What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Discuss any topics related to metaphysics (the philosophical study of the principles of reality) or epistemology (the philosophical study of knowledge) in this forum.
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Rr6
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Rr6 »

Yes metaphysics do exist and Ive laid out clearly cosmic set of four;

1} metaphysical-1{ spirit-1 }, mind/intellect/concepts ie. concepts of Space, God, Universe Dogs Cats etc...

-----------line-of-demarcation------------------------

2} metaphysical-2, macro-infinite non-occupied space, that, embraces the following,

3} metaphysical-3{ spirit-3 }, gravity that, I speculate is positive shaped geodesic arc of Space ( ),

4} metaphysical-4{ spirit-4 }, dark energy, that, I speculate is negative shaped geodesic are of Space )(.

Metaphysical-1, has led us to discover many patterns and principles associated with our finite, occupied space Universe and many of its parts.

We see a sine-wave ripple of water but mind intellect has discovered the sine-wave frequencies of that which humans cannot see with naked eye via the invention of technologies to express those sine-wave to us visually.

Metaphysical-1 has shown us that most of Universe is not observed by us with naked eye. Ex viruses can only be understood via the technology that allows us to visualize them and discover there icosahedral protein shells.

r6
Rr6 wrote:1 triangle + 1 triangle = 4 triangles in 3D.
3 angles of triangle + 3 angles of triangle = 12 triangles in 3D.
rwgrayprojects.com/synergetics/s01/figs ... f0801.html
There exists five and only five regular/symmetrical polyhedra of "U"niverse.
Relatively easy to grasp, absolute truths.
r6
"U"niverse > UniVerse > universe > I-verse < you-verse < we-verse < them-verse
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Phenomexistentialist
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Phenomexistentialist »

Excaljnur wrote:The more I study metaphysics the more I become convinced that metaphysics tells us very little about the actual world. And that very little may be nothing at all. This is not the experience of most philosophers I've surveyed because I get rejections of this idea stated in a very matter-a-fact way. The answers essentially consist of the main topics in metaphysics. If I group the answers together the most complete one would sound like this, "Of course it tells us about the actual world, it tells us about causation, properties, universals, particulars, free will and it is the only field in the position to answer why there is something rather than nothing." [To be fair, I have studied massive amounts of Kant's work, so I am largely influenced by his notion of metaphysics, this is where many of my ideas are coming from.] With this answer, I respond, "These metaphysical problems could just be problems that arise when we reach the limits of human cognition. They may not represent anything in the actual world. What if metaphysics is the investigation of how the mind structures our experience of the world, and the limits and capacities of the mind?" I’m tempted to believe that the commitment that metaphysics tells us things about the external world is a contemporary form of strong Rationalism. I am surprised by how many philosophers I know are committed to the idea that you can know things about the world without verifying those ideas empirically.

Am I missing something important about metaphysics? I am not saying metaphysics is useless or answers to metaphysical problems are meaningless. What I am saying is that the answers to metaphysical questions mean less than what many metaphysicians think. The answers (or probable/possibility of answers) reflect the limits and capacities of human cognition, as well as its ability to structure its experience and conceptual thought.

The main questions of my post are:
1) What does metaphysics tell us about the world?
2) How do you know these metaphysical facts are not merely conceptual truths devoid of empirical verification?
1. Probably quite a bit. To me one of the most important things metaphysics tells us about the world is that there is something rather than nothing. Which is pretty magical if you think about it. Heidegger focused on this concept quite a bit.

2. Not sure that metaphysics is empirical to any extent, but I believe conceptual truths are still truths.
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Tamminen »

Some concrete metaphysical questions:

Why is there something instead of nothing?
Is reality rational? What does irrationality mean?
Is everything necessary or is there something which is contingent? What does contingency mean?
Is there such a thing as chance or genuine probability in nature?
What is the relation of subjective time and physical space-time?
Does subjective time have a beginning and an end?
Which is more fundamental, matter or subjectivity, or are they interrelated?
What does it mean to have a world with no one experiencing it?

And much more. These are questions that are connected to our very existence and should, I think, concern us at least as much as the empirical questions of physics and biology, the answering of which has achieved so great success lately.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

I agree that metaphysics is, if entertaingly, pointless. But I think it's worth trying to show why. So here's my go.

