Actualism and the necessity / contingency distinction

[NicoL]

The proposition that I am a person is necessarily true. On the other hand, the proposition that I am hungry at this very moment is only contingently true, but plausibly eternally so, if there is just this (the actual) world and no other existing world where it might have been false.

The state of affairs that I am a person obtains necessarily. On the other hand, the state of affairs that I am hungry at this very moment obtains contingently, but it does obtain in this, the only and actual, world.

Do you see a problem here? Does the distinction between necessity and contingency fade when we accept actualism? How could a contingently but eternally true proposition have failed to be true in any logically possible world, or in any metaphysically possible world, seeing that there is only one, the actual world? How could a contingently obtaining state of affairs fail to obtain since there is only one world, the actual world, for it to obtain in?

It really seems to me that necessity makes more sense in terms of essence, as having to do with the "internal structure" of a state of affairs, the sort of connection that links its constituents: objects, kinds, properties, relations. In that respect I would say that there are necessary (essential) connections, like identity and instantiation, but also contingent (accidental) ones such as characterisation and composition.

Necessity as a formal property of propositions / states of affairs, as far as their status in different possible worlds goes, seems confused. Assuming the truth of actualism, there is only one world and that single existing world:

(a) consists only of all obtaining states of affairs which could not have failed to obtain in that very world anyway, and
(b) contains one totality of truth-makers, which determine the exact same class of true propositions in all logically (maximally consistent) possible worlds.

[Quotidian]

The proposition that I am a person is necessarily true. On the other hand, the proposition that I am hungry at this very moment is only contingently true, but plausibly eternally so, if there is just this (the actual) world and no other existing world where it might have been false.

I can see you have put a lot of thought into this, but I think your understanding of contingent and necessary truth is very much your own.

The fact that you're a person is not, I think, a necessary truth. It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that your post might have been written by a computer. As it happens, I think the post was written by a person, but I don't think it is a necessary truth.

An example of a necessary truth would be, if you did write it, that you necessarily finished writing it after you started writing it; it is necessarily the case that writing a post takes some time. Necessary truths are true by virtue of logic - if you had four of something, and I took two of them, then you would necessarily have two left - not one, or three, or some other number, but always and only two.

Whereas, a contingent fact is dependent on some other fact. I went around asking a group of people if they could lend me five dollars, as it happens you were the only person who would. But it might have been some other person, or I might have got nothing at all. But if you had given me five dollars, then that is what I would have, by virtue of the necessary fact that 5=5.

incidentally, I googled 'actualism', and instantly decided it was wrong, because there are such things as 'real possibilities'. Even physics supports that, because it is the wave equation describes the distribution of possibilities, which is fundamental to the current conception of matter. Whereas actualism would require, it would seem to me, atoms, i.e. truly existent things.

[NicoL]

I have put a lot of thought into this, but I think your understanding of contingent and necessary truth is very much your own.

No doubt - I am merely a layman still trying to understand the basics of philosophy.

The fact that you're a person is not, I think, a necessary truth. It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that your post might have been written by a computer. As it happens, I think the post was written by a person, but I don't think it is a necessary truth.

Yes, but isn't the proposition that I am a person, different than the proposition that the person who wrote this post is a person, despite both of them being true? Here are two reasons for that:

1. If I am using "I" as a personal pronoun to refer to myself, then the first proposition involves the singular concept of a particular person (myself) and the universal concept of a kind (Person). The latter proposition does not involve anywhere the singular concept of myself, thus it is a distinct proposition from the former one.

2. The proposition that I was entertaining when I wrote this sentence had subject-predicate logical form (I am instantiating Person-hood), while the the logical form of the proposition you grasped as the reader was that of an existential quantification (Something wrote that sentence and it was a person).

Necessary truths are true by virtue of logic.

Strictly logical necessities are true by virtue of logic. What about broadly logical necessities (i.e. metaphysical necessities)? If I understand correctly the (a?) standard reply is that those are just true in every logically possible world. Also, why are the laws of logic necessarily true? It cannot be because they are true in virtue of themselves, or can it?

incidentally, I googled 'actualism', and instantly decided it was wrong, because there are such things as 'real possibilities'. Even physics supports that, because it is the wave equation describes the distribution of possibilities, which is fundamental to the current conception of matter. Whereas actualism would require, it would seem to me, atoms, i.e. truly existent things.

Are those real possibilities just states of affairs, both the obtaining and the non-obtaining ones? And, by 'real', do you mean 'objectively existing'? If I understand correctly, then we would need to say that states of affairs have three different formal properties:

1. Existence: all states of affairs exist.
2. Obtaining or failing to obtain: but whether a state of affairs obtains or not, it still exists.
3. Necessity or contingency: every state of affairs exists and either obtains or not, necessarily so, or only contingently.

In that case, perhaps the distinction between necessity and contingency is a bit more well-defined, but what justifies the belief that non-obtaining states of affairs exist objectively? Why should we postulate the existence of a non-obtaining state of affairs for each false proposition? And, if perhaps we can appeal to contemporary scientific theories for such justification, then how do we explain the transition of a state from obtaining to non-obtaining status, and vice versa? Why does that happen and how does it work?

[NicoL]

I have put a lot of thought into this, but I think your understanding of contingent and necessary truth is very much your own.

No doubt - I am merely a layman still trying to understand the basics of philosophy.

The fact that you're a person is not, I think, a necessary truth. It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that your post might have been written by a computer. As it happens, I think the post was written by a person, but I don't think it is a necessary truth.

Yes, but isn't the proposition that I am a person, different than the proposition that the person who wrote this post is a person, despite both of them being true? Here are two reasons for that:

1. If I am using "I" as a personal pronoun to refer to myself, then the first proposition involves the singular concept of a particular person (myself) and the universal concept of a kind (Person). The latter proposition does not involve anywhere the singular concept of myself, thus it is a distinct proposition from the former one.

2. The proposition that I was entertaining when I wrote this sentence had subject-predicate logical form (I am instantiating Person-hood), while the the logical form of the proposition you grasped as the reader was that of an existential quantification (Something wrote that sentence and it was a person).

Necessary truths are true by virtue of logic.

Strictly logical necessities are true by virtue of logic. What about broadly logical necessities (i.e. metaphysical necessities)? If I understand correctly the (a?) standard reply is that those are just true in every logically possible world. Also, why are the laws of logic necessarily true? It cannot be because they are true in virtue of themselves, or can it?

incidentally, I googled 'actualism', and instantly decided it was wrong, because there are such things as 'real possibilities'. Even physics supports that, because it is the wave equation describes the distribution of possibilities, which is fundamental to the current conception of matter. Whereas actualism would require, it would seem to me, atoms, i.e. truly existent things.

Are those real possibilities just states of affairs, both the obtaining and the non-obtaining ones? And, by 'real', do you mean 'objectively existing'? If I understand correctly, then we would need to say that states of affairs have three different formal properties:

1. Existence: all states of affairs exist.
2. Obtaining or failing to obtain: but whether a state of affairs obtains or not, it still exists.
3. Necessity or contingency: every state of affairs exists and either obtains or not, necessarily so, or only contingently.

In that case, perhaps the distinction between necessity and contingency is a bit more well-defined, but what justifies the belief that non-obtaining states of affairs exist objectively? Why should we postulate the existence of a non-obtaining state of affairs for each false proposition? And, if perhaps we can appeal to contemporary scientific theories for such justification, then how do we explain the transition of a state from obtaining to non-obtaining status, and vice versa? Why does that happen and how does it work?

[Mosesquine]

There are two sorts of necessity: logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Your having a personhood is not logically necessary. You are logically possible to be a dog or whatnot. However, you are metaphysically not possible to be a dog. Your body parts are wholly different from a dog, so you cannot metaphysically a dog. However, it is still logically and grammatically possible for you to be a dog. Logical necessity and metaphysical necessity should be distinguished.

[Quotidian]

[quote"NicoL"]why are the laws of logic necessarily true? It cannot be because they are true in virtue of themselves, or can it?[/quote]

You're asking something along the lines of 'why does 2 and 2 equal 4'? There is no answer to that question - '4' is the terminus of explanation, for the question 'what does 4 + 4 equal'. That is what logical necessity entails.

by 'real', do you mean 'objectively existing'?

Do numbers 'objectively exist'? I would say they don't. Numerical symbols exist, but numbers are purely intellectual constructs, they 'exist' only in the mind of an observer capable of counting. But they're still real, if you enter a wrong value in constructing an object, it will have consequences.

I think your issue is that you're equating what is real with what exists in space and time, what has a location, what is 'out there somewhere'. BUt there may be things, like numbers, which are not 'out there anywhere', however, are real regardless. Of course the status of such things is a highly contentious issue; but the idea that number is real, which is mathematical Platonism or realism, has a long pedigree in Western philosophy, and still has support.

Of course, it also has detractors, typically empiricists, for whom the efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences is an embarrasment.

Bottom line here: science doesn't explain everything. Science explains very specific things, although sometimes across very wide ranges. But every system rests on some axioms which are themselves unprovable, as Kurt Godel showed.

-- Updated September 5th, 2016, 9:49 pm to add the following --

I made some errors in the above post but this forum doesn't permit the luxury of being able to correct them.