JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Astro Cat wrote: June 23rd, 2022, 1:59 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 22nd, 2022, 7:30 am Oh, and I forgot to mention my rejection of the correspondence - or any other - theory of truth. What we call truth or the truth no more needs explaining by way of a theory than does knowledge, or any other supposed (but fictional) abstract thing.
In the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."

Is it pedantic? Sure. But I have been surprised in some discussions where it is useful to ask someone "what do you mean by "true" in this instance" to surprising results affecting the actual argument.
Trouble is, a correspondence is a two-way relationship. But the assertion 'snow is white' is true because - what we call snow is what we call white - which is effectively a tautology - a purely linguistic affair.

A name no more corresponds with what it names than an arrow corresponds with its target. The relationship is all one way. To call it a correspondence is to assume a nomenclaturism or representationalism that mistakes what we say about things- how we name and describe them - for the way things are.

Like all so-called philosophical theories, theories of truth can only be explanations of how we do or could use the word 'truth', its cognates and related words, such as 'falsehood'.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: June 25th, 2022, 5:41 amTrouble is, a correspondence is a two-way relationship. But the assertion 'snow is white' is true because - what we call snow is what we call white - which is effectively a tautology - a purely linguistic affair.
To say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Astro Cat wrote: June 23rd, 2022, 1:59 amIn the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."
QUOTE>
"Not all the ways the world can be represented are ways the world is, so a particular species of creature found it necessary to employ the following convention to distinguish representations from misrepresentations. Representations that indicate the way the world actually is they called ‘true,’ and representations that failed to do so they called ‘false.’

Truth is a relation between two things—a representation (the truth bearer) and the world or some part of it (the truthmaker). The Truthmaker Principle is intended to capture this fact. It is not meant to suggest that things in the world actually make truths as fire makes heat; it is not the ‘make’ of the sort in which they (in and of themselves) cause things called ‘truths’ to come into existence. A world in which there were no representations (i.e. no truth bearers) would be a world in which there were no truths."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 24-5)
<QUOTE

If the "Truthmaker Principle" is the principle that all truths have truthmakers (aka truthmaker maximalism), then there are philosophers who reject it.

See:

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Peter Holmes
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 1:50 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 25th, 2022, 5:41 amTrouble is, a correspondence is a two-way relationship. But the assertion 'snow is white' is true because - what we call snow is what we call white - which is effectively a tautology - a purely linguistic affair.
To say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
Have a really good think about what you say. 'Snow is white' is true because real snow really is white. Truth-maker/truth-bearer theory is just correspondence theory in another form. That we don't recognise the tautology demonstrates the way we confuse what we say about things for the way things are.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Gertie »

Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 2:01 am
Astro Cat wrote: June 23rd, 2022, 1:59 amIn the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."
QUOTE>
"Not all the ways the world can be represented are ways the world is, so a particular species of creature found it necessary to employ the following convention to distinguish representations from misrepresentations. Representations that indicate the way the world actually is they called ‘true,’ and representations that failed to do so they called ‘false.’

Truth is a relation between two things—a representation (the truth bearer) and the world or some part of it (the truthmaker). The Truthmaker Principle is intended to capture this fact. It is not meant to suggest that things in the world actually make truths as fire makes heat; it is not the ‘make’ of the sort in which they (in and of themselves) cause things called ‘truths’ to come into existence. A world in which there were no representations (i.e. no truth bearers) would be a world in which there were no truths."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 24-5)
<QUOTE

If the "Truthmaker Principle" is the principle that all truths have truthmakers (aka truthmaker maximalism), then there are philosophers who reject it.

See:

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
I agree it's not at heart a linguistic issue about propositions. It's an issue of inter-subjective falsifiability.

Each human creates a personal experiential representation (model) of the world as we interact with it. That interaction manifests in subjects on-the-hoof, as conscious experience. When we compare notes we create a shared model of our shared world. Physical things like white snow are third person falsifiable via observation and measurement. I point at the snow, and as a fellow human with similar sensory and cognitive systems your experiential interaction with the snow is presumably much like mine, and we agree the snow is white. Language is how we symbolically represent our experience, which adds extra room for error and a layer of abstraction, but that's not the underlying issue. The under-lying issue for justifying our inter-subjective agreement that snow is white, is that we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. So while our experiential models of the world might tally, that doesn't mean they are accurate and complete.

- Each experiencing subject has a flawed and limited first person pov

- We can compare notes on things like lumps on the bed which are physical (observable and measurable) and can agree we both see a lump on the bed (we can't see through the blankets, hence the error), to create an inter-subjective model of our shared physical world. This is third person pov falsifiability.

