Ontological Emergence

[Atla]

It is.
Well, using color terms is misleading here insofar as nothing extended can be (wholly) blue, (wholly) red, and (wholly) green at the same time and at the same place; but, as I said, the color terms are just used to refer to mutually compatible physical properties such as mass and temperature, which can be had by a thing at the same time and place. So there is no contradiction.

Something can be blue and green at the same time, but these refer to mutually combatible physical properties, but both are colors so they are the same proeprty, and one is emergent?

????

What we observe or perceive aren't "free-floating" properties, but propertied objects or substances, which aren't reducible to mere bundles of properties lacking a substratum.

What objects, what substances? Where are you getting all this stuff from?

[Consul]

And further, the whole typical discussion re emergentism, reductioninsm, bottom-up/top-down, etc. always comes across as rather befuddled to me.

The properties of anything are always due to the dynamic relations of matter that we're talking about, ALL of the dynamic relations of matter in a given thing, which are all parts, but which is also a whole. Properties change if we change anything in the whole/collection of "parts" that we're talking about. Both the parts and the whole are integral. They all have an impact on the properties that obtain in the parts/whole.

The usual talk here always seems to be confusedly separating this into two different things, so to speak, but that doesn't make any sense. Nothing is more than the sum of its parts, but parts include relations and processes, and we can say for everything that the properties of the whole (of all of the dynamic relations of matter) are non-identical to the properties of any proper subset of the parts. So neither emergence as something at all "transcedent," nor reductionism, as something that ignores relations or processes or that claims that properties of proper subsets of parts are identical to properties of the whole, are at all correct, and causality is neither (just or primarily) "bottom-up" nor "top-down."

Regarding causality in mechanisms or systems, there's a distinction between intra-level, "sideways", or "horizontal" causation (interaction) between subsystems or elements on the same level and inter-level, "bottom-up"/"upward", "top-down"/"downward", or "vertical" causation (interaction). (Whether emergent downward causation makes coherent sense is another question.)

The truth-value of the statement that a whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts depends on what is counted among the parts. An integral whole—i.e. a whole which isn't just an arbitrary sum such as the sum of the Eiffel tower and the moon but a real, natural unity—is more than the sum of its substantive parts (objectual/substantial components), because it also has attributive parts, i.e. the properties of and (causal-spatial-temporal) relations between its substantive parts. But an integral whole isn't more than the sum of its substantive parts plus the sum of its attributive parts.

A so-called structural property of an integral whole or system is a composite property which is (nothing more than) a sum of properties of or/and relations between its basic substantial components. Structural properties of a system are ontologically reducible, derivative properties—as opposed to emergent properties of a system, which are non-structural and thus irreducible, basic properties.
Note that neither structural properties nor emergent properties of a system are had by subsystems or elements of it; so they are both "holistic" properties. The crucial ontological difference between them is that structural properties are reducible and non-basic/derivative, whereas emergent properties are irreducible and basic/non-derivative (and yet dependent on structural properties).

QUOTE>
"The key to understanding the model is to consider wholes not merely as simple aggregates, collections that cease to exist with the addition or subtraction of a single element. Instead, think of a particular kind of whole as comprising its constituents in all their interrelations and interactivities (actual and potential) for one another and for whatever might be external to them (with varying degrees of stability of all of these), while at the same time allowing for degrees of addition, subtraction, alteration, configuration, and even qualitative transformation, within whatever rough limits pertain to wholes of that kind."

(Martin, C. B., and John Heil. "The Ontological Turn." Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXIII (1999): 34-60. p. 41)

"Wholes, I argue, are nothing over and above the organization of their parts in all of their interrelations and inter-reactions with one another and with whatever might exist externally to them."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. xv)

"When suitably formulated, the compositional model expresses the thought that (a) there are no levels of being (or, rather, there is only one level of ultimate constituents), although there are levels of description and explanation; and (b) the constituents in all of their interrelatednesses, interreactivities, and dispositions for these with one another and with whatever might be external, in all of their varying degrees of stability, do fully constitute and together are the whole (admitting some additions, subtractions, and alterations of properties and configuration suitable for being that kind of whole). Nothing less than this will do as a compositional model."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 38-9)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

If Z is neither wholly nor partly in x, and neither wholly nor partly in y, then it is neither wholly nor partly in x+y either, which means it isn't in x+y at all

That's a complete non-sequitur. There's no argument for it in the argument in question. It's just stated out of nowhere in the middle of the argument.

