Semantics from Syntax: simple version

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Rr6
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Rr6 »

Philo_soph wrote: Meaning is a creation of symbolic networks of relations. There are no symbols in natural processes. Everything in our perceptual world is symbolic: the legal system, the scientific system, the society. What is the role of symbol in the rules of physics (nature)?
If a body of water rises and falls it may leave water marks for its high level ergo a symbol of a dynamic process.

Variations in our visualization of the moon is symbol of dynamic process involving sun and Earth.

Frost on windshield of auto is symbol of temperature and how much moisture in air at ground level.

Dead trees in forest is symbol of finite life of trees.

A well trodden path through bushes means some animals use this pathway.

Animals make certain noises as warnings of danger ergo a dnyamic action as symbol or sign with meaning.

Animals have various ways of communicating with visuals displays of width, height color smells and sound symbols to convey a meaning.

A star twinkles a planet does not. A symbol for planet or star.
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

Rr6 wrote:
A star twinkles a planet does not. A symbol for planet or star.
Although the list of these ideas are not attached to any expressed argument, they only strengthen my point. The question is simple: These are symbols to whom? To stars, to stones, to H2O? Or to a thinking agent, like human beings?
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

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In the one case you quoted below, humans only. I dont have the others in front of me. Animals other than humans may also gain information from the symbols I listed if not others.

r6
Philo_soph wrote:Rr6 wrote:
A star twinkles a planet does not. A symbol for planet or star.
Although the list of these ideas are not attached to any expressed argument, they only strengthen my point. The question is simple: These are symbols to whom? To stars, to stones, to H2O? Or to a thinking agent, like human beings?
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

Rr6 wrote:In the one case you quoted below, humans only. I dont have the others in front of me. Animals other than humans may also gain information from the symbols I listed if not others.

r6
What is the cognitive proof that animals perceive the world symbolically? Or they are "thinking agents"? And why would they even need the symbols? Their reactions to physical events (e.g. a tide) are genetically and environmentally determined. This condition is quite opposite to symbolic perception.
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

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Rr6 wrote:In the one case you quoted below, humans only. I dont have the others in front of me. Animals other than humans may also gain information from the symbols I listed if not others.r6
Philo_sop---What is the cognitive proof that animals perceive the world symbolically? Or they are "thinking agents"? And why would they even need the symbols? Their reactions to physical events (e.g. a tide) are genetically and environmentally determined. This condition is quite opposite to symbolic perception.
I never claimed to have proof of the validity of my comments as stated.

Here again is the original list--- that came to mind ---I gave of things access by our senses that human could use as symbols of signs of this or that
r6--If a body of water rises and falls it may leave water marks for its high level ergo a symbol of a dynamic process.
Variations in our visualization of the moon is symbol of dynamic process involving sun and Earth.
Frost on windshield of auto is symbol of temperature and how much moisture in air at ground level.
Dead trees in forest is symbol of finite life of trees.
A well trodden path through bushes means some animals use this pathway.
Animals make certain noises as warnings of danger ergo a dynamic action as symbol or sign with meaning.
Animals have various ways of communicating with visuals displays of width, height color smells and sound symbols to convey a meaning.
You were concerned that my list does not apply to animals other than humans. I stated animals other than humans may also ascertain information from some signs or symbols in my list or others Ive not considered yet.

The most conceptual thing I recall hearing about was a dude who studied sounds dolphins and/or porpoises made and believed they had evidence that the mother and/ father had individual calls for each of their progeny. This is to say a specific name, kinda-of-like bob, sue, david for each of the progeny and not just one generalized call for all of their progeny. Again I dunno if it is true.

Humans smell decay and that is a sign or symbol of death. I'm sure other animals have olfactory communications.

