Art and the Objective-Subjective Relation

Use this forum to have philosophical discussions about aesthetics and art. What is art? What is beauty? What makes art good? You can also use this forum to discuss philosophy in the arts, namely to discuss the philosophical points in any particular movie, TV show, book or story.
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Stirling
Posts: 91
Joined: December 7th, 2009, 2:14 pm
Favorite Philosopher: Friedrich Nietzsche
Location: Pullman, WA

Art and the Objective-Subjective Relation

Post by Stirling »

1

It's fairly difficult to come into aesthetics without bringing with some presuppositions about what 'beauty' is or what 'art' is or what the duty or actions of an 'artist' - whatever that may be - consist of. We make valuations on these terms as we hear them and more stringent ones as we come about an experience which gives us the opportunity to consider them with more critical interest. What do these terms mean in relation to the objects or events we ascribe to them? And, perhaps more importantly, what is the significance of this lingual relationship between us and the objects we identify (or perceive)? And for the while considering this the curious point to be made is that our presuppositions - our seemingly automatic equation of an object and its perhaps fixed term - illuminates the point that our basic understanding of art is based on our expectations of what art is, or rather 'ought to be'.

Expectations tell us nothing of beauty as such, or things related to it. What they do tell us, though, is the type of relationship we have with it. And it's perhaps an offhand point to make, though it may be well-pointed, but to say that beauty is, for all its worth, a product, or consideration, or category, for those who have the ability to define it (i.e. humans) and lay on it psychological preconditions which then offers such a thing that might move one to give it such a word; and this from the experience of coming by something the effects the senses in such a way as to move one to even consider the idea of 'beauty', 'being moved', and the like, and the relation between the two or so words (or the feelings suggest). And this expresses a relationship, the perception of something that gives the physical inclination to say, for what emotions the word may express, that something is 'beautiful': That the relationship between us and beauty is a physical phenomenon; it's rooted, it's human, it's within the world of cause and effect, conditions, and such laws and stuffs as existence, as we know, is made up of. And beauty can be related in a similar way.

Beauty is a physical thing. But what does that mean? Is it found in nature? Is there an object we can call beauty, and nothing else? Or is it, for what stuffs - does it have stuffs? - it's made of, just an effect of something? Or is it a reaction to, or of, something? Well, we know it's found in nature, but how it's found in nature is still somewhat allusive. There isn't an object called beauty, that I know of anyway; and if there was, would it be some kind of embodiment of beauty as we know the concept? That'd be rather strange - and it sounds almost religious, so I'll veer from that point. Off that, does it have stuffs? Maybe - probably. We can assume, anyway, that given it’s a phenomenon in nature (so far as we can tell) it's either a stuffs or a product of some assortment of stuffs. And since there isn't anything in nature called, say, 'the beauty particle' - that is, it's not a thing you can add to something to give it beauty - we can assume then that beauty is the product of certain assortments of stuffs. Though calling it a product might be somewhat misleading: what's meant is that it's a phenomenon created in nature, though it might not have any mass or seem like any regular object found in nature (i.e. a tree or a mountain; a leopard or a human; an atom or a quark), we can categorize this product as, rather than an object, an effect.

This is, I think, fairly illuminating about the relationship between us and beauty. If beauty is an effect of certain objects or assortment of objects, what is there to say against the notion that humans, as well as not-humans, have the ability to 'create' beauty? But this is somewhat confounding. From one point of view, it's rather impossible to create something if there isn't a conscious effort behind it; things, most things, in nature just happen. So beauty, by this, in nature just happens and by human endeavor (as we see from his 'art', which I'll get to later) can also be created.

But the notion that humans can create beauty makes me wonder whether there are certain faculties humans have which permit the recognition of beauty, and therefore the manipulation of objects in order to induce that kind of effect, and makes humans singular to the concept of it. It's a somewhat presumptuous idea, but it might be illuminating to explore anyhow.