You're wrong, it is a "sequitur"!

Using my example, if H were a non-emergent, structural property of a+b by being identical to F+G, then it would be in a+b by having one part (= F) in a and another part (= G) in b. There's no problem here!

The crucial point in my argument is that if H were an emergent, non-structural property of a+b that is different from F+G, then there would be no place in a+b for H to be:
If H were wholly in a, it would be a property of a rather than of a+b; and if it were wholly in b, it would be a property of b rather than of a+b. And—unlike the structural property F+G—H cannot be partly in a and partly in b, since it doesn't have any parts that can be located at distinct places.

…in which case Z isn't an emergent property of x+y.

It's not an "emergent" property, unless by "emergence" we simply mean via dynamic relations of matter rather than simply properties of ontic simples. That would have to be clarified in any discussion, though, because it's not at all what a lot of people have in mind by "emergence."

By definition, emergent properties are (mereologically) simple properties of (mereologically) nonsimple objects. And their simplicity is precisely what raises the question of their place or location.

I stated clearly what I mean by "(ontological) emergence": An (ontologically) emergent property is a (mereologically) simple, basic, non-structural property of a composite object or substance (as a whole).

The dynamic relations of x + y are parts, by the way. When matter has relations to other matter (as it always does), when those relations are process-oriented (as they always are), different properties obtain. Any difference in physical structure/relations amounts to property differences. The location of those properties is that they're "of"/they're located at the dynamic physical structures in question.

The mere sum a+b doesn't include the properties F and G, nor any relation R between a and b. According to standard mereology, only things (objects/substances) count as parts of wholes, and properties or relations do not.
One can argue that there is a relevant distinction between mere sums of things and complexes which comprise both things, properties, and relations.

Emergent properties coexist with and depend on structural properties of systems, but they are irreducibly different from them.

If H = F+G, then it is a structural property of a+b; and then it's clear where H is and what has H: H is partly in and had by a, and it is partly in and had by b.
But if H ≠ F+G, then it is an emergent property of a+b; and then it's unclear where H is and what has H!

By the way, the location or place of relations or structures qua sums or webs of relations is as problematic as the location or place of (nonrelational) emergent properties. Relations are said to be between their relata, but this cannot be taken literally, since they are not spatially extended material objects like a clothesline between two houses.

[Consul]

It is.
Well, using color terms is misleading here insofar as nothing extended can be (wholly) blue, (wholly) red, and (wholly) green at the same time and at the same place; but, as I said, the color terms are just used to refer to mutually compatible physical properties such as mass and temperature, which can be had by a thing at the same time and place. So there is no contradiction.

Something can be blue and green at the same time, but these refer to mutually combatible physical properties, but both are colors so they are the same proeprty, and one is emergent???

No, in my scenario, blue, red, and green aren't really colors but just proxies for three different physical properties of some kind or other; and the greenness of R3 = R1+R2 is said to be a (quasi-)emergent property grounded in the blueness of R1 and the redness of R2.

Note that R1 is next to R2, so there's no spatial distance between them. That is, their sum R1+R2 is a connected larger region, which means that the location of the emergent greenness of R3 = R1+R2 is unproblematic, because R3's greenness needn't have spatially separate parts in order to be present both in R1 and in R2.

What we observe or perceive aren't "free-floating" properties, but propertied objects or substances, which aren't reducible to mere bundles of properties lacking a substratum.

What objects, what substances? Where are you getting all this stuff from?

From ontological analysis!
I'm not sure what your question is aiming at. I'm talking about the ontological categories "object" and "substance".

[Sy Borg]

Consider abiogenesis. It's alive! It's a miracle!

What emerged 3.8 billion years ago? Nothing much, really. The change was gradual.

Abiogenesis, as with the evolution of lucid consciousness, was simply a variation on what came immediately before it. And what came just before that, and so on, in an unbroken chain of development. We call that development "evolution" when referring to biology. We call it other names when referring to chemistry, geology, and other "nonliving" entities.

So what is the difference between the simplest ever form of life (presumably the first) and the most complex non-life? Not much.

