Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

Post by Mgrinder »

I hope you realize how and why I regard the debate of panpsychism vs emergence as a little... superfluous. I've got a theory of the mind that is close to panpsychism, but not really panpsychism, has some elements of dualism, and even emergentism. It should stand or fall on it's own merits, it should be tested.

Panpsychism is a vague doctrine, as is emergentism. Debating the merits of either is interesting, but is only useful if it leads to an actual theory of mind that more specific and makes testable claims about reality. Once that happens, the debate is moot, I think.
Bohm2 wrote:
Mgrinder wrote:I don't agree with this. If aliens know alot about Hydrogen and oxygen, they can reason that they will form a liquid under certain pressure and temperature, even if water has never been discovered on their world. Hence the "liquidity" is there in the intrinsic properties of H2 and O2. In fact, we can do this today, our science is good enough.
But again, the issue is that nobody goes around referring to the intrinsic properties that are responsible for these macroscopic properties as "proto-liquid", or "proto-life" because it's understood that these are macroscopic properties that do not exist at the more fundamental level.
No, nobody does talk like that, however, the information that H and O will form a liquid is in the atom. Even if we didn't know how to derive that H2O will form a liquid, we would have an idea of how to do this from physics and chemistry. Then we would wait until science progressed and then we would be able to derive it, which we have done, and now science has progressed so we can derive it. Happy story.

The same does not apply to conscious experience. If it were "emergent" like a liquid, the information would be "in the atom", even if we couldn't do it today, we could see a path as to how we would derive conscious experience. However, the path cannot be seen by anyone, not even in principle. In past discussions, you have conceded this, but you wait for a "better science". You're in for a long wait, because no path can be seen in the candidates for an ultimate physics (string theory, loop quantum gravity, etc.) either.
Bohm2 wrote: Single water molecules are not wet or liquidy.

But they are in the sense that we can see how they form a liquid.
Bohm2 wrote: But with mental stuff, this is exactly what panpsychists do. You won't find liquidity by looking at a single water molecule,

But you do find it.
Bohm2 wrote: because it's understood that liquidity is a macroscopic property. So why should it be different with mental properties?
Because you can see a way to derive the macroscopic from the micro with liquidity, or superconduction, or acidity, or whatever. No way can be seen at all for mental stuff (well, I can. but normal science can't). It's a nice story to say that it's because we're not smart enough, but the truth is otherwise.
Bohm2 wrote: Panpsychists try to claim that the mental is something totally different so it cannot possibly emerge from more fundamental stuff that isn't itself mental. But this isn't convincing as Chomsky ponts out:
In Nagel’s phrase, “we can see how liquidity is the logical result of the molecules ‘rolling around on each other’ at the microscopic level,” though “nothing comparable is to be expected in the case of neurons” and consciousness...It is built into the notion of emergence that emergence cannot be brute in the sense of there being no reason in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.” This is Strawson’s No-Radical Emergence Thesis, from which he draws the panpsychic conclusion that “experiential reality cannot possibly emerge from wholly and utterly non-experiential reality.”...

It should be noted that the molecule-liquid example, commonly used, is not a very telling one. We also cannot conceive of a liquid turning into two gases by electrolysis, and there is no intuitive sense in which the properties of water, bases, and acids inhere in Hydrogen or Oxygen or other atoms. Furthermore, the whole matter of conceivability seems to be irrelevant, whether it is brought up in connection with the effects of motion that Newton and Locke found inconceivable, or the irreducible principles of chemistry, or mind-brain relations. There is something about the nature of Hydrogen and Oxygen “in virtue of which they are intrinsically suited to constituting water,” so the sciences discovered after long labors, providing reasons “in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.”

What seemed “brute emergence” was assimilated into science as ordinary emergence—not, to be sure, of the liquidity variety, relying on conceivability. I see no strong reason why matters should necessarily be different in the case of experiential and nonexperiential reality, particularly given our ignorance of the latter, stressed from Newton and Locke to Priestley, developed by Russell, and arising again in recent discussion.
The Mysteries of Nature: How Deeply hidden?
http://www.trulysuperb.com/wp-content/u ... y-2009.pdf
I don't see this, why was it inconceivable that Newtonian physics could explain macroscopic properties? A path could be seen, even then, I think. Was it the right path? No, but it was a resolvable question, even back then. They could see how they could possibly solve it, they had options. TO say it was "inconceivable" is not right, I think.

