JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Terrapin Station »

Consul wrote: June 20th, 2021, 11:58 am
Count Lucanor wrote: June 19th, 2021, 10:48 pm I don't mind if only one other person in the world agrees with me:
https://philosophynow.org/issues/63/The ... _a_Problem
Gettier has tried to use semantic obscurity to trick the reader into believing that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. However, it can be seen that in this case the ‘knowledge’ was either not justified or false, and thus never constituted knowledge in the first place.[...]

Gettier makes the assumption that the evidence presented justified Smith’s beliefs. However, Gettier makes no attempt at saying how strong the evidence is, and if we can infer anything it is that the evidence is quite weak, and it could be argued that in both cases Smith was not justified in making the statements of knowledge he made.[...]

The problem of reference-muddling in example one and the inherent logical flaw in example two show that Gettier problems are no threat to ‘knowledge as justified true belief’. The classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief doesn’t have to be changed, and no extra premises have to be added.
1. "Gettier makes a very specific statement (Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket), and from that he deduces a very generalized statement, (The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.) However, it is not clear who ‘the man’ refers to here. If ‘the man’ refers to Jones then the statement is false, because Jones is not the man who gets the job. If ‘the man’ refers to Smith, then Smith would be making a statement without any justification, since he believes that Jones will get the job. The first possibility violates the truth requirement for justified true belief, while the second case violates the justification requirement. Gettier has tried to use semantic obscurity to trick the reader into believing that justified true belief is not enough for knowledge. However, it can be seen that in this case the ‘knowledge’ was either not justified or false, and thus never constituted knowledge in the first place."

The author presupposes that there is a particular person—either Jones or Smith—to which the noun phrase "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" refers. Is this presupposition true? Not necessarily, because that noun phrase can be interpreted purely quantificationally rather than referentially:

"There is a (exactly one) man who will get the job and has ten coins in his pockets."

This statement doesn't imply any specific reference to Smith or Jones—let alone an ambiguous one—, so the author's argument against Gettier's example is thereby undermined. Smith believes both justifiedly and truly that there is a (exactly one) man who will get the job and has ten coins in his pockets, but he doesn't know there is owing to an epistemically relevant mismatch between what justifies his belief and what makes it true.

2. "…This second example cannot be accepted because it contains an inherent logical flaw. Gettier uses an example in the form of ‘either a or b, not a, therefore b’. However, this form of logic can ‘prove’ an infinite number of impossibilities. For example, I have reason to believe that Brown is in Barcelona, so I say “Either cows fly or Brown is in Barcelona.” It turns out Brown is now in Amsterdam, therefore, cows fly. This is obviously impossible, thus showing that the formula can’t be used to prove anything ­– or else it could be used to prove everything! You cannot claim here to know a proposition which randomly happened to be true just because its complementary proposition which you thought was true wasn’t. This is the wrong ‘justification’. Conclusions derived using this logical sleight-of-hand cannot be considered knowledge."

If I am justified in believing that Brown is in Barcelona, then I am also justified in believing that either Brown is in Barcelona or cows fly. Gettier's example has the logical form "a, therefore either a or b", which is doubtless a valid inference (independently of whether or not b is possible); and this is all that is needed for Gettier's argument.

The author's logical objection fails generally, because if b is impossible such that []~b (necessarily-not-b), then the inference "either a or b, not a, therefore b" is invalid. It is valid if and only if both a and b are possible. For if only a is possible and b is not, then not-a is impossible—given that it is true that either a or b. And, then, if not-a is impossible (due to b's impossibility), there can be no valid inference to any possible or impossible b. So it is not the case that "this form of logic can ‘prove’ an infinite number of impossibilities", because it cannot prove any impossibilities at all. For if either a or b, and b is necessarily false, then a is necessarily true (*, and there can be no true impossible b (such as "Cows fly").

(* By "a is necessarily true" I don't mean to say that a is a necessary truth).
When we're talking about meanings (propositions) and beliefs (so that we're talking about propositional knowledge), we need to actually be talking about meanings and beliefs, both of which are things going on in particular individual's heads.

The way that belief works is not that when someone believes "Joe took a trip to London," thy believe something like, "A man took a trip to London" where "a man" might not refer to Joe. If someone believes "Joe took a trip to London," then when they say "A man took a trip to London" is true as a suitable substitution, "a man" refers to Joe per their belief, per how they assign meaning to that sentence.

