Machine Consciousness Experiment Conceivability

[jvh]

The generation of machine consciousness will not succeed until a significant barrier is overcome. That barrier is the development of a model of the function of consciousness. There is a natural tendency to want to get on with the experiment and worry about the theory later. However in this case there is a fundamental problem with the lack of a functional model of consciousness. That is without at least a first draft understanding of the purpose of consciousness and what it is trying to achieve, how will it be possible to test whether machine consciousness has been achieved or not ?

The test is the thing, without a test it will not be possible to demonstrate machine consciousness, and a test can only be considered when a functional model of consciousness, even a rough one, is developed.

John

[Atla]

Read somewhere that meta studies on parapsychological QM studies might indicate a 3% or so deviation from random chance.

Unfortunately for you even if this is true, it's much more probable that it has to do with quantum biological exploitation of a nested extradimensional structure of our nondual universe, than an inter mind.

Meta Studies on Parapsychological QM Studies are Irrelevant to the Machine Consciousness Experiment configuration. Yes of course, Quantum Biological Exploitation of a Nested Extradimensional Structure of our Nondual Universe is the only other Explanation.

How irrelevant? If that 3% is correct then it has already been shown that QM behaviour can be altered by attention/volition and maybe we do that all the time. Maybe our brains our wired on a basic level to exploit collapses and quantum zeno and anti zeno effects etc.

[SteveKlinko]

Read somewhere that meta studies on parapsychological QM studies might indicate a 3% or so deviation from random chance.

Unfortunately for you even if this is true, it's much more probable that it has to do with quantum biological exploitation of a nested extradimensional structure of our nondual universe, than an inter mind.

Meta Studies on Parapsychological QM Studies are Irrelevant to the Machine Consciousness Experiment configuration. Yes of course, Quantum Biological Exploitation of a Nested Extradimensional Structure of our Nondual Universe is the only other Explanation.

How irrelevant? If that 3% is correct then it has already been shown that QM behaviour can be altered by attention/volition and maybe we do that all the time. Maybe our brains our wired on a basic level to exploit collapses and quantum zeno and anti zeno effects etc.

If that 3% is correct then that opens the door wide open to further study this Phenomenon and design methods to Amplify the response. I believe I am doing that with my Experiments. But I am trying to find out how to make Machines Conscious, which is a different goal than the setup for the 3% result.

[GE Morton]

If Conscious Experience is some Phenomenon of Science, then what is it? Is it Energy? Is it some sort of Matter? Is it some aspect of Space itself? I think Conscious Experience will never be classified into any of the above categories. Conscious Experiences don't even seem like they could be any of the above. I'm betting that Conscious Experiences are truly something different. We are at an Impasse on this.

Well, I'm not sure what counts as a "Phenomenon of Science," but the way you pose the question indicates the problem with answering it. Asking whether it is energy, matter, etc., assumes that if consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then it must be reducible to the laws of physics. That is not the case. It qualifies as a physical phenomenon because it is produced by, and only by, physical systems and wholly dependent upon those systems. That is sufficient to consider it a physical phenomenon.

The phenomena are not reducible to nor derivable from the laws of physics, however, because they are subjective and private --- they are not available for objective empirical study. They cannot even be described in any informative way (no one can tell Frank Jackson's Mary what seeing red "will be like;" no one can tell anyone else what sensation evoked by some stimulus he's never experienced "will be like" for him).

The phenomena of consciousness are empirically inaccessible and thus unanalyzable; hence they would not be reducible to nor derivable from any objective theory. They just have to be accepted as analytical primitives, as "brute facts."

[GE Morton]

Value is anything of which it can be said that it has meaning. Value can be a number in physics, a pattern or a personal ethical principle.

"Value" has several meanings:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/value

"Having a meaning" is not one of them (which would be a very vague definition).

Meaning in a pure form is equal to 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued).

"Meaning in pure form"? Now you're using "meaning" in some idiosyncratic way. Nothing, BTW, is "good per se." To say that something X is good is to say 1) that one desires or approves of X ("That was a good movie!"), or 2) that X satisfies some standard ("The painter did a good job"). The first is subjective, the second relative (to the assumed standard). "Good per se" is meaningless.

Moral value would be value relative to what one deems to be 'good' according to morality. My logic has indicated that the origin of morality is a moral sense (moral compass) that underlays conscious experience.