We can presume that the last super-complex molecular package that preceded abiogenesis would have been more complex than any such nonliving chemistry "in the wild" today. Almost life. As with LUCA, the complex "non-living" cells that preceded LUCA could not exist today. In today's aggressive and developed biosphere, such simple and undeveloped cells would have no chance of developing before being consumed.

We speak of emergence because it looks as though there's a gap between life and non-life, but it's today's biology that keeps chemistry relatively simple. That maintains that gap. By the same token, there's no place for Autralipothecus and Homo habilis in today's environments. So, again, it appears to us that there's a sudden gap between humans and other animals.

So we can think of emergence as a period of rapid change leading to an exponential interruption in the often linear (but sometimes stepped) larger processes of change that started with the big bang (maybe).

A key feature of "emerged" entities is that they "clear the space" around themselves, which more clearly defines them against former peers and the environment. In that sense, emergence is both a fact of history and an illusion of the present.

[Consul]

By the way, the location or place of relations or structures qua sums or webs of relations is as problematic as the location or place of (nonrelational) emergent properties. Relations are said to be between their relata, but this cannot be taken literally, since they are not spatially extended material objects like a clothesline between two houses.

There is no plausible solution to the location problem of emergent properties, and there is no plausible solution to the location problem of relations either; and that's the main reason why I disbelieve both in emergent properties and in relations. There are no relations qua (irreducible) polyadic properties, but only relational monadic properties. A relational property of a toward b isn't between a and b, but in a (only); and it isn't collectively had by both a and b, but by a alone.

[Consul]

There is no plausible solution to the location problem of emergent properties, and there is no plausible solution to the location problem of relations either; and that's the main reason why I disbelieve both in emergent properties and in relations. There are no relations qua (irreducible) polyadic properties, but only relational monadic properties. A relational property of a toward b isn't between a and b, but in a (only); and it isn't collectively had by both a and b, but by a alone.

Of course, the location problem arises only within the context of immanent realism about properties and relations, according to which they have a location, position, or place in space. For there is no such location problem within the context of transcendent realism or antirealism. According to the former, properties and relations do not exist anywhere in space, even if the things instantiating them do exist somewhere in space. According to the latter, properties and relations do not exist at all, and what doesn't exist at all doesn't exist anywhere in space either.

[Terrapin Station]

Using my example, if H were a non-emergent, structural property of a+b by being identical to F+G, then it would be in a+b by having one part (= F) in a and another part (= G) in b. There's no problem here!

The crucial point in my argument is that if H were an emergent, non-structural property of a+b that is different from F+G, then there would be no place in a+b for H to be:
If H were wholly in a, it would be a property of a rather than of a+b; and if it were wholly in b, it would be a property of b rather than of a+b. And—unlike the structural property F+G—H cannot be partly in a and partly in b, since it doesn't have any parts that can be located at distinct places.

First, the entire idea of properties being "additive" like that is nonsensical.

The properties of a+b are unique properties of the system a+b. They're not "additive" properties--we're not adding the properties of a + the properties of b. The "place where the properties of a+b are" is the system of a+b. H is wholly [of] a+b. That's not to say that the property H is "emergent." Its identical to the characteristics of all of the parts as a system.

[Sculptor1]

Is ontological emergence possible?

Ontological emergence involves causal features of a whole system that are not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. There are some scientists/philosophers who hold that genuine ontological emergence cannot be ruled out and have even suggested that Quantum mechanics, in the Bell properties of entangled particles may serve a promising candidates:

The classical picture offered a compelling presumption in favour of the claim that causation is strictly bottom up-that the causal powers of whole systems reside entirely in the causal powers of parts. This thesis is central to most arguments for reductionism. It contends that all physically significant processes are due to causal powers of the smallest parts acting individually on one another. If this were right, then any emergent or systemic properties must either be powerless epiphenomena or else violate basic microphysical laws. But the way in which the classical picture breaks down undermines this connection and the reductionist argument that employs it. If microphysical systems can have properties not possessed by individual parts, then so might any system composed of such parts...

Were the physical world completely governed by local processes, the reductionist might well argue that each biological system is made up of the microphysical parts that interact, perhaps stochastically, but with things that exist in microscopic local regions; so the biological can only be epiphenomena of local microphysical processes occurring in tiny regions. Biology reduces to molecular biology, which reduces in turn to microphysics. But the Bell arguments completely overturn this conception...

