Science and consciousness are necessarily incompatible?

[Mgrinder]

I've been discussing my theory of consciousness with some people on the forum, and a new argument occurred to me, I am hoping for some discussion on it.

Basically it seems to me the fact that consciousness is puzzling, mysterious and seemingly incompatible with science is inevitable, due to the way science works. Science, as it is practiced, is necessarily incompatible with consciousness.

This is due to the things which necessarily take on a causal role in science, namely physical laws (which are rules), will not allow a scientist to "see" consciousness, as consciousness has the same causal role as physical laws. Our experience tells us that consciousness makes our bodily actions come out the way they do, and physical laws also make things come out the way they do. Hence there are two things in nature doing the same thing, and the result of this is that it makes science "blind" to consciousness. Inevitably then, science will never "find" consciousness.

To explain better, the basic model of science (well, physics really) is to find mathematical rules (physical laws) and things which obey those rules. The sort of things which obey the rules are mass, charge, length, time, charm, forces, etc. The physical laws include conservation of momentum and energy, the uncertainty principle, etc.

Given that this is how physics works, what sort of thing is able to take on a causal role in physics? To my mind physical laws take on a causal role. Regardless of what the actual physical laws are, they will necessarily play a causal role in the sense that the laws (rules) make the things which follow those rules (mass, charge, etc) come out the way they do when those things change.

To be certain, I think other things can be said to play a causal role in physics, like forces or charge, but these things do not make things come out in a certain way, rather these things are inputs for the laws, the laws are the things that make things come out the way they do. Unfortuntely, I think our notions of "cause and effect" are quite hazy (or maybe it's just me), and some clarification would be nice.

Anyways, what about consciousness? Our personal experience strongly suggests that consciousness has a causal role as well. It plays some causal role in our physical movements. When we think we want something, we try to get it, this causes physical actions. There is no reason to think this is wrong, because there is not really any counterevidence, it is outside the perview of science, it seems, since I think we can all agree that science has shed very little light on consciousness.

So then, you have two things in the universe that play a causal role in the way events will play out. What will be the result, independent of what physics actually discovers about nature?

The result will be that the action of consciousness, what it causes to happen, will be seen as a rule (law) or a set of rules. This seems to me to be inevitable. If you look at the universe through the lens of science, all you can see are rules if you are looking for something with a causal role. You will thus never see consciousness, it is, in some sense, impossible to see it.

Thus, any theory of consciousness that seeks to be compatible with science will render consciousness as causally inert. It must, or violate the laws of physics. This is also true of any future physics as well, even if it is a correct "theory or everything" that marries gravity and quantum mechanics. Even in such a theory, consciousness will still be a mystery.

The evidence for this argument being correct is everywhere. Every theory of consciousness except for one varient of Dualism (where physical laws are broken, which is thus dismissable) renders consciousness causally inert. Materialism, panpsychism, other versions or Dualism, emergentism, functionalism, all treat consciousness as a useless by product that does nothing in nature, and plays no causal role. This is, as I say, inevitable, given the way science works and what it must assign a causal role to. Further, all candidates for a unified physics (which might be correct and seem promising, like string theory and loop quantum gravity) appear to shed no light on consciousness, even if they turn out to be right. This is, as I say, inevitable given how physics works.

How can reconciliation happen then? The only way I see it is to either abandon this scientific model of finding physical laws and things which follow them, which would be stupid, or to take the route I do in my essay , and to make physical laws and consciousness roughly the same. There seems to be no other choice, as long as consciousness is to have a causal role in nature.

Interestingly, we will never believe we have found consciousness unless we explain why it seems it has a causal role in nature, even if it doesn't. Thus even if consciousness actually has no causal role in anture, science will still never "see" it either. Thus I think my argument is quite powerful.

In a nutshell:

(1) Science will necessarily assign a causal role to physical laws, regardless as to what these laws actually are.

(2) Consciousness also takes on the same causal role in nature as physical laws, according to our direct experience.

(3) Science will inevitably "see" consciousness as a physical law, or as a set of physical laws, due to (2).

(4) Thus, science will never "detect" consciousness. It will inevitably be seen as a mystery, unless one acknowledges the limitations of the way science is practiced.