The question is more "can the way science is done, using physical laws, expressed through mathematics, conceivably figure out how liquids form?" the answer was yes in Newton's day. If Newton could figure out the planets, liquidity was with in his grasp. However, this same model, of using physical laws, can't do the job for experiences of qualia.

In any event, these debates, though maybe interesting, are all beside the point. I hope you can see that. Here's a new theory to deal with. it's not really panpsychism, or emergentism, or dualism, or materialism, it's something new. I'm hoping to deal with it, not vaguely related doctrines.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder wrote:The question is more "can the way science is done, using physical laws, expressed through mathematics, conceivably figure out how liquids form?" the answer was yes in Newton's day. If Newton could figure out the planets, liquidity was with in his grasp. However, this same model, of using physical laws, can't do the job for experiences of qualia.
I think it's pretty clear that one cannot figure out many macroscopic properties from micro-physics. The Nobel laureate physicist, Anderson, many years ago pointed out some of the limitations of reductionism:

More is different
http://robotics.cs.tamu.edu/dshell/cs68 ... ferent.pdf

Of course, reductionists can still argue that this is simply a limitation of our knowledge and not the phenomena:
In other terms, ontological reductionism can easily accomodate emergence, provided this is only epistemological emergence; provided this is only apparent emergence relatively to our limited faculties of knowledge. The appearance of new and autonomous features can easily be explained by ontological reductionists provided they assume that our experimental or perceptive analysis is coarse-grained. After all, if we use a poor instrument of study which cannot provide us with information below a certain scale, no wonder the large-scale behavior looks as if it were new and autonomous with respect to basic elements studied at a much higher resolution.
Ontology, Matter and Emergence
http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921576.pdf
Mgrinder wrote:In any event, these debates, though maybe interesting, are all beside the point. I hope you can see that. Here's a new theory to deal with. it's not really panpsychism, or emergentism, or dualism, or materialism, it's something new. I'm hoping to deal with it, not vaguely related doctrines.
I could not follow how you model is falsifiable/testable. How could one ever show that particles make (conscious) choices? Generally there are 2 ways to view laws:

1. Behaviour guided by a rule/law (implying teleology)

2. Behaviour that fits a rule/law (i.e. being correctly describable by a rule/law).

For instance, when we jump from some height, do the particles that make up our bodies really say to themselves "Okay, I think we will go 9.8 m/s2"? There's a difference between behaviour being guided by a rule/law (which would be teleological) versus having one's behaviour fit a rule/law (being correctly describable by a law/rule). I can't think of many scientists believing the former view. Most scientists/philosophers would view the particle's behaviour as being correctly described by a rule/law but would not view the particle as consciously trying to make its behaviour fit the rule (“obeying" the law). Moreover, I can't see any way you can test this, so I don't follow how your model is testable/falsifiable.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Bohm2 wrote:
Mgrinder wrote:The question is more "can the way science is done, using physical laws, expressed through mathematics, conceivably figure out how liquids form?" the answer was yes in Newton's day. If Newton could figure out the planets, liquidity was with in his grasp. However, this same model, of using physical laws, can't do the job for experiences of qualia.
I think it's pretty clear that one cannot figure out many macroscopic properties from micro-physics. The Nobel laureate physicist, Anderson, many years ago pointed out some of the limitations of reductionism:

More is different
http://robotics.cs.tamu.edu/dshell/cs68 ... ferent.pdf

Of course, reductionists can still argue that this is simply a limitation of our knowledge and not the phenomena:
In other terms, ontological reductionism can easily accomodate emergence, provided this is only epistemological emergence; provided this is only apparent emergence relatively to our limited faculties of knowledge. The appearance of new and autonomous features can easily be explained by ontological reductionists provided they assume that our experimental or perceptive analysis is coarse-grained. After all, if we use a poor instrument of study which cannot provide us with information below a certain scale, no wonder the large-scale behavior looks as if it were new and autonomous with respect to basic elements studied at a much higher resolution.
Ontology, Matter and Emergence
http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921576.pdf
I just thought of a new argument on all this (new for me at least). Science has, as its basic model, the idea we can formulate mathematical rules which will predict (and in some ways explain) the behavior of matter. The rules will take on the role of causality in such a model. The rules, (physical laws) will be the determining thing, the causing thing, in science. There is no way around this as long as science takes this form of using rules to predict and explain. (sorry for the clumsy language, I can't think of a better way to put this).Eg. the conservation of momentum causes particles to bounce off each other the way they do. This sort of causal picture is inevitable in science, regardless of the laws we actually find.