Your "moral sense" (moral intuitions) may be the origin of some people's morality, but those are subjective, idiosyncratic, not rationally grounded and thus not philosophically interesting. But those intuitions don't "underlay conscious experience." They are just part of that experience, like one's preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream, or for Beethoven over Mozart.

Basic sensory experience such as Vision requires a priori moral valuing to be possible because it involves valuing on behalf of what is to be considered 'good'.

Well, no. You'll need to have a sensory experience of Mozart BEFORE you can judge whether it is "good." And most sensory experiences involve no judgment at all regarding "goodness." They are value-neutral.

You are confusing morality with ethics. While morality is involved in the creation of ethical theory, by the simple addressing of the question 'What is good?', morality does not reside in theory or denoted good and bad (i.e. morality does not reside within the scope of a retro-perspective).

Morality and ethics are synonyms. It is you who is confused, confusing morality with values (deontology with axiology). Values are idiosyncratic and subjective. Morality (if it is to be philosophically respectable) is universal and objective.

[GE Morton]

The generation of machine consciousness will not succeed until a significant barrier is overcome. That barrier is the development of a model of the function of consciousness. There is a natural tendency to want to get on with the experiment and worry about the theory later. However in this case there is a fundamental problem with the lack of a functional model of consciousness. That is without at least a first draft understanding of the purpose of consciousness and what it is trying to achieve, how will it be possible to test whether machine consciousness has been achieved or not ?

The test is the thing, without a test it will not be possible to demonstrate machine consciousness, and a test can only be considered when a functional model of consciousness, even a rough one, is developed.

We already have a test for machine consciousness --- the Turing test. It is the same test we use for determining biological consciousness, i.e., behavior.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test

We also have a functional model of consciousness -- the "phenomenal world model" and "phenomenal self-model" proposed by Metzinger.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZFjY1fAcESs

[psyreporter]

"Value" has several meanings:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/value

"Having a meaning" is not one of them (which would be a very vague definition).

The term value indicates the result of valuing, which is simply the assignment of meaning. Therefore, while the description may be considered vague within a complex human language scope, at it's core value is simply a term that indicates something that has been assigned meaning.

When it concerns the category 'empirical value', it concerns a category that restricts the scope of value to what science deems meaningful.

Meaning in a pure form is equal to 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued).

"Meaning in pure form"? Now you're using "meaning" in some idiosyncratic way. Nothing, BTW, is "good per se." To say that something X is good is to say 1) that one desires or approves of X ("That was a good movie!"), or 2) that X satisfies some standard ("The painter did a good job"). The first is subjective, the second relative (to the assumed standard). "Good per se" is meaningless.

The applicability of the concept 'meaning' as the foundation of value (and thus of physical reality) implies that meaning in a pure form is necessarily applicable since the origin of value cannot be valued itself while in the same time it is necessarily meaningful, which implies that at a fundamental nature level the origin of value in the Universe can be considered 'pure meaning' or 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued).

Since 'good per se' cannot be valued, it cannot apply to a 'thing'. Your logic related to subjective good/bad denotation therefore does not apply.

Basic sensory experience such as Vision requires a priori moral valuing to be possible because it involves valuing on behalf of what is to be considered 'good'.

Well, no. You'll need to have a sensory experience of Mozart BEFORE you can judge whether it is "good." And most sensory experiences involve no judgment at all regarding "goodness." They are value-neutral.

It is nonsensical to consider that the indicated 'you' can have existed before the senses.

All sensory experiences involve a moral judgement relative to 'good' since it involves attention.

You are confusing morality with ethics. While morality is involved in the creation of ethical theory, by the simple addressing of the question 'What is good?', morality does not reside in theory or denoted good and bad (i.e. morality does not reside within the scope of a retro-perspective).

Morality and ethics are synonyms. It is you who is confused, confusing morality with values (deontology with axiology). Values are idiosyncratic and subjective. Morality (if it is to be philosophically respectable) is universal and objective.

No, that is incorrect. Ethics is denoted good and bad (fixed / theory), morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (eternal / a never ending quest with value as a result).

[SteveKlinko]

If Conscious Experience is some Phenomenon of Science, then what is it? Is it Energy? Is it some sort of Matter? Is it some aspect of Space itself? I think Conscious Experience will never be classified into any of the above categories. Conscious Experiences don't even seem like they could be any of the above. I'm betting that Conscious Experiences are truly something different. We are at an Impasse on this.