[Hereandnow]

Mgrainder: Basically it seems to me the fact that consciousness is puzzling, mysterious and seemingly incompatible with science is inevitable, due to the way science works. Science, as it is practiced, is necessarily incompatible with consciousness.

Two things. One is the paradox of phenomenology. Consciousness as a centered act never reveals it's origin for once one looks, one can only see what lies before consciousness. It cannot behold itself, the subjective end of a consciousness/object relationship, and is therefore, as philosophy repeatedly reminds us, transcendental. Of course, you can always deny there is a self behind the perception altogether; it is, after all, never making an appearance, never appearing at all. But then, from whence comes the rules for judgment, those Kantian active principles of synthesis? These can only be outside our ability to see: after all, once you "look" and judge something, you are always, already within the influence of their function.You look at a brain, a gray, folded mass, or at the neuronal networks through a microscope and what yo see is is entirely conditioned by the consciousness you are supposed to studying!

So forget it; scientific observation will never "see" behind its own thinking processes.

ok, one thing.

[Sy Borg]

Is this basically about the limitations of observing reality from the inside, trying to understand the whole from within that whole?

[Mgrinder]

Is this basically about the limitations of observing reality from the inside, trying to understand the whole from within that whole?

It's just that the role of consciousness in nature - which determines how our actions come out - has the same role as physical laws. They do they same thing.

That's going to create issues. Inevitably. And I am saying that science will see the action of consciousness as a physical law, or a bunch of them acting together. There is no escaping it.

It's like my poker aliens analogy. The aliens only know the rules of poker, they don't know why it's played, who plays it, that money is exhanged, but they can predict who will will very well. Knowing the rules and having a model of things which obey the rules gets you some understanding, but not enough (the following quote is from my essay).

As an analogy, consider aliens analysing a game of poker. Poker is played according to rules, and the humans that play poker may or may not adhere to those rules. Suppose the players adhere to the rules. Further suppose we feed the information about the beginning cards, final cards, who wins each hand, and so on to a computer, do this for many poker games, then give the results to some alien scientists. The aliens analyze the many games of poker and figure out the rules of poker, and also create elaborate mathematical models to predict which hands will be folded, who will win given certain hands, etc. They create a science of poker, and can predict what will happen in a poker game to some arbitrary extent, let us suppose these predictions are quite good.

Now, let us ask how well these aliens understand poker? They do not know humans play it, they do not know how humans feel as they play, they do not know the motivations that humans have when they play poker, they may not even know about bluffing, they would not know that people play it for money, they may not understand various strategies in poker, etc. In fact, one might say they know very little about poker.

Yet, even though the aliens have a very impoverished knowledge of poker, they have a good knowledge of who will win, and can predict what will happen probably better than the players themselves. All they have is a science of poker, which though it may be a very good science, isn’t much in the way of knowledge about poker in this case.

The thought here is that perhaps our knowledge of nature, gotten through science, is a bit like the knowledge these aliens have about poker. They know nothing about what is going on “behind the scenes”, and perhaps we don’t either. We know the rules of nature (the laws of nature), but we don’t really know what is making these laws “tick”. The proposal here is that, “behind the scenes” consciousness is at work making particles do what they do, and what consciousness does to each particle obeys mathematical rules.

[Rotifer]

It's just that the role of consciousness in nature - which determines how our actions come out - has the same role as physical laws. They do they same thing.

Hi Mgrinder,

That looks to me like part of the "Free Will vs Determinism" debate. I've never really understood the problem with Free Will, I just think consciousness introduces a new kind of cause. But I've got a couple of books about it which I have been putting off reading, so I will try to do that next, and maybe come back to you!

It's like my poker aliens analogy.

I thought this was very good and interesting, but I don't think it illustrates what you think.

The thought here is that perhaps our knowledge of nature, gotten through science, is a bit like the knowledge these aliens have about poker. They know nothing about what is going on “behind the scenes”, and perhaps we don’t either.

I think your aliens are like computers, I think they illustrate the limitations of Artificial Intelligence. A computer can calculate the maths of poker (like your aliens) but it can't understand why we would play poker. The reason is that it doesn't feel things. We do know what is going on behind the scenes, because we have feelings.