For whom the Bell arguments toll
Censored

Many others are, however, skeptical of this view arguing that emergence is a psychological concept; that is,

...it is a measure of our surprise at the consequences of low-level natural laws, not a fundamental truth of Nature in its own right.

So, for example, even non-linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, on careful analysis display only epistemological emergence. So emergence only appears to exist either because of our cognitive limitations or due to the fact that our physics/scientific models are not yet complete:

I should emphasize that the ability, for example, to reduce chemistry to physics is an in principle reduction only. No discoveries in the field of physics will ever render chemistry (or biology, or sociology, etc.) obsolete as fields of legitimate inquiry. Even in a universe in which reductionism is absolutely true, the physical world is hugely complex, and its complexities explode out of control very quickly in a chaotic fashion without any hope of being modeled at the low levels by beings with cognitive limitations like us. It will always be astronomically easier to deal in terms of higher-level chunks of reality than in atomic terms or subatomic terms for almost all purposes. Nevertheless, in principle, if you could model reality at the low level in a reductionist's universe, that would be all you would need to derive any measurable fact about that universe. Any higher level chunking of reality is a cognitive convenience. Put differently, the universe has no need of any "high level" things or concepts as it clanks along one moment to the next. All of the explanatory heavy lifting is done at the lowest level.

Is genuine ontological emergence a possibility? Is it even possible to know the answer to this question, especially given the provisional nature of our scientific models?

I think it is a fact that emergence has been a concept from the earliest times, and that no one is going to argue that emergent properties do not come about from the combination of simpler elements.
I think it is also possible to construct a massive list of emergent properties where a more detailed knowledge and scientific description of elements are laws of nature has thrown light on just HOW these emergent properties come to be from the physical nature of the parts, IN fact the recognition of those mergent properties have, in many cases, been of great help to science in demonstrating just how those physicals laws and primary properties can join together to create them so that laws have been demonstrated by their observation.
All this point to an unfolding of understanding whereby epistemological emergence or should we say empirical emergence has been proven and demonstrated, to obey and reveal the complexity of the structures of the world.
We no longer believe, as Aristotle did that the brain served as a cooling agent for the heart. Through diligent study we have a clear idea that consciousness is an epistemologically emergent quality of the structuration of neural tissue.
I see no reason to offer "ontological" emergence into this understanding. I fail to see what role such an idea offers.

[Consul]

Using my example, if H were a non-emergent, structural property of a+b by being identical to F+G, then it would be in a+b by having one part (= F) in a and another part (= G) in b. There's no problem here!

The crucial point in my argument is that if H were an emergent, non-structural property of a+b that is different from F+G, then there would be no place in a+b for H to be:
If H were wholly in a, it would be a property of a rather than of a+b; and if it were wholly in b, it would be a property of b rather than of a+b. And—unlike the structural property F+G—H cannot be partly in a and partly in b, since it doesn't have any parts that can be located at distinct places.

First, the entire idea of properties being "additive" like that is nonsensical.

The properties of a+b are unique properties of the system a+b. They're not "additive" properties--we're not adding the properties of a + the properties of b. The "place where the properties of a+b are" is the system of a+b. H is wholly [of] a+b. That's not to say that the property H is "emergent." Its identical to the characteristics of all of the parts as a system.

In mereology, the formal theory of part-whole relations, the symbol "+" doesn't stand for mathematical addition but for mereological summation. In standard mereology, parts and wholes are always things (objects/substances) or masses of stuff rather than properties or relations; but mereological principles can nonetheless be applied to properties and relations as well: Mereological sums of properties or/and relations are composite, complex, structural properties.

Using my example again, there are two objects—a and b—, two properties—F (had by a) and G (had by b)—, a relation R (between a and b), and a property H (had by a+b). Now, if H is a non-emergent, structural property of a+b (as a whole), then we have H = F+G or H = F+G+R.

It is clear where F and G are, viz. in a and in b respectively; but it's not clear where R is, since it's not literally between a and b.

But if H is an emergent, non-structural property of a+b (as a whole), then we have H ≠ F+G or H ≠ F+G+R; and then it's unclear where H is. There seems to be no place for (emergent) H to be in the whole a+b, and this location problem isn't solved by saying that H is a property of a+b as one whole.

