The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
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The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Since consciousness is a property who's only manifestation is the conscious experience of the one who is conscious ( I think therefore I am), then anything that a conscious mind thinks, says, experiences or imagines is subjective by definition. There is no getting around this as a fact.
This should be obvious to any who would contemplate this fact but the implications are profound across the entire field of philosophy and metaphysics in particular.
First and foremost there can be no true or absolute objectivity experienced, conveyed or realized by a conscious mind. This means therefore there can be no "absolute" truth realized or experienced consciously, only truth that is bounded by the context of the conscious entity experiencing or proposing such a truth. In other words all truth would be contextual and therefore relative. This also means that no two conscious individuals can ever have precisely the same experience, that no matter what there will be differences even if only at the quantum level, but differences nonetheless. I am directly equating absolute truth with absolute objectivity. The philosophy of language is also at the center of this concept as language cannot escape this subjective prison either since it's a manifestation and expression of consciousness.
This does not discount the validity of social truths or scientific truths or philosophical truths, but it does limits them to context. It makes it impossible for human beings to pass any sort of "absolute" judgment or proclamation about what can consciously be known. It does not preclude society or science from making practical statements about what is objectively true for a given context which is in fact how we operate as a society anyway. It's just that there are many people who do not recognize the limits of their own experience and indeed put way to much stock in their personal experience and point of view.
There are many other implications of the absolute subjectivity of consciousness, I'm just scratching the surface here but I hope to give those who read this post something to think about and see why this fact cannot be undone or gotten around, no matter how certain you are about a particular belief or experience.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Why not?Philosch wrote:This does not discount the validity of social truths or scientific truths or philosophical truths, but it does limits them to context...It does not preclude society or science from making practical statements about what is objectively true for a given context.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
We all take for granted our perspective of the world. Most people are naturally naive realists - believing the world is as they see it. But the more you learn about how our bodies work and how they evolved, and how we interact with the world, it becomes clear that naive realist just can't be the case.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
There is one theory that seems that could be applied in every context, and it is has often been touted as the best idea every - natural selection. You may think that this only applies to a biological context but allow me to explain.Philosch wrote:Because contextual truth can be proven, accepted and be very useful from a pragmatic standpoint. Quick example would be Newtonian mechanics. Newtonian mechanics or physics can be used to calculate the motion of planets, the escape velocity for satellites and any other number of everyday technical questions. We know that Newtonian Physics is incomplete and inaccurate at quantum and cosmic scales or in other words only "true" in a given context. Relativity is truer in additional contexts but it too falls short in some contexts. However we don't need to discard these contextually limited truths as the provide practical utility. There are many other examples but I think these will do.
First, your mention of Newtonian physics and Quantum Mechanics being incompatible is a great example of how two seemingly successful theories don't compliment each other. They are different theories that explain the physics at different size scales. Evolution by natural selection is a theory that is given more power because our theories at the molecular level (genetics) actually compliment the theory of evolution by natural selection. So we have two theories at different size scales that compliment each other and work together.
Now, let's see if we can expand this theory to other contexts. Take the shape of planets, for instance. Planets are shaped like spheres because gravity causes them to take this shape. Gravity acts on these bodies to give them their shape. Gravity is a natural force. This isn't any different from how natural forces in the environment act on organisms over long periods of time to shape their bodies to be more in sync with the environment. Natural selection is simply nature "selecting" certain features as if it were "seeking" the environment to be in sync. It's like a feedback loop where forces in the environment act on some body while the body itself is part of the environment and produces effects in it's environment as well.
