JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: July 16th, 2019, 4:59 pm"What are truths?
…Take beliefs and thoughts first.…"


(Armstrong, D. M. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. p. 131)
As for the primary truthbearers or "truth vehicles" (Quine), Russell thought that…

"Truth is a property of beliefs, and derivatively of sentences which express beliefs. Truth consists in a certain relation between a belief and one or more facts other than the belief. When this relation is absent, the belief is false. A sentence may be called 'true' or 'false' even if no one believes it, provided that, if it were believed, the belief would be true or false as the case may be."

(Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. 1948. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. p. 135)

So to believe a truth is to believe truly that p/s, and to believe a falsity is to believe falsely that p/s.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul wrote: July 16th, 2019, 4:01 pm"Notice again that the truthmaking relation is an internal relation in the sense already introduced: given the terms, the truthmakers and the propositional truthbearers, the relation is given. The truthmakers, I think, necessitate the truths, that is, the truthbearers. This seems to be a matter of supervenience. Reality fixes the truths as true."

(Armstrong, D. M. Sketch for a Systematic Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 65)
That is to say, no truth can change unless something in reality changes.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: July 15th, 2019, 11:03 amBut I'm not sure that replacing 'correspondence' with 'representation' clears up the problem of the relationship between a so-called 'truth-maker' (a state of affairs) and a so-called 'truth-bearer' (a proposition, which is, in fact, simply a declarative sentence). So the 'representation theory of truth' doesn't seem any more plausible than a correspondence theory.
Any plausible theory of truth must be some version of the correspondence theory or other, because mere coherence, consensus, or usefulness is definitely insufficient for truth.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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"Truth-makers are posited to provide the point of semantic contact whereby true representations touch upon an independent reality, upon something non-representational."https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Thanks, Consul. I think what you quote here is very important:

"Truth-makers are posited to provide the point of semantic contact whereby true representations touch upon an independent reality, upon something non-representational." – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Agreed: truth-makers are posited. If we look for the supposed truth-maker for the claim 'snow is white', all we can show or say is that real snow really is white, which is perfectly circular. And this is the problem with correspondence theories. With what does the claim 'snow is white' correspond? Is it a two-way relationship?

And you say this:

'Any plausible theory of truth must be some version of the correspondence theory or other, because mere coherence, consensus, or usefulness is definitely insufficient for truth.'

What definition, model or conception of truth are you working with? Is it metaphysical or Platonic? Do you think the word 'truth' corresponds with a thing of some kind?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: July 17th, 2019, 3:04 amThanks, Consul. I think what you quote here is very important:

"Truth-makers are posited to provide the point of semantic contact whereby true representations touch upon an independent reality, upon something non-representational." – https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/

Agreed: truth-makers are posited. If we look for the supposed truth-maker for the claim 'snow is white', all we can show or say is that real snow really is white, which is perfectly circular. And this is the problem with correspondence theories. With what does the claim 'snow is white' correspond? Is it a two-way relationship?

And you say this:

'Any plausible theory of truth must be some version of the correspondence theory or other, because mere coherence, consensus, or usefulness is definitely insufficient for truth.'

What definition, model or conception of truth are you working with? Is it metaphysical or Platonic? Do you think the word 'truth' corresponds with a thing of some kind?
I think there are truths = true representations (of some sort or other, e.g. judgements, statements), and I think there is the predicate "true" (and, perhaps, also the concept of truth); but I don't think there is something in the world which is the property of truth. Moreover, I'm skeptical about the definability of "truth" or "true".

"I take the notion of truth to be primitive and indefinable, alongside the notions of existence and identity. Only some of the family of formal ontological notions are definable and truthmaking plausibly ought to be one of them. But truth itself, I believe, is too fundamental a notion to admit of non-circular definition."