But I don't think your analogy matches the situation with our knowledge of nature. In that case we are gradually finding out more and more about what is going on behind the scenes, at an astonishing speed.

We know the rules of nature (the laws of nature), but we don’t really know what is making these laws “tick”. The proposal here is that, “behind the scenes” consciousness is at work making particles do what they do, and what consciousness does to each particle obeys mathematical rules.

I think I follow your reasoning up to a point, but if you are suggesting that the action of all particles is caused by consciousness I think that is a leap into the unknown, and very possibly into absurdity.

My current thinking is that our level of consciousness allows us to direct the actions of particles in our brains. So when I decide to type "X", particles in areas of my brain associated with the concepts involved will behave in a particular way, a learned sequence will be triggered, resulting in electro-chemical impulses to muscles etc. This is why I think we have free will. But I'll have to read those books.

I don't think science and consciousness are incompatible, we are making great progress in that field right now.

[Bohm2]

The evidence for this argument being correct is everywhere. Every theory of consciousness except for one varient of Dualism (where physical laws are broken, which is thus dismissable) renders consciousness causally inert. Materialism, panpsychism, other versions or Dualism, emergentism, functionalism, all treat consciousness as a useless by product that does nothing in nature, and plays no causal role.

I don't agree with this. Emergentism doesn't render consciousness causally inert.

[Togo1]

It looks like (3) In your argument should refer to (1), not (2). Is that just a typo?

The argument seems solid as far as it goes. Certainly there are limits on what science, or more specifically, empirical science, can deal with, because empiricism is based on measurement of the physical universe, and experiences don't neatly reduce to physical events.

There are two possible responses to this:

a) Declare consciousness to be outside the scope of science/physical measurement

b) Declare all non-physical events to be reducible to physical events.

Note that both of these imply some kind of undiscovered mechanism/process, so neither really explains how it is that consciousness works.

However, both are compatible with science. There's really no difficulty in reconciling a mind/consciousness with an entirely physical system. The problems only occur if you insist not only that all events are physical, but that those events must form a complete causal system. And that flies in the face of Gödel's fundamental incompleteness theorem, which states that any system may not be complete (explicable) from within the system.

I came up with a simple illustration of this in the Godelbox, a hypothetical gadget with two buttons, that light up, and a brain scanner. The Godelbox scans your brain, works out which button you're going to press next, and then lights up that button. Despite the allure of the model of an entirely explicable, complete physical universe, very few people believe that, given such a box, the person involved would somehow be constrained from choosing to press the button that was not lit.

[Toadny]

The evidence for this argument being correct is everywhere. Every theory of consciousness except for one varient of Dualism (where physical laws are broken, which is thus dismissable) renders consciousness causally inert. Materialism, panpsychism, other versions or Dualism, emergentism, functionalism, all treat consciousness as a useless by product that does nothing in nature, and plays no causal role.

I don't agree with this. Emergentism doesn't render consciousness causally inert.

I don't agree either. When I decide to think about a certain thing this causes changes in my brain.

[Mgrinder]

The evidence for this argument being correct is everywhere. Every theory of consciousness except for one varient of Dualism (where physical laws are broken, which is thus dismissable) renders consciousness causally inert. Materialism, panpsychism, other versions or Dualism, emergentism, functionalism, all treat consciousness as a useless by product that does nothing in nature, and plays no causal role.

I don't agree with this. Emergentism doesn't render consciousness causally inert.

How so?

-- Updated Mon Nov 30, 2015 9:22 am to add the following --

The thought here is that perhaps our knowledge of nature, gotten through science, is a bit like the knowledge these aliens have about poker. They know nothing about what is going on “behind the scenes”, and perhaps we don’t either.

I think your aliens are like computers, I think they illustrate the limitations of Artificial Intelligence. A computer can calculate the maths of poker (like your aliens) but it can't understand why we would play poker. The reason is that it doesn't feel things. We do know what is going on behind the scenes, because we have feelings.

