JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

[Consul]

So, did people know that the earth is flat? Or did they just believe it?

Yes, they knew that the Earth was flat. Which means that they believed it, they felt it was a justified belief, and they judged it to be true.

No, they just believed to know or were certain that the Earth was flat; but neither knowledge-belief nor subjective certainy entails knowledge.
If being true = being believed to be true and being justified = being believed to be justified, then knowledge collapses into mere belief, and we end up with epistemic subjectivism and relativism (as we find it it postmodernism).

Again, it's important to not conflate knowledge (and truth) with facts in the states of affairs sense.

Facts are either true propositions (statements) or actual states of affairs. Knowledge qua propositional/factual knowledge is always knowledge of facts qua true propositions or actual states of affairs.

[Peter Holmes]

So, did people know that the earth is flat? Or did they just believe it?

Yes, they knew that the Earth was flat. Which means that they believed it, they felt it was a justified belief, and they judged it to be true.

No, they just believed to know or were certain that the Earth was flat; but neither knowledge-belief nor subjective certainy entails knowledge.
If being true = being believed to be true and being justified = being believed to be justified, then knowledge collapses into mere belief, and we end up with epistemic subjectivism and relativism (as we find it it postmodernism).

Again, it's important to not conflate knowledge (and truth) with facts in the states of affairs sense.

Facts are either true propositions (statements) or actual states of affairs. Knowledge qua propositional/factual knowledge is always knowledge of facts qua true propositions or actual states of affairs.

I agree. We'd never say that people knew the earth is flat, or that their belief that the is flat was justified - because the actual earth isn't actually flat - and that's what matters. So there is scope for epistemic objecticity. There really are facts - things that can be known.

[Terrapin Station]

If being true = being believed to be true and being justified = being believed to be justified, then knowledge collapses into mere belief,

It's not "mere belief," but belief that one feels is justified and that one judges to be true.

and we end up with epistemic subjectivism

Which is all you can get. Epistemic objectivism is a category error.

and relativism (as we find it it postmodernism).

Well, relativism is what the world is like.

[Terrapin Station]

I agree. We'd never say that people knew the earth is flat, or that their belief that the is flat was justified - because the actual earth isn't actually flat

And then when someone believes instead that the actual Earth actually is flat, they'd say, "Well, I'd never say that Peter Holmes knew the Earth wasn't flat, and he wasn't justified in that belief, because the actual Earth is flat . . ."

Of course, you think they're wrong. They think you're wrong.What counts as knowledge, what's justified, what's true, etc., is relative to the person making the assessment. That's the whole point.

[Consul]

…and we end up with epistemic subjectivism

Which is all you can get. Epistemic objectivism is a category error.

No, the methods of science provide objective criteria of truth; truth is essential to knowledge and it's an objectivistic category. So-called "subjective truth" is just belief: what is true for me is what I believe (to be true).

Subjective certainty is the absence of doubt, maximal conviction. Objective certainty is the absence of possible error; but if my belief-justifying evidence for p doesn't eliminate all possibilities in which ~p, then I cannot be objectively certain that my belief that p is knowledge.

QUOTE>
"Mr B. Erdmann equates truth with general validity, grounding the latter on general certainty regarding the object judged, and this in turn on general consensus amongst those judging. And so, in the end, truth is reduced to being taken to be true by individuals. In opposition to this, I can only say: being true is different from being taken to be true, be it by one, be it by many, be it by all, and is in no way reducible to it. It is no contradiction that something is true that is universally held to be false."
(pp. xv-xvi)

"Can the sense of the word 'true' be subjected to a more damaging corruption than by the attempt to incorporate a relation to the judging subject!"
(p. xvi)

(Frege, Gottlob. Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vol. 1. 1893. In Basic Laws of Arithmetics, Vols. 1&2, translated and edited by Philip A. Ebert and Marcus Rosenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.)
<QUOTE

…and relativism (as we find it it postmodernism)

Well, relativism is what the world is like.

The postmodernists from the Woke faction think so too; and that's why they speak relativistically of a plurality of group-relative "knowledges" rather than of knowledge.

"Many postmodernists hold one or more of the following views: (1) there is no objective reality; (2) there is no scientific or historical truth (objective truth); (3) science and technology (and even reason and logic) are not vehicles of human progress but suspect instruments of established power; (4) reason and logic are not universally valid; (5) there is no such thing as human nature (human behavior and psychology are socially determined or constructed); (6) language does not refer to a reality outside itself; (7) there is no certain knowledge; and (8) no general theory of the natural or social world can be valid or true (all are illegitimate “metanarratives”)."

Source: https://www.britannica.com/topic/postmo ... philosophy

[Terrapin Station]

No, the methods of science provide objective criteria of truth;

No, they don't.

Do you not agree that truth is a property of propositions and that it's some relationship between a proposition and something else (like states of affairs, for example)?