(Lowe, E. J. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 210)

"For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for attention, like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right, are the most elementary concepts we have, concepts without which (I am inclined to say) we would have no concepts at all. Why then should we expect to be able to reduce these concepts definitionally to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic? We should accept the fact that what makes these concepts so important must also foreclose on the possibility of finding a foundation for them which reaches deeper into bedrock.
We should apply this obvious observation to the concept of truth: we cannot hope to underpin it with something more transparent or easier to grasp. Truth is, as G. E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Gottlob Frege maintained, and Alfred Tarski proved, an indefinable concept. This does not mean we can say nothing revealing about it: we can, by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause, and action. Nor does the indefinability of truth imply that the concept is mysterious, ambiguous, or untrustworthy."


(Davidson, Donald. "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth." Journal of Philosophy 93/6 (1996): 263-278. pp. 264-5)

As for the crucial aspect of "correspondence":

"It takes two to make a truth. Hence (obviously) there can be no criterion of truth in the sense of some feature detectable in the statement itself which will reveal whether it is true or false. Hence, too, a statement cannot without absurdity refer to itself."

(Austin, J. L. "Truth." 1950. Reprinted in Philosophical Papers, edited by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, 85-101. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961. p. 92n1)

So, true representations stand in a certain ontological relation to something else—some nonrepresentation(s) in the world; and the ontological relation in question is verification, with "to verify" literally meaning "to make true". Note that this ontological concept of verification is different from the methodological concept of verification, where "to verify" means "to make sure or demonstrate that (something) is true, accurate, or justified" (Oxford Dictionary). Making sure that something is true is something people do, a kind of action, whereas making something true in the ontological sense is neither a kind of action nor a kind of causation:

A (truth-apt) representation is true iff there are entities/realities in the world which verify it (make it true) either directly or indirectly (through logical inference).

This is certainly not a formally proper definition due to its circularity, since what is to be defined—"true"—is part of what defines it. Nonetheless, the statement expresses the essential correspondence-theoretical point that "it takes two [or more] to make a truth".

"When an indicative sentence is asserted, there are three things concerned. There is the cognitive attitude of the assertor—belief, disbelief and hesitation, in the cases so far considered; there is the content or contents denoted by the sentence; and there is the fact or facts in virtue of which the sentence is true or false, which I will call the 'verifier' or 'falsifier' of the sentence.

(Russell, Bertrand. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. 1948. Reprint, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009. p. 117)

Note that verifiers or falsifiers needn't (exclusively) belong to the ontological category <fact> or <state of affairs>!
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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"The idea of truthmaking is the idea of something on the side of the world – a fact, perhaps, or a state of affairs – verifying, or making true, something on the side of language or thought – a statement, perhaps, or a proposition."

(Fine, Kit. "Truthmaker Semantics." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Vol. 2, 2nd ed., edited by Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, and Alexander Miller, 556-577. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017. p. 556)
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Consul - thanks again.

These quotations from the literature are interesting, of course, but they merely make the 'correspondence' claim about truth-making and truth-bearing, and my point is that the claim has not been demonstrated to be true. Please - can you show what, for example, the claim 'snow is white' corresponds with? If we call this stuff snow, and that colour white, to say that 'snow is white' is true because it corresponds with the whiteness of snow is vacuous.

To repeat: an arrow does not correspond with its target; a name does not correspond with the thing it names.

The quotations about the indefinable or primitive nature of some (such as so-called 'ontological') concepts demonstrate the extraordinary depth and ubiquity of the confusion between the way things are and what we say about them. What and where are concepts? Is the concept of truth something different from the ways we use the word 'truth'?

A definition is either an explanation of the way we use a word, or a description of a thing - and those are radically different operations. We agree that truth is not a thing of any kind - so there's no thing to describe - which means that a definition of truth can only be an explanation of how we use the word 'truth'. Davidson (1996) gets this muddled.