As far as we know, there isn't any other animal in our earthly kingdom that has the ability to conceptualize and recognize beauty as we humans do. Though it is indeed presumptuous to think that we're so unique in our humanly ways, other animals seem to be more practical in there endeavors than we are: instead of going out to find the day's stock of food for the family, we don't worry about that but instead go about doing other perhaps less immediate and severe things, like going to a concert or playing video games, going to a party or out on a dinner-date. We don't spend our days waiting and quietly roaming about fields waiting for some game to come close, attack and maul, and drag the carcass home for the family, then spend the rest of the time protecting and reproducing. We're not - well, generally - that simple. We enjoy more stimulating things. And for this we can give large credit to the activities of our consciousnesses.

Humans are singular in their efforts in the world. We're often so apart from other animals that many persons are offended at the idea of being in anyway related to them. The typical religious - religions of the Book - epithet is that all those animals - which we are not - were placed there for our benefit: We get to eats them! - Our consciousness places us apart. And we can safely assure ourselves from this point that our understanding of the world is wholly different from even the most advanced understanding of our closest animal relatives, the chimps. Indeed, we see the world - I'm willing to assume and generalize for the sake of argument - that, if our history suggests anything, the world isn't just there to be lived in, as an animal might have it, but is there for the conquering, or for mastery, however you want to look at it.
Beauty is an effect in nature; but more than that, it's solely, as we can suppose, recognized by us, by our most advanced condition in all Animalia, our consciousness. Can we be so sure that beauty is a stuff out there? Other animals don't see it, as far as we know. Why is it just us?

Well, perhaps it is. A comparison to make is to someone who has some psychosis, like schizophrenia: in a crowded room one man, and nobody else, sees a man hanging from a beam above a doorway - is it fair to assume that, after everyone having seen this beam without the dangling man except this one man, that he's most likely having a hallucination? He probably is. (It would be pointless to go into the details of the scenario.) Mass psychosis (not seeing the dangling man) is much less likely. I would assume that the recognition of beauty is unique to humans, as, I think, it's a product not of nature generally, but of the nature of advanced consciousness.

What we perceive, then, isn't necessarily what nature is in the most objective sense, but what we see nature as, which is, in some strange sense, a species-unique characteristic, species-subjective. Besides it's being necessary to our existence, this other thing, its curious 'beautification'; that phenomenon is wholly unique to an animal that's overcome its more base instincts - and so far we're the only ones to have made the leap that we know of.

And beyond this point, to become more microscopic, we find that, though humans have the ability to recognize beauty, that recognition is incredibly varied. What's beautiful for one person might take on the negative for another person, being ugly. This is well-observed. However, one might often find that more thorough appreciations of certain things once found ugly might change the perception of it - the recognition ugliness - to seeing in a slightly altered sense, or maybe a profoundly different sense, seeing it as beautiful; and vice versa. So, this curiously human categorization of 'beautiful' and 'ugly' isn't fixed to first impressions; minds can change with experience, and notions of ugliness and beautifulness can be changed, and, supposedly, to any degree one might wish to scale it. This leaves us at a difficult place of determining what can be definitively beautiful (I'll leave 'ugly' alone). But that's to ask: What is beauty objectively? Or: What is objectively beautiful?

Well, this is somewhat tricky to answer. If we suppose that what I've so far said is true, then what we have to work with is a mesh of evidence that suggests that objects aren't in themselves beautiful, but are projected upon, by whatever psychological determinations, to be beautiful; consciousness projects beauty on objects ('why' is a matter for a different discussion). And it's not a grand surprise that so many would find the same objects beautiful: from conditioning (epigenetically); natural dispositions, as per the regularity of reproduced consciousness (genetically); etc. There can be many reasons for why so many people find the same things beautiful, and even more reasons why so many people disagree on what is beautiful. That's not really at issue, I don't think.