I don't think so, the scenario could be reversed with an alien game transmitted to us. We get this transmission from outer space with all this data that we can read, but it hard to make sense of. Eventually we figure out the rules of the data, how to predict the next set of data from the previous sets. Our math works pretty good every time. But we still don't know what the data is all about. IT's just asetrix's and semicolons and stuff like this : **;;###**** and so on. Some people think the alien data is about the improvements to their next generation of spaceship, some think it is about a child's game, others think it's their stock market. We can't know without more information, and they won't give it to us.

But I don't think your analogy matches the situation with our knowledge of nature. In that case we are gradually finding out more and more about what is going on behind the scenes, at an astonishing speed.

Well it's just an analogy, not an argument. The point is that knowing the rules and the things which follow the rules can leave you with alot unexplained.

For instance, scientists are still scratching their heads about Quantum theory. Many are seriously considering parallel universes to explain how a single photon can interfere with itself. Others think pilot waves are the way to go, others think it's just a fundamental fact with no deeper explanation. We know the rules, but interpreting those rules, explaining them, that's harder. The issue might be resolvable with more data, but how do you get more data, can you get more data? What if we can't?

So my point is that if consciousness does something in nature, has a causal role (as it appears to), then science will interpret the results of consciousness as a rule or set of rules (laws of nature). This is inevitable and predictable, no wonder consciousness is considered a mystery.

We know the rules of nature (the laws of nature), but we don’t really know what is making these laws “tick”. The proposal here is that, “behind the scenes” consciousness is at work making particles do what they do, and what consciousness does to each particle obeys mathematical rules.

I think I follow your reasoning up to a point, but if you are suggesting that the action of all particles is caused by consciousness I think that is a leap into the unknown, and very possibly into absurdity.

Well, I've got a whole essay about this, if you want to read it. I agree it sounds absurd, but it seems to work pretty good.

I don't think science and consciousness are incompatible, we are making great progress in that field right now.

I don't really think they're totally incompatible either, my point is that, as science is currently practiced, the current problem with consciousness is unresolvable. You can't have to different things with the same causal role. As long as you do, you're going to have a weird mystery on your hands, which is what we have with consciousness.

-- Updated Mon Nov 30, 2015 9:34 am to add the following --

It looks like (3) In your argument should refer to (1), not (2). Is that just a typo?

The argument seems solid as far as it goes. Certainly there are limits on what science, or more specifically, empirical science, can deal with, because empiricism is based on measurement of the physical universe, and experiences don't neatly reduce to physical events.

Ok, thanks.

There are two possible responses to this:

a) Declare consciousness to be outside the scope of science/physical measurement

b) Declare all non-physical events to be reducible to physical events.

Note that both of these imply some kind of undiscovered mechanism/process, so neither really explains how it is that consciousness works.

Well, my idea is to roughly equate physical laws with the action of consciousness, and go from there. I guess that's option (c).

However, both are compatible with science. There's really no difficulty in reconciling a mind/consciousness with an entirely physical system. The problems only occur if you insist not only that all events are physical, but that those events must form a complete causal system. And that flies in the face of Gödel's fundamental incompleteness theorem, which states that any system may not be complete (explicable) from within the system.

I don't know about Godel, but I think you can accept that science is causally closed, and still explain consciousness by saying that science simply sees consciousness as a law of nature, and go from there. That's what I do in my essay.

I came up with a simple illustration of this in the Godelbox, a hypothetical gadget with two buttons, that light up, and a brain scanner. The Godelbox scans your brain, works out which button you're going to press next, and then lights up that button. Despite the allure of the model of an entirely explicable, complete physical universe, very few people believe that, given such a box, the person involved would somehow be constrained from choosing to press the button that was not lit.

Interesting. I suppose a box that lights up the femtosecond before you press it (so that you can't perceive that it will be the button) would be a counter argument?

-- Updated Mon Nov 30, 2015 9:49 am to add the following --

I don't agree with this. Emergentism doesn't render consciousness causally inert.

I don't agree either. When I decide to think about a certain thing this causes changes in my brain.

As with Bohm2, Please explain.

Oh, as a note to self (new thought)- Perhaps the fact that science has such trouble with consciousness means that consciousness is in fact not causally inert, it has a role in nature, otherwise science wouldn't have trouble with it. It's not just that we think consciousness has a causal role in nature, it actually does, and this is proven by the difficulty science has with consciousness. Heh. he.