Well, I'm not sure what counts as a "Phenomenon of Science," but the way you pose the question indicates the problem with answering it. Asking whether it is energy, matter, etc., assumes that if consciousness is a physical phenomenon, then it must be reducible to the laws of physics. That is not the case. It qualifies as a physical phenomenon because it is produced by, and only by, physical systems and wholly dependent upon those systems. That is sufficient to consider it a physical phenomenon.

But Conscious Experience cannot be shown to be produced by Neural Activity or any other Brain process. All Science knows is that there is a Correlation between Neural Activity and Conscious Experience. You have no Basis to say that Conscious Experience is a Physical Phenomenon.

The phenomena are not reducible to nor derivable from the laws of physics, however, because they are subjective and private --- they are not available for objective empirical study. They cannot even be described in any informative way (no one can tell Frank Jackson's Mary what seeing red "will be like;" no one can tell anyone else what sensation evoked by some stimulus he's never experienced "will be like" for him).

If Conscious Experience is not reducible to nor derivable from the laws of Physics then you again have no Basis for saying they are Physical Phenomena.

The phenomena of consciousness are empirically inaccessible and thus unanalyzable; hence they would not be reducible to nor derivable from any objective theory. They just have to be accepted as analytical primitives, as "brute facts."

You have decreed that Conscious Experiences are Inaccessible and Unanalyzable forever, as if you know something that nobody else knows. I say they probably will be Accessible and Analyzable someday with the right Perspective on the situation.

[SteveKlinko]

The generation of machine consciousness will not succeed until a significant barrier is overcome. That barrier is the development of a model of the function of consciousness. There is a natural tendency to want to get on with the experiment and worry about the theory later. However in this case there is a fundamental problem with the lack of a functional model of consciousness. That is without at least a first draft understanding of the purpose of consciousness and what it is trying to achieve, how will it be possible to test whether machine consciousness has been achieved or not ?

The test is the thing, without a test it will not be possible to demonstrate machine consciousness, and a test can only be considered when a functional model of consciousness, even a rough one, is developed.

John

But the right type of test could provide a fundamental clue for developing Models.

[GE Morton]

The term value indicates the result of valuing, which is simply the assignment of meaning. Therefore, while the description may be considered vague within a complex human language scope, at it's core value is simply a term that indicates something that has been assigned meaning.

Well, again, you've invented your own definitions of those two words. "Meaning," of course, has several uses, the most common being something denoted or indicated by something else, such as the definition of a word or the referent of a symbol: "'Cat' means a member of the Felidae family of mammals." Neither of those uses implies any valuation of either the word or symbol or of the things denoted. "Meaning" can also be used as a synonym for the significance or implication or purpose of an object, event, or act: "What is the meaning of this intrusion!?" That doesn't imply any valuation either.

And as I said, value is a measure of the strength, or rank, or someone's desire for something. It has nothing to do with meaning in any literal sense, though I suppose one could say that if someone values something, then it is "meaningful" to him. That would be a rather metaphorical use.

The applicability of the concept 'meaning' as the foundation of value (and thus of physical reality) implies that meaning in a pure form is necessarily applicable since the origin of value cannot be valued itself while in the same time it is necessarily meaningful, which implies that at a fundamental nature level the origin of value in the Universe can be considered 'pure meaning' or 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued).

Meanings are not "foundations of value." There are no "foundations of value." Nor is there any "pure form" of "meaning." The latter is just a word with several uses in the English language. Nor is there any "origin of value in the Universe." Value originates in human minds, and differs from mind to mind with respect to the things to which it is applied. "Pure meaning" and "good per se" are vacuous terms.

Morality and ethics are synonyms. It is you who is confused, confusing morality with values (deontology with axiology). Values are idiosyncratic and subjective. Morality (if it is to be philosophically respectable) is universal and objective.

No, that is incorrect. Ethics is denoted good and bad (fixed / theory), morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (eternal / a never ending quest with value as a result).

That distinction is contrived and arbitrary. Historically, "ethics" and "morals" are synonymous: Aristotle, Spinoza, G. E. Moore, Sidgwick, et al, titled their works on moral philosophy ""Ethics." Hume, Kant, Bentham, William James, et al, entitled their contributions "morals." They were all addressing the same subject matter.

The "process of denoting good and bad" is axiology, not morality. A morality is a set of rules and principles governing behavior. A private morality is usually aimed at rules for securing the things one values. But since values are subjective and idiosyncratic, a public morality must be neutral, indifferent, with respect to values.

[GE Morton]

But Conscious Experience cannot be shown to be produced by Neural Activity or any other Brain process.

