JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Hereandnow - thanks again for your explanation of your approach. I understand that 'phenonmenology' is a an umbrella term for many different ideas - so my responses here may miss the mark, because I'm reading things into what you say that aren't there - for which I apologise. But here goes.
Hereandnow wrote: October 22nd, 2019, 7:58 am I should add, Peter Homes, that our positions amount to essentially the same thing. I said the Gettier problems could not ever confirm P, and S knows P reduces therefore to justification and belief. The object P is more IN S, or, S's contribution to P than P.

My point is that what S knows is not a proposition at all (a linguistic expression) - what you call P - but rather a feature of reality. (Of course, we can know propositions - I prefer to call them factual assertions - which are also features of reality. But knowing a feature of reality is the case has nothing to do with the truth of a factual assertion, which is what the JTB account of knowledge claims. That's a ridiculous idea.) Given this, talk of the object P being IN S makes no sense to me.

There is a lot to say about this, but your position is that when we encounter an object and analyze the knowledge relationship, it is wrong to assign any propositional properties to it, for the object is itself absent of these. If you take the object to the Realist's object, some thing beyond the pale of perception, then yes, the object would be nearly without this. Such things are metaphysical ideas, by my thinking. No one has ever seen one.
I agree that there's a radical difference between features of reality and any ways they can be described. That's the point of my distinctions: features of reality / what we believe and know about them / what we say about them. The expression 'propositional properties' conflates the first and third, as do the expressions 'propositional belief' and 'propositional knowledge'. But that doesn't mean there are 'things' or 'objects' beyond 'the pale of perception' - something like Kant's noumena - things that no one has ever seen. If there are no noumena, then the distinction between noumena and phenomena is redundant.

Now, if we take the object to be the phenomenon, then the matter changes altogether, for the thing there, before my eyes, is acknowledged as a thing, not as a kite or a desk, but under the heading of a concept: thing, before me, witnessed, duly classified, and so on.
I don't think the thing before me is a phenomenon or a concept. I think it's a feature of reality, that can be described in different ways for different purposes - all descriptions, and so all truth-claims, being conventional and contextual.

I don't think I've clearly identified why our positions don't 'amount to essentially the same thing' - but I don't think they do. And the root of it may be my objection to phenomenology tout court, which I think is a form of foundationalism that recycles the mistakes of all foundationalisms that fail to recognise the constitutive centrality of our linguistic practices.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Hereandnow »

Peter Holmes

My point is that what S knows is not a proposition at all (a linguistic expression) - what you call P - but rather a feature of reality. (Of course, we can know propositions - I prefer to call them factual assertions - which are also features of reality. But knowing a feature of reality is the case has nothing to do with the truth of a factual assertion, which is what the JTB account of knowledge claims. That's a ridiculous idea.) Given this, talk of the object P being IN S makes no sense to me.
As to the object P being IN S: I know this sounds like a strange idea, and I do not want to drop names, but there is a history here. So how about this: when I acknowledge the lamp on the table, how is it that anything out there gets in here, in my experience? It is the independence of the thing that needs to be shown, but once the thing is analyzed as a thing, there is no way to affirm this independence. It only makes sense to take this lamp as a composite thing: it is idea and sensory data of a piece. Take away the idea, that is, the language and the logic, and there is nothing to be said at all. To say it would be counter to the point. So what we "see" must include the conceptual embodiment. Outside of this is unthinkable, and no one has ever encountered it, for to encounter anything is to have conceptual apparatus ready to hand. I don't see a lamp for the first time, ex nihilo; it is my readiness to take it AS a lamp. I am always prepared, preapprehending, anticipating, predisposed to taking up the world AS this or that. This is Husserl. This is Heidegger, though the latter is not the same as the former at all.

Thus my lamp is part of a past to future continuum of an anticipating cogito. If you find this line of thought interesting, check out Heidegger, but first Husserl, but before this, Kant. I just finished Husserl's Ideas and am moving into the commentaries. Massively interesting, but as with all, tedious here and there.
I don't think the thing before me is a phenomenon or a concept. I think it's a feature of reality, that can be described in different ways for different purposes - all descriptions, and so all truth-claims, being conventional and contextual.