- But we don't know how close our inter-subjective models correspond with ontological reality, because we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. We don't have a god's-eye pov.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Gertie wrote: June 27th, 2022, 7:53 am
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 2:01 am
Astro Cat wrote: June 23rd, 2022, 1:59 amIn the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."
QUOTE>
"Not all the ways the world can be represented are ways the world is, so a particular species of creature found it necessary to employ the following convention to distinguish representations from misrepresentations. Representations that indicate the way the world actually is they called ‘true,’ and representations that failed to do so they called ‘false.’

Truth is a relation between two things—a representation (the truth bearer) and the world or some part of it (the truthmaker). The Truthmaker Principle is intended to capture this fact. It is not meant to suggest that things in the world actually make truths as fire makes heat; it is not the ‘make’ of the sort in which they (in and of themselves) cause things called ‘truths’ to come into existence. A world in which there were no representations (i.e. no truth bearers) would be a world in which there were no truths."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 24-5)
<QUOTE

If the "Truthmaker Principle" is the principle that all truths have truthmakers (aka truthmaker maximalism), then there are philosophers who reject it.

See:

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
I agree it's not at heart a linguistic issue about propositions. It's an issue of inter-subjective falsifiability.

Each human creates a personal experiential representation (model) of the world as we interact with it. That interaction manifests in subjects on-the-hoof, as conscious experience. When we compare notes we create a shared model of our shared world. Physical things like white snow are third person falsifiable via observation and measurement. I point at the snow, and as a fellow human with similar sensory and cognitive systems your experiential interaction with the snow is presumably much like mine, and we agree the snow is white. Language is how we symbolically represent our experience, which adds extra room for error and a layer of abstraction, but that's not the underlying issue. The under-lying issue for justifying our inter-subjective agreement that snow is white, is that we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. So while our experiential models of the world might tally, that doesn't mean they are accurate and complete.

- Each experiencing subject has a flawed and limited first person pov

- We can compare notes on things like lumps on the bed which are physical (observable and measurable) and can agree we both see a lump on the bed (we can't see through the blankets, hence the error), to create an inter-subjective model of our shared physical world. This is third person pov falsifiability.

- But we don't know how close our inter-subjective models correspond with ontological reality, because we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. We don't have a god's-eye pov.
Our common or shared experience of reality - for example, of that stuff we call snow - isn't the issue. Correspondence or truth-maker/truth-bearer theories are theories about truth, which (like falsehood) is an attribute of some factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - not of features of reality or our experiences of them.

The claim that 'snow is white' is true because snow is white is patently tautological - a purely linguistic matter. It doesn't take us outside language, because a use of language can't do that. And there is, in fact, no correspondence whatsover between the linguistic expression and the feature of reality it describes.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Gertie »

Peter Holmes wrote: June 27th, 2022, 10:12 am
Gertie wrote: June 27th, 2022, 7:53 am
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 2:01 am
Astro Cat wrote: June 23rd, 2022, 1:59 amIn the same sense, I'm fond of correspondence theory and think it's important we be able to define or give some idea of what is going on when we say something is "true."
QUOTE>
"Not all the ways the world can be represented are ways the world is, so a particular species of creature found it necessary to employ the following convention to distinguish representations from misrepresentations. Representations that indicate the way the world actually is they called ‘true,’ and representations that failed to do so they called ‘false.’

Truth is a relation between two things—a representation (the truth bearer) and the world or some part of it (the truthmaker). The Truthmaker Principle is intended to capture this fact. It is not meant to suggest that things in the world actually make truths as fire makes heat; it is not the ‘make’ of the sort in which they (in and of themselves) cause things called ‘truths’ to come into existence. A world in which there were no representations (i.e. no truth bearers) would be a world in which there were no truths."

(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. pp. 24-5)
<QUOTE

If the "Truthmaker Principle" is the principle that all truths have truthmakers (aka truthmaker maximalism), then there are philosophers who reject it.

See:

Truthmakers: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthmakers/
I agree it's not at heart a linguistic issue about propositions. It's an issue of inter-subjective falsifiability.

Each human creates a personal experiential representation (model) of the world as we interact with it. That interaction manifests in subjects on-the-hoof, as conscious experience. When we compare notes we create a shared model of our shared world. Physical things like white snow are third person falsifiable via observation and measurement. I point at the snow, and as a fellow human with similar sensory and cognitive systems your experiential interaction with the snow is presumably much like mine, and we agree the snow is white. Language is how we symbolically represent our experience, which adds extra room for error and a layer of abstraction, but that's not the underlying issue. The under-lying issue for justifying our inter-subjective agreement that snow is white, is that we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. So while our experiential models of the world might tally, that doesn't mean they are accurate and complete.

- Each experiencing subject has a flawed and limited first person pov

- We can compare notes on things like lumps on the bed which are physical (observable and measurable) and can agree we both see a lump on the bed (we can't see through the blankets, hence the error), to create an inter-subjective model of our shared physical world. This is third person pov falsifiability.