[Bohm2]

How so?

One way this can be done is by rejecting an atomistic fundamental ontology that subscribes to the view that every entity is endowed with a set of absolutely intrinsic properties. Both Santos and Bitbol discussed this in the papers I previously linked in the other thread. Santos writes:

Being so, and if what I have been arguing is correct, the only option left to allow ontological emergence by naturalistic means, is to refuse the fundamental metaphysical tenet of Eleatic pluralism, explicitly assuming a relational ontology according to which the existence conditions, the identity and the causal behavior of any entity must always be conceived and explained as constructed and transformed by the interplay of its intrinsic and extrinsic relational processes...Life is not a system’s components latent micro-property or micro-power activated by some emergence-engendering way...no mental state exists already in potency at the level of each nerve cell, since no single neuron begins to think about himself when it gets involved in some relational context with other neurons, but they rather have the capacity to qualitatively transform each other in certain relational contexts in such a way that the system they compose—the brain, as the center of the nervous system—acquires new qualitative properties, activities, causal powers and behaviors that do not exist at the level of its components. In short, emergence is not the transition from potency to act, even though this kind of change, at the level of each individual component of a relational system, is a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of genuine ontological emergence at the level of a system taken as a whole.

Ontological Emergence: How is That Possible? Towards a New Relational Ontology
http://link.springer.com/article/10.100 ... -x#/page-1

There are a number of authors in quantum foundations who discuss how a relational ontology can generate ontological emergence and macro-causality:

Relational holism and quantum mechanics
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/686998. ... b_contents

Holism, Physical Theories and Quantum Mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2191/1/holism_shpmp.pdf

Reduction and emergence in the fractional quantum Hall state
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ar ... 9815000933

Moreover, the assumption has always been that there is a fundamental level. J. Schaffer rejects the causal closure thesis by arguing that if, in fac,t there is no fundamental level, then all the causal powers would drain away down a bottomless pit:

What would a metaphysic of infinite descent look like? The most striking feature of an infinite descent is that no level is special...Mesons, molecules, minds, and mountains are in every sense ontologically equal. Because there can be no privileged locus for the causal powers, and because they must be somewhere, they are everywhere. So infinite descent yields an egalitarian metaphysic which dignifies and empowers the whole of nature.

Is there a fundamental level?
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/fundamental.pdf

Some (including myself) may question, the "turtles all the way down" ontology but Schaffer argues, " What evidence shows the actual world to have a fundamental level?"

And I'm not saying that ontological emergence has no problems but there a lot of problems with panpsychism. If panpsychism is true, why the need for brains? McGinn writes:

Then there is the question of the need for a brain. We normally suppose that one of these is pretty useful when it comes to having a mind, indeed a sine qua non (even if it’s made of silicon); we suppose that, at a minimum, a physical object has to exhibit the right degree of complexity before it can make a mind. But the panpsychist is having none of it: you get to have a mind well before even organic cells come on the market, before molecules indeed...So brains are a kind of contingency, a kind of pointless luxury when it comes to possessing mental states. It becomes puzzling why we have them at all, and why they are so big and fragile; atoms don’t need them, so why do we?...But then the brain isn’t necessary for the kind of experiential property it reveals to us; it is only necessary for the revealing to occur. What is revealed by introspection is spread over the entire physical universe. In fact, it would not be stretching a point to say that all bits of matter—from strings, to quarks, to atoms, to molecules, to cells, to organs, to animals — are themselves brains. There can be brains without brains! But if so, why bother with brains?...One last point: Galen says he has got used to crediting particles with experiences, so impressed is he with the problem-resolving power of this move; but why stop there — why not credit space with experiences? That is, if experience is everywhere that matter is, why not say that it is also everywhere that space is—empty space included? That region of space between the earth and moon, for example— it pullulates with experience. Since nothing is required of bits of matter for them to have experiences (no neurons or functional complexity), why not extend to space the courtesy of recognizing its mentality? After all, most of the brain — like all lumps of matter — is mainly empty space, and maybe this space itself contributes to the mind (the right density of matter is needed if human mentality is to take off).We know from physics that matter and space are deeply interwoven, so it is unlikely that such a fundamental property of matter as mindedness would not spill over to space, which is the medium in which matter has its being.