I don't think I've clearly identified why our positions don't 'amount to essentially the same thing' - but I don't think they do. And the root of it may be my objection to phenomenology tout court, which I think is a form of foundationalism that recycles the mistakes of all foundationalisms that fail to recognise the constitutive centrality of our linguistic practices.
Husserl appears to be a kind of foundationalist, though is it not the empirical scientist's realism. There is some dispute on this. He thinks the objects that come before consciousness are intuitively grounded, are actual and apodictically certain. But what is there, before the perceiving mind, is Idea, process, predicatively formed eidetic and actual affairs (his language). Odd language, sure. But he thinks what we have before our waking perceiving consciousness is intuitively present. A very big term, much contested in Heidegger and others. But the constitutive centrality of language you mention is what Husserl si all about. See his reductions, his epoche, the move from naive empirical "naturalism" to phenomena. Indeed, his ontology is essentially eidetic, and the phenomenological reduction is toward ideas.

The "mistake" he makes has to do with the centrality of presence. How can presence ever, ever be a defensible term? How can a person have a 'pure" encounter with a thing, an idea, if the interpretative apparatus that is in place makes presence itself a term lost in, if you will, translation, tht is, interpretation?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Hereandnow

Thanks for this explanation of phenomenology. Where we disagree, I think, is here:

'So how about this: when I acknowledge the lamp on the table, how is it that anything out there gets in here, in my experience? It is the independence of the thing that needs to be shown, but once the thing is analyzed as a thing, there is no way to affirm this independence. It only makes sense to take this lamp as a composite thing: it is idea and sensory data of a piece. Take away the idea, that is, the language and the logic, and there is nothing to be said at all. To say it would be counter to the point.'

My argument is that the 'thinginess' of the thing - the lamp - is not in any way composite. It is neither an idea, nor our sensory data of the lamp. Its existence and nature is completely independent of any perception of its existence or nature. So that whatever can be said about it -- including its independence - is and must be - secondary to, or dependent on, a linguistic practice. How what is 'out there' gets 'in here' is a matter of neurology. But 'in here' isn't an ontologically different place from 'out there'. That's just the myth of abstract things such as minds at work.

I'm familiar with the ideas of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and some other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty - and I can see their attractions. But I think their fundamental mistake derives from an ancient dualism that reaches back to at least Plato: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. The noumena / phenomena distinction is one example.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes
My argument is that the 'thinginess' of the thing - the lamp - is not in any way composite. It is neither an idea, nor our sensory data of the lamp. Its existence and nature is completely independent of any perception of its existence or nature. So that whatever can be said about it -- including its independence - is and must be - secondary to, or dependent on, a linguistic practice. How what is 'out there' gets 'in here' is a matter of neurology. But 'in here' isn't an ontologically different place from 'out there'. That's just the myth of abstract things such as minds at work.

I'm familiar with the ideas of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and some other phenomenologists, such as Merleau-Ponty - and I can see their attractions. But I think their fundamental mistake derives from an ancient dualism that reaches back to at least Plato: mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. The noumena / phenomena distinction is one example.
I believe one has to ask, what is it that one is analyzing? If it is the thing before you, then it becomes clear, by my thinking, that there is something in the "presence" of the thing that defies analysis altogether. Note here that we are already mired in objections: the thing's presence, which "claims" to be a kind of "intuition simpliciter" is already structured by reason and antecedent experience. How can one's present apprehension of "presence" be free of this? But I lean toward your side of this: It is certainly true that my perceptual affair is complex, one cannot ignore the intuition simpliciter.

This is a very difficult thing to defend. After all, ALL of what we think is simpliciter is not upon analysis. I see instantly enjoy morning coffee or doing the crossword puzzle, but though they come upon me immediately, clearly, they are learned enjoyments; they have background, language, antecedent associations that come to bear upon the moment. I think is it safe say that the crisis in philosophy, the postmodern crisis, is all about the failure to revive reality simpliciter. The few who defend it in a compelling way are controvertial. I read Husserl, who is among these. I actually think his epoche reveals that Kierkegaard (and Wittgenstein) called the eternal present. Mystical hogwash to most disciplined philosophy, but this latter misses the point. When you look at that lamp, I say to all, try the meditative approach of "reducing" it to its essential presence. Where it goes from there is up to you. For me, it is the threshold of something deeply profound.

I follow the bread crumbs of apophatic philosophy (having come to the point where knowledge meets its end). Philosophical thought has an end, a teleology, which I find played out in Kierkegaard, Buddhism (which Heidegger gave a mysterious nod of recognition to), Levinas and others. That end was realized long ago in the East: these objects all around us are without logical identity in their actuality.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Hereandnow wrote: October 30th, 2019, 9:37 am
Peter Holmes
My argument is that the 'thinginess' of the thing - the lamp - is not in any way composite. It is neither an idea, nor our sensory data of the lamp. Its existence and nature is completely independent of any perception of its existence or nature. So that whatever can be said about it -- including its independence - is and must be - secondary to, or dependent on, a linguistic practice. How what is 'out there' gets 'in here' is a matter of neurology. But 'in here' isn't an ontologically different place from 'out there'. That's just the myth of abstract things such as minds at work.
I follow the bread crumbs of apophatic philosophy (having come to the point where knowledge meets its end). Philosophical thought has an end, a teleology, which I find played out in Kierkegaard, Buddhism (which Heidegger gave a mysterious nod of recognition to), Levinas and others. That end was realized long ago in the East: these objects all around us are without logical identity in their actuality.
I think I understand. And perhaps we do agree, beneath our ways of saying it. Mine is: features of reality are completely separate and different from anything that can be said about them - the rules of logic in descriptions - including anything that can be said about their identity: what they are.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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For anyone interested, here's a link to my paper DFPKT, which is an attempt to clarify and synthesise ideas from my previous papers, and from contributions to this and other online discussion groups. The long title is Definition, facts, propositions, knowledge and truth.

http://www.peasum.co.uk/447931834
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Signs such as words – words such as knowledge and truth – can mean only what we use them to mean. And that is why correspondence, truth-maker/bearer, nomenclaturist and representationalist theories are misleading. The relationship can only be one-way. And this has a bearing on what we say about knowledge, as follows.

I assume there are three separate and different things: features of reality that are or were the case; what we believe and know about them; and what we say about them, which, in classical logic, may be true or false. And to muddle these things up is a mistake.

My standing question is this: what and where are so-called abstract things, and in what way do they exist? (Objects and entities are more up-market than things. But then – what and where are abstract objects? In what way do abstract entities exist?)

Pending an answer that avoids equivocation or question-begging, here are some thoughts.

1 To define a thing is to describe it, which we may do in different ways. So, if there are abstract things, to define them is to describe them.

2 We cannot name or describe a thing into or out of existence. Outside language, the existence and nature of things have nothing to do with language.

3 Pending evidence for the existence of abstract things, belief that they exist is irrational. (Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things.)

4 Belief that abstract things exist may come from the ancient and pervasive delusion that what we call abstract nouns are names of things which, therefore, do or may exist.

5 The claim that abstract things are concepts in minds explains nothing. Concepts and minds are just more abstract things. A dog chasing its tail needs to re-think the premise.

6 Descriptions of abstract things – such as being, truth, knowledge, justice, beauty and identity – in short, the stuff of philosophy – are fictions about fictions.

7 Like metaphors, fictions can both have their uses and lead us astray. Talk about minds, and mental things and events, is an example.

