JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

[Terrapin Station]

I'm not saying that Jim is "general" rather than a particular person, lol. I'm saying that the belief is about a specific observation, a specific person Bill saw. The belief isn't just that "someone, but not necessarily this specific person I saw in the restaurant, is Jim." The latter is what I mean by " general."

[Consul]

I think your account of what we call knowledge - or knowing that something is the case - is interesting. But I'd like to run some suggestions by you.

1 Perhaps the opening should be 'S knows that s is or was the case iff...'
2 That would make 1: 's is or was the case'.
3 Then 2 could be: 'S believes that s is or was the case'.
4 And 3 could be: 'S is justified in believing that s is or was the case'.

The temporal aspect can be built into the states of affairs, so that we needn't use the past tense form "was the case":
Generally, a (nonpropositional) state of affairs consists in something having some property (at/during some time), or two or more things standing in some relation (at/during some time).

For example: Barack Obama's being president of the USA from 2009 to 2017 is the case.

In the phrase "is the case", "is" is not used in the tensed sense of "is now (at the present time)" but tenselessly; so the temporal aspect is part of the state of affairs itself rather than of its being the case.
However, alternatively, the temporal aspect can be built into its being the case: s is the case at t instead of s-at-t is the case.
For example: Barack Obama's being president of the USA is the case from 2009 to 2017.
(Note that "is" itself is still used tenselessly here, so I needn't write "was the case from from 2009 to 2017".)

But, on reflection, I'm wondering why belief and justification have to be conditions for knowing something is or was the case. (And, as you know, justification has itself been much debated in the JTB literature.)

I have the feeling that this need to provide so-called conditions for what we call knowledge comes from a metaphysical delusion. Words such as 'knowledge' and 'knowing' and 'know' can mean only what we use them to mean. So all we can do is explain the ways we use them.

More thought needed. Thanks again.

The truth condition (or fact condition) of knowledge is uncontroversial (I hope) and indispensable to knowledge, since you just can't know what ain't so.

As for the belief condition, it can be formulated in an equivalent way with alternative words such as "opinion" or "judgment"; so we can as well say that knowledge is justified true opinion/judgment.
Nonetheless, knowledge does entail belief or some belief-like state. For example, when someone says "I know my beloved wife just died, but I don't believe it", this can only mean "…but I don't want to believe it", thereby expressing "I wish it weren't true".

As for the justification condition, some (externalist or internalist) form it seems indispensable to knowledge too. However, David Lewis argues that…

"[J]ustification is not always necessary. What (non-circular) argument supports our reliance on perception, on memory, and on testimony? And yet we do gain knowledge by these means. And sometimes, far from having supporting arguments, we don't even know how we know. We once had evidence, drew conclusions, and thereby gained knowledge; now we have forgotten our reasons, yet still we retain our knowledge. Or we know the name that goes with the face, or the sex of the chicken, by relying on subtle visual clues, without knowing what those clues may be."

(Lewis, David. "Elusive Knowledge." 1996. In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 418-445. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 421-2)

Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/

[Consul]

I'm not saying that Jim is "general" rather than a particular person, lol. I'm saying that the belief is about a specific observation, a specific person Bill saw. The belief isn't just that "someone, but not necessarily this specific person I saw in the restaurant, is Jim." The latter is what I mean by " general."

Yes, Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is based on seeing one particular man he mistakes for Jim, because that man looks like Jim.
When Bill thinks "Hey, there's Jim!", he uses "Jim" (wrongly) to refer to someone who he thinks is Jim, but who is actually Tim; but it by no means follows that in Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant "Jim" refers to Tim rather than to Jim, who is in the restaurant too.

[Terrapin Station]

Yes, Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is based on seeing one particular man he mistakes for Jim, because that man looks like Jim.
When Bill thinks "Hey, there's Jim!", he uses "Jim" (wrongly) to refer to someone who he thinks is Jim, but who is actually Tim; but it by no means follows that in Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant "Jim" refers to Tim rather than to Jim, who is in the restaurant too.

Wrong. It "follows," re Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant, that "Jim" refers to a particular, observed person, x (who turns out to be "Tim"), because that's exactly what Bill's belief is! Bill's belief is that <<that guy>>, x, (who turns out to be Tim) is Jim in the restaurant. That's follows just like it follows from P that P.

Bill does NOT have a belief that some person in the restaurant--but not necessarily <<that guy>>, x, (who turns out to be Tim) is Jim in the restaurant. Thus it's illegitimate to substitute that for Bill's "Jim is in the restaurant."

[Consul]

Yes, Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is based on seeing one particular man he mistakes for Jim, because that man looks like Jim.
When Bill thinks "Hey, there's Jim!", he uses "Jim" (wrongly) to refer to someone who he thinks is Jim, but who is actually Tim; but it by no means follows that in Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant "Jim" refers to Tim rather than to Jim, who is in the restaurant too.