Their are similar issues with most Gettier examples (though different issues depending on the example).
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Count Lucanor wrote: June 20th, 2021, 2:33 pmIn conclusion, Gettier's problem only works assuming a very stupid person making false inferences. Stupidity cannot be the basis for studying epistemology.
If you aren't convinced by Gettier's original examples, maybe the following one will convince you of the insufficiency of the JTB definition of "knowledge", which I just thought up (and which is analogous to the sheep-in-the-meadow case):

Bill looks through the window of a restaurant and sees a man sitting at a table who looks exactly like his friend Jim; so he believes that Jim is in that restaurant. However, the man he sees isn't Jim but Jim's identical twin brother Tim, whose existence is unknown to Bill, because he never met Tim and (for some strange reason) Jim never told him that he has an identical twin brother. As it happens, Jim is in the restaurant too, sitting at another table that Bill cannot see through the window. So Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is both justified by his seeing someone who looks exactly like Jim and true owing to Jim's presence in the restaurant. But does he really know that Jim is in the restaurant? No, he arguably doesn't; and if he doesn't, then justified true belief isn't the same as knowledge.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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1 Believing or knowing that something is the case has nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with propositions. The expressions 'propositional belief' and 'propositional knowledge' are misattributions that muddle up what we believe or know and what we say.

2 So the JTB truth condition - S knows that p iff p is true - is incorrect. And Gettier merely recycled the mistake.

3 The idea that the meaning of a linguistic expression - such as a declarative - is something different and separate from the 'token' expression is a metaphysical delusion.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: June 20th, 2021, 10:08 pm
Count Lucanor wrote: June 20th, 2021, 2:33 pmIn conclusion, Gettier's problem only works assuming a very stupid person making false inferences. Stupidity cannot be the basis for studying epistemology.
If you aren't convinced by Gettier's original examples, maybe the following one will convince you of the insufficiency of the JTB definition of "knowledge", which I just thought up (and which is analogous to the sheep-in-the-meadow case):

Bill looks through the window of a restaurant and sees a man sitting at a table who looks exactly like his friend Jim; so he believes that Jim is in that restaurant. However, the man he sees isn't Jim but Jim's identical twin brother Tim, whose existence is unknown to Bill, because he never met Tim and (for some strange reason) Jim never told him that he has an identical twin brother. As it happens, Jim is in the restaurant too, sitting at another table that Bill cannot see through the window. So Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is both justified by his seeing someone who looks exactly like Jim and true owing to Jim's presence in the restaurant. But does he really know that Jim is in the restaurant? No, he arguably doesn't; and if he doesn't, then justified true belief isn't the same as knowledge.
Bill's belief is actually "That guy (whom I see) is Jim sitting in the restaurant." His belief isn't "There is some guy in the restaurant--not necessarily the guy I see--who is Jim." Again, when we're talking about belief, we need to actually be talking about belief, which in this case is a particular occurrence in Bill's head.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Terrapin Station »

Philosophy has a weird tradition of treating the "belief" part of knowledge as more or less not really being a belief. This is probably due to the aversion to psychologism that developed in the field (well, and pretending that there wasn't always some aversion to that present from the start--basically most of Plato's mistakes stem from wanting to avoid parsing various things as psychological phenomena, for example). Beliefs are particular events in particular individual's heads, and have all sorts of psychological nuances as such. We shouldn't ignore that if we're talking about beliefs.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Terrapin Station wrote: June 21st, 2021, 6:45 am
Consul wrote: June 20th, 2021, 10:08 pm If you aren't convinced by Gettier's original examples, maybe the following one will convince you of the insufficiency of the JTB definition of "knowledge", which I just thought up (and which is analogous to the sheep-in-the-meadow case):

Bill looks through the window of a restaurant and sees a man sitting at a table who looks exactly like his friend Jim; so he believes that Jim is in that restaurant. However, the man he sees isn't Jim but Jim's identical twin brother Tim, whose existence is unknown to Bill, because he never met Tim and (for some strange reason) Jim never told him that he has an identical twin brother. As it happens, Jim is in the restaurant too, sitting at another table that Bill cannot see through the window. So Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is both justified by his seeing someone who looks exactly like Jim and true owing to Jim's presence in the restaurant. But does he really know that Jim is in the restaurant? No, he arguably doesn't; and if he doesn't, then justified true belief isn't the same as knowledge.
Bill's belief is actually "That guy (whom I see) is Jim sitting in the restaurant." His belief isn't "There is some guy in the restaurant--not necessarily the guy I see--who is Jim." Again, when we're talking about belief, we need to actually be talking about belief, which in this case is a particular occurrence in Bill's head.
Bill believes the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, which belief is justified (because that guy looks exactly like Jim) but false (because that guy isn't Jim). Believing the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, he also believes that Jim is in the restaurant, which belief is justified (because the guy he thinks is Jim looks exactly like Jim) and true (because Jim is in the restaurant).
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: June 21st, 2021, 1:08 am 1 Believing or knowing that something is the case has nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with propositions. The expressions 'propositional belief' and 'propositional knowledge' are misattributions that muddle up what we believe or know and what we say.