I believe some animals other than humans have some degree of access to metaphysical-1, mind/intellect/concepts, irrespective of how small or seemingly insignificant the degree of access. An internet search may find others Ive not thought of above, that, were only posted in regards to human cognition, at the time.

r6
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

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First of all, for the purpose of the argument in the OP, it doesn't matter what we mean by "meaning" or "semantics", as long as we agree that it's produced by human brains, at least. For the purpose of the argument, we assume three things:
1. Meaning/semantics comes from the human brain.
2. Everything the brain does follows the rules of physics
3. The rules of physics is a syntax. (A syntax is a set of rules which explicitly determine the order of events in a process)
Therefore,
4. Meaning/semantics comes from syntax.

Searle expressly accepts the first two premises. If he accepts the third, he should accept the conclusion. Right?

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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

Rr6 wrote:
You were concerned that my list does not apply to animals other than humans. I stated animals other than humans may also ascertain information from some signs or symbols in my list or others Ive not considered yet.

Humans smell decay and that is a sign or symbol of death. I'm sure other animals have olfactory communications.

I believe some animals other than humans have some degree of access to metaphysical-1, mind/intellect/concepts, irrespective of how small or seemingly insignificant the degree of access. An internet search may find others Ive not thought of above, that, were only posted in regards to human cognition, at the time.
In both continental and analytical traditions, there are usually un-natural causes assigned to human beings' capacity of interpreting events. Human will (or other variations such as free will or will to power) are usually used to explain why human beings can "make sense of" the external world. In fact, interpretation, as some believe, is an act of appropriation, which needs a willful agent.

Similarly, epistemic reality is another explanation normally used in rationalistic traditions. But what these ideas have in common is a "human" component not apparently existing in pure nature. As a result, the way an animal perceives physical elements (e.g. stars, light, heat, another running animal, water) seems to be a result of natural adaptation rather than (symbolic) interpretation.
This response, of course, is closely related to the OP, as it suggests that there might be an association between syntax and natural laws; an assumption I don't believe to be right.


-- Updated March 24th, 2017, 4:28 am to add the following --

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
First of all, for the purpose of the argument in the OP, it doesn't matter what we mean by "meaning" or "semantics", as long as we agree that it's produced by human brains, at least. For the purpose of the argument, we assume three things:
1. Meaning/semantics comes from the human brain.
2. Everything the brain does follows the rules of physics
3. The rules of physics is a syntax. (A syntax is a set of rules which explicitly determine the order of events in a process)
Therefore,
4. Meaning/semantics comes from syntax.

Searle expressly accepts the first two premises. If he accepts the third, he should accept the conclusion. Right?
In post #15, I viewed the question from the perspective of a constructivist sociologist. Syntax, then, in this view, is a simple social construct. Yet, even if we wanted to see the OP the way Searle did in his argument, I'd say something was missing (or left implicit) in the OP. We'd at least need a proposition about "intentionality" or better said "artificial intentionality". I agree with Searle about the implausibility of a "thinking CPU", because it would lack will to power. The computer is itself an accumulation of codes formulated by its designers. Even if it can make decisions, it is bound to the logic of its originators.

As for the idea of physics and syntax, I'd say preposition 2 (e.g. Everything the brain does follows the rules of physics) is not exactly what Searle says. He obviously talks about "causal features", but I didn't find any physical rules in his discourse. But what seems to be against Searle's theory is preposition 4 (Meaning/semantics comes from syntax). In fact, I believe he started the whole story to strongly oppose proposition 4. He most clearly explains that semantics shapes mental content, while syntax cannot constitute nor constrain semantics. If he defended preposition 4, then his theory of human intentionality would be wrong, which would ultimately contradict his entire argument.
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Philo_soph, you are completely missing the point of the question in the OP.
Philo_soph wrote:If our focus is on “meaning”, first we should decide what meaning itself is. Meaning is a fundamentally “human” creation; there is no meaning in nature.
While I disagree with the last part quoted here, it doesn't matter. We don't have to decide what "meaning itself is", as long as we agree that "[m]eaning is a fundamentally 'human' creation". If meaning is a human creation, it's a creation of the human brain.
Comparing rules of physics to syntactical formulae sounds like a very remote, and apparently impractical, metaphor. Syntax is a collection of socially and historically shaped conventions that can formally structure human language.