We also know that natural selection plays a role in how our minds work. The field of evolutionary psychology explains how our minds were shaped over time to provide adaptable solutions to problems in the environment. How we learn and acquire knowledge is another form of natural selection, or the environmental feedback that allows us to take in information about the environment and filter out the information that isn't useful in favor of useful information. We then act on that information and observe the results and try again if the results weren't what we wanted. It's just another feedback loop of being affected by the environment and responding to those pressures and how the environment responses to those actions and back again. This isn't any different from how organisms evolve - as if nature itself was "learning" what features, or mutations, work best by trying them out and weeding out those mutations that don't promote survival and procreation, and adding to those solutions that came before and still work.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
-- Updated February 24th, 2017, 11:52 pm to add the following --
I just saw your first post somehow I missed that before but I wanted to comment that I totally agree, our consciousness is a prisoner of time and I like your comment about naïve realism as well. Well said and very relevant since some of my intention was to get posters to see that all of what they argue for in this or that post is completely bound by context and only has a relative truth even if they prove their case.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Some scientists would question the importance of "natural selection" arguing that its use (really over-use) can sometimes become a vacuous tautology. They argue that other forces such as physical and chemical laws/constraints are at work shaping evolution. From my understanding, it's like why Helium came after Hydrogen during the evolution of our universe: there are serious constraints based on physical laws that shape evolution that often don't have much to do with natural selection/adaptation. In a classic paper, Gould and Lewontin warned against "naive adaptationism," the inappropriate use of adaptive theorizing to explain traits that have emerged for other reasons. The argument is illustrated by an analogy with the mosaics on the dome and spandrels of the San Marco basilica in Venice:Trajk Logik wrote:There is one theory that seems that could be applied in every context, and it is has often been touted as the best idea every - natural selection. You may think that this only applies to a biological context but allow me to explain... Evolution by natural selection is a theory that is given more power because our theories at the molecular level (genetics) actually compliment the theory of evolution by natural selection. So we have two theories at different size scales that compliment each other and work together...Natural selection is simply nature "selecting" certain features as if it were "seeking" the environment to be in sync. It's like a feedback loop where forces in the environment act on some body while the body itself is part of the environment and produces effects in it's environment as well.
We also know that natural selection plays a role in how our minds work. The field of evolutionary psychology explains how our minds were shaped over time to provide adaptable solutions to problems in the environment. How we learn and acquire knowledge is another form of natural selection, or the environmental feedback that allows us to take in information about the environment and filter out the information that isn't useful in favor of useful information. We then act on that information and observe the results and try again if the results weren't what we wanted. It's just another feedback loop of being affected by the environment and responding to those pressures and how the environment responses to those actions and back again. This isn't any different from how organisms evolve - as if nature itself was "learning" what features, or mutations, work best by trying them out and weeding out those mutations that don't promote survival and procreation, and adding to those solutions that came before and still work.
The spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian paradigm: a critique of the adaptationist programSpandrels-the tapering triangular spaces formed by the intersection of two rounded arches at right angles...are necessary architectural by-products of mounting a dome on rounded arches. Each spandrel contains a design admirably fitted into its tapering space. An evangelist sits in the upper part flanked by the heavenly cities. Below, a man representing one of the four biblical rivers ... pours water from a pitcher in the narrowing space below his feet. The design is so elaborate, harmonious, and purposeful that we are tempted to view it as the starting point of any analysis, as the cause in some sense of the surrounding architecture. But this would invert the proper path of analysis. The system begins with an architectural constraint: the necessary four spandrels and their tapering triangular form. They provide a space in which the mosaicists worked; they set the quadripartite symmetry of the dome above. Such architectural constraints abound, and we find them easy to understand because we do not impose our biological biases upon them....Anyone who tried to argue that the structure [spandrels] exists because of [the designs laid upon them] would be inviting the same ridicule that Voltaire heaped on Dr. Pangloss: "Things cannot be other than they are ... Everything is made for the best purpose. Our noses were made to carry spectacles, so we have spectacles. Legs were clearly intended for breeches, and we wear them." ... Yet evolutionary biologists, in their tendency to focus exclusively on immediate adaptation to local conditions, do tend to ignore architectural constraints and perform just such an inversion of explanation.
