What is relevant is not only logical self-consistency or internal logical consistency but also external logical consistency with other (empirically well-confirmed) theories.Consul wrote: ↑July 4th, 2021, 7:06 pmNote that I'm talking about theories which are both self-consistent (free from internal inconsistencies or contradictions) and consistent with all empirical facts! If a simple theory is logically or/and empirically inconsistent, its simplicity is irrelevant as a theoretical criterion of truth.
JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
A theory's (relative) simplicity in comparison with another theory can be measured in terms of the number of principles (laws) it contains or the number of (kinds of) entities it posits (and to which it is ontologically committed). The former can be called nomological simplicity/parsimony and the latter ontological simplicity/parsimony.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑July 4th, 2021, 8:35 pm"Simplicity" is vague and subjective. It isn't well-defined.
See e.g. the SEP entry on simplicity and the Schindler quote!Terrapin Station wrote: ↑July 4th, 2021, 8:35 pmIf we're going to claim that there's something scientific or objective about it, we'd very well better be able to show that. So show it.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
How do we scientifically or objectively discover that that is the simpler theory?Consul wrote: ↑July 4th, 2021, 9:17 pm A theory's (relative) simplicity in comparison with another theory can be measured in terms of the number of principles (laws) it contains or the number of (kinds of) entities it posits (and to which it is ontologically committed). The former can be called nomological simplicity/parsimony and the latter ontological simplicity/parsimony.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
A common claim in our debates is 'there's no such thing as X'. And the following are some values for X in dichotomies.
reality-as-it-really-is / a thing-in-itself vs reality as we perceive, know and describe it
absolute truth vs any contextual, contingent truth-claim
universals vs particulars
abstract things vs real things
But a dichotomy requires two options, with a contrast between them. So if we deny the existence of one option, there's no longer a dichotomy.
For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.
And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.
And, for example, if there are no so-called universals, there's no distinction between them and so-called particulars. (What are Platonists and nominalists arguing about?)
The argument-pattern is the same: entertain a (fantasy) option (X), then both dismiss it and use it to reach a conclusion.
My point is that a so-called eliminativst position in a philosophical debate always makes an unnecessary concession.
I think instead we should ask these questions: The existence of exactly what is being denied? Are reality-as-it-really-is, absolute truth, universals and abstract things - things that could exist but (perhaps) happen not to? If the answer is no, then denying their existence is pointless and confusing.
(Why say 'all models are wrong, but some are useful'? What would a model that's right look like?)
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
PH!Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 9th, 2022, 11:45 am The aim of my OP was to challenge the JTB definition of knowledge by pointing out its reliance on the myth of propositions. But I've come around to thinking that this is one manifestation of a very deep and general philosophical confusion.
A common claim in our debates is 'there's no such thing as X'. And the following are some values for X in dichotomies.
reality-as-it-really-is / a thing-in-itself vs reality as we perceive, know and describe it
absolute truth vs any contextual, contingent truth-claim
universals vs particulars
abstract things vs real things
But a dichotomy requires two options, with a contrast between them. So if we deny the existence of one option, there's no longer a dichotomy.
For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.
And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.
And, for example, if there are no so-called universals, there's no distinction between them and so-called particulars. (What are Platonists and nominalists arguing about?)
The argument-pattern is the same: entertain a (fantasy) option (X), then both dismiss it and use it to reach a conclusion.
My point is that a so-called eliminativst position in a philosophical debate always makes an unnecessary concession.
I think instead we should ask these questions: The existence of exactly what is being denied? Are reality-as-it-really-is, absolute truth, universals and abstract things - things that could exist but (perhaps) happen not to? If the answer is no, then denying their existence is pointless and confusing.
(Why say 'all models are wrong, but some are useful'? What would a model that's right look like?)
I think the 'right' model to completely understand reality would have to include the design and construction of: The Unity of Opposites (subject-object, temporal-eternal, physical-metaphysical and so on).
― Albert Einstein
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
Okay. Pending evidence for the existence of anything non-physical, I'm a physicalist. So I'd guess we resonate to a different frequency. But thanks anyway.3017Metaphysician wrote: ↑June 9th, 2022, 1:46 pmPH!Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 9th, 2022, 11:45 am The aim of my OP was to challenge the JTB definition of knowledge by pointing out its reliance on the myth of propositions. But I've come around to thinking that this is one manifestation of a very deep and general philosophical confusion.
A common claim in our debates is 'there's no such thing as X'. And the following are some values for X in dichotomies.
reality-as-it-really-is / a thing-in-itself vs reality as we perceive, know and describe it
absolute truth vs any contextual, contingent truth-claim
universals vs particulars
abstract things vs real things
But a dichotomy requires two options, with a contrast between them. So if we deny the existence of one option, there's no longer a dichotomy.
For example, some anti-realists deny the existence of reality-as-it-really-is - rejecting the dichotomy - but then in effect invoke it to attack realism and the idea that we can have knowledge of what we call reality.
And, for example, we can't both deny the existence of absolute truth, and at the same time criticise the contingency of contextual truth-claims for not being absolute but merely 'relative' - for not being truly true.
And, for example, if there are no so-called universals, there's no distinction between them and so-called particulars. (What are Platonists and nominalists arguing about?)
The argument-pattern is the same: entertain a (fantasy) option (X), then both dismiss it and use it to reach a conclusion.
My point is that a so-called eliminativst position in a philosophical debate always makes an unnecessary concession.
I think instead we should ask these questions: The existence of exactly what is being denied? Are reality-as-it-really-is, absolute truth, universals and abstract things - things that could exist but (perhaps) happen not to? If the answer is no, then denying their existence is pointless and confusing.
(Why say 'all models are wrong, but some are useful'? What would a model that's right look like?)
I think the 'right' model to completely understand reality would have to include the design and construction of: The Unity of Opposites (subject-object, temporal-eternal, physical-metaphysical and so on).
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
Gettier cases have never sat well with me. It always seems to me that every Gettier case is "solved" by simply noting that most of our statements are actually truncated.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑July 19th, 2017, 9:10 am The Gettier problem is that some cases of justified true belief don't amount to knowledge, so the JTB definition is inadequate. But I suggest that Gettier-cases really demonstrate the muddle caused by the myth of propositions. (Propositions are factual assertions about features of reality.)
A Gettier-case is a story with dramatic irony. We know the complete situation, but the protagonist doesn't. But there is nothing propositional about the story. The individual's mistaken belief doesn't come from a false premise. And the belief itself is not propositional. Propositional belief is as muddled an idea as propositional knowledge. There are just beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions.
We want to say the individual's belief is true, but that is the myth of propositions at work. What the individual believes is a feature of reality, not a proposition. When we believe or know a feature of reality is the case, we don't believe a proposition. So we don't believe something that is true or false. A feature of reality has no truth value.
Gettier-cases recycle the JTB definition's concentration on: subjective knowledge - what an individual knows - effectively ignoring objective knowledge and its justification; propositional knowledge - S knows that p - as though what we know is propositions rather than features of reality; and the truth condition - S knows that p only if p is true - which gets things back to front.
But Gettier-cases also contain the solution to the Gettier problem. The individuals believe things for reasons that don't objectively justify their beliefs, which is why their beliefs don't amount to knowledge. Objective knowledge of features of reality, which may be expressed by means of true factual assertions, frees us from subjective, epistemic isolation. It's the knowledge that we Gettier-spectators have.
Consider the situation where P looks into a room, sees a bundle under the covers, and concludes that S is in the room. Then Gettier steps in and says "aha, but that bundle is actually just pillows under the blanket. But S really is in the room, just somewhere out of sight."
So P's statement of his belief, according to Gettier, stops at "S is in the room."
But from the context, isn't it obvious that P's belief is really "S is under the covers on the bed," and that this belief is simply false by not corresponding to reality (if we use correspondence theory)?
It seems that for every Gettier case, there is some clarification that can be made tying the belief statement to the justifier that gets truncated, leading to the Gettier "surprise." If we simply refuse to truncate the statement by being very specific, there is no problem. So why is this impressive to Gettier? I've never understood.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
I look forward to your thoughts!Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 18th, 2022, 7:14 am Thanks for this. I think that's an interesting angle, and it's set me thinking. I'll get back when I knock a response into shape.
--Richard Feynman
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
Thanks for this. I think we may be saying the same thing from different angles - and I like your angle! So - just some thoughts.Astro Cat wrote: ↑June 17th, 2022, 6:01 amGettier cases have never sat well with me. It always seems to me that every Gettier case is "solved" by simply noting that most of our statements are actually truncated.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑July 19th, 2017, 9:10 am The Gettier problem is that some cases of justified true belief don't amount to knowledge, so the JTB definition is inadequate. But I suggest that Gettier-cases really demonstrate the muddle caused by the myth of propositions. (Propositions are factual assertions about features of reality.)
A Gettier-case is a story with dramatic irony. We know the complete situation, but the protagonist doesn't. But there is nothing propositional about the story. The individual's mistaken belief doesn't come from a false premise. And the belief itself is not propositional. Propositional belief is as muddled an idea as propositional knowledge. There are just beliefs and knowledge-claims expressed by means of propositions.
We want to say the individual's belief is true, but that is the myth of propositions at work. What the individual believes is a feature of reality, not a proposition. When we believe or know a feature of reality is the case, we don't believe a proposition. So we don't believe something that is true or false. A feature of reality has no truth value.