- But we don't know how close our inter-subjective models correspond with ontological reality, because we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. We don't have a god's-eye pov.
Our common or shared experience of reality - for example, of that stuff we call snow - isn't the issue. Correspondence or truth-maker/truth-bearer theories are theories about truth, which (like falsehood) is an attribute of some factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - not of features of reality or our experiences of them.

The claim that 'snow is white' is true because snow is white is patently tautological - a purely linguistic matter. It doesn't take us outside language, because a use of language can't do that. And there is, in fact, no correspondence whatsover between the linguistic expression and the feature of reality it describes.
Well yes the assigned agreed word for what we experience as cold white wet stuff is ''snow'' , so the proposition that ''snow'' is that cold, white wet stuff is tautological. That's just word games, but we expect more from the concept of truth. We can agree how to define a unicorn, but if I say I have one in my attic you'd want to see it with your own eyes.

The truth-bearer/truth-maker framing is a way of saying that it's experiencing subjects who create knowledge via our experiential interaction with the world. But we can't know that knowledge corresponds to ontological reality if we are flawed and limited observers and thinkers. So correspondence is a form of inter-subjective falsifiability which can eliminate anomalies in how humans subjectively experience eg snow.

Language is an abstract symbolic encoding of our actual conscious experience (thoughts, sensory perceptions, sensations, imaginings, memories, etc) which enables us to communicate our private, first person experience and compare notes.

The linguistic symbol isn't the experience, and the experience isn't the thing being experienced.

So what's actually going on, what are we talking about here, how do we decide what propositions to call ''true'' -

I think what we do is each create first person experiential models of the world via interacting with it, then inter-subjectively compare notes via language and other synbols (because our experience is private), and note similarities and differences which we categorise in different ways. Some of those categories we agree to categories as , ''objective'', ''factual'' and corresponding to the real ontological world we experience/interact with. Propositions linguistically representing these agreed ''facts'' we call ''true''. Physical stuff which is third person observable/measurable we can inter-subjectively agree on/falsify - using our evolved-for-utility (not complete accuracy) sensory and cognitive experiential toolkit.

But the only directly known truth is in the form of our own experience. So I point at what I experience as white snow and ask you if you see/feel it too. You agree. We can't know each other's private experience (see eg the prob of inverted qualia), but our language works reliably enough for us to eventually come up with a shared physical (observable/measurable) model of our world reducible to particle physics.

Abstract, conceptual agreed ''truths'' like reason, logic, cause and effect, theorising from observing predictable patterns - like our physicalist model these are all ultimately rooted in our (designed-for-utility) experience of the world and how it works. And if we're flawed and limited observers and thinkers, they carry that caveat too as regards how accurate/true they are.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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Peter Holmes wrote: June 27th, 2022, 5:30 am
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 1:50 amTo say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
Have a really good think about what you say. 'Snow is white' is true because real snow really is white. Truth-maker/truth-bearer theory is just correspondence theory in another form. That we don't recognise the tautology demonstrates the way we confuse what we say about things for the way things are.
"A logical combination of sentences that is always true, regardless of the truth or falsity of the constituent sentences, is known as a 'tautology'."

(Rucker, Rudy. Mind Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality. London: Penguin, 1988. p. 211)

Thus defined, T<p> <—> p is a logical tautology, because every sentential substitution for p results in a true biconditional, no matter whether p is true or false. For example, it is false that Joe Biden is the president of Canada; but it is still true that the sentence "Joe Biden is the president of Canada" is true if and only if Joe Biden is the president of Canada.

Despite being tautological, the right side of T<p> <—> p is world-involving, which means that truth depends or supervenes on how the world is or isn't.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Leontiskos »

Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 1:50 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 25th, 2022, 5:41 amTrouble is, a correspondence is a two-way relationship. But the assertion 'snow is white' is true because - what we call snow is what we call white - which is effectively a tautology - a purely linguistic affair.
To say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
Of course you are correct. Holmes is back, and he's far from Sherlock. :lol: He still hasn't worked out the difference between a proposition and that which a proposition signifies.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

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"[T]ruth should hinge on reality, and it does. No sentence is true but reality but makes it so."

"Truth hinges on reality; but to object, on this score, to calling sentences true, is a confusion. Where the truth predicate has its utility is in just those places where, though still concerned with reality, we are impelled by certain technical complications to mention sentences. Here the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point."


(Quine, W. V. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. pp. 10+11)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
Peter Holmes
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Leontiskos wrote: June 27th, 2022, 6:35 pm
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 1:50 am
Peter Holmes wrote: June 25th, 2022, 5:41 amTrouble is, a correspondence is a two-way relationship. But the assertion 'snow is white' is true because - what we