2 So the JTB truth condition - S knows that p iff p is true - is incorrect. And Gettier merely recycled the mistake.

3 The idea that the meaning of a linguistic expression - such as a declarative - is something different and separate from the 'token' expression is a metaphysical delusion.
According to one ontological theory of propositions, they are abstract, nonmental&nonphysical meanings or senses of declarative sentences, such that synonymous declarative sentences in the same language or in different languages express the same proposition. For example, "Schnee ist weiss" in German and "Snow is white" in English are different sentences; but, being synonymous, they express the same proposition <Snow is white>. (Of course, you cannot mention a proposition without using a sentence in some language expressing it.)

According to another theory (the favorite one of cognitive psychologists), propositions are concrete, mental representations in the (nonconscious) language of thought ("Mentalese"), which is homologous to natural languages but not identical to any of them. Moreover (as far as I know), Mentalese is independent of natural languages, so nonhuman animals lacking a natural language such as English can be cognitively equipped with Mentalese too, and thereby have mental attitudes such as beliefs too.

However, if that is what propositions are, then the phrase "propositional attitude" is a misnomer if it is read as "attitude toward a proposition". For a proposition qua mental representation isn't the intentional object of an attitude such as belief, knowledge, and desire but its representational content—unless, of course, the attitude is actually about a proposition (e.g. the belief that the proposition <Snow is white> is expressed by the German sentence "Schnee ist weiss").

A proposition qua representational content is that through which the intentional object of an attitude is represented to the thinker; and the intentional objects of attitudes such as belief and desire are states of affairs, objects, or events rather than propositions—except for those cases where attitudes are actually about propositions. For example, when I fear that my house is on fire, what I fear is the state of affairs of my house being on fire rather than the proposition <my house is on fire> (or the sentence "My house is on fire").

According to the received view in cognitive science, having a propositional attitude is a matter of standing in a functional-computational relation to a proposition qua mental representation; but it's actually a mistake to regard the proposition as that what the attitude is about, i.e. as the attitude's intentional object.

QUOTE>
"According to the standard and mistaken view, an intentional state is a relationship between an agent and a mental representation (typically a proposition). So for example, if I believe that Obama is president of the United States, on this mistaken view I stand in a relation of believing to the proposition that Obama is president of the United States. This is why these sorts of states are called “propositional attitudes,” because they consist in a relationship between an agent and a proposition. If I believe that Obama is president, I have an attitude to a proposition.

I used to think the terminology of “propositional attitudes” was a harmless mistake, but in fact it is almost invariably disastrous. It gives exactly the wrong account of intentionality. There is indeed a relation if I believe that Obama is president, but the relationship is between me and Obama himself, not between me and a proposition. I do not have any attitude toward the proposition. Some beliefs are attitudes towards propositions. If I believe that Bernoulli’s principle is boring, then I do have an attitude toward a proposition—namely, the proposition that states Bernoulli’s principle—I think it is boring. But this is a very unusual belief. Most beliefs are not about propositions. They are about people, objects, states of affairs, etc. In the belief we are considering, the proposition is not the object of the belief, it is the content of the belief. Indeed, thought of in the right way, it is the belief itself. The belief that Obama is president of the United States just consists in that proposition as believed. There is not some further relationship between the agent and some representation. In this case the belief just is the believed representation."

(Searle, John R. Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 38-9)
<QUOTE
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: June 21st, 2021, 9:51 amAccording to another theory (the favorite one of cognitive psychologists), propositions are concrete, mental representations in the (nonconscious) language of thought ("Mentalese"), which is homologous to natural languages but not identical to any of them. Moreover (as far as I know), Mentalese is independent of natural languages, so nonhuman animals lacking a natural language such as English can be cognitively equipped with Mentalese too, and thereby have mental attitudes such as beliefs too.
QUOTE>
"[T]here is evidence that nonlinguistic creatures are capable of certain kinds of thought. If that is so, then one’s language of thought cannot be equated with one’s natural language. A second reason for the view that the language of thought cannot be a natural language is that thinking of a kind is required to learn the conventions that govern natural languages. Neither of these two lines of argument is uncontroversial, but together they have persuaded many theorists that even if much distinctively human thought may be encoded in natural language, there must also be a more primitive ‘language of thought’ that is independent of one’s natural language."