The topics in metaphysics comprise a list of abstract nouns: reality, causation, properties, universals, particulars, free will, knowledge, belief, justification, truth, justice, beauty, love, and so on. It turns out to be a list of the topics in philosophy.

But in the phrase abstract noun, the modifier abstract is grammatically misattached. A word such as a noun is not abstract; it is a real thing: a sound, a mark on paper or screen, and so on. The word abstract really refers to the supposed thing that an abstract noun names. And as nouns are names, it seems there are abstract things of which abstract nouns are the names. So in philosophy, when we talk about causation, knowledge or truth, we seem to be talking about abstract things.

To define a word such as causation is to show how use or could use it. By contrast, to define a thing is to describe it, which is a radically different operation. We describe a real thing by making falsifiable factual assertions about it. And they are falsifiable only because, usually, we have the thing itself with which to compare the description. And there's the rub. How do we describe or analyse an abstract thing at all, let alone falsifiably?

It is possible that, like fairies and gods, abstract things exist. But until we have evidence for them, there is no reason to believe they do. And if, in this context, the words things and exist are equivocations, we have to know what those words mean as applied to abstract things. Otherwise, any attempt to define or analyse abstract things is tendentious. Metaphysics in a nutshell: tendentiousness.

One ruse is to say abstract things are concepts. But concepts are also abstract things, just like propositions. So-called conceptual analysis is pure equivocation.

One example of the fruit of metaphysical equivocation is the amazing complexity of the conceptual analysis of the supposed thing we call truth, the upshot of which is we can't satisfactorily account for things being true. So if the sky is blue, the factual assertion the sky is blue may seem to be true, but what do we mortals know? We just don't understand that truth makers and truth bearers are hopelessly unsatisfactory things.

Some abstract nouns are among the most important words we use. And we could say they are merely words. But then all words are merely words. And, hey, linguists deal with words. We are philosophers. We deal with things.
Prothero
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Prothero »

If one is looking for concrete definitive answers "certainty" in metaphysics, then one should go elsewhere.
What metaphysics does do is expose us to a wide range of possible answers or conjectures to difficult (perhaps unanswerable) questions.
This expands our range of thinking and perhaps makes us more thoughtful and humble by questioning many assumptions we hold without having carefully examined the issues.
Metaphysical discussions also force us to put in writing our positions and thus clarify our thoughts in a way that casual living does not.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

My point is that those 'difficult (perhaps unanswerable) questions' are the wrong questions. And, trying to answer them, we disappear down the rabbit hole otherwise known as metaphysics.

And the legitimacy of asking and trying, endlessly unsuccessfully, to answer those questions, comes precisely from not questioning the assumption that there are abstract things which we can at least try to describe and analyse. The burden of proof lies with those who claim such things exist, not with those who reject the claim.
Togo1
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Togo1 »

Peter Holmes wrote:I agree that metaphysics is, if entertaingly, pointless. ...
Eh.. I'd strongly disagree. I'll make an alternative case at the end.
Peter Holmes wrote: ...But I think it's worth trying to show why. So here's my go.

The topics in metaphysics comprise a list of abstract nouns: reality, causation, properties, universals, particulars, free will, knowledge, belief, justification, truth, justice, beauty, love, and so on. It turns out to be a list of the topics in philosophy.

But in the phrase abstract noun, the modifier abstract is grammatically misattached. A word such as a noun is not abstract; it is a real thing: a sound, a mark on paper or screen, and so on.
Well, no, it's still an abstraction. If you write down a word on a peice of paper with a pencil in cursive script, you have a physical object, sure. And if you have a spoken word, then the vibrations which make up that sound are a physical effect. And if you cut out the shape of that same word in sheet metal in block capitals, you have a physical object. But these three physical effects/objects, despite being the same word, have no common physical features. They are in no sense the same physical object. The only thing that links them is that they share the same underlying reference, and that reference is entirely non-physical. It's not, in your parlance, a 'real thing'.
Peter Holmes wrote:So in philosophy, when we talk about causation, knowledge or truth, we seem to be talking about abstract things.

To define a word such as causation is to show how use or could use it. By contrast, to define a thing is to describe it, which is a radically different operation. We describe a real thing by making falsifiable factual assertions about it.