And if we go on further with this notion that beauty is perceived personally, projected onto things from singular and species-specific dispositions, then a curious term arises, I find. That humans perceive beauty is understood; but that that beauty is made at a personal level is a strange addition to it. What we get is: objective-subjectivity.

I understand the contradictory nature of the term. But if we analyze its parts and what they refer to - most of which I think I've stated above - then we understand what is meant. The 'objective-subjective' relation refers to the innate ability to perceive beauty, as all we humans presumably have; but the subjective ability to project onto what objects, by whatever psychological predispositions, is wholly personal and is determined by our unique and individual stations. (I realize how continental this sounds, but I think there's some truth to it.)

And this further illuminates the relationship we have with the word 'beauty'. The term refers to an incredibly personal sense of oneself and the world; it expresses entire outlooks. I don't think the relationship should be understated.

2

And onto the point of this thread: What is art? I think that this can only be understood in terms of our understanding of beauty - and maybe a few other things. In terms of beauty since art is so often seen in relation to it. And the 'few other things' might include terminology, language and definitions, etc.

First off, a definition of 'art': '[The] quality, production, expression, or realm, according to aesthetic principles, of what is beautiful, appealing, or of more than ordinary significance'. This is a very broad definition - and I realize how many of you might be disappointed about a definition as it, or so it goes, bogs down philosophical creativity, and perhaps limits what the truth of the matter might be, etc. But I find it at least to be a fair starting point.

If it is a matter determining 'quality, production, expression...' in relation to a general, mean feeling of beauty toward certain things, we could well-extrapolate what a piece of art is and decide what like it could also qualify. A typical example would be van Gogh's 'Starry Night'. Many people, if not all, really, consider a work of art. It's a 'work' insofar as it was made, and 'of art' insofar as it qualifies for such a notion: it's made of the qualities of art, we could say; made satisfying certain 'aesthetic principles'. And because it's made by those principles of beauty, as it would be understood, and, as it is observable, it moves people to call it beautiful, to whatever degree, then we're inclined to... call it a physical projection of beauty? These be murky waters.

If beauty is a projection, an effect of consciousness on objects, what could we call something that's made in the name of that projection? Pretty mountains and streams aren't physical projections; their prettiness is dependent on a projection, but not a physical projection - or, so we could term it. Physical projections of feelings of such things as 'beauty' and 'ugly' are then, I think, 'works of art'. That is to say, a 'work of art', as defined above, is a perceived notion of some such thing as beauty made physical; whereas, something like a 'pretty mountain' is only projected on to be pretty, etc., but is not itself a 'work of art', or, more to the point of this thread, is not a work of art. I hope the difference is understood. And you could easily figure from this what is and isn't art, going outside art and maybe into music and so on.

3

Artistic valuation is another point of consideration. If 'art' is a physical projection of an interpretation of beauty - as we might well put it - then we might well exclaim that a valuation on any one give piece of art is subject to a general interpretation. But this seems fallacious.

Imagine 'Starry Night'. Now imagine a crowd of people observing it. Suppose among this crowd that 47% of them found it to be rubbish; imagine the rest, 53%, found particularly pretty, beautiful. What could we say of the art, then? Is the beauty of 'Starry Night' a matter of percentages, holding to just a slight majority of beauty? Though perhaps the notion sounds well, one would think that the actuation of beauty in the art is something wholly other than the instance of general interpretation - that it's beyond just recognition.

But I'm often inclined toward the idea that some opinions are more valuable than others - depending on the appreciation of whatever their consideration. And is that not fair? One would assume, and rightly, that a consideration of some matter in physics is better opined by a physicist than, say, a priest. Where one severely studies all of what is known by set, critical method, eliminating as much nonfactual information from the study - and one would hope ill-reason - as is possible within the limitations of human consciousness; the other sways upon old dogmas, holding that nothing beyond this religious precept is, instead of possible - though that may be a consideration, though misleading - permissible. One would think that such a thing could well be taken for granted: it is open-minded science versus close-minded and absolutist metaphysics - the former being more rightly, if we're to take any advantage of the last few hundred years of enlightened inquiry. (Though that's all a matter for a different discussion.)