Hard Questions: Comments on Galen Strawson
http://philpapers.org/rec/MCGHQ

[Mgrinder]

How so?

One way this can be done is by rejecting an atomistic fundamental ontology that subscribes to the view that every entity is endowed with a set of absolutely intrinsic properties. Both Santos and Bitbol discussed this in the papers I previously linked in the other thread.

So assume that protons, which have an electric charge, don't actually have an electric charge? Assume physics isn't true? Wow, that's pretty bad.

Santos writes:

Being so, and if what I have been arguing is correct, the only option left to allow ontological emergence by naturalistic means, is to refuse the fundamental metaphysical tenet of Eleatic pluralism, explicitly assuming a relational ontology according to which the existence conditions, the identity and the causal behavior of any entity must always be conceived and explained as constructed and transformed by the interplay of its intrinsic and extrinsic relational processes...Life is not a system’s components latent micro-property or micro-power activated by some emergence-engendering way...no mental state exists already in potency at the level of each nerve cell, since no single neuron begins to think about himself when it gets involved in some relational context with other neurons, but they rather have the capacity to qualitatively transform each other in certain relational contexts in such a way that the system they compose—the brain, as the center of the nervous system—acquires new qualitative properties, activities, causal powers and behaviors that do not exist at the level of its components. In short, emergence is not the transition from potency to act, even though this kind of change, at the level of each individual component of a relational system, is a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of genuine ontological emergence at the level of a system taken as a whole.

I can't really follow this, there's too many big words. Usually I find that a preponderance of big words is a way to hide the fact that what's being said doesn't make a whole lot of sense.

How is this supposed to mean that emergence doesn't render consciousness as causally inert?

Ontological Emergence: How is That Possible? Towards a New Relational Ontology
http://link.springer.com/article/10.100 ... -x#/page-1

There are a number of authors in quantum foundations who discuss how a relational ontology can generate ontological emergence and macro-causality:

Relational holism and quantum mechanics
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/686998. ... b_contents

Holism, Physical Theories and Quantum Mechanics
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2191/1/holism_shpmp.pdf

Reduction and emergence in the fractional quantum Hall state
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ar ... 9815000933

Moreover, the assumption has always been that there is a fundamental level. J. Schaffer rejects the causal closure thesis by arguing that if, in fac,t there is no fundamental level, then all the causal powers would drain away down a bottomless pit: (Nested quote removed.)

Is there a fundamental level?
http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/fundamental.pdf

Some (including myself) may question, the "turtles all the way down" ontology but Schaffer argues, " What evidence shows the actual world to have a fundamental level?"

This seems to me to be yet another wishy washy attempt to make emergence work in a way far divorced from reality. Not even sure what it's trying to say. There is "no fundmanetal level", what does that mean? Electrons don't have charges? That electron interactions cannot explain how matter behaves?

Anyways, your point was that emergence does not declare consciousness to be causally inert. How so? All I can gather from this is that some people think that maybe "emergent properties" follow their own rules. WEll, that's not true, these rules are derivable from the behavior of atoms and how they bind and stuff. They don't contradict the fundamental laws of physics, they are derivable from the fundamental laws of physics. There is no "new" causal structure in a liquid.

These writings make me think of desperation.

And I'm not saying that ontological emergence has no problems but there a lot of problems with panpsychism. If panpsychism is true, why the need for brains? McGinn writes: (Nested quote removed.)

Hard Questions: Comments on Galen Strawson
http://philpapers.org/rec/MCGHQ

You're familiar with my theory, you know that the above is not a problem for me.

[Bohm2]

So assume that protons, which have an electric charge, don't actually have an electric charge? Assume physics isn't true? Wow, that's pretty bad.