And they are falsifiable only because, usually, we have the thing itself with which to compare the description. And there's the rub. How do we describe or analyse an abstract thing at all, let alone falsifiably?
The same way we do physical objects. The first step is to work out what definitions can be agreed on. You then apply those definitions to the abstraction. It's exactly the same process as describing a physical object. e.g.

1) My car is new and cheap
2) My neighbour is new and cheap
3) This idea for funding street lighting is new and cheap

In each case it's entirely possible to compare the description to what is agreed to be true, in each case you have to come up with some kind of critieria for what qualifies as new or cheap.

I really think falsifiability is a bit of a blind here. After all you don't start labelling statements such as:

The photo I just burnt featured a green car.

as metaphysical, or even as abstract, just because they're not testable in practice.

Peter Holmes wrote:And if, in this context, the words things and exist are equivocations, we have to know what those words mean as applied to abstract things. Otherwise, any attempt to define or analyse abstract things is tendentious. Metaphysics in a nutshell: tendentiousness.

One ruse is to say abstract things are concepts. But concepts are also abstract things, just like propositions. So-called conceptual analysis is pure equivocation.
Um.. by this arguement everything you've just said is equivocation. Should we thus discount it? Or are we applying this to all metaphysical arguements except this one?
Peter Holmes wrote:One example of the fruit of metaphysical equivocation is the amazing complexity of the conceptual analysis of the supposed thing we call truth, the upshot of which is we can't satisfactorily account for things being true. So if the sky is blue, the factual assertion the sky is blue may seem to be true, but what do we mortals know? We just don't understand that truth makers and truth bearers are hopelessly unsatisfactory things.


While this is a complicated area, it does actually make sense. Again, the problem is this idea that truth is somehow contained in the outside world rather than being the product of the application of definitions. So the truth value of 'the sky is blue' depends rather on how you're defining your terms. It doesn't look blue from space, it's generally quite transparent, and the blue effect we see is the result of light from the sun defracting through it at a particular angle. So yes, the sky is blue, given normal definitions. And under other definitions, such as trying to work out the colour saturation of substances, it isn't.

You've given a good account of a school of metaphysical thought known as pragmatism. However, it is a metaphysical position, which poses a problem given that it suggests dispensing with metaphysics.

In general, those who suggest that metaphysics should be ignored, discounted or disposed of are most often those who have a very firmly held metaphysical viewpoint that they don't wish to be challenged. This can be for practical reasons, such as in the well-established areas of science where such a challenge would have to be overwhelming to make any headway, or for ideological reasons (as found amongst politicians, religious fanatics, reductionists, etc.) where the idea that there might be more than one version of the truth threatens their core beliefs. In each case they often have very compelling reasons why considering rival worldviews are pointless, even dangerous.

Meanwhile, understanding how different definitions can change our understanding of problems is indispensible in several areas. Cutting edge sciences, i.e. ones where the basic paradigm is subject to challenge and change, such as quantum theory, astrophysics, and psychology, absolutely require this, as does higher mathematics, some forms of policy making, logic, philosophy, and critical thinking more generally.

All metaphysics really is, is considering whether your initial assumptions are wrong. It's annoying, because you need to make assumptions in order to reach any kind of conclusion, so it can feel like needless criticism, but in some situations it's well worth doing.
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

'Well, no, it's still an abstraction. If you write down a word on a peice of paper with a pencil in cursive script, you have a physical object, sure. And if you have a spoken word, then the vibrations which make up that sound are a physical effect. And if you cut out the shape of that same word in sheet metal in block capitals, you have a physical object. But these three physical effects/objects, despite being the same word, have no common physical features. They are in no sense the same physical object. The only thing that links them is that they share the same underlying reference, and that reference is entirely non-physical. It's not, in your parlance, a 'real thing'.'

The ways we speak or write the same word do have the common feature of being productions of the same word, given the convention in a language of using an alphabet to write the phonemes involved. Of course they're not the same physical object. No two spoken or written examples of the same word in any medium are the same physical object. But what is the 'underlying reference' of a word? Is it different from what we use the word to refer to? Is the 'underlying reference' of the word 'dog' entirely non-physical? Are dogs non-physical things? And is this a matter of definition? I don't understand your use of the word 'reference' here.

'The first step is to work out what definitions can be agreed on. You then apply those definitions to the abstraction. It's exactly the same process as describing a physical object. e.g.