[Consul]

No, the methods of science provide objective criteria of truth;

No, they don't.
Do you not agree that truth is a property of propositions and that it's some relationship between a proposition and something else (like states of affairs, for example)?

I don't believe in the existence of abstract propositions; but, yes, truth is a property of certain truth-apt representations, and there is a relationship between truthbearers (e.g. statements, judgments) and truthmakers in the world (e.g. states of affairs, facts).

[Terrapin Station]

No, the methods of science provide objective criteria of truth;

No, they don't.
Do you not agree that truth is a property of propositions and that it's some relationship between a proposition and something else (like states of affairs, for example)?

I don't believe in the existence of abstract propositions; but, yes, truth is a property of certain truth-apt representations, and there is a relationship between truthbearers (e.g. statements, judgments) and truthmakers in the world (e.g. states of affairs, facts).

Okay, but then how do you believe that science provides criteria for how to connect truthbearers to truthmakers?

[Consul]

Okay, but then how do you believe that science provides criteria for how to connect truthbearers to truthmakers?

A criterion is "a test, principle, rule, canon, or standard, by which anything is judged or estimated" (Oxford Dictionary of English), and scientific methodology provides criteria for whether or not a statement (hypothesis, theory) is true, doesn't it?

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, but then how do you believe that science provides criteria for how to connect truthbearers to truthmakers?

A criterion is "a test, principle, rule, canon, or standard, by which anything is judged or estimated" (Oxford Dictionary of English), and scientific methodology provides criteria for whether or not a statement (hypothesis, theory) is true, doesn't it?

Does it? Give an example (via some sort of citation) of scientific methodology providing criteria for how the truthbearer/truthmaker relation works.

[Consul]

A criterion is "a test, principle, rule, canon, or standard, by which anything is judged or estimated" (Oxford Dictionary of English), and scientific methodology provides criteria for whether or not a statement (hypothesis, theory) is true, doesn't it?

Does it? Give an example (via some sort of citation) of scientific methodology providing criteria for how the truthbearer/truthmaker relation works.

That's an ontological relation the philosophers are dealing with. I said science provides (practical) criteria for truth. I didn't say it provides a theory of truth and truthmaking.

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Truthmaker Theory: https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/

[Terrapin Station]

A criterion is "a test, principle, rule, canon, or standard, by which anything is judged or estimated" (Oxford Dictionary of English), and scientific methodology provides criteria for whether or not a statement (hypothesis, theory) is true, doesn't it?

Does it? Give an example (via some sort of citation) of scientific methodology providing criteria for how the truthbearer/truthmaker relation works.

That's an ontological relation the philosophers are dealing with. I said science provides (practical) criteria for truth. I didn't say it provides a theory of truth and truthmaking.

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Truthmaker Theory: https://iep.utm.edu/truth-ma/

How does science provide criteria for truth if truth has to do with truthbearers and truthmakers and science doesn't address this?

Hence why I disagreed with you that science provides criteria for truth. (The question above isn't just rhetorical though. You claimed it. Support your claim.)

[Consul]

How does science provide criteria for truth if truth has to do with truthbearers and truthmakers and science doesn't address this?
Hence why I disagreed with you that science provides criteria for truth. (The question above isn't just rhetorical though. You claimed it. Support your claim.)

A criterion for/of truth tells us how we can find out (in practice) what is true. It doesn't tell us what it is to be true or what "true" means.

"Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories."

Scientific Method: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-method/

[Terrapin Station]

How does science provide criteria for truth if truth has to do with truthbearers and truthmakers and science doesn't address this?
Hence why I disagreed with you that science provides criteria for truth. (The question above isn't just rhetorical though. You claimed it. Support your claim.)

A criterion for/of truth tells us how we can find out (in practice) what is true. It doesn't tell us what it is to be true or what "true" means.

"Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories."

Scientific Method: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-method/

We have no criteria for truth per se if we don't have an account of how to connect truthbearers and truthmarkers. But there's no scientific account of this, because it's not science's purview, it's philosophy's.

[Consul]

We have no criteria for truth per se if we don't have an account of how to connect truthbearers and truthmarkers. But there's no scientific account of this, because it's not science's purview, it's philosophy's.

Scientific methodology is part of the philosophy of science. Is philosophy of science part of philosophy or part of science? Well, it's both part of philosophy and part of science, especially as there is no sharp boundary between philosophy and science. Obviously, philosophy of science is part of philosophy, but it's also part of (theoretical) science.

For example, hypothesis testing as practiced by scientists is an empirical criterion for truth.

By the way, the German term for "philosophy of science" is "Wissenschaftstheorie", which literally means "theory of science". Wissenschaftstheorie isn't a scientific theory among others, because it's the metatheory of science itself with regard to its ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations.