Hereandnow wrote: ↑October 22nd, 2019, 7:58 am I should add, Peter Homes, that our positions amount to essentially the same thing. I said the Gettier problems could not ever confirm P, and S knows P reduces therefore to justification and belief. The object P is more IN S, or, S's contribution to P than P.
My point is that what S knows is not a proposition at all (a linguistic expression) - what you call P - but rather a feature of reality. (Of course, we can know propositions - I prefer to call them factual assertions - which are also features of reality. But knowing a feature of reality is the case has nothing to do with the truth of a factual assertion, which is what the JTB account of knowledge claims. That's a ridiculous idea.) Given this, talk of the object P being IN S makes no sense to me.
I agree that there's a radical difference between features of reality and any ways they can be described. That's the point of my distinctions: features of reality / what we believe and know about them / what we say about them. The expression 'propositional properties' conflates the first and third, as do the expressions 'propositional belief' and 'propositional knowledge'. But that doesn't mean there are 'things' or 'objects' beyond 'the pale of perception' - something like Kant's noumena - things that no one has ever seen. If there are no noumena, then the distinction between noumena and phenomena is redundant.
There is a lot to say about this, but your position is that when we encounter an object and analyze the knowledge relationship, it is wrong to assign any propositional properties to it, for the object is itself absent of these. If you take the object to the Realist's object, some thing beyond the pale of perception, then yes, the object would be nearly without this. Such things are metaphysical ideas, by my thinking. No one has ever seen one.
I don't think the thing before me is a phenomenon or a concept. I think it's a feature of reality, that can be described in different ways for different purposes - all descriptions, and so all truth-claims, being conventional and contextual.
Now, if we take the object to be the phenomenon, then the matter changes altogether, for the thing there, before my eyes, is acknowledged as a thing, not as a kite or a desk, but under the heading of a concept: thing, before me, witnessed, duly classified, and so on.
I don't think I've clearly identified why our positions don't 'amount to essentially the same thing' - but I don't think they do. And the root of it may be my objection to phenomenology tout court, which I think is a form of foundationalism that recycles the mistakes of all foundationalisms that fail to recognise the constitutive centrality of our linguistic practices.