http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org/ ... 1.full.pdf
A more recent paper published in Nature seems to support their criticism of adaptationism:
A latent capacity for evolutionary innovation through exaptation in metabolic systemsThe question of how often adaptive traits have non-adaptive origins has profound implications for evolutionary biology, but is difficult to address systematically. Here we consider this issue in metabolism, one of the most ancient biological systems that is central to all life...Our observations suggest that many more metabolic traits may have non-adaptive origins than is appreciated at present. They also challenge our ability to distinguish adaptive from non-adaptive traits.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/va ... 12301.html
Other write-ups on that paper:
Great Exaptations: Most Traits Emerge for No Crucial Reason, Scientists FindThe findings underscore the idea that traits we see now-even complex ones, like color vision-may have had neutral origins that sat latent for generations before spreading through populations, Wagner says...If exaptations are pervasive in evolution, he adds, it becomes difficult to distinguish adaptation from exaptation, and it could change the way evolutionary biologists think about selective advantage as the primary driver of natural selection.
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/20 ... 134424.htm
Simulated metabolic networks show exaptations far outnumber adaptations
http://phys.org/news/2013-07-simulated- ... umber.html
Gould along with some other scientists like Lewontin, Chomsky, etc. have also suggested that many of our mental systems (e.g. language) may have also arose as nonadaptations:
Evolution: The Pleasures of PluralismThe human brain is the most complicated device for reasoning and calculating, and for expressing emotion, ever evolved on earth. Natural selection made the human brain big, but most of our mental properties and potentials may be spandrels—that is, nonadaptive side consequences of building a device with such structural complexity. If I put a small computer (no match for a brain) in my factory, my adaptive reasons for so doing (to keep accounts and issue paychecks) represent a tiny subset of what the computer, by virtue of inherent structure, can do (factor-analyze my data on land snails, beat or tie anyone perpetually in tic-tac-toe). In pure numbers, the spandrels overwhelm the adaptations. The human brain must be bursting with spandrels that are essential to human nature and vital to our self-understanding but that arose as nonadaptations, and are therefore outside the compass of evolutionary psychology, or any other ultra-Darwinian theory.
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/reviews/ ... alism.html
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
You say "the one " (who is conscious). You have not proved that a conscious state must in all cases be an attribute of an individual, or that the attribution of any conscious state defines what an individual is.Since consciousness is a property who's only manifestation is the conscious experience of the one who is conscious ( I think therefore I am), then anything that a conscious mind thinks, says, experiences or imagines is subjective by definition. There is no getting around this as a fact.
Conjoined twins share conscious states.
If Jean and Jessie were to be joined together at the brain by some mad but efficient scientist then Jean and Jessie would share memories , perceptions and indeed qualia.
-- Updated February 25th, 2017, 6:06 am to add the following --
Philosch wrote:
You say "the one " (who is conscious). You have not proved that a conscious state must in all cases be an attribute of an individual, or that the attribution of any conscious state defines what an individual is.Since consciousness is a property who's only manifestation is the conscious experience of the one who is conscious ( I think therefore I am), then anything that a conscious mind thinks, says, experiences or imagines is subjective by definition. There is no getting around this as a fact.
Conjoined twins share conscious states.
If Jean and Jessie were to be joined together at the brain by some mad but efficient scientist then Jean and Jessie would share memories , perceptions and indeed qualia.
If Robert and Maisie were to be similarly operated on by the mad but efficient scientist then John-Maisie would experience labour pains when the Maisie body gave birth.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
These things I'm stating are facts based on the meanings of words like consciousness. This is where the rubber meets the road so to speak. The definition of consciousness to which I'm adhering is not all the different pop culture definitions floating around out there, it's the one Searle and other modern philosophers use which is..."is there something that it feels like to be this object" then it's conscious. In other words "Self-awareness". The very use of the term, "to feel like" exposes the subjective boundary of consciousness.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
You seem to have overlooked Searle's distinction between epistemic/epistemological subjectivity/objectivity and ontic/ontological subjectivity/objectivity. Ontological subjectivity doesn't preclude epistemological objectivity!Philosch wrote:…Since consciousness is a property who's only manifestation is the conscious experience of the one who is conscious ( I think therefore I am), then anything that a conscious mind thinks, says, experiences or imagines is subjective by definition. There is no getting around this as a fact.
This should be obvious to any who would contemplate this fact but the implications are profound across the entire field of philosophy and metaphysics in particular.
First and foremost there can be no true or absolute objectivity experienced, conveyed or realized by a conscious mind. This means therefore there can be no "absolute" truth realized or experienced consciously, only truth that is bounded by the context of the conscious entity experiencing or proposing such a truth. In other words all truth would be contextual and therefore relative. This also means that no two conscious individuals can ever have precisely the same experience, that no matter what there will be differences even if only at the quantum level, but differences nonetheless. I am directly equating absolute truth with absolute objectivity. The philosophy of language is also at the center of this concept as language cannot escape this subjective prison either since it's a manifestation and expression of consciousness.
This does not discount the validity of social truths or scientific truths or philosophical truths, but it does limits them to context. It makes it impossible for human beings to pass any sort of "absolute" judgment or proclamation about what can consciously be known. It does not preclude society or science from making practical statements about what is objectively true for a given context which is in fact how we operate as a society anyway. It's just that there are many people who do not recognize the limits of their own experience and indeed put way to much stock in their personal experience and point of view.
There are many other implications of the absolute subjectivity of consciousness, I'm just scratching the surface here but I hope to give those who read this post something to think about and see why this fact cannot be undone or gotten around, no matter how certain you are about a particular belief or experience.
"Much of our world view depends on our concept of objectivity and the contrast between the objective and the subjective. Famously, the distinction is a matter of degree, but it is less often remarked that both 'objective' and 'subjective' have several different senses. For our present discussion two senses are crucial, an epistemic sense of the objective-subjective distinction and an ontological sense. Epistemically speaking, 'objective' and 'subjective' are primarily predicates of judgments. We often speak of judgments as being 'subjective' when we mean that their truth or falsity cannot be settled 'objectively', because the truth or falsity is not a simple matter of fact but depends on certain attitudes, feelings, and points of view of the makers and the hearers of the judgment. An example of such a judgment might be, 'Rembrandt is a better artist than Rubens.' In this sense of 'subjective', we contrast such subjective judgments with objective judgments, such as the judgment 'Rembrandt lived in Amsterdam during the year 1632.' For such objective judgments, the facts in the world that make them true or false are independent of anybody's attitudes or feelings about them. In this epistemic sense we can speak not only of objective judgments but of objective facts. Corresponding to objectively true judgments there are objective facts. It should be obvious from these examples that the contrast between epistemic objectivity and epistemic subjectivity is a matter of degree.
In addition to the epistemic sense of the objective-subjective distinction, there is also a related ontological sense. In the ontological sense, 'objective' and 'subjective' are predicates of entities and types of entities, and they ascribe modes of existence. In the ontological sense, pains are subjective entities, because their mode of existence depends on being felt by subjects. But mountains, for example, in contrast to pains, are ontologically objective because their mode of existence is independent of any perceiver or any mental state.
We can see the distinction between the distinctions clearly if we reflect on the fact that we can make epistemically subjective statements about entities that are ontologically objective, and similarly, we can make epistemically objective statements about entities that are ontologically subjective. For example, the statement 'Mt. Everest is more beautiful than Mt. Whitney' is about ontologically objective entities, but makes a subjective judgment about them. On the other hand, the statement 'I now have a pain in my lower back' reports an epistemically objective fact in the sense that it is made true by the existence of an actual fact that is not dependent on any stance, attitudes, or opinions of observers. However, the phenomenon itself, the actual pain, has a subjective mode of existence."
(Searle, John R. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 1995. pp. 7-9)
"The famous distinction between objective and subjective is ambiguous between an epistemic sense, where “epistemic” means having to do with knowledge, and an ontological sense, where “ontological” means having to do with existence. In the epistemic sense, the distinction between the objective and the subjective is between different types of claims (statements, assertions, beliefs, etc.): epistemically objective claims can be settled as matters of objective fact, the subjective are matters of subjective opinion. For example, the claim that van Gogh died in France is epistemically objective. Its truth or falsity can be settled as a matter of objective fact. The claim that van Gogh was a better painter than Gauguin is epistemically subjective; it is a matter of subjective evaluation. Underlying this epistemic distinction is an ontological distinction between modes of existence. Some entities—mountains, molecules and tectonic plates for example—have an existence independent of any experience. They are ontologically objective. But others—pains, tickles and itches, for example—exist only insofar as they are experienced by a human or animal subject. They are ontologically subjective. I cannot tell you how much confusion has been generated by the failure to distinguish between the epistemic and the ontological senses of the distinction between subjective and objective. I will say more about this later. Pains, as I just said, are ontologically subjective. “But are they epistemically subjective as well”? It is absolutely important to see that that question makes no sense. Only claims, statements, etc. can be epistemically subjective or objective. Often statements about ontologically subjective entities such as pains can be epistemically objective. “Pains can be alleviated by analgesics” is an epistemically objective statement about an ontologically subjective class of entities."
(Searle, John R. Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. pp. 16-7)
-- Updated February 25th, 2017, 5:03 pm to add the following --
* What about conjoined twins of the Craniopagus type (ones who are joined at the skull). Couldn't they share parts of their brains and thus share experiences, with "experience-sharing" meaning here that two subjects have one and the same—i.e. numerically identical—experience? (That's different from saying that the numerically different experiences of two subjects can be qualitatively identical, which is certainly possible.)Philosch wrote:…This also means that no two conscious individuals can ever have precisely the same experience…
* Or what about an even more extreme case of conjoined twins, where there are two bodies but only one head and one brain? Couldn't this be a case where two subjects share one and the same stream of experience? Of course, you could deny that we would really have two subjects here. It depends on what kind of entities subjects (or persons) are.
* Or what about the possibility of what is called "drifting" in the movie Pacific Rim?
"The process of Drifting is a type of Mind Meld that requires the pilots to share memories, instinct and emotions. Drifting allows them to act as one and control the very movement of the Jaeger itself, one pilot controlling the "right hemisphere", the other the "left hemisphere". Rangers who pilot on the right side of the Jaeger are considered the dominant pilot."
http://pacificrim.wikia.com/wiki/Drift
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
-- Updated February 25th, 2017, 8:51 pm to add the following --
Having given the above reference I'm going to have to rethink my original post. I clearly have mixed the types or senses of objectivity and subjectivity. I do think ontological category is where I was leaning. In terms of any kind of conjoined twins I think my assessment previously was ok. If two consciousness's were to be experientially or subjectively indistinguishable from one another they would be a single consciousness. People can share experiences in various circumstances. How their individual consciousness qualitatively experience a given event could not be identical unless their consciousness's were identical which again I think would make them one actual consciousness.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
if we allow that a property and its object are the same thing, then it seems just as plausible to me to say that consciousness is the water and the brain is its liquidity.
There is no reason to treat one as the property and the other as the object.
Regardless, the property of an infinite object, like space, would likewise be infinite. There's no real reason therefore why consciousness should be regarded as "trapped" in "subjectivity". Something that is "trapped" is limited.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Your first statement was fine, I even agree that consciousness and "wet matter" neurons and brain are inseparable. That does not however make them the same thing. Liquidity is a property of water, not water itself. Liquidity is a "state" that a system of water molecules are in. But a water molecule by itself has no liquidity. Digestion is a process and a state that a digestive system is in, it is not "the" digestive system. Consciousness is a field state that a "wet-matter" neural system (brain) is in. Brains can exist in unconscious states, brain and consciousness are not synonymous.PuerAzaelis wrote: Regardless, the property of an infinite object, like space, would likewise be infinite. There's no real reason therefore why consciousness should be regarded as "trapped" in "subjectivity". Something that is "trapped" is limited.
If you read and agree with Searle you would know he does not regard any of these popular notions of consciousness as universal and applying to other systems besides the brain. Your last statement just doesn't follow at all. So what that space is infinite? It has nothing to do with consciousness. Your statement is in the form of a logic fallacy. The property of an infinite A, like space, would likewise be A,. There is no reason therefore why C should be regarded as trapped in (-A). It's a non-sequitur at the very least.