(Bayne, Tim. Thought: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.)
<QUOTE
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: June 21st, 2021, 1:08 am 1 Believing or knowing that something is the case has nothing to do with language, and so nothing to do with propositions. The expressions 'propositional belief' and 'propositional knowledge' are misattributions that muddle up what we believe or know and what we say.
2 So the JTB truth condition - S knows that p iff p is true - is incorrect. And Gettier merely recycled the mistake.
Interestingly, in the definition of "knowledge" as "justified true belief" truth is ascribed to beliefs rather than to propositions or sentences. However, many would argue that a belief is true iff the proposition believed is true; so propositions are the primary or direct bearers of truth-values, and beliefs are just secondary or indirect bearers of truth-values.
Bertrand Russell thinks otherwise:

"Truth is a property of beliefs, and derivatively of sentences which express beliefs. Truth consists in a certain relation between a belief and one or more facts other than the belief. When this relation is absent, the belief is false. A sentence may be called 'true' or 'false' even if no one believes it, provided that, if it were believed, the belief would be true or false as the case may be."

(Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. 1948. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. p. 135)

Correspondingly, one can say that a belief is true iff the state of affairs which is its intentional object obtains, and is thus a fact. To believe truly is to believe a fact. But even if this is so, beliefs have representational contents in addition to their intentional objects that represent (actual, obtaining or nonactual, nonobtaining) states of affairs; and those representational contents can be regarded as propositions qua mental representations of states of affairs or facts.

By the way, as for the ontology of states of affairs, there are philosophers who think that states of affairs can exist without obtaining or being actual (like propositions that can exist without being true). That is, they think there are states of affairs which aren't facts. I think they're wrong, because I think nonactual, nonobtaining states of affairs are nothing but nonexistent intentional objects or "objectives" (as Alexius Meinong calls them) of thought. Moreover, those who believe in existing nonobtaining states of affairs regard them as abstract entities; but then I no longer see an ontological distinction between states of affairs and propositions (qua abstract entities = nonmental Fregean thoughts).
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consider the following list:

1. (declarative) sentences
1.1 abstract sentence-types
1.2 concrete sentence-tokens
2. abstract propositions = Fregean Gedanken/thoughts
3. abstract or concrete states of affairs
4. abstract or concrete facts

As for the respective ontologies of 2-4 and their relationships, see:

Propositions: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

States of Affairs: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/states-of-affairs/

Facts: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: June 21st, 2021, 9:05 am Bill believes the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, which belief is justified (because that guy looks exactly like Jim) but false (because that guy isn't Jim). Believing the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, he also believes that Jim is in the restaurant, which belief is justified (because the guy he thinks is Jim looks exactly like Jim) and true (because Jim is in the restaurant).
Again, he doesn't believe some general "Jim is in the restaurant." He believes "That guy I saw, who is Jim, is in the restaurant." That's the only reason that he'd agree to "Jim is in the restaurant."
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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If we're going to talk about Bill's belief, we need to actually talk about Bill's belief per se. Bill's belief has specific content, for specific reasons.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Terrapin Station wrote: June 21st, 2021, 3:05 pm
Consul wrote: June 21st, 2021, 9:05 am Bill believes the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, which belief is justified (because that guy looks exactly like Jim) but false (because that guy isn't Jim). Believing the guy he sees in the restaurant is Jim, he also believes that Jim is in the restaurant, which belief is justified (because the guy he thinks is Jim looks exactly like Jim) and true (because Jim is in the restaurant).
Again, he doesn't believe some general "Jim is in the restaurant." He believes "That guy I saw, who is Jim, is in the restaurant." That's the only reason that he'd agree to "Jim is in the restaurant."
Bill believes falsely that the man he sees in the restaurant is Jim, but it just so happens that he believes truly that Jim is in the restaurant.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: June 21st, 2021, 3:43 pm Bill believes falsely that the man he sees in the restaurant is Jim, but it just so happens that he believes truly that Jim is in the restaurant.
It wouldn't make sense to say that Bill believes that the man he sees in the restaurant is Jim, but he doesn't believe that Jim is in the restaurant.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Terrapin Station wrote: June 21st, 2021, 3:05 pmAgain, he doesn't believe some general "Jim is in the restaurant."
Of course not. He believes that his one particular friend Jim is in the restaurant.
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