Wrong. It "follows," re Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant, that "Jim" refers to a particular, observed person, x (who turns out to be "Tim"), because that's exactly what Bill's belief is! Bill's belief is that <<that guy>>, x, (who turns out to be Tim) is Jim in the restaurant. That's follows just like it follows from P that P.

Bill does NOT have a belief that some person in the restaurant--but not necessarily <<that guy>>, x, (who turns out to be Tim) is Jim in the restaurant. Thus it's illegitimate to substitute that for Bill's "Jim is in the restaurant."

There is no illegitimate substitution: Bill sees a man in a restaurant who looks exactly like Jim, and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant. He thinks "That guy in the restaurant is Jim", and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant, which is equivalent to "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim". Bill thinks that one guy is the man he sees, but he's wrong. Nonetheless, all that is needed for the truth of "Jim is in the restaurant" and "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim" is the presence of Jim there.

[Terrapin Station]

There is no illegitimate substitution: Bill sees a man in a restaurant who looks exactly like Jim, and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant. He thinks "That guy in the restaurant is Jim", and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant, which is equivalent to "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim".

No, it isn't. He doesn't believe "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim," where it could be any guy. He believes "This particular guy whom I see is Jim." This is just the point. There's a difference between "one of the guys," where it could be any guy, and "this particular guy."

In order to talk about Bill's belief, we have to actually talk about Bill's belief. Bill's belief is about a particular guy that he sees.

[Consul]

There is no illegitimate substitution: Bill sees a man in a restaurant who looks exactly like Jim, and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant. He thinks "That guy in the restaurant is Jim", and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant, which is equivalent to "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim".

No, it isn't. He doesn't believe "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim," where it could be any guy. He believes "This particular guy whom I see is Jim." This is just the point. There's a difference between "one of the guys," where it could be any guy, and "this particular guy."
In order to talk about Bill's belief, we have to actually talk about Bill's belief. Bill's belief is about a particular guy that he sees.

Our discussion has become much too complicated and confusing, because whatever else Bill believes, he does believe that Jim is in the restaurant. This is the only belief that is central to my fictional Gettier scenario, because the relevant question is whether Bill knows that Jim is in the restaurant, given that his belief that Jim is in the restaurant is (arguably) both justified and true.

[Consul]

Our discussion has become much too complicated and confusing, because whatever else Bill believes, he does believe that Jim is in the restaurant.

Why does he believe so? Because he believes that the man he sees in the restaurant is Jim. So Bill holds both a belief about the man he sees and a belief about Jim; but, once again, the belief that constitutes the Gettier case is the one about Jim, and not the one about the man he sees.

[Count Lucanor]

Do you have anything to say on my response to the specific case presented by Gettier?

See: viewtopic.php?p=387799#p387799

I'm referring to my response to that, where I specifically addressed the original case presented by Gettier, here: viewtopic.php?p=387829#p387829

[Consul]

…As for the justification condition, some (externalist or internalist) form it seems indispensable to knowledge too.

Well, there are philosophers (such as Crispin Sartwell in "Knowledge Is Merely True Belief", 1991) who think that justification (justifiedness) isn't a necessary condition of knowledge (by being part of its definition), because they think that knowledge is nothing more than true belief.
Note that to say so is not to say that justification is epistemologically irrelevant, because as soon as you ask someone, or are asked by someone "How do you know?", justification matters—but only in the sense of providing criteria for knowledge that aren't part of the definition of "knowledge". A criterion for knowledge doesn't tell me what knowledge is; it just tells me how I can find out whether a belief or knowledge-claim is true. Even if knowledge is true belief, you still don't know whether your or someone else's beliefs are true unless you have evidence for their truth. Otherwise, you may have knowledge, but you don't know you do.

[Count Lucanor]

If you aren't convinced by Gettier's original examples, maybe the following one will convince you of the insufficiency of the JTB definition of "knowledge", which I just thought up (and which is analogous to the sheep-in-the-meadow case):

Bill looks through the window of a restaurant and sees a man sitting at a table who looks exactly like his friend Jim; so he believes that Jim is in that restaurant. However, the man he sees isn't Jim but Jim's identical twin brother Tim, whose existence is unknown to Bill, because he never met Tim and (for some strange reason) Jim never told him that he has an identical twin brother. As it happens, Jim is in the restaurant too, sitting at another table that Bill cannot see through the window. So Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is both justified by his seeing someone who looks exactly like Jim and true owing to Jim's presence in the restaurant. But does he really know that Jim is in the restaurant? No, he arguably doesn't; and if he doesn't, then justified true belief isn't the same as knowledge.

The JTB definition requires that p is true, Bill believes that p, and Bill is justified in believing that p. But what is p in this case? It is not that Jim is in that restaurant, but that the man BIll is seeing is Jim, which is not true, therefore even though Bill seems justified in believing that the man he is seeing is Jim, this does not constitute knowledge of Jim being the person he is seeing. In a second instance, Bill's false belief creates the conditions for having another belief: that Jim is in the restaurant, but evidently this means the person that Bill is confusing as Jim being seen in the restaurant, which is false. The fact that the real Jim (not being seen by Bill) is by mere chance in the restaurant, unknown to Bill, does not constitute for Bill knowledge of Jim being in the restaurant.

The relevant belief is Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant. I stipulated in my imaginary example that this is Bill's justified true belief which doesn't seem to equal knowledge. (Bill is an unreal person, so we cannot discover what he really believes, since unreal persons don't really believe anything.)

There's no need to pick what's the "relevant belief". I have pointed out the two beliefs that Bill has: the first one: "the man I'm seeing now is Jim". This belief is the basis for his next belief: "Jim, the man I'm seeing now, is in the restaurant". As I explained, the first belief does not meet the requeriments of the Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge, or Justified True Belief analysis. Since the second belief is dependent on the first, it cannot meet the requirements either. The whole point of the JTB analysis is that if you believe what is true, then you have acquired knowledge. And the whole point Gettier wanted to make is that there are cases in which someone believes what is true (therefore, knowledge), but yet there's no sufficient and neccesary connection between the belief and the truth. Of course, Gettier failed miserably trying to achieve it.

1. Bill believes justifiedly (but falsely) that the man he sees in the restaurant is Jim (because that man looks exactly like Jim).

It is irrelevant for the JTB analysis if there are reasons to be fooled by appearances. The condition to call Bill's belief knowledge is that it is justified true belief. To be justified true belief, it has to meet the 3 conditions previously mentioned, that's why it is called Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge. If the belief is false, then it is not considered knowledge.

2. So Bill believes justifiedly that Jim is in the restaurant.

This is not justified true belief, as I explained above, and therefore not knowledge.

Bill only believes that Jim is in the restaurant because he is seeing a man who he confuses with Jim. His belief is inevitably tied to what he is seeing.

3. Bill also believes truly that Jim is in the restaurant (because Jim is in the restaurant).

If that other man moves away from the restaurant, his belief immediately changes, so it is not related to the actual Jim in the restaurant.

4. Therefore, Bill believes both justifiedly and truly that Jim is in the restaurant, and yet he doesn't know he is.

What BIll believes is that he is seeing a man he knows as Jim in a restaurant, but that's not the case. Since it requires that this be true in order to constitute knowledge, it is not justified true belief. Bill does not know that the man he is seeing is not the real Jim, neither he knows that Jim is in the restaurant because of this.
The Analysis of Knowledge

1. Knowledge as Justified True Belief
There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

The Tripartite Analysis of Knowledge:
S knows that p if
p is true;
S believes that p;
S is justified in believing that p.

[Peter Holmes]

I think your account of what we call knowledge - or knowing that something is the case - is interesting. But I'd like to run some suggestions by you.

1 Perhaps the opening should be 'S knows that s is or was the case iff...'
2 That would make 1: 's is or was the case'.
3 Then 2 could be: 'S believes that s is or was the case'.
4 And 3 could be: 'S is justified in believing that s is or was the case'.

The temporal aspect can be built into the states of affairs, so that we needn't use the past tense form "was the case":
Generally, a (nonpropositional) state of affairs consists in something having some property (at/during some time), or two or more things standing in some relation (at/during some time).

For example: Barack Obama's being president of the USA from 2009 to 2017 is the case.

In the phrase "is the case", "is" is not used in the tensed sense of "is now (at the present time)" but tenselessly; so the temporal aspect is part of the state of affairs itself rather than of its being the case.
However, alternatively, the temporal aspect can be built into its being the case: s is the case at t instead of s-at-t is the case.
For example: Barack Obama's being president of the USA is the case from 2009 to 2017.
(Note that "is" itself is still used tenselessly here, so I needn't write "was the case from from 2009 to 2017".)

But, on reflection, I'm wondering why belief and justification have to be conditions for knowing something is or was the case. (And, as you know, justification has itself been much debated in the JTB literature.)

I have the feeling that this need to provide so-called conditions for what we call knowledge comes from a metaphysical delusion. Words such as 'knowledge' and 'knowing' and 'know' can mean only what we use them to mean. So all we can do is explain the ways we use them.

More thought needed. Thanks again.

The truth condition (or fact condition) of knowledge is uncontroversial (I hope) and indispensable to knowledge, since you just can't know what ain't so.

As for the belief condition, it can be formulated in an equivalent way with alternative words such as "opinion" or "judgment"; so we can as well say that knowledge is justified true opinion/judgment.
Nonetheless, knowledge does entail belief or some belief-like state. For example, when someone says "I know my beloved wife just died, but I don't believe it", this can only mean "…but I don't want to believe it", thereby expressing "I wish it weren't true".

As for the justification condition, some (externalist or internalist) form it seems indispensable to knowledge too. However, David Lewis argues that…

"[J]ustification is not always necessary. What (non-circular) argument supports our reliance on perception, on memory, and on testimony? And yet we do gain knowledge by these means. And sometimes, far from having supporting arguments, we don't even know how we know. We once had evidence, drew conclusions, and thereby gained knowledge; now we have forgotten our reasons, yet still we retain our knowledge. Or we know the name that goes with the face, or the sex of the chicken, by relying on subtle visual clues, without knowing what those clues may be."

(Lewis, David. "Elusive Knowledge." 1996. In Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, 418-445. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 421-2)

Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/

Thanks, but this is a rehearsal of the standard JTB account of what we call knowledge - and that's what I'm challenging. For example, you say this:

'The truth condition (or fact condition) of knowledge is uncontroversial (I hope) and indispensable to knowledge, since you just can't know what ain't so.'

But 'knowing what's so' has nothing to do with language, and therefore nothing to do with the truth-value of a factual assertion. A state-of-affairs just is or was the case, neither true not false. The claim that truth and falsehood come into 'knowing' demonstrates the conflation of what's the case with what's said about what's the case. The supposed necessity of the truth condition is a mistake.

There's much more to say about what's wrong with the JTB theory - but this is the main problem, in my opinion.

[Terrapin Station]

There is no illegitimate substitution: Bill sees a man in a restaurant who looks exactly like Jim, and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant. He thinks "That guy in the restaurant is Jim", and he concludes that Jim is in the restaurant, which is equivalent to "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim".

No, it isn't. He doesn't believe "One of the guys in the restaurant is Jim," where it could be any guy. He believes "This particular guy whom I see is Jim." This is just the point. There's a difference between "one of the guys," where it could be any guy, and "this particular guy."
In order to talk about Bill's belief, we have to actually talk about Bill's belief. Bill's belief is about a particular guy that he sees.

Our discussion has become much too complicated and confusing, because whatever else Bill believes, he does believe that Jim is in the restaurant. This is the only belief that is central to my fictional Gettier scenario, because the relevant question is whether Bill knows that Jim is in the restaurant, given that his belief that Jim is in the restaurant is (arguably) both justified and true.

No. He doesn't have a belief that Jim is in the restaurant where that's not referring to the guy he sees. Again, this is just the point. We can't just ignore it and still be talking about Bill's belief.

[Steve3007]

The post from which the recent strand of conversation seems to have grown:

Bill looks through the window of a restaurant and sees a man sitting at a table who looks exactly like his friend Jim; so he believes that Jim is in that restaurant. However, the man he sees isn't Jim but Jim's identical twin brother Tim, whose existence is unknown to Bill, because he never met Tim and (for some strange reason) Jim never told him that he has an identical twin brother. As it happens, Jim is in the restaurant too, sitting at another table that Bill cannot see through the window. So Bill's belief that Jim is in the restaurant is both justified by his seeing someone who looks exactly like Jim and true owing to Jim's presence in the restaurant. But does he really know that Jim is in the restaurant? No, he arguably doesn't; and if he doesn't, then justified true belief isn't the same as knowledge.

Presumably, if we were to maintain that Bill's belief is simply "Jim is in the restaurant" then we would have to say that the belief is not justified. But if we were to maintain than Bill's belief is "This particular guy whom I see in the restaurant is Jim" then his belief is not true. Either way, it's not a JTB.

[Terrapin Station]

At any rate, there are similar problems with most Gettier scenarios. I can't say that there is a problem of this sort with all of them, because there have been so many examples proposed and they're so varied, but to my memory, every proposal for a Gettier problem example has itself had serious issues in my opinion.

Re Gettier's original paper, for example, re case (I), Smith does not believe that some generic or "variable-izable" "the man" will get the job and has ten coins in his pocket. That's similar to the example you're proposing. Re case (II), Smith only believes that "Jones owns a Ford," and that's the only reason he'd assent to any of those disjunctions--it could be any random garbage on the other side of the "or"; the assent would just imply that Smith knows how disjunctions work conventionally, and it doesn't matter what garbage is on the other side when he believes that the one side is the case; his belief is ONLY that Jones owns a Ford.