Consciousness is decidedly dependent on brain tissue and nothing in science indicates otherwise. Unfortunately this notion of the "earth" being conscious or the "universe" being conscious are popular ideas that are nothing more than distortions of the meaning of the word consciousness. If a larger cosmic system could be shown to have self-awareness and other markers of sentience then that would be a different matter but so far no such indication exists. I'm with Searle on this. As much as I would like to believe conscious can survive the death of neural tissue because it has a non-physical component(dualism), I just can't rationally justify that position, I think it's wishful thinking, nothing more.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Contradicts this:Philosch wrote:... consciousness and "wet matter" neurons and brain are inseparable ...
The brain is extended in space. Therefore it has parts. Its parts also have parts, ad infinitum. Since the brain is divisible ad infinitum, it is composed of an infinite number of infinitesimals, it is infinite, unlimited. Since the object is unlimited, so is its properties.Philosch wrote:So what that space is infinite? It has nothing to do with consciousness.
Furthermore, consciousness is not a simple property, like "blue". It has intentionality. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. This means that all objects of consciousness are known by means solely of its contents. But since this is so, this divorces consciousness from certainty regarding any real existence either of subject or object. Why? Since the status of external objects are known only as contents of consciousness, their ontological status as truly external is undecidable. This was Descartes' problem. But likewise, because of this same intentionality, the subject itself is not known as such by the contents of consciousness. This is so because the contents of consciousness are what is known, they are not what knows. Thus the ontological status of the subject as internal is likewise undecidable. That is, the intentionality of consciousness divorces us from certainty as to the existence of the subject just as much as it divorces us from certainty as to the existence of external objects.
Since, as a result of the intentionality of consciousness, the existence of both subject and object are ontologically undecidable, there is neither a "subjective" nor an "objective" definition that could be applied to it.
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Re: The Implications of the Subjective Prison of Mind
Philosch, the sense of self may include individual's memories, hopes and fears, but what binds together any viable individual's memories , hopes, and fears is the individual's need to stay alive, to maintain its integrity against all the entropic force that surrounds and threatens to engulf most of all the complex energy systems. Us.Philosch wrote:So Belindi, you pose an interesting challenge but I would still argue that since these individuals still have a sense of self to indeed call themselves individual conscious minds, I would argue that although they may share memories and experiences in time, their experiences are still separate or distinct to the way the individual consciousness state experiences it. The qualia as you say would be different otherwise you would not have and individual consciousness. If their individuality has been enmeshed as you say and their qualitative experience is identical then they are now a supra-individual, their initial conscious boundaries have been blurred and you would have a new conscious structure called Jean-Jesse perhaps. But even if it's not the case....everything these either separate or intertwined conscious states experiences is still subjective by any external measure. If all of our consciousness's were proven to be linked together and there was indeed one cosmic super-consciousness, the experience of reality by this mega-consciousness would still be subjective or relative to that mega-being. At which point you might say it becomes a mute point. I would still argue that absolute objectivity cannot be experienced by a consciousness, it's the very sense of self that gives it dimension that also imprisons it in it's own subjectivity.
These things I'm stating are facts based on the meanings of words like consciousness. This is where the rubber meets the road so to speak. The definition of consciousness to which I'm adhering is not all the different pop culture definitions floating around out there, it's the one Searle and other modern philosophers use which is..."is there something that it feels like to be this object" then it's conscious. In other words "Self-awareness". The very use of the term, "to feel like" exposes the subjective boundary of consciousness.
This overarching motivation to maintain integrity applies to individuals with however many arms, legs, livers, brains and so on. The binder-upper of the self which distinguishes it from not-self is whatever the reasoning, feeling, system holds to be indispensible for it integrity. Usually this would be the awarely functionaing brain-mind however I can well imagine that there have been and are people who care more for ambition, pride, and power than they do for maintaining life in a dangerous habitat.
If there were a "cosmic super consciousness" i.e.absolute super consciousness, then it would be all-knowing and I presume all-loving. Subject and object would in that case be united in the same identity.
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