A similar tone can be marked by the difference between a car mechanic and... a philosopher. Supposing in this instance that the mechanic has supreme knowledge on cars compared to the philosopher, who may in comparison have supreme knowledge on the works of Kant, it is fair to suppose that the opinion of what's to be done with the car is much further in the way of the mechanic than the philosopher, and an opinion on the philosophy of Kant is much more valuable from the mouth of the philosopher than the mechanic. And supposing both are particularly truthful in their intercourse.

And that is a further point of consideration in what must be done about the problem of artistic valuation: If art can be valuated by a general consensus (which I'm not yet willing to concede), what can we say of the legitimacy of the individual valuations? Are they truthful? Why do these people in the crowd hold the opinions they do about the piece, 'Starry Night'?
But this highlights the problem of what truth is, which will lead us astray from the primary issue of valuation. And it can well be understood that the problem of truth, though vital to the importance of many things, isn't wholly practical to relate to regular human endeavor and inquiry: People are, of their imperfect, ever-growing and ever-changing states of being, not in any place where truth in the most absolute sense can be rendered an adequate property of the human condition and its faculties.

Art is, as I have said, an allusive thing - as is its property, beauty. And what can be known about art - thinking that it's a phenomenon from consciousness - is very difficult to apprehend, for how we know something of art and beauty is in a similar way as we might know about the mind: art is, I would say, a sub-category of the 'hard problem'. And for that, the furthest we can expect to go - besides physical analysis - is to best find what honesty, rather than truth, is in valuating art. And though that would require extensive psychological analysis, I'll assume further philosophic stipulations.

'Humility and honesty do not dictate saying: I am probably wrong; what is the use? Honest humbition says: This is my view; I may be wrong, though I do not see in what way; but if you offer informed criticisms or objections, I am eager to consider them', wrote Walter Kaufmann in 'The Faith of a Heretic (pg. 335). Honesty, as we might all expect, is a fairly rare thing, a least in its deepest form. House, from the TV show of the same name, expresses this constantly; it's one of the primary philosophical expressions in this series. And in his modern Holmesian fashion; I always expect his to say, 'Oh! my dear Watson: everybody lies - or didn't you know?'

And this is a point that makes it even more difficult: determining a proper valuation of art from the impressions and opinions of a crowd - those looking at 'Starry Night' - we have to find out what their most honest response to the art is, or would be, otherwise the percentages of appreciation of the art may change exponentially. And that leaves us nowhere on the matter. And how does one find this singular honest opinion about the art? What is their honesty?

If we take their honesty to mean that they have an opinion about the art that's final and unchanging, and 'true' to something that's wholly pertinent to their conscious projection of their sense of beauty, and then art, then we'd have to submit that, since people are indeed changing perpetually, appreciations altering by new and newer sense-experiences, that their most honest opinion at any one moment doesn't exist. And, therefore, the percentage of value in 'Starry Night' - just by the one crowd, supposing that they all come back to it at random intervals throughout their lives - would be ever-changing as well. And the metaphysical observation that could be made by this is, indeed, that the art is in perhaps every sense a physical projection of their consciousness.

For that, the art has no definite value. This, to me, seems strange. One would think that an object, no matter what it is or how it came to be, would have a definite value, regardless of interpretation - that is, a solely objective worth, with no subjective influence. But if we do believe that the art is just a projection of conscious needs or interests, then the value derived is wholly independent of the objects existence, independent of itself, its objective nature. And any general value, fluctuating as it does, is irrelevant to the question. The only use a general value may requisite is its appearance on some prestigious gallery wall.
"Live slow, die eventually, leave an indifferently attractive corpse. That's my motto." - David Mitchell

"By a sarcasm of law and phrase they were freemen." - Mark Twain
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