[Consul]

Consider abiogenesis. It's alive! It's a miracle!

What emerged 3.8 billion years ago? Nothing much, really. The change was gradual.

Abiogenesis, as with the evolution of lucid consciousness, was simply a variation on what came immediately before it. And what came just before that, and so on, in an unbroken chain of development. We call that development "evolution" when referring to biology. We call it other names when referring to chemistry, geology, and other "nonliving" entities.

So what is the difference between the simplest ever form of life (presumably the first) and the most complex non-life? Not much.

Evolutionary novelty comes with increasingly complex novel structures, with new arrangements, configurations, organizations, or systematizations of (large numbers of) elementary particles.

[Terrapin Station]

In standard mereology, parts and wholes are always things (objects/substances) or masses of stuff rather than properties or relations;

Again, there's nothing that's really separable from properties, and aside from imagining elementary particles in isolation, there's nothing that's really sans relations, either. (We can't even imagine an existent without properties, on the other hand; that idea is incoherent.)

I don't want to talk about 20 different things per post, so just one more thing at the moment:

Using my example again, there are two objects—a and b—, two properties—F (had by a) and G (had by b)—, a relation R (between a and b), and a property H (had by a+b). Now, if H is a non-emergent, structural property of a+b (as a whole), then we have H = F+G or H = F+G+R.

It is clear where F and G are, viz. in a and in b respectively; but it's not clear where R is, since it's not literally between a and b. [/quote]
Just for example, if we're talking about a and b being, say, a centimeter distant from each other, the relation of "a centimeter distant" is most certainly literally located between a and b.

[Consul]

In standard mereology, parts and wholes are always things (objects/substances) or masses of stuff rather than properties or relations;

Again, there's nothing that's really separable from properties, and aside from imagining elementary particles in isolation, there's nothing that's really sans relations, either. (We can't even imagine an existent without properties, on the other hand; that idea is incoherent.)

"What must first be done, I think, to deal with this problem is to take states of affairs as the fundamental structures in reality. They are primary, particulars and universals secondary. I mean by this that states of affairs are the least thing that can have independent existence. Unpropertied particulars and uninstantiated universals are false abstractions, meaning that they are incapable of independent existence."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 27)

I believe attributes (properties or relations) are particulars rather than universals, but otherwise I think Armstrong is right: Objects/substances and attributes are both essentially integrated into and thus parts of states of affairs or facts, such that there are neither attributeless objects/substances nor substrateless attributes.

It is clear where F and G are, viz. in a and in b respectively; but it's not clear where R is, since it's not literally between a and b.

Just for example, if we're talking about a and b being, say, a centimeter distant from each other, the relation of "a centimeter distant" is most certainly literally located between a and b.

No, it's most certainly not, because a distance relation between a and b is not itself an extended thing with a length corresponding to the distance between a and b. Generally, relations are quite unlike cables, strings, or wires between things, which are all material 3D things themselves! Whatever is literally between two things in space, it's not a spatial or any other kind of relation.

[Sy Borg]

Consider abiogenesis. It's alive! It's a miracle!

What emerged 3.8 billion years ago? Nothing much, really. The change was gradual.

Abiogenesis, as with the evolution of lucid consciousness, was simply a variation on what came immediately before it. And what came just before that, and so on, in an unbroken chain of development. We call that development "evolution" when referring to biology. We call it other names when referring to chemistry, geology, and other "nonliving" entities.

So what is the difference between the simplest ever form of life (presumably the first) and the most complex non-life? Not much.

Evolutionary novelty comes with increasingly complex novel structures, with new arrangements, configurations, organizations, or systematizations of (large numbers of) elementary particles.

That seems tautologous to me, basically saying that novelty comes from new things.

[Consul]

Evolutionary novelty comes with increasingly complex novel structures, with new arrangements, configurations, organizations, or systematizations of (large numbers of) elementary particles.

That seems tautologous to me, basically saying that novelty comes from new things.

My statement isn't tautologous, because what I mean to say is that evolutionary novelty comes from new arrangements of old basic things, viz. elementary particles and forces, rather than from the emergence of new basic things, i.e. new things which are ontologically irreducible to arrangements of old basic things.