on you or something that just happened to you by chance. [This explains what the two contradictory things are that I mentioned two paragraphs earlier.]
Unfortunately, these conditions are mutually exclusive, and cannot both exist in the same part of a choice or action at the same time.[This restates what my argument will prove, but more precisely.]
Suppose, first, that the universe is 100% deterministic. In that case, your turning left was caused by prior events over which you have no control. (B) can be true, because those prior events did not occur by chance and may have occurred within you, rather than being imposed on you (e.g. by someone else turning the wheel); but (A) can't be true, because your choice was determined by a series of causes going all the way back to the beginning of the universe. [This is the first part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is 100% deterministic]
Suppose now that the universe is 100% non-deterministic: all events are random, and are not determined by prior causes. In that case you could have turned right - it just randomly happened that you turned left - so (A) could be true. However, (B) can't be true, because if the choice was just a random event, then it wasn't your choice, it was something that just happened to you by chance; for a choice to be your choice, it has to be caused by something in you, and not be merely a random uncaused event. [This is the second part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is 100% non-deterministic.]
If the universe is in the middle - party deterministic and partly non-deterministic - then any part that is deterministic may assist in (B) but will also assist in preventing (A), while any part that is non-deterministic may assist in (A), but will also assist in preventing (B). (A) and (B) necessarily exclude each other wherever they occur. [This is the third part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is neither 100% deterministic nor 100% non-deterministic.]
Could your action of turning the car be partly determined and partly undetermined? It could, but that wouldn't allow your action to be an exercise of free will, because the parts of the action that were determined would be parts that you couldn't have done any differently, and the parts that were undetermined weren't parts that were caused by you, they were parts that just happened to you by chance. [This restates the third part of the argument, but with reference specifically to the choice in the example situation, rather than in general terms.]
Conclusion: free will is impossible in any universe, whether deterministic or not. [This is the conclusion which I earlier undertook to prove.]
====================================================================================================
Not really. You can certainly infer from my argument that my post here is not the result of a free will action, but you can't infer that my post is "dictated by some force (constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor)", for two reasons; firstly, because the words you have used imply that my post was caused by something external to me, and my argument does not imply that; and second, because my post could be partly or wholly (though 'wholly' is less plausible than 'partly') the result of random non-deterministic factors (e.g. quantum indeterminacy). The most plausible view, I think, is that my post was caused by events in my brain which were, or were very close to, 100% deterministic. If there was any random factor at work, it would probably be very slight, because if a lot of random stuff was going on in my brain at the time, it's hard to see how I could have successfully completed my post at all. But the deterministic stuff in my brain that resulted in my post would not be a "constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor", because all of those descriptions imply that I was somehow forced to write my post by something outside myself, and that is not the case. I simply wrote the post. But I could not have not written the post, because that would have required my brain to be in a different state from the state it was actually in.Alkis wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 12:34 pmNevertheless, according to your conclusion, I can assume that your post here is dictated by some force (constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor) and not done based on free will, which of course you lack (like everyone else for that matter). Is that right?
I'm simply allowing for the possibility that a choice has parts. Are you claiming that a choice is something so simple that it doesn't have parts? If so, what grounds do you have for making that claim?
Are you implying that I am committing the same fallacies?
- Whitedragon
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
I'm confused about something. It seems by this argument we have no internal influences and that's why we don't have freewill?CIN wrote: ↑June 27th, 2021, 7:07 pmYou seem to have been confused by the structure of my post. In quoting my post back to me, you omit the four paragraphs which contain my argument, so it's hardly surprising if what remains makes no sense. Maybe it would help if I repeat my post with annotations that explain what each bit of it is doing, as follows:Alkis wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 12:34 pmHow can you assume such a thing? Why two? And why contradictory?
Why are these two conditions mutually exclsuive? They must both apply, be true in order that your action is made based on free will. And you have correctly brought them in. Then, what do you mean by "in the same part of a choice"? It's kind of vague ... In fact, it doesn't make sense. Maybe this is why you infer that the conditions are mutually exclusive, which also makes no sense. I mean to me, at least. But it would be really interesting to know what you mean ...Suppose you are driving your car, and you come to a junction where you can (apparently) turn either left or right. Suppose you turn left. Was this an exercise of free will?
The answer is 'yes', provided two things are true:
(A) you could have turned right instead
(B) turning left was your choice, not something imposed on you or something that just happened to you by chance.
Unfortunately, these conditions are mutually exclusive, and cannot both exist in the same part of a choice or action at the same time.