1) My car is new and cheap
2) My neighbour is new and cheap
3) This idea for funding street lighting is new and cheap

In each case it's entirely possible to compare the description to what is agreed to be true, in each case you have to come up with some kind of critieria for what qualifies as new or cheap.

I really think falsifiability is a bit of a blind here. After all you don't start labelling statements such as:

The photo I just burnt featured a green car.

as metaphysical, or even as abstract, just because they're not testable in practice.'

But my point about definition is that we use the word 'definition' in two completely different ways. Defining words and defining things are radically different operations. Is the definition of a supposed abstract thing, the kind of thing that metaphysicians claim to be talking about, the definition of a word or the definition of a thing? Do you think there are abstract things, such as causation, knowledge and truth? If you do, do you have any evidence that they exist? Because if you don't, why do you think it's possible to describe and analyse them, which is what metaphysicians claim to do? (The photo was, like the green car itself, obviously not an abstract thing. I don't understand your point here.)

I also don't understand why you say my argument is itself metaphysical? Not being funny - can you explain why what I say assumes the existence of abstract things? Perhaps I'm missing something.

'...the problem is this idea that truth is somehow contained in the outside world rather than being the product of the application of definitions. So the truth value of 'the sky is blue' depends rather on how you're defining your terms. It doesn't look blue from space, it's generally quite transparent, and the blue effect we see is the result of light from the sun defracting through it at a particular angle. So yes, the sky is blue, given normal definitions. And under other definitions, such as trying to work out the colour saturation of substances, it isn't.'

Obviously, truth is not somehow contained in the outside world. That's like saying truth is a thing of any kind anywhere. No, wait... So, your argument is that instead truth is 'the product of the application of definitions'. If by that you mean that, if the sky is blue, the factual assertion 'the sky is blue' is true, because that's how we English speakers use those words - and that that's pretty much what 'being true' amounts to - then I agree. But notice how very different this is from the absurd contortions of metaphysical, conceptual analysis. (As for the sky's not always being blue - is a dog a dog, or is it sub-atomic particles in space? And is the answer to do with the definition of words, or of things?)

In sum, can you explain which metaphysical viewpoint I am defending, of which I am unaware? Which abstract things am I assuming to exist, unaware?
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Togo1 »

Peter Holmes wrote:The ways we speak or write the same word do have the common feature of being productions of the same word, given the convention in a language of using an alphabet to write the phonemes involved. Of course they're not the same physical object. No two spoken or written examples of the same word in any medium are the same physical object. But what is the 'underlying reference' of a word? Is it different from what we use the word to refer to? Is the 'underlying reference' of the word 'dog' entirely non-physical? Are dogs non-physical things? And is this a matter of definition? I don't understand your use of the word 'reference' here.
Ok, so when you say that two instances of representing the same word have "the common feature of being productions of the same word", that's what I'm getting at. What is this 'word' that you're referring to? Is it an object, a concept, what?

'
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo wrote:The first step is to work out what definitions can be agreed on. You then apply those definitions to the abstraction. It's exactly the same process as describing a physical object. e.g.

1) My car is new and cheap
2) My neighbour is new and cheap
3) This idea for funding street lighting is new and cheap

In each case it's entirely possible to compare the description to what is agreed to be true, in each case you have to come up with some kind of critieria for what qualifies as new or cheap.
But my point about definition is that we use the word 'definition' in two completely different ways. Defining words and defining things are radically different operations.
And my point is they aren't, that they're the substantially same operation.
Peter Holmes wrote:Is the definition of a supposed abstract thing, the kind of thing that metaphysicians claim to be talking about, the definition of a word or the definition of a thing? Do you think there are abstract things, such as causation, knowledge and truth? If you do, do you have any evidence that they exist? Because if you don't, why do you think it's possible to describe and analyse them, which is what metaphysicians claim to do?
I'm not sure what you mean here. What does it mean to you to claim that an abstract thing 'exists'? What's the difference between a concept and an abstract thing?