Gettier-cases recycle the JTB definition's concentration on: subjective knowledge - what an individual knows - effectively ignoring objective knowledge and its justification; propositional knowledge - S knows that p - as though what we know is propositions rather than features of reality; and the truth condition - S knows that p only if p is true - which gets things back to front.
But Gettier-cases also contain the solution to the Gettier problem. The individuals believe things for reasons that don't objectively justify their beliefs, which is why their beliefs don't amount to knowledge. Objective knowledge of features of reality, which may be expressed by means of true factual assertions, frees us from subjective, epistemic isolation. It's the knowledge that we Gettier-spectators have.
Consider the situation where P looks into a room, sees a bundle under the covers, and concludes that S is in the room. Then Gettier steps in and says "aha, but that bundle is actually just pillows under the blanket. But S really is in the room, just somewhere out of sight."
So P's statement of his belief, according to Gettier, stops at "S is in the room."
But from the context, isn't it obvious that P's belief is really "S is under the covers on the bed," and that this belief is simply false by not corresponding to reality (if we use correspondence theory)?
It seems that for every Gettier case, there is some clarification that can be made tying the belief statement to the justifier that gets truncated, leading to the Gettier "surprise." If we simply refuse to truncate the statement by being very specific, there is no problem. So why is this impressive to Gettier? I've never understood.
I'm not sure that it's about truncation of statements themselves, or that being more specific, by changing or making other statements, 'solves' the so-called problem. I'm wondering if 'clarification' is what's needed, and if so, exactly what needs clarifying.
For example, substituting 'S is under the covers on the bed' for 'S is in the room' arguably doesn't get around the supposed Gettier problem of justified true belief not amounting to knowledge. Couldn't it be a justified true belief that S is under the covers on the bed - given some other expectations?
I completely agree that there isn't really a problem in the first place. And my angle is rejection of the supposed necessity of the JTB truth-condition - plus a more fundamental rejection of the idea that what we call knowledge is a thing of some kind that needs explanation or a theory in the first place.
Not sure I've sorted this out to my own satisfaction yet. Thanks again for the stimulus.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
What do you mean by other expectations?Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 7:21 am Thanks for this. I think we may be saying the same thing from different angles - and I like your angle! So - just some thoughts.
I'm not sure that it's about truncation of statements themselves, or that being more specific, by changing or making other statements, 'solves' the so-called problem. I'm wondering if 'clarification' is what's needed, and if so, exactly what needs clarifying.
For example, substituting 'S is under the covers on the bed' for 'S is in the room' arguably doesn't get around the supposed Gettier problem of justified true belief not amounting to knowledge. Couldn't it be a justified true belief that S is under the covers on the bed - given some other expectations?
To clarify what I meant, when P looks through the doorway and sees bundles under the covers and believes that the bundles under the covers are S's body, what P believes is that "the bundle I see under the covers is S." The bundle is the justifier (as we know that justifiers can lead to false beliefs, as it happens to in this case).
Gettier steps in whenever P forms the syllogism:
The bed is in the room
S is under the covers on the bed
Therefore, S is in the room
But as we know this syllogism doesn't obtain because the second premise is false. So P doesn't have "justified true belief" that S is in the room at all. P has justified false belief that S is under the covers on the bed. That S happens to be in the room (out of sight) never contributed anything to P's justification.
So Gettier's claim that there is a "justified true belief" that isn't knowledge never hits its mark: P never had justified true belief, only justified false belief. I think this tricks all of our brains because we're not used to such a thing as "justified false belief." We expect justifiers to usually lead to the truth. We forget about times where we see water in the desert and get a justified (but false) belief there is water there, when it is actually just a mirage.
So, there's never a Gettier problem in the first place. Every Gettier problem just describes a justified false belief, and it always seems tricky because of some truncation of the justifier ("S is under the covers" --generalized to--> "S is in the room"). The generalization is what tricks Gettier and (to be honest) all of us, until we figure this out.
I'm fond of JTB as a theory of knowledge, I think it works. I think we do need to be able to explain in some detail what we're proposing is going on when we say that we "know" something.Peter Holmes wrote:I completely agree that there isn't really a problem in the first place. And my angle is rejection of the supposed necessity of the JTB truth-condition - plus a more fundamental rejection of the idea that what we call knowledge is a thing of some kind that needs explanation or a theory in the first place.
Not sure I've sorted this out to my own satisfaction yet. Thanks again for the stimulus.
--Richard Feynman
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem
In the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 22nd, 2022, 7:30 am Oh, and I forgot to mention my rejection of the correspondence - or any other - theory of truth. What we call truth or the truth no more needs explaining by way of a theory than does knowledge, or any other supposed (but fictional) abstract thing.
Is it pedantic? Sure. But I have been surprised in some discussions where it is useful to ask someone "what do you mean by "true" in this instance" to surprising results affecting the actual argument.
--Richard Feynman
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