There is no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices. So that there is no foundation beneath our use of the word 'truth' is trivially true and inconsequential. And none of this implies anti-realism.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes
The quotations about the indefinable or primitive nature of some (such as so-called 'ontological') concepts demonstrate the extraordinary depth and ubiquity of the confusion between the way things are and what we say about them. What and where are concepts? Is the concept of truth something different from the ways we use the word 'truth'?
A passage like this just screams the need to read Heidegger's Being and Time. Read Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Analytic philosophers have all read Kant. Anyone who takes philosophy seriously at all has to read Kant. It's not that suddenly all questions will be resolved, but that the questions will grow, evolve through German idealism. Once you read Kant you can read the existentialists, who make no sense without Kant.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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1 I think Kant and Heidegger - and certainly at least Merleau-Ponty and Sartre - are mired in precisely the confusion I'm pointing out.
2 Please explain - preferably succinctly - how German idealism helps in addressing the confusion.
3 Can you explain what analytic philosophers analyse?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: July 18th, 2019, 3:10 amThese quotations from the literature are interesting, of course, but they merely make the 'correspondence' claim about truth-making and truth-bearing, and my point is that the claim has not been demonstrated to be true. Please - can you show what, for example, the claim 'snow is white' corresponds with? If we call this stuff snow, and that colour white, to say that 'snow is white' is true because it corresponds with the whiteness of snow is vacuous.
To repeat: an arrow does not correspond with its target; a name does not correspond with the thing it names.
This is true if "correspondence" means identity or similarity; but a representation can correspond to (or accord with) reality in the sense that reality is as the representation represents it to be.

I don't like the "Snow is white" example, because snow isn't always white, and whiteness isn't an objective property of physical stuffs or things. Okay, the sentence could be formulated as follows: "Pure snow looks white."
Anyway, the general point is that sentences can correspond to reality in the sense that the way things are represented to be by them is the way things really are.

Nominal or sentential representations are symbols in Charles Peirce's narrow sense of the term, in which it is not synonymous with "sign"; and pictorial representations such as photographies are icons. In the case of iconic representations, there can be a correspondence with what is represented in terms of similarity or resemblance.
Peter Holmes wrote: July 18th, 2019, 3:10 amThe quotations about the indefinable or primitive nature of some (such as so-called 'ontological') concepts demonstrate the extraordinary depth and ubiquity of the confusion between the way things are and what we say about them.
But when you say the truth, what you say about the way things are corresponds to the way they really are.

By the way, "correspondence" isn't the only relational term used in this context: "conformity", "congruence", "agreement", "accordance", "harmony".
Peter Holmes wrote: July 18th, 2019, 3:10 amWhat and where are concepts? Is the concept of truth something different from the ways we use the word 'truth'?
For the ontology of concepts, see: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/

If concepts are abstract predicate-meanings/-senses that are part of abstract sentence-meanings/-senses (= propositions), then I think such concepts don't exist.

But if concepts are a kind of mental or intellectual ability, then we can draw a distinction between them and linguistic predicates:

"[H]aving concept X is having the ability to think about Xs (or better, that having concept X is being able to think about Xs 'as such')."

(Fodor, Jerry A. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 3)

However, how can you think about Xs (as such) without having a word for them? (Here, I don't subsume nonlinguistic imagination under thought.) On the other hand, when you do so you needn't always use the same word, since you can alternatively use synonyms in the same or some other language without thereby changing your corresponding concept, i.e. your way of thinking of Xs.
Peter Holmes wrote: July 18th, 2019, 3:10 amA definition is either an explanation of the way we use a word, or a description of a thing - and those are radically different operations.
Williamson's distinction between concepts and conceptions seems relevant here:

"A distinction is sometimes drawn between concepts and conceptions. A concept is more like a dictionary definition. For example, a dictionary may define the word 'vixen' as 'female fox', so the concept <vixen> just is the concept <female fox> (my dictionary also gives another definition for 'vixen', as 'quarrelsome woman', which would be another concept). By contrast, your conception of a vixen includes all the beliefs you would express using that word (in a given sense). Unlike the concept <vixen>, my conception of a vixen includes my belief that a vixen lives under my garden shed. Dictionaries are for concepts, encyclopaedias for conceptions. If we distinguish concepts from conceptions like this, then conceptual questions are special, because they concern definitions. Clarifying one's concepts is defining one's terms.
One advantage of distinguishing concepts from conceptions is that it explains how knowledge can be communicated from one person to another and preserved over time. Conceptions are personal and fleeting, but definitions can be shared and stable. 'Vixen' has benn defined as 'female fox' for many centuries and many millions of speakers of English."