I believe that you have arrived to that conclusion because of the above mentioned vague, and most probably baseless, description.Conclusion: free will is impossible in any universe, whether deterministic or not.
====================================================================================================
Free will cannot exist, because it requires two contradictory things to be true at the same time. [This states, in general terms, what my argument is going to prove.]
Suppose you are driving your car, and you come to a junction where you can (apparently) turn either left or right. Suppose you turn left. Was this an exercise of free will? [This sets up a situation to use as an example in my argument.]
The answer is 'yes', provided two things are true:
(A) you could have turned right instead
(B) turning left was your choice, not something imposed on you or something that just happened to you by chance. [This explains what the two contradictory things are that I mentioned two paragraphs earlier.]
Unfortunately, these conditions are mutually exclusive, and cannot both exist in the same part of a choice or action at the same time.[This restates what my argument will prove, but more precisely.]
Suppose, first, that the universe is 100% deterministic. In that case, your turning left was caused by prior events over which you have no control. (B) can be true, because those prior events did not occur by chance and may have occurred within you, rather than being imposed on you (e.g. by someone else turning the wheel); but (A) can't be true, because your choice was determined by a series of causes going all the way back to the beginning of the universe. [This is the first part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is 100% deterministic]
Suppose now that the universe is 100% non-deterministic: all events are random, and are not determined by prior causes. In that case you could have turned right - it just randomly happened that you turned left - so (A) could be true. However, (B) can't be true, because if the choice was just a random event, then it wasn't your choice, it was something that just happened to you by chance; for a choice to be your choice, it has to be caused by something in you, and not be merely a random uncaused event. [This is the second part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is 100% non-deterministic.]
If the universe is in the middle - party deterministic and partly non-deterministic - then any part that is deterministic may assist in (B) but will also assist in preventing (A), while any part that is non-deterministic may assist in (A), but will also assist in preventing (B). (A) and (B) necessarily exclude each other wherever they occur. [This is the third part of the argument. It shows that free will is impossible in a universe that is neither 100% deterministic nor 100% non-deterministic.]
Could your action of turning the car be partly determined and partly undetermined? It could, but that wouldn't allow your action to be an exercise of free will, because the parts of the action that were determined would be parts that you couldn't have done any differently, and the parts that were undetermined weren't parts that were caused by you, they were parts that just happened to you by chance. [This restates the third part of the argument, but with reference specifically to the choice in the example situation, rather than in general terms.]
Conclusion: free will is impossible in any universe, whether deterministic or not. [This is the conclusion which I earlier undertook to prove.]
====================================================================================================
Not really. You can certainly infer from my argument that my post here is not the result of a free will action, but you can't infer that my post is "dictated by some force (constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor)", for two reasons; firstly, because the words you have used imply that my post was caused by something external to me, and my argument does not imply that; and second, because my post could be partly or wholly (though 'wholly' is less plausible than 'partly') the result of random non-deterministic factors (e.g. quantum indeterminacy). The most plausible view, I think, is that my post was caused by events in my brain which were, or were very close to, 100% deterministic. If there was any random factor at work, it would probably be very slight, because if a lot of random stuff was going on in my brain at the time, it's hard to see how I could have successfully completed my post at all. But the deterministic stuff in my brain that resulted in my post would not be a "constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor", because all of those descriptions imply that I was somehow forced to write my post by something outside myself, and that is not the case. I simply wrote the post. But I could not have not written the post, because that would have required my brain to be in a different state from the state it was actually in.Alkis wrote: ↑June 26th, 2021, 12:34 pmNevertheless, according to your conclusion, I can assume that your post here is dictated by some force (constraint, suppression, compulsion or other uncontrolled factor) and not done based on free will, which of course you lack (like everyone else for that matter). Is that right?
I'm simply allowing for the possibility that a choice has parts. Are you claiming that a choice is something so simple that it doesn't have parts? If so, what grounds do you have for making that claim?
Are you implying that I am committing the same fallacies?
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Re: Freewill as a retrospect
@Whitedragon, your quote within quote within quote ... contains 1300 words. How can I know where do you refer to by "this argument"? If you want an answer, you must isolate "this argument" and use only that as a quote. As I did. Makes sense?Whitedragon wrote: ↑June 28th, 2021, 2:49 am
I'm confused about something. It seems by this argument we have no internal influences and that's why we don't have freewill?
In fact, I am not even sure if you are addressed to me or to @CIN! So, in such cases it's also good to add the name of the member to whom you are addressed to. As I also did.
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