Accepting any realistic particle ontology of QM, you don't have much of a choice. With the exception of position, all other properties of any fundamental particle (e.g. spin, charge, etc.) must be contextual as per Kochen-Specker theorem. For instance, in the most popular realistic interpretation of QM, Bohmian mechanics, all properties (e.g. spin, charge, etc.) are contextual. The only non-contextual ("intrinsic" property) is position. Not only that, but Bell's theorem and experiments confirming violations of Bell's inequality, requires that any realistic particle interpretation must also be non-local. If you want to accept a particle ontology, as you appear to be, contextuality and the non-locality come as a necessary package due to KS and Bell's theorems. You have no choice.

Anyways, your point was that emergence does not declare consciousness to be causally inert. How so? All I can gather from this is that some people think that maybe "emergent properties" follow their own rules. WEll, that's not true, these rules are derivable from the behavior of atoms and how they bind and stuff. They don't contradict the fundamental laws of physics, they are derivable from the fundamental laws of physics. There is no "new" causal structure in a liquid.

But atoms aren't the most fundamental units. That which is more fundamental is not the matter (little balls moving in space-times by contiguous contact, etc.) you appear to think it is. In fact, neither are atoms as the buckey ball diffraction experiments demonstrate. And there is a fully relational interpretation of QM that would be consistent with this relational ontology:

Relational Quantum Mechanics
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609002v2.pdf

If you consider these papers by some leading researchers in fields like quantum foundations as grasping for straws, that's your entitlement but they must have also convinced the journal referees that their arguments made sense or it wouldn't have been published in some half-decent journals. If what you say about your model is so inclusive and provides so many answers to so many questions, re-consider getting it published. If it isn't passing the review process, then maybe you should consider the possibility that your arguments are not as cogent as you believe them to be.

[Mgrinder]

So assume that protons, which have an electric charge, don't actually have an electric charge? Assume physics isn't true? Wow, that's pretty bad.

Accepting any realistic particle ontology of QM, you don't have much of a choice. With the exception of position, all other properties of any fundamental particle (e.g. spin, charge, etc.) must be contextual as per Kochen-Specker theorem. For instance, in the most popular realistic interpretation of QM, Bohmian mechanics, all properties (e.g. spin, charge, etc.) are contextual. The only non-contextual ("intrinsic" property) is position. Not only that, but Bell's theorem and experiments confirming violations of Bell's inequality, requires that any realistic particle interpretation must also be non-local. If you want to accept a particle ontology, as you appear to be, contextuality and the non-locality come as a necessary package due to KS and Bell's theorems. You have no choice.

Non locality, fine. What do you mean by "contextual"?

Anyways, your point was that emergence does not declare consciousness to be causally inert. How so? All I can gather from this is that some people think that maybe "emergent properties" follow their own rules. WEll, that's not true, these rules are derivable from the behavior of atoms and how they bind and stuff. They don't contradict the fundamental laws of physics, they are derivable from the fundamental laws of physics. There is no "new" causal structure in a liquid.

But atoms aren't the most fundamental units. That which is more fundamental is not the matter (little balls moving in space-times by contiguous contact, etc.) you appear to think it is. In fact, neither are atoms as the buckey ball diffraction experiments demonstrate. And there is a fully relational interpretation of QM that would be consistent with this relational ontology:

Relational Quantum Mechanics
http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609002v2.pdf

Sure, that's all fine. My point is that macroscopic properties are derivable from micro. There are no "new" rules. No "new" causality.

If you consider these papers by some leading researchers in fields like quantum foundations as grasping for straws,

I was talking about emergentists who think there is "new causality" in macroscopic properties.

that's your entitlement but they must have also convinced the journal referees that their arguments made sense or it wouldn't have been published in some half-decent journals. If what you say about your model is so inclusive and provides so many answers to so many questions, re-consider getting it published. If it isn't passing the review process, then maybe you should consider the possibility that your arguments are not as cogent as you believe them to be.

Publishing in established physics (where things are well supported by experiment) depends on getting something right and making a cogent mathematical case. Publishing in string theory, where things are not known, depends on prestige and fashion. Publishing in philosophy also depends on prestige and fashion.

[Bohm2]

Non locality, fine. What do you mean by "contextual"?