(Williamson, Timothy. Doing Philosophy: From Common Curiosity to Logical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 45-5)
Peter Holmes wrote: July 18th, 2019, 3:10 amWe agree that truth is not a thing of any kind - so there's no thing to describe - which means that a definition of truth can only be an explanation of how we use the word 'truth'. Davidson (1996) gets this muddled.
There is no foundation, for what we say, beneath our linguistic practices. So that there is no foundation beneath our use of the word 'truth' is trivially true and inconsequential. And none of this implies anti-realism.
That there is no property of truth doesn't mean that the predicate "true" is true of nothing. In fact, it is true of many (truth-apt) representations such as declarative sentences or statements. So there must be something objective about true representations in virtue of which they are true (the predicate "true" is true of them), such as their having truthmakers.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Hereandnow wrote: July 18th, 2019, 10:49 amAnalytic philosophers have all read Kant.
Franz Brentano (is said to have) called him "the father of the German School of Common Nonsense Philosophy".

"Brentano is often considered a forerunner of both the phenomenological movement and the tradition of analytic philosophy."
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote:
1 I think Kant and Heidegger - and certainly at least Merleau-Ponty and Sartre - are mired in precisely the confusion I'm pointing out.
2 Please explain - preferably succinctly - how German idealism helps in addressing the confusion.
3 Can you explain what analytic philosophers analyse?

The essential problem you have is, as rorty put it, assuming you can get what is out there in here. It comes down to what it is that is preserved, or, if you will, the extent to which what lies before you is a presentation or a representation. Kant had little to do with re presentational aspects of the object before the perceiver and his need to bring in noumena as a necessary postulate was nearly just as unwarranted as the any other metaphysics (god, freedom and the soul), but there has to be something. If you read him he mostly tells you in the transcendental dialectic such things are illusory logic. As to Gettier, the matter goes to 'P' doesn't it? Getting from S to P. Heidegger denies there is a P, or, he denies P its "giveness" (as does Kant, but not in so many words). Contrast this is Husserl who holds P to be there, as something embedded in the fabric of the world; and where Husserl thought the object replete with it eidetic fullness is "magically there" Heidegger held to the only thing that makes sense: the objecdt before is part and parcel of the interpretative thought that grasps it. Out Being in the world IS the world and the traditional mind/body dualisms cause a lot of confusion by putting P out there somewhere.
The analytic philosophers, like Donald Davidson and Quine and Sellars and other I don't remember, are very systematic, very bound containing meaning within the power of words and not allowing meanings to extend beyond the rigor of knowing. This is the kind of thing that led to the Gettier phenomena in the sixties and seventies where philosophers were endlessly trying to save P. Absurd, really, with their severed head and barn facsimile e.g.s. I spend some time reading Quine and his radical translation, and others and I concluded that they really were bound to logic and it containment rather than exploring the thresholds of existential thought. I can't imagine Quine taking Levinas seriiously (see Emanuel Levinas
totality and Infinity), but Levinas is right in ways analyticity cannot touch. Wittgenstein is among the analytics, a principle proponent, but he taught me a lot about limitations and language. What can I say, these guys are obviously great philosophers, but they are not interesting to take that drmatic step toward liberating knowledge from its traditions. Heidegger did. He is fascinating once you get into him.

Sartre? Maybe. I will have to think about it. He was working in the shadow of Husserl and Heidegger, argued about the transcendental ego with Husserl, was a Cartesian (his pour soi vs en soi), but his objects were phenomenological, not material. his was, like Heidegger, an ontology of phenomena.
And so on.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Keep in mind with the foregoing that this is just a hobby of mine. But I try to take it seriously. Ever since I started reading Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Levinas and even Derrida philosophy has actually become, well, profound. Kiekegaard's Concept of Anxiety was extraordinary.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Hereandnow wrote: July 18th, 2019, 4:48 pmThe essential problem you have is, as rorty put it, assuming you can get what is out there in here. It comes down to what it is that is preserved, or, if you will, the extent to which what lies before you is a presentation or a representation.