I think we can agree that a concept is more than just the thoughts in my head. If I talk about justice, for example, you'll recognise some aspects of what I'm talking about, but disagree with others. I'm not free to just think of anything, label it justice, and expect the concept to have changed in the wider world. So in the sense that a concept is shared between many many people, it has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice. Whether that means it 'exists' or not depends on what you understand by the term.
Peter Holmes wrote: (The photo was, like the green car itself, obviously not an abstract thing. I don't understand your point here.)
Well it's not a physical object. I destroyed it. It no longer exists. So if it's not a physical thing, and not an abstract thing, what is it?
Peter Holmes wrote:I also don't understand why you say my argument is itself metaphysical? Not being funny - can you explain why what I say assumes the existence of abstract things? Perhaps I'm missing something.
Oh, because you're talking about metaphyscal issues, and terms. I don't know where you've gotten the idea that metaphysics must involve the existence of abstract things, or even what you mean by that.
Peter Holmes wrote:Obviously, truth is not somehow contained in the outside world. That's like saying truth is a thing of any kind anywhere. No, wait...
??? what for?
Peter Holmes wrote:So, your argument is that instead truth is 'the product of the application of definitions'. If by that you mean that, if the sky is blue, the factual assertion 'the sky is blue' is true, because that's how we English speakers use those words - and that that's pretty much what 'being true' amounts to - then I agree. But notice how very different this is from the absurd contortions of metaphysical, conceptual analysis.
It seems identical to me. Can you give an example of these absurd contortions, and how they're any different at base from saying the sky is blue when the sky goes pink and red twice a day?
Peter Holmes wrote:(As for the sky's not always being blue - is a dog a dog, or is it sub-atomic particles in space? And is the answer to do with the definition of words, or of things?)
It's both a dog and a collection of sub-atomic particles, surely? I really don't see the problem here.
Peter Holmes wrote:In sum, can you explain which metaphysical viewpoint I am defending, of which I am unaware?
Only in very broad strokes, as it's your position to explain. The position you appear to be taking is that statements can be divided into broadly sensible assertions about the real world that make sense, and absurd metaphysical contortions of metaphysical analysis. That is a metaphysical position. You alos appear to be suggesting a distinction between concepts and abstract things, between falsifiable statements and non-falsifiable statements, and between positions that assert the existance of abtract things and those that don't. All these would be metaphysical positions, assuming they're of any significance.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Thanks, Togo1. I'm embarrassed to ask, but can you explain to me how to get a nice blue box when quoting your words in a response? I don't have an available five-year-old to show me how to do it. I'd be very grateful for the help.
Prothero
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Prothero »

Peter Holmes wrote:My point is that those 'difficult (perhaps unanswerable) questions' are the wrong questions. And, trying to answer them, we disappear down the rabbit hole otherwise known as metaphysics.

And the legitimacy of asking and trying, endlessly unsuccessfully, to answer those questions, comes precisely from not questioning the assumption that there are abstract things which we can at least try to describe and analyse. The burden of proof lies with those who claim such things exist, not with those who reject the claim.
What is wrong about questioning the mind-body (mental-physical) relationship?
And one should remember, many of Einstein's theories involved arm-chair thought experiments, like riding on a beam of light.
Peter Holmes
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Togo1 wrote:Ok, so when you say that two instances of representing the same word have "the common feature of being productions of the same word", that's what I'm getting at. What is this 'word' that you're referring to? Is it an object, a concept, what?
If I write the word 'dog' and then write the word 'dog', have I written the same word or a different word? I say I've written the same word. But we use the expressions 'is the same as' and 'is different from' in a variety of ways. We could get into a discussion of the supposedly mysterious thing we call identity: what ARE sameness and difference? Or we could resist the lure of the rabbit hole and say: the words 'dog' and 'word' are common nouns that we use to refer to real things: dogs and words. The word 'dog' is a word, and a dog is a real thing. And neither of them is a concept - unless you can show me why either is indeed a concept.

You say that explaining how we use a word and describing a thing are substantially the same operation. Please can you give a demonstration, perhaps with the word 'dog'? I hope you'll agree that these are different operations. We use the word to denote the thing, and we describe the thing by making falsifiable factual assertions listing its properties - a list which will change according to the nature of the description.
Togo1 wrote:What does it mean to you to claim that an abstract thing 'exists'? What's the difference between a concept and an abstract thing?