When Searle talks about syntax, he's specifically talking about computer CPU's. They operate according to their preset rules, i.e., they follow the syntax, and they ignore semantics. In fact, computers also follow the set of rules defined by physics, and so do our brains. So the conclusion is that meaning, whatever that is, comes from the operation of the rules of physics.

*

-- Updated March 24th, 2017, 8:35 pm to add the following --

[I accidentally re-responded to philo_soph's earlier post. Here is my response to the recent post]

The point of the OP is to show Searle's "theory of human intentionality" is in fact, necessarily, wrong.

The argument says that if you agree with 1, 2, and 3, you must agree with 4. And Searle agrees with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4. So he's wrong for agreeing with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4.

*

-- Updated March 24th, 2017, 8:41 pm to add the following --

I agree that syntax does not constitute or constrain semantics. However, syntax plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.

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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
Philo_soph, you are completely missing the point of the question in the OP.
Well, the more we go on, the more problematic the OP becomes. The ideas rest on implicit and potentially wrong information.
In fact, computers also follow the set of rules defined by physics, and so do our brains. So the conclusion is that meaning, whatever that is, comes from the operation of the rules of physics.
This is an illusion, and has no basis in the canon of computer science. Codes are formulated by logic and arithmetic. No relation whatsoever to physics. Just formal logic and mathematical functions. This is one of the illusions based on which the OP works.
The point of the OP is to show Searle's "theory of human intentionality" is in fact, necessarily, wrong.
That's another illusion. So are we talking about the philosopher John Searle or not? Have you read his article at all? It's not a bad idea to read the article first. In fact, the illusion of "syntax as physics" arises from missing the "intentionality" argument in Searle's paper. Intentionality is one of the major purposes he follows.
I agree that syntax does not constitute or constrain semantics. However, syntax plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.
So what's the role of physics?
The argument says that if you agree with 1, 2, and 3, you must agree with 4. And Searle agrees with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4. So he's wrong for agreeing with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4.
Proposition 2 does not appear in Searle's paper. So this presupposition is totally wrong. Your argument is formally correct but its content is basically wrong. The character recognized as "Searle" does not really have any relevance to the conclusion. In academic writing, direct citation is a necessity. Without his direct words, all of this is just a hypothesis. So, by ignoring Searle and the canon of cognitive science all without the content of the propositions, the argument is formally right.
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

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Philo_soph wrote:JamesOfSeattle wrote:
In fact, computers also follow the set of rules defined by physics, and so do our brains. So the conclusion is that meaning, whatever that is, comes from the operation of the rules of physics.
This is an illusion, and has no basis in the canon of computer science.
What part of that statement is an illusion? That computers follow the rules of physics? You say "Codes are formulated by logic and arithmetic." What codes are you talking about? Computer programs? There are multiple levels of organization, and so multiple levels of syntax. Physics is at the bottom level, and computers and brains share syntax at that level.
Philo_soph wrote:
James wrote: I agree that syntax does not constitute or constrain semantics. However, syntax plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.
So what's the role of physics?
The role of physics is to be/describe the syntax. Physics plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.
Philo_soph wrote:
James wrote: The argument says that if you agree with 1, 2, and 3, you must agree with 4. And Searle agrees with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4. So he's wrong for agreeing with 1, 2, and 3, but not 4.
Proposition 2 does not appear in Searle's paper. So this presupposition is totally wrong. Your argument is formally correct but its content is basically wrong.
The argument of the OP stands by itself. I don't know what you mean when you say the content is wrong. You can argue that proposition 2 is in fact wrong, or even that Searle would say that proposition 2 was wrong, but I don't think either is the case. You (or Searle) would be saying that the brain is operating to produce meaning/consciousness in some way independent of physics, which would take us back to Descartes.