"[W]e have to do with reality when something presents itself as it actually and authentically is, be it a real truth or a real fact. In consequence, the fundamental distinction is not between the appearances available in our experience and that which is inaccessibly external to it, but rather between that which is correct within our experience and that which is somehow incorrect or misleading. lt would thus be wrongheaded to think of reality as a distinct sort of being different from 'the phenomenal realm' of what people take to be so. The crux is not the contrast between what is and what is thought to be, but rather between what is thought correctly and what is thought incorrectly and imperfectly.

In this context of consideration, reality just exactly is, and is nothing but, the condition of things that people purport when they avoid making mistakes and achieve the adaequatio ad rem that the medievals saw as the hallmark of truth. Properly conceived, reality is by its very nature accessible to inquiry, albeit to an inquiry which in practice will often get matters wrong. Reality, that is to say, is not something inherently extra-experiential: a mysterious something outside our cognitive reach. Instead, it encompasses that sector of experience which involves the true facts of the matter. After all, there is no reason why things cannot be what they appear in various respects, and in these respects appear as they actually are. Save in the world of the paranoid, things can be as they appear to be.

But of course they need not be so. As the proverb says, appearances can be deceiving. Our clock loses five minutes a day. Nevertheless on two occasions of the day it will be right on time. But if this circumstance somehow blinds us to this clock's flaws, we will be much deceived. In distinguishing reality from mere appearance, what is fundamentally at issue is thus not an ontological distinction of different realms of being or thing-kinds, but an epistemological distinction between a correct and an incorrect view of things. Properly understood, the operative contrast is thus not that between reality and the phenomenon but between reality (veridical and authentic phenomena included) and what is misleading or incorrect. For reality can make its appearance in different guises—sometimes correctly and sometimes not. Appearance is not something different in kind and nature from reality, it is how reality presents itself. And reality is not by nature something different from appearance: it sometimes—and one would hope often—actually is what it appears to be."

(pp. 5-6)

"Regrettably, the contrast between appearance and reality is often identified—and thereby confused—with that between reality on the one side and mistaken or misleading appearance on the other. And this conflation will, effectively by definition, erect a Chinese Wall between reality and appearance. And this, rather paranoid, view of the matter must be put aside from the outset. To reemphasize: the philosophically significant contrast is not that between the real and the apparent as such, but rather that between the real and the merely apparent."
(p. 12)

"'Appearance' as philosophers use the term encompasses not just how things manifest themselves in sensory observation but the much broader range of how we take matters to stand—how we accept them to be not just in sense-observation but in conceptual thought as well. On this basis it would be gravely fallacious to take the step—as is often done—to map the real/unreal distinction and the real/apparent distinction. For this mixes the sheep and the goats in heaping vertical appearance together with mere (i.e., non-vertical) appearance, thereby subscribing to the paranoid delusion that things are never what they seem to be.

Reality is not a distinct realm of being standing apart and separate from the manifold of what we know in the realm of appearance. Those 'appearances' will—insofar as correct—be appearances of reality that represent features thereof. And, accordingly, the contrast between Reality and Appearance is not one carried out in the ontological order of different sorts of things. The realm of appearance is homogeneous with that of reality insofar as those appearances are correct.

The fact of it is that things sometimes—perhaps even frequently—are substantially as they appear to be. Reality and its appearance just are not two separate realms: there is nothing to prevent matters actually being as they are perceived and/or thought to be. Appearance can in principle be something self-contained and self-sufficient: when appearing there is there need not be something that appears. When it appears to one that there is a pink elephant in your corner there need not be a something in that corner which appears as an elephant to me. Appearances may not only be deceiving, they may also be illusionary. In the sphere of appearance things can go seriously awry. And yet while matters can go wrong here, they need not do so. Things can indeed be as they appear. Total paranoia is clearly unwarranted. There is no reason that is, why appearance and reality cannot agree in this or that detail."

(pp. 14-5)

(Rescher, Nicholas. Reality and Its Appearance. New York: Continuum, 2010.)
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Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021