Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 30th, 2022, 5:46 am
Consul wrote: ↑June 28th, 2022, 8:13 pmYes, in
"Snow is white" is true iff snow is white we have sentence-tokens of the same sentence-type on the left and on the right—so what? There is still a translinguistic reference on the right. Non-metalinguistic reference isn't a
word-word relation but a
word-world relation.
But the nature of 'translinguistic reference' is what we're arguing about - the nature of the relation between the assertion and what it asserts. And my point is there's absolutely no correspondence between them - in the sense of 'A close similarity, connection, or equivalence'. The 'relation', such as it is, is entirely one-way. And recognising that fact is crucial for understanding how signs mean things - what we do when we use signs.
Charles Peirce famously distinguishes between three basic kinds of representation or signs:
1.
iconic signs (icons), where there is some
resemblance or similarity between the sign and its object (referent), e.g. a photography or a realistic painting.
2.
indexical signs (indexes), where there is some
physical (causal) connection between the sign and its object (referent), e.g. tree rings as indexes of a tree's age, weather vanes as indexes of the direction of the wind.
3.
symbolic signs (symbols), where there is only a conventional relation between the sign and its object (referent), e.g. linguistic signs (words, sentences).
"A symbol is a sign which represents an object by virtue of having a character imputed to it by an operation of the interpreting mind."
"…Symbols, or those signs which represent their objects simply because they will be interpreted to refer to those objects…"
"The word “Symbol” will in this book be used as the common name for that class of Signs which represent, to those that can interpret them, the objects they do quite regardless of any resemblances to them (although such may have influenced the original choice of the signs), and equally so of any actual connexions therewith, (however close such connexions there may be,) but solely because those interpreters have habits of mind, whether inherited or acquired, that lead them whenever they perceive the signs straightway to think of those Objects."
Charles Peirce: http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/symbol
Although symbolic signs, especially linguistic ones, don't "correspond to/with" their (intentional) objects by virtue of similarity or a causal connection, they can still be used to represent and to refer to nonlinguistic entities.
Truth according to the so-called correspondence theory of truth is to be understood as
true (correct, accurate) representation, which doesn't require a similarity or causal connection to what is represented by the representation. Symbolic representations such as declarative sentences are true iff things are as they represent them to be, and they don't depend for their truth on resembling or being causally connected to what they represent.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 28th, 2022, 3:28 pmConsul wrote: ↑June 28th, 2022, 8:13 pmTruth does deal with "the reality outside language"; and we can and do use linguistic entities to represent and refer to nonlinguistic entities.
Notice your substitution of 'truth' for 'logic' in my assertion. Truth and falsehood are values in classical binary logic. And any logic deals with what can be said consistently, without (defined) contradiction. Your claim, that 'Truth does deal with "the reality outside language" ' is incoherent. My point stands: logic deals with language, not the reality outside language. (Other discourses deal with reality, such as the natural sciences.)
Frege defines logic as "the science of the most general laws of truth", and Lukasiewicz defines it as "the science of logical values" (i.e. truth-values); but are
logical truths really about nothing but formal relations between sentences (propositions)? For example, isn't the logical law of non-contradiction also about nonlinguistic reality, in the sense that a
worldly state of affairs cannot both obtain and not obtain at the same time. That is, isn't the law of non-contradiction also an
ontological law concerning reality as a whole?
QUOTE>
"Like ethics, logic can also be called a normative science. How must I think in order to reach the goal, truth? We expect logic to give us the answer to this question, but we do not demand of it that it should go into what is peculiar to each branch of knowledge and its subject matter. On the contrary, the task we assign logic is only that of saying what holds with the utmost generality for all thinking, whatever its subject matter. We must assume that the rules for our thinking and for our holding something to be true are prescribed by the laws of truth. The former are given along with the latter. Consequently we can also say: logic is the science of the most general laws of truth."
(Frege, Gottlob. "Logic." 1897. In
The Frege Reader, edited by Michael Beaney, 227-250. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. p. 228)
"Ontologically, truth has its analogue in being, and falsehood, in non-being. The objects denoted by propositions are called
logical values. Truth is the positive, and falsehood is the negative logical value. Truth is represented by 1, falsehood by 0. These symbols are also read as propositions “truth is”, “falsehood is”.
…
By
logic I mean the science of logical values. Conceived in this way, logic has its own subject-matter of research, with which no other discipline is concerned. Logic is not a science of propositions, since that belongs to grammar; it is not a science of judgements or convictions, since that belongs to psychology; it is not a science of contents expressed by propositions, since that, according to the content involved, is the concern of the various detailed disciplines; it is not a science of “objects in general”, since that belongs to ontology. Logic is the science of objects of a specific kind, namely a science of
logical values."
(Łukasiewicz, Jan. "Two-Valued Logic." [1921.] In
Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, 89-109. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1970. p. 90)
<QUOTE
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑June 28th, 2022, 3:28 pmConsul wrote: ↑June 28th, 2022, 8:13 pmOf course, there is a distinction between properties of (linguistic or nonlinguistic) representations and properties of what they represent. Snow is cold, the adjective "cold" isn't.
And why is 'snow is cold' true? Is it because what we call snow is what we call cold? (Hamstering in the wheel.)
It is true that snow is cold because snow is cold; and snow is cold because its has certain physical properties which dispose it to appear cold to those touching or tasting it.