COnsciousness, on the other hand, has its own causal nature. The action of consciousness seems to be a causal one, consciousness causes our actions. COnsciousness is a determining thing.

Therefore there is always going to be a sort of incompatibility with science and consciousness. Both have causal roles, and they must be compatible. But how can this be done?

Therefore, science will neccessarily never discover consciousness, it only discovers rules and things which follow the rules. Whatever consciousness does in nature will neccessarily seen by science as a rule or a bunch of rules working in concert. Hence consciousness is necessarily beyond the perview of science, as long as science maintains its present structure of trying to find rules.

As long as consciousness has a causal role in nature, science cannot "see" it. You only discover rules and things which obey the rules in science, you do not discover the things which make the rules work.

Hence, my solution - some of the rules (physical laws) of nature and the action of consciousness are the same thing. Another way to put this is that consiousness makes the rules work as they do.

Hence consciouness will never "emerge" from science. It is necessarily beyond its perview, no scientific theory which conforms to this mathematical rule model will ever find it. Is that comprehensible?
Bohm2 wrote:
Mgrinder wrote:In any event, these debates, though maybe interesting, are all beside the point. I hope you can see that. Here's a new theory to deal with. it's not really panpsychism, or emergentism, or dualism, or materialism, it's something new. I'm hoping to deal with it, not vaguely related doctrines.
I could not follow how you model is falsifiable/testable. How could one ever show that particles make (conscious) choices? Generally there are 2 ways to view laws:

1. Behaviour guided by a rule/law (implying teleology)

2. Behaviour that fits a rule/law (i.e. being correctly describable by a rule/law).

For instance, when we jump from some height, do the particles that make up our bodies really say to themselves "Okay, I think we will go 9.8 m/s2"? There's a difference between behaviour being guided by a rule/law (which would be teleological) versus having one's behaviour fit a rule/law (being correctly describable by a law/rule). I can't think of many scientists believing the former view. Most scientists/philosophers would view the particle's behaviour as being correctly described by a rule/law but would not view the particle as consciously trying to make its behaviour fit the rule (“obeying" the law). Moreover, I can't see any way you can test this, so I don't follow how your model is testable/falsifiable.
Of course particles don't decide to accelerate at such numerical rate in this theory. They sense out their environment, using their wavefunction ( I would guess), and compare their state to what they sense of their environment. If their state does not conform, does not have the right "frequency", the particle must adjust itself. This continuous adjustment will be the "choice" of the particle, but it will conform to rules. It will be somewhat predictable, just as our choices are predictable. From what I can understand of your two choices, it is choice (2) that is occurring.

As for testability, it seems to me that according to this theory, verbal reports of qualia in the brain would be correlated not with the action of many neurons, but with the internal chemical state of one neuron. Then the next conscious state would be correlated with the internal chemical state of another neuron, some time later. IF this is not true, and verbal reports are better correlated with the action of many neurons, this theory is false (I think, I've got more studying to do about cellular chemistry, in fact, I need help :) )

Further, each qualia will be predictable from the unique situation a particle is in. It will correlate with the set up of the governing schrodinger equation for that situation. It requires a way of mapping the equation to a qualia. If such a mapping procedure can be found, then we will have a way of predicting qualia that either works or it doesn't.