Of course it can, easily. If I shine a red light into your eye and thus stimulate the photo-sensitive neurons on your retina, you will experience a sensation of "redness." When I shut the light off, that experience will cease. We could trace that neural signaling all the way from your retina to the visual cortex in your brain.

All Science knows is that there is a Correlation between Neural Activity and Conscious Experience. You have no Basis to say that Conscious Experience is a Physical Phenomenon.

Correlation is not causation --- unless the alleged cause is a sufficient condition for the alleged effect, i.e., the effect occurs every time the cause is present. Which it is in the example above. If the effect --- conscious experience --- has a physical cause, and does not occur in the absence of a physical cause, then we have a perfectly good basis for considering it a physical effect. That we can't derive it theoretically from the laws of physics does not preclude it being a physical effect. There is a good reason for that impossibility, as previously outlined.

If Conscious Experience is not reducible to nor derivable from the laws of Physics then you again have no Basis for saying they are Physical Phenomena.

See above.

You have decreed that Conscious Experiences are Inaccessible and Unanalyzable forever, as if you know something that nobody else knows.

That the conscious experiences of anyone other than ourselves are inaccessible is known to nearly everybody, and certainly to all philosophers of mind. As long as they are --- which will likely be forever --- it will be impossible to derive their specific qualities and character from physical (or any other) theory.

[psyreporter]

The term value indicates the result of valuing, which is simply the assignment of meaning.

Well, again, you've invented your own definitions of those two words. "Meaning," of course, has several uses, the most common being something denoted or indicated by something else, such as the definition of a word or the referent of a symbol: "'Cat' means a member of the Felidae family of mammals." Neither of those uses implies any valuation of either the word or symbol or of the things denoted. "Meaning" can also be used as a synonym for the significance or implication or purpose of an object, event, or act: "What is the meaning of this intrusion!?" That doesn't imply any valuation either.

The assignment of meaning always involves valuing and as such, it always results in value.

Meaning cannot be said to be definitive or fixed and is therefore unable to be grasped empirically. The fundamental meaning of for example a 'Cat' is unknown outside the scope of value.

Value is simply something that has been assigned meaning. In the case of your example "What is the meaning of this intrusion!?", when the question is answered, an act of valuing takes place of which the result is value.

And as I said, value is a measure of the strength, or rank, or someone's desire for something. It has nothing to do with meaning in any literal sense, though I suppose one could say that if someone values something, then it is "meaningful" to him. That would be a rather metaphorical use.

My previous logic has indicated that the concept meaning is fundamental, despite that it is impossible to grasp empirically. Thus, when one values something and it is then to be considered meaningful to him, the meaning that was assigned is not subjective but originates from something fundamental.

Meanings are not "foundations of value." There are no "foundations of value." Nor is there any "pure form" of "meaning." The latter is just a word with several uses in the English language. Nor is there any "origin of value in the Universe." Value originates in human minds, and differs from mind to mind with respect to the things to which it is applied. "Pure meaning" and "good per se" are vacuous terms.

As the above logic has indicated, valuing is the assignment of meaning and as such the potential required for valuing to be possible can be said to be 'pure meaning'.

The logic is very simple:

1. the origin of valuing is meaning (value is the assignment of meaning).
2. the origin of valuing cannot be valued itself, therefore the indicated meaning can be said to be 'pure'.

An alternative reference for the indicated 'pure meaning' would be 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued).

No, that is incorrect. Ethics is denoted good and bad (fixed / theory), morality is found in the process of denoting good and bad (eternal / a never ending quest with value as a result).

That distinction is contrived and arbitrary. Historically, "ethics" and "morals" are synonymous: Aristotle, Spinoza, G. E. Moore, Sidgwick, et al, titled their works on moral philosophy ""Ethics." Hume, Kant, Bentham, William James, et al, entitled their contributions "morals." They were all addressing the same subject matter.

The "process of denoting good and bad" is axiology, not morality. A morality is a set of rules and principles governing behavior. A private morality is usually aimed at rules for securing the things one values. But since values are subjective and idiosyncratic, a public morality must be neutral, indifferent, with respect to values.

Their work was moral philosophy, the result of their work was ethics. Therefore, they named their work ethics while they would refer to their work as moral philosophy. They could not have named their work 'morality' when their intent was to denote good and bad.

To display an indication of the difference, philosopher Bertrand Russell was opposed ethical claims because, in his view, such claims result in violence.