It means that any QM system cannot possesses a property, independently of any measurement context. In other words, the property isn't an intrinsic/objective property of the system that exists independently of measurement. You might find this useful:

The Kochen-Specker Theorem
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/

So, if one assumes that QM describes some mind-independent reality so the wave function isn't just a mathematical algorithm to compute probabilities of measurements in given experimental situations, then to get the correct experimental results, the theory must be both contextual and non-local. There are some ways out of this (like backward causation, multiple worlds or superdeterminism), but those interpretations have other problems.

As most physicists do not like non-locality because it appears to be inconsistent with relativity (on some level), they prefer to abandon realism and take a non-realist/epistemic interpretation. Thus, the wave function is interpreted as a probability "wave" not some real objective entity that exists "out" there. The whole point, is that at the most fundamental level, we don't have a clear picture of what "matter" is. The naïve picture of a nucleus with orbiting electrons with definite objective properties like spin, charge, etc. and all that is not the way matter is. Such a model cannot explain experimental findings.

Publishing in established physics (where things are well supported by experiment) depends on getting something right and making a cogent mathematical case. Publishing in string theory, where things are not known, depends on prestige and fashion. Publishing in philosophy also depends on prestige and fashion.

I don't know a whole lot about philosophy but I had a few papers accepted in journals with only a B.Sc. at that time and in a field outside my own. And I had someone reference another paper of mine which was published in a reputable biophysics journal. And again, I only had a B.Sc. at that time. If you make good arguments with some references that provide some cogency to your arguments, I don't think they will reject it (unless perhaps they are very high-calibre journals). I'm not sure what that entails in philosophy but I've come across papers being published in philosophy journals by authors with little background in the respective field where the author was not a big name. For instance, an occasional poster in the old philosophy section of the physics forum who asked us for feedback got a panpsychist paper published fairly recently. Here's the paper:

Kicking the Psychophysical Laws into Gear: A New Approach to the Combination Problem
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/i ... 1/art00005

[Mgrinder]

Non locality, fine. What do you mean by "contextual"?

It means that any QM system cannot possesses a property, independently of any measurement context. In other words, the property isn't an intrinsic/objective property of the system that exists independently of measurement. You might find this useful:

The Kochen-Specker Theorem
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kochen-specker/

So, if one assumes that QM describes some mind-independent reality so the wave function isn't just a mathematical algorithm to compute probabilities of measurements in given experimental situations, then to get the correct experimental results, the theory must be both contextual and non-local. There are some ways out of this (like backward causation, multiple worlds or superdeterminism), but those interpretations have other problems.

As most physicists do not like non-locality because it appears to be inconsistent with relativity (on some level), they prefer to abandon realism and take a non-realist/epistemic interpretation. Thus, the wave function is interpreted as a probability "wave" not some real objective entity that exists "out" there. The whole point, is that at the most fundamental level, we don't have a clear picture of what "matter" is. The naïve picture of a nucleus with orbiting electrons with definite objective properties like spin, charge, etc. and all that is not the way matter is. Such a model cannot explain experimental findings.

But it does explain experimental findings. Quite well.

Anyways, by "contextual" you seem to be talking about how Quantum systems don't take on a definite state until they are measured. Ok then.

Now, sorry for being so thick, but the original claim was that emergentist theories do not relegate consciousness to "causally inert" status. I still don't see how.

Publishing in established physics (where things are well supported by experiment) depends on getting something right and making a cogent mathematical case. Publishing in string theory, where things are not known, depends on prestige and fashion. Publishing in philosophy also depends on prestige and fashion.

I don't know a whole lot about philosophy but I had a few papers accepted in journals with only a B.Sc. at that time and in a field outside my own. And I had someone reference another paper of mine which was published in a reputable biophysics journal. And again, I only had a B.Sc. at that time. If you make good arguments with some references that provide some cogency to your arguments, I don't think they will reject it (unless perhaps they are very high-calibre journals). I'm not sure what that entails in philosophy but I've come across papers being published in philosophy journals by authors with little background in the respective field where the author was not a big name. For instance, an occasional poster in the old philosophy section of the physics forum who asked us for feedback got a panpsychist paper published fairly recently. Here's the paper:

Kicking the Psychophysical Laws into Gear: A New Approach to the Combination Problem
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/i ... 1/art00005

Good for you. Do you have any suggestions for me?