While the argument of the OP is made in response to Searle's thought experiment, nothing in the argument depends on Searle's content. It's just that the conclusion of the argument seems to undermine Searle 's point.

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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
What part of that statement is an illusion? That computers follow the rules of physics? You say "Codes are formulated by logic and arithmetic." What codes are you talking about? Computer programs? There are multiple levels of organization, and so multiple levels of syntax. Physics is at the bottom level, and computers and brains share syntax at that level.
OK, let's think about data storage. It's not about code-writing and things like that. Give us an example of syntax in data storage devices.
(But more importantly I'm getting the sense that you identify formulae with "rules of physics." In this sense, even rhyme in poetry can be explained in terms of formulae, thus making the impression of a highly rule-goverend system.)

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
I agree that syntax does not constitute or constrain semantics. However, syntax plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.
What is a causal datum?

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
The role of physics is to be/describe the syntax. Physics plus causal data can generate and interpret semantics.
I'm not follwing this line of thinking: the role of physics is to describe syntax?
James wrote: The argument of the OP stands by itself. I don't know what you mean when you say the content is wrong. You can argue that proposition 2 is in fact wrong, or even that Searle would say that proposition 2 was wrong, but I don't think either is the case. You (or Searle) would be saying that the brain is operating to produce meaning/consciousness in some way independent of physics, which would take us back to Descartes.
The content of an argument involves the concepts and theories used in the format of the argument. As mentioned, Searle never suggested proposition 2. But why should one directly relate meaning interpretation to physics? There are numerous intermediatory sciences that can better explain the mechanism of interpretation: cognitive science, psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, cultural anthropology, and so on. These are strcutured sciences and are filled with numerous formulae(apparently what you call rules of physics).

And, why would a questioning of physics " take us back to Descartes"? There are many philosophical movements which rule out Descartes and at the same time avoid physics or any system of positivism: structuralism, hermeneutics, and so on.
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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by JamesOfSeattle »

Philo_soph wrote:What is a causal datum?
A datum is a measurable physical quantity. Adding "causal" is meant to emphasize the causal history associated with that datum. The point is that semantic "meaning" is essentially a reference to the causal history of data.
Philo_soph wrote:I'm not follwing this line of thinking: the role of physics is to describe syntax?
I said syntax plus data generates semantics. You asked what is the role of physics. My reply is that the rules which we call "physics" are the syntax that operate on data to generate new data and that data's semantics.
Philo_soph wrote:But why should one directly relate meaning interpretation to physics?
Because any set of data and syntax can be duplicated in an appropriately programmed computer. Thus, "meaning interpretation" can be duplicated in a computer, contrary to Searle's conclusion.

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Re: Semantics from Syntax: simple version

Post by Philo_soph »

JamesOfSeattle wrote:
A datum is a measurable physical quantity. Adding "causal" is meant to emphasize the causal history associated with that datum.
That's in fact a paraphrased version of "statistics".
The point is that semantic "meaning" is essentially a reference to the causal history of data.
That is another definition of historicity. And in reality it has no relation to physics. In some disciplines of meaning interpretation, historical data is used to perceive meaning. It is true that every science looks at its past data to interpret future events. No science has monopoly on that.
You asked what is the role of physics. My reply is that the rules which we call "physics" are the syntax that operate on data to generate new data and that data's semantics.
There's a man called Chomsky, who proposed UG. Your description is a version of generative grammar. You may be surprised to know that he is a Cartesian rationalist who even denies Behaviorism (let alone physics).
Because any set of data and syntax can be duplicated in an appropriately programmed computer. Thus, "meaning interpretation" can be duplicated in a computer, contrary to Searle's conclusion.
That's not a duplication of meaning. In computer science there are generally two levels of processing: system and user. Meaning is ultimately the imagination of the user. It's true that the computer, just like Chomsky's generative grammar, can replicate processes, but what meaning is only depends on the user.
It's important to note that any formally structural system does not necessarily lead to physics. We could create formulae in every discipline, no matter how accurate it may be.
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