It is certainly true that corroborations of a hypothesis are facts. All the objections made no distinction betwen observations that substantiate hypotheses as facts, and theories as facts. After listening to the objections, my conclusion is that Ptolemy's theory should not make anyone assert beyond doubt that the theory which produced a hypothesis can be turned into fact. That is, the problem has ceased to be one that can be addressed epistemologically, and has become an ethical issue. The reasoning follows:
The Historical Position. Scientific theories have been considered theories because they could again be superseded. In the case of Copernican and Keplerian heliocentric theories, they have already been superseded by relativistic theory, which states that the universe is still expanding from all points in space simultaneously. Further, something like antigravity could be discovered, in which case current astronomical theory will again be superseded by new theories. That is why science is held as being only an explanation of observations, and not a statement of necessary cause. Holding that scientific theories are 'facts' has historically been referred to as 'scientism,' because such belief can only be justified if the theories won't change.
Demands for Falsification. All but one of those asserting that Ptolemy's astronomy is pseudoscience (in one way or another) marred their position by claiming Ptolemy's theory has been falsified, whether or not they understood they were criticizing the premise (geocentrism), or the theory's induction (epicycles would explain retrograde motion).
Falsification Scope. Theory falsification now invokes as its foundation the argument of critical rationalism, a multi-part thesis from the eminent but wildly controversial Dr. Karl Popper (1934, 1959, 2002). At the turn of the millennium the USA almost completely rejected Popper's critical rationalism, because it also defines the so-calledsoft sciences (psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc) as insufficiently critical to be classified as science. Europeans have far less objection to considering soft sciences as arts. By contrast, the USA tries to shift as much as possible into science from the arts, because science gets far more funding, not only academically, but also in the business arena.
Motives for Falsification. Anti-theists such as Dr. Richard Dawkins (2006) claim that scientific theories such as evolution must be regarded as facts, and that inductions leading to theory formation must be regarded as causes, an ideology one may call 'scientific realism.' That works against the interests of those trying to get more funding for soft sciences. To meet Dawkins' goal of scientific realism, any paradigm that is even currently out of vogue must be demoted to pseudoscience, in the interest of maintaining factual purity.
Ethics of Falsification. On the one hand, USA's scientific realists believe that eradication of belief in God is good for society. On the other hand, scientific realism results in soft sciences receiving less funding. Thus falsification is no longer an epistemological issue, but has become an ethical issue. But there remains another issue independent of the motivations of scientific realists and soft scientists: does one want a society which has decided science has accumulated so many facts that we can no longer dream of new possibilities, be they antigravity or anything else, because we have turned theories into facts, denying new imaginations? And we cannot, for that is exactly the universally held criticism of Galileo's persecution.
The Deontology of Falsification. The dilemma remains, however, that those who wish to believe that scientific realism is true cannot be denied the right to that belief either. Thus while we can say theories should not be facts, we also cannot say that theories could not be facts. That moves the debate on whether Ptolemy's theory is falsifiable beyond the realm of logical truth and falsehood into the shadowy world of deontology (the study of what one ought to do), for which science has no answer (a long-standing problem called Hume's guillotine (1739), restated as Moore'sNaturalistic fallacy (1922), that observations of the world cannot define what we ought to do without defining moral premises).
The solution: demarcation, instead of falsification. The degradation of falsification into a deontological quagmire makes it clear that it is not the appropriate approach to deciding whether it is pseudoscience. Amazingly, however, there is another part of Popper's multi-part thesis that defined a new notion called demarcation, which can draw a line between that which is science and that which is not science, without even introducing the issue of theory falsification at all."In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason."
"Hume's Treatise on Human Nature (1739). Book III, part I, section I.