(2020) The politics of logic - Philosophy at war: nationalism and logical analysis
Russell told one colleague that the talk (On Scientific Method in Philosophy, Oxford) ‘was partly inspired by disgust at the universal outburst of “righteousness” in all nations since the war began. It seems the essence of virtue is persecution, and it has given me a disgust of all ethical notions.
...
In private, Russell referred to the essay as ‘Philosophers and Pigs’.
...
Russell’s antiwar protest was so extensive that it would cost him both his job and, for a time, his personal freedom. His theoretical antidote to the irrational, sectarian vitriol between European nations was to try to show how logic could function as an international language that could be used impartially and dispassionately to adjudicate disputes. His theoretical antidote was, in other words, analytic philosophy.

‘The truth, whatever it may be, is the same in England, France, and Germany … it is in its essence neutral’
https://aeon.co/essays/philosophy-at-wa ... l-analysis

Truth = "meaning before value" or 'good' = origin of morality.

The indicated good or 'pure meaning' that is the origin of morality (the fundamental nature of morality) would be of a different nature than a ethical claim and can be referenced as 'good per se' (good that cannot be valued) or truth. Since 'good per se' cannot be valued, it cannot be objective (nor subjective).

Aristotle considers a state of philosophical contemplation (eudaimonia) the greatest virtue (highest human good). It is a strive to serve life: the discovery of "good" from which value follows (the act of valuing, truth finding etc). It would be an everlasting quest and thus philosophy (morality) would have no end and would advance into infinity.

[SteveKlinko]

But Conscious Experience cannot be shown to be produced by Neural Activity or any other Brain process.

Of course it can, easily. If I shine a red light into your eye and thus stimulate the photo-sensitive neurons on your retina, you will experience a sensation of "redness." When I shut the light off, that experience will cease. We could trace that neural signaling all the way from your retina to the visual cortex in your brain.

Yes but the Magic of the Conscious Visual Experience happens after what the Cortex does. You are missing an important next step in the Processing.

All Science knows is that there is a Correlation between Neural Activity and Conscious Experience. You have no Basis to say that Conscious Experience is a Physical Phenomenon.

Correlation is not causation --- unless the alleged cause is a sufficient condition for the alleged effect, i.e., the effect occurs every time the cause is present. Which it is in the example above. If the effect --- conscious experience --- has a physical cause, and does not occur in the absence of a physical cause, then we have a perfectly good basis for considering it a physical effect. That we can't derive it theoretically from the laws of physics does not preclude it being a physical effect. There is a good reason for that impossibility, as previously outlined.

But Connectism reaches the same conclusions as the "In the Neurons" conclusions for all tests and thought experiments. See https://theintermind.com/#ConnectionPerspective

If Conscious Experience is not reducible to nor derivable from the laws of Physics then you again have no Basis for saying they are Physical Phenomena.

They are Conscious Phenomena not Physical Phenomena.

See above.

You have decreed that Conscious Experiences are Inaccessible and Unanalyzable forever, as if you know something that nobody else knows.

That the conscious experiences of anyone other than ourselves are inaccessible is known to nearly everybody, and certainly to all philosophers of mind. As long as they are --- which will likely be forever --- it will be impossible to derive their specific qualities and character from physical (or any other) theory.

I think that Science will discover a new Consciousness Phenomena and will make it an integral part of Science. That does not make Conscious Experience a Physical Phenomenon but it will be a begrudging admission by Science that it does not know everything right now. Science will need to change its' Perspective and think outside of the Box it is in.

[GE Morton]

The assignment of meaning always involves valuing and as such, it always results in value.

Well, no, it doesn't. At least, not according to the dictionary definitions of those two words. Perhaps you can spell out your definitions.

[GE Morton]

Yes but the Magic of the Conscious Visual Experience happens after what the Cortex does.

Of course. Effects always follow causes in time. In this case, the time it takes for the signals from the visual cortex to reach the frontal lobes (a few milliseconds).

[/quote]I think that Science will discover a new Consciousness Phenomena and will make it an integral part of Science.[/quote]

A "new" conscious phenomenon? Where would one look for such a thing? How would it be recognized as such --- what determining properties must it have to warrant being called "conscious"?

That does not make Conscious Experience a Physical Phenomenon but it will be a begrudging admission by Science that it does not know everything right now. Science will need to change its' Perspective and think outside of the Box it is in.

Well, no physicist (that I know of) claims his science knows everything. But we already know that consciousness is a physical phenomenon, because it is produced by, and only by, physical systems. The decisive test will be whether we can build a machine that can pass the Turing test.