8 Philosophy is talk about abstract things. But all we can do is explain the ways we do or could use signs in general, and certain abstract nouns and their cognates in particular.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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The Gettier Problem should be regarded as one of the most embarrassing episodes in the annals of philosophy. Perhaps it could dispute that position to the Trolley Problem. It represents the lowest level of philosophical thinking, lacking rigorous analysis and not being able to expose the essence of the problem to be addressed, as it gets muddled with ambiguous situations and their possible interpretations.
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Peter Holmes
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Count Lucanor wrote: June 13th, 2021, 10:37 am The Gettier Problem should be regarded as one of the most embarrassing episodes in the annals of philosophy. Perhaps it could dispute that position to the Trolley Problem. It represents the lowest level of philosophical thinking, lacking rigorous analysis and not being able to expose the essence of the problem to be addressed, as it gets muddled with ambiguous situations and their possible interpretations.
Fair enough. But I think Gettier merely recycled and amplified the JTB's mistakes - and the delusion that there actually is an essential problem with knowledge that rigorous analysis could solve. Rigorous analysis of what?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: June 16th, 2021, 4:53 am
Count Lucanor wrote: June 13th, 2021, 10:37 am The Gettier Problem should be regarded as one of the most embarrassing episodes in the annals of philosophy. Perhaps it could dispute that position to the Trolley Problem. It represents the lowest level of philosophical thinking, lacking rigorous analysis and not being able to expose the essence of the problem to be addressed, as it gets muddled with ambiguous situations and their possible interpretations.
Fair enough. But I think Gettier merely recycled and amplified the JTB's mistakes - and the delusion that there actually is an essential problem with knowledge that rigorous analysis could solve. Rigorous analysis of what?
Epistemology can be made a rigorous discipline. Gettier and others simply don't appear to be competent at it.
The wise are instructed by reason, average minds by experience, the stupid by necessity and the brute by instinct.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Count Lucanor wrote: June 16th, 2021, 9:14 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: June 16th, 2021, 4:53 am
Count Lucanor wrote: June 13th, 2021, 10:37 am The Gettier Problem should be regarded as one of the most embarrassing episodes in the annals of philosophy. Perhaps it could dispute that position to the Trolley Problem. It represents the lowest level of philosophical thinking, lacking rigorous analysis and not being able to expose the essence of the problem to be addressed, as it gets muddled with ambiguous situations and their possible interpretations.
Fair enough. But I think Gettier merely recycled and amplified the JTB's mistakes - and the delusion that there actually is an essential problem with knowledge that rigorous analysis could solve. Rigorous analysis of what?
Epistemology can be made a rigorous discipline. Gettier and others simply don't appear to be competent at it.
Okay. I don't think rigorous (conceptual?) analysis of knowledge amounts to anything more than talk about the ways we use - or coud use - the word 'knowledge', its cognates, and related words, such as 'ignorance'. And the same applies to any of the invented things named by what we misleadingly call 'abstract nouns'.

The myth of abstract (non-physical) things has rotted our thinking every bit as much as the myth of supernatural things, to which it's closely related. I think we should apply the same rational skepticism to both. Time to wake up.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Terrapin Station »

Peter Holmes wrote: June 17th, 2021, 2:03 am Okay. I don't think rigorous (conceptual?) analysis of knowledge amounts to anything more than talk about the ways we use - or coud use - the word 'knowledge'
Sure, and we can't have rigorous analysis of that because?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Terrapin Station wrote: June 17th, 2021, 7:06 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 17th, 2021, 2:03 am Okay. I don't think rigorous (conceptual?) analysis of knowledge amounts to anything more than talk about the ways we use - or coud use - the word 'knowledge'
Sure, and we can't have rigorous analysis of that because?
Well, if you agree that that's all conceptual analysis amounts to, analyse away. Or you could look in dictionaries.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Terrapin Station »

Peter Holmes wrote: June 18th, 2021, 4:29 am
Terrapin Station wrote: June 17th, 2021, 7:06 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 17th, 2021, 2:03 am Okay. I don't think rigorous (conceptual?) analysis of knowledge amounts to anything more than talk about the ways we use - or coud use - the word 'knowledge'
Sure, and we can't have rigorous analysis of that because?
Well, if you agree that that's all conceptual analysis amounts to, analyse away. Or you could look in dictionaries.
Sure, although philosophy does this in a more rigorous way than a dictionary, where the latter's task is more along the lines of journalism rather than assessing usage for systematic coherence, veracity relative to practice, etc.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Terrapin Station wrote: June 18th, 2021, 6:03 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 18th, 2021, 4:29 am
Terrapin Station wrote: June 17th, 2021, 7:06 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 17th, 2021, 2:03 am Okay. I don't think rigorous (conceptual?) analysis of knowledge amounts to anything more than talk about the ways we use - or coud use - the word 'knowledge'
Sure, and we can't have rigorous analysis of that because?
Well, if you agree that that's all conceptual analysis amounts to, analyse away. Or you could look in dictionaries.
Sure, although philosophy does this in a more rigorous way than a dictionary, where the latter's task is more along the lines of journalism rather than assessing usage for systematic coherence, veracity relative to practice, etc.
'Assessing usage for systematic coherence' - against which standard? Do philosophers know how words should be used?

Don't mean to cavil - and that probably isn't what you mean. If you're just referring to logical consistency - no argument.
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