i talk about htis in my essay.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder wrote:As for testability, it seems to me that according to this theory, verbal reports of qualia in the brain would be correlated not with the action of many neurons, but with the internal chemical state of one neuron. Then the next conscious state would be correlated with the internal chemical state of another neuron, some time later. IF this is not true, and verbal reports are better correlated with the action of many neurons, this theory is false (I think, I've got more studying to do about cellular chemistry, in fact, I need help :) )
There is research arguing that only a subset of all neurons are responsible for consciousness (see paper and references). The author suggests that this evidence argues against a panpsychist view:
Some progress regarding the hard problem has been made by attempts to identify the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). This research shows that phenomenal states are associated with only a subset of all brain regions and processes (Crick & Koch, 1995; Logothetis, 1998; Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Milner & Goodale, 1995; Ortinski & Meador, 2004; Weiskrantz, 1997), providing evidence against the idea that these states are simply a property of the nerve cell or that (an even more panpsychist notion) they are a property of all matter.
The Function of Phenomenal States: Supramodular Interaction Theory
http://www.researchgate.net/publication ... ion_theory
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder wrote:Panpsychism is a vague doctrine, as is emergentism.
The question whether consciousness has always existed, whether there have always been subjects of experience in the universe is not vague.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Consul wrote:
Mgrinder wrote:Panpsychism is a vague doctrine, as is emergentism.
The question whether consciousness has always existed, whether there have always been subjects of experience in the universe is not vague.
The vagueness I was referring to is: if matter has mental properties, what parts of matter have mental properties? Just electrons, quarks too? When matter is said to have mental properties, is this meant to be like charge on an electron, something (more or less) "attached" to the electron which helps determine its behaviour? Or is it like I am postulating, where consciousness is the means by which particles "decide" what to do? What is the role of these mental properties? What do they do?

The point is that just saying "Maybe all matter has mental properties" leaves alot of questions unanswered. Hence it is a vague doctrine.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder wrote:The vagueness I was referring to is: if matter has mental properties, what parts of matter have mental properties? Just electrons, quarks too? When matter is said to have mental properties, is this meant to be like charge on an electron, something (more or less) "attached" to the electron which helps determine its behaviour? Or is it like I am postulating, where consciousness is the means by which particles "decide" what to do? What is the role of these mental properties? What do they do?
The point is that just saying "Maybe all matter has mental properties" leaves alot of questions unanswered. Hence it is a vague doctrine.
Okay, it certainly needs to be clarified what mental properties are.
There is a traditional tripartite classification of mental items:

1. Fühlen (Germ.) – feel(ing)
2. Denken (Germ.) – think(ing)
3. Wollen (Germ.) – want(ing)

Correspondingly, there are:

1. affective properties/states: sensations, emotions (feelings, moods)
2. cognitive properties/states:
2.1 occurrent: imagination, cogitation (reflection, contemplation, etc.): thought, reasoning, deciding, choosing, judging
2.2 dispositional: beliefs, knowledge, memories, preferences, interests, intentions, habits
3. conative properties/states: volition, motivation, desires, drives

I think the having of mental properties requires the having of experiential properties. That is, I think the concept of a never-conscious mind is inacceptable (as opposed to the concept of a temporarily non-conscious mind). Things that are never (able to be) conscious, that (can) never have subjective experiences (sensations, emotions, imaginations) don't have any mental properties/states: experienceless beings are mindless beings. It follows that panpsychism must be defined as the view that all things or at least some kinds of microphysical things have conscious minds, are subjects of consciousness/experience. So "panexperientialism" is a good alternative term.

"[A] functional definition of panpsychism might be: 'All objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them.'"

(Skrbina, David. Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. p. 16)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

Post by Dlaw »

If consciousness is the awareness of other, then suppose particles, in order to exist in time, have to interact.

If interaction inheres in their existence, that would bring about the appearance of something like consciousness without any actual consciousness being present.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Consul wrote:
Mgrinder wrote:The vagueness I was referring to is: if matter has mental properties, what parts of matter have mental properties? Just electrons, quarks too? When matter is said to have mental properties, is this meant to be like charge on an electron, something (more or less) "attached" to the electron which helps determine its behaviour? Or is it like I am postulating, where consciousness is the means by which particles "decide" what to do? What is the role of these mental properties? What do they do?
The point is that just saying "Maybe all matter has mental properties" leaves alot of questions unanswered. Hence it is a vague doctrine.
Okay, it certainly needs to be clarified what mental properties are.
There is a traditional tripartite classification of mental items:

1. Fühlen (Germ.) – feel(ing)
2. Denken (Germ.) – think(ing)
3. Wollen (Germ.) – want(ing)

Correspondingly, there are:

1. affective properties/states: sensations, emotions (feelings, moods)
2. cognitive properties/states:
2.1 occurrent: imagination, cogitation (reflection, contemplation, etc.): thought, reasoning, deciding, choosing, judging
2.2 dispositional: beliefs, knowledge, memories, preferences, interests, intentions, habits
3. conative properties/states: volition, motivation, desires, drives

I think the having of mental properties requires the having of experiential properties. That is, I think the concept of a never-conscious mind is inacceptable (as opposed to the concept of a temporarily non-conscious mind). Things that are never (able to be) conscious, that (can) never have subjective experiences (sensations, emotions, imaginations) don't have any mental properties/states: experienceless beings are mindless beings. It follows that panpsychism must be defined as the view that all things or at least some kinds of microphysical things have conscious minds, are subjects of consciousness/experience. So "panexperientialism" is a good alternative term.

"[A] functional definition of panpsychism might be: 'All objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them.'"

(Skrbina, David. Panpsychism in the West. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007. p. 16)
That's a nice summary.

I think one of the points I keep bringing up is that if you are going to propose panpsychism, you have to be more specific than "All objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them." What are the role of these experiences in nature for one thing? What do they do? Are they useless by products, or do they determine things? Are these experiences tacked onto particles (like charge is) or not?

I've got a theory that, though it sounds silly, tackles these questions. That's more than I can say for other theories. You've posted in reply a few times, have you read it?

If you don't answer these questions, then you are stuck in a useless debate with emergentists, like Bohm2 keeps trying to engage me in. Debating emergentism versus panpsychism seems like an issue if you have doctrines as vague as emergentism and normal pansychism, but once you get a more specific theory, like I have, the debates fall by the wayside, and I realize how useless they are.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Mgrinder wrote: I think one of the points I keep bringing up is that if you are going to propose panpsychism, you have to be more specific than "All objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them." What are the role of these experiences in nature for one thing? What do they do? Are they useless by products, or do they determine things? Are these experiences tacked onto particles (like charge is) or not?
Suppose instead, reversing the causality, that in order to exist particles must interact [thus "be defined by" rather than "detect" or "experience' the world around them]
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Dlaw wrote:
Mgrinder wrote: I think one of the points I keep bringing up is that if you are going to propose panpsychism, you have to be more specific than "All objects, or systems of objects, possess a singular inner experience of the world around them." What are the role of these experiences in nature for one thing? What do they do? Are they useless by products, or do they determine things? Are these experiences tacked onto particles (like charge is) or not?
Suppose instead, reversing the causality, that in order to exist particles must interact [thus "be defined by" rather than "detect" or "experience' the world around them]
That's kind of what QM says, I guess.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

Post by Dlaw »

Mgrinder wrote:
Dlaw wrote: (Nested quote removed.)


Suppose instead, reversing the causality, that in order to exist particles must interact [thus "be defined by" rather than "detect" or "experience' the world around them]
That's kind of what QM says, I guess.
But where you've really got something nailed down - and I've pondered it myself at length and never quite gotten there - is defining that "moment of decision" that particles, animals, roots, branches and slimes all have to go through.

Your panpsychism is very bold and, I think, really forces the issue to the fore. Physicists just sweep it under the rug. Religious people have a hidden agenda. Determinists are too closed-minded.

But we NEED an ontology for these moments. My explanation is no more persuasively backed up than yours. I'm talking about the Universe winking in and out of existence all the time, every moment. How would that be tested? But I'm taking that radical a view because I think you get to a place where you MUST figure out how these things are "decided". You have to settle on something. Panpsychism I may disagree with (quite reflexively, I'm sure) but at least makes these moments in time "heavy" enough.
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

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Dlaw wrote:
Mgrinder wrote: (Nested quote removed.)


That's kind of what QM says, I guess.
But where you've really got something nailed down - and I've pondered it myself at length and never quite gotten there - is defining that "moment of decision" that particles, animals, roots, branches and slimes all have to go through.

Your panpsychism is very bold and, I think, really forces the issue to the fore. Physicists just sweep it under the rug. Religious people have a hidden agenda. Determinists are too closed-minded.

But we NEED an ontology for these moments. My explanation is no more persuasively backed up than yours. I'm talking about the Universe winking in and out of existence all the time, every moment. How would that be tested? But I'm taking that radical a view because I think you get to a place where you MUST figure out how these things are "decided". You have to settle on something. Panpsychism I may disagree with (quite reflexively, I'm sure) but at least makes these moments in time "heavy" enough.

Well thank you. Glad you like it. Hopefully I can present it to a luminary like Chalmers one day. Trying to spruce it up a bit before that. :)
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

Post by Rr6 »

Agency or agent for existence of time stems from positive shaped gravity and negative shaped dark energy. imho

Time is temporal i.e. stems from temporal lobes ego sensations or experience ergo experience of time ergo physical/reality is time{ time }.

Time is frequency ergo the sine-wave pattern is the best symbol for time{ ^v }. imho.

Resultant of experience is our access to metaphysical-1, mind/intellect/concept.

R. B Fuller stated it approximately like this, God created mind accessing creatures to see if they could exist without destroying the integrity of Universe.

Putting aside what a field may, or may not be, we are left with the individual quanta{ particle }.

The minimal particle would be the graviton{ gravity }, or the darkiton{ dark energy }.

Since mass-attractive gravity has not distance limits and interact with any particle of Universe, then we can say Universe is truly one, because all particles are connected by gravity( gravitons }.

I believe any two particles along with their line of relationship, and background are a degree of consciousness. I do not think they make decisions. So one of the questions becomes, why would they have a change of direction of their trajectory.

Is it something to do with their spin. Is it something to do with another particles spin. Can the graviton or some other particles be composed of other parts, that, cannot be considered as individual parts. Ex we only observe three quarks, however, we do have two quark mesons, that exist briefly.

I believe these are questions regarding space-time--- that grfavity is property of ---that Ive had in mind for some 20 years now.

Humans appear to make a decision because of this or that event. I believe there exists no true decision making. Rather there exists only cause, effect and resultants.

So, getting back to the concept of field. Here also, I would want explore what are the fields of the minimal properties of space-time ergo gravity and I speculate that dark energy is also a property of space-time. I go further in making this clearly by treating space-time as space-time-space.

I.e. if we want to understand the fundamentals of consciousness or panpsychism, then we need to understand the mechanisms of space-time-space. I have some ideas expressed geometrically ergo visual understanding of space-time-space mechanisms.

r6
"U"niverse > UniVerse > universe > I-verse < you-verse < we-verse < them-verse
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Re: Do physical fields imply panpsychism?

Post by ThamiorTheThinker »

Question: Is consciousness necessary for choices to be made? More specifically, can a physical system have the appearance of choice without actually being conscious and perceiving information or states?

Another question: Can a bit (or rather, a single transistor) make "decisions"? Is a transistor not - as the the fundamental piece of information processing in an electronic computer - nothing but a switch which flips on or off so as to allow less or more electric current?
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by E. Alan Fleischauer
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First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough

First Survivor: The Impossible Childhood Cancer Breakthrough
by Mark Unger
August 2023

Predictably Irrational

Predictably Irrational
by Dan Ariely
September 2023

Artwords

Artwords
by Beatriz M. Robles
November 2023

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope

Fireproof Happiness: Extinguishing Anxiety & Igniting Hope
by Dr. Randy Ross
December 2023

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes

Beyond the Golden Door: Seeing the American Dream Through an Immigrant's Eyes
by Ali Master
February 2024

2022 Philosophy Books of the Month

Emotional Intelligence At Work

Emotional Intelligence At Work
by Richard M Contino & Penelope J Holt
January 2022

Free Will, Do You Have It?

Free Will, Do You Have It?
by Albertus Kral
February 2022

My Enemy in Vietnam

My Enemy in Vietnam
by Billy Springer
March 2022

2X2 on the Ark

2X2 on the Ark
by Mary J Giuffra, PhD
April 2022

The Maestro Monologue

The Maestro Monologue
by Rob White
May 2022

What Makes America Great

What Makes America Great
by Bob Dowell
June 2022

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!

The Truth Is Beyond Belief!
by Jerry Durr
July 2022

Living in Color

Living in Color
by Mike Murphy
August 2022 (tentative)

The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021