I think we can agree that a concept is more than just the thoughts in my head. If I talk about justice, for example, you'll recognise some aspects of what I'm talking about, but disagree with others. I'm not free to just think of anything, label it justice, and expect the concept to have changed in the wider world. So in the sense that a concept is shared between many many people, it has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice. Whether that means it 'exists' or not depends on what you understand by the term.
I think a concept, like a proposition, is an example of an abstract thing. I think the phrase 'abstract thing' is an equivocation on the the word 'thing', because it smuggles in an equivalence or analogy between supposed abstract things and real things. Until we differentiate between the way we use the words 'abstract' and 'unreal', I think the words 'abstract' and 'unreal' are synonyms. So, do unreal things exist? If we want to say they do exist, we have to explain the way we're using the word 'exist' in this context.

You ask if a concept is more than just the thoughts (a thought?) in your head. So that means you suppose a concept is at least a thought in your head. So is a concept a thought, in which case why have two names for the same thing? And if they're different things, why say they're the same thing? And if they're different things, can you explain the difference between a concept and a thought? And in what way can a thing in your head be shared between many people anyway?

I'm just trying to show that we use words such as 'concept', 'idea' and 'thought', and 'justice', then fool ourselves into thinking they are the names of things - abstract things - which we can describe and even analyse - hence metaphysics. When you say 'a concept [such as justice]...has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice', you're expressing almost unalloyed Platonism. We've been making the same mistake for at least two an a half thousand years.
Togo1 wrote:Well it's not a physical object. I destroyed it. It no longer exists. So if it's not a physical thing, and not an abstract thing, what is it?
A burnt photo is indeed a physical thing. It just isn't the original photo before it was burnt. A thing that is burnt doesn't become an abstract thing.
Togo1 wrote:I don't know where you've gotten the idea that metaphysics must involve the existence of abstract things, or even what you mean by that.
Please can you give an example of a metaphysical question or answer that doesn't involve an abstract thing. I remain resolutely open to persuasion.
Togo1 wrote:The position you appear to be taking is that statements can be divided into broadly sensible assertions about the real world that make sense, and absurd metaphysical contortions of metaphysical analysis. That is a metaphysical position. You alos appear to be suggesting a distinction between concepts and abstract things, between falsifiable statements and non-falsifiable statements, and between positions that assert the existance of abtract things and those that don't. All these would be metaphysical positions, assuming they're of any significance.
Not so. Among the many things we do with language, we make factual assertions about features of reality. If a factual assertion correctly asserts a feature of reality, given the way we use the words or other signs involved, it is true. If not, it is false. Why is that a metaphysical distinction? And why is the distinction between real and unreal things a metaphysical distinction? Genuine questions.

-- Updated July 25th, 2017, 12:57 pm to add the following --

This is the quintessential metaphysical mess: assume there is an abstract, immaterial thing, the mind, which we can describe or analyse; then puzzle over its relationship with a real thing, the body.

And poor old Einstein. Suppose he believed in fairies. Would that make it more likely that there are fairies?
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Atreyu »

What metaphysics tells us about the world is that the vast majority of it lies outside the boundaries of empiricism...
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Peter Holmes »

Indeed. Metaphysics 'tells us' this - assumes it is the case - then proceeds to discuss that supposed metaphysical reality, and/or the supposed things in it - without providing evidence that there is such a reality with such things in it. We could say: but you're asking for empirical evidence, and that's not available, by definition, for things outside the scope of empirical knowledge. But then, metaphysics itself is a feature of 'empirical' reality, so, like any other knowledge claim, it needs objective justification. Where and how do metaphysicians get the information that leads them to posit a metaphysical reality? And what is that information?

I'm not the first to notice that metaphysics is sublimated theology - or more generally, supernaturalism. Grand and similar claims, similarly unjustified.
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Re: What does metaphysics tell us about the world?

Post by Togo1 »

Peter Holmes wrote:Thanks, Togo1. I'm embarrassed to ask, but can you explain to me how to get a nice blue box when quoting your words in a response? I don't have an available five-year-old to show me how to do it. I'd be very grateful for the help.
If you highlight some text, and press the Quote button immediately above the text box you're writing in, it will do it for you.

Or you can do it yourself by putting quote into square brackets at the start of some text, and /quote in square brackets at the end of the text.

-- Updated July 26th, 2017, 6:17 pm to add the following --
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo1 wrote:Ok, so when you say that two instances of representing the same word have "the common feature of being productions of the same word", that's what I'm getting at. What is this 'word' that you're referring to? Is it an object, a concept, what?
If I write the word 'dog' and then write the word 'dog', have I written the same word or a different word? I say I've written the same word. But we use the expressions 'is the same as' and 'is different from' in a variety of ways. We could get into a discussion of the supposedly mysterious thing we call identity: what ARE sameness and difference? Or we could resist the lure of the rabbit hole and say: the words 'dog' and 'word' are common nouns that we use to refer to real things: dogs and words. The word 'dog' is a word, and a dog is a real thing. And neither of them is a concept - unless you can show me why either is indeed a concept.
That's great, but in no way answers my question. This 'word' that is the common feature between Dog, dog and DOG. What is it? It's clearly not physical, because the three words share no physical features. Is it real or unreal?

I ask because you appear to be relying fairly heavily on this thing to communicate. Does this mean that communication doesn't involve real things, or does it mean that real things may not have any physical features?
Peter Holmes wrote:You say that explaining how we use a word and describing a thing are substantially the same operation.
No, I don't believe I do.
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo1 wrote:What does it mean to you to claim that an abstract thing 'exists'? What's the difference between a concept and an abstract thing?

I think we can agree that a concept is more than just the thoughts in my head. If I talk about justice, for example, you'll recognise some aspects of what I'm talking about, but disagree with others. I'm not free to just think of anything, label it justice, and expect the concept to have changed in the wider world. So in the sense that a concept is shared between many many people, it has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice. Whether that means it 'exists' or not depends on what you understand by the term.
I think a concept, like a proposition, is an example of an abstract thing. I think the phrase 'abstract thing' is an equivocation on the the word 'thing', because it smuggles in an equivalence or analogy between supposed abstract things and real things. Until we differentiate between the way we use the words 'abstract' and 'unreal', I think the words 'abstract' and 'unreal' are synonyms.
Ok, so let's take an example of an abstract: 1+2=3 Is that unreal?
Peter Holmes wrote:You ask if a concept is more than just the thoughts (a thought?) in your head. So that means you suppose a concept is at least a thought in your head.
No, it doesn't.
Peter Holmes wrote:When you say 'a concept [such as justice]...has to have some form of independence from any one instance of justice', you're expressing almost unalloyed Platonism. We've been making the same mistake for at least two an a half thousand years.
I'd be interested in why you feel I'm making a mistake. If you treat 'justice' as a series of unconnected instances, then why do they share features? If you treat it as a single entity, then why isn't it identical to any one instance?
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo1 wrote:Well it's not a physical object. I destroyed it. It no longer exists. So if it's not a physical thing, and not an abstract thing, what is it?
A burnt photo is indeed a physical thing. It just isn't the original photo before it was burnt. A thing that is burnt doesn't become an abstract thing.
But the colour of the car in the photo is not a feature of the burnt photo, only of the unburnt photo. And the unburnt photo no longer exists. So if the unburnt photo is not a physical thing, and not an abstract thing, what is it?
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo1 wrote:I don't know where you've gotten the idea that metaphysics must involve the existence of abstract things, or even what you mean by that.
Please can you give an example of a metaphysical question or answer that doesn't involve an abstract thing. I remain resolutely open to persuasion.
I'm not seeking to pursuade you. I just want to know where this idea came from, and what you mean by 'existence of abstract things'. It sounds very... abstract.
Peter Holmes wrote:
Togo1 wrote:The position you appear to be taking is that statements can be divided into broadly sensible assertions about the real world that make sense, and absurd metaphysical contortions of metaphysical analysis. That is a metaphysical position. You alos appear to be suggesting a distinction between concepts and abstract things, between falsifiable statements and non-falsifiable statements, and between positions that assert the existance of abtract things and those that don't. All these would be metaphysical positions, assuming they're of any significance.
Not so.
That isn't your position, or the position isn't a metaphysical position?
Peter Holmes wrote: Among the many things we do with language, we make factual assertions about features of reality. If a factual assertion correctly asserts a feature of reality, given the way we use the words or other signs involved, it is true. If not, it is false. Why is that a metaphysical distinction? And why is the distinction between real and unreal things a metaphysical distinction? Genuine questions.
Because you're proposing statements about the nature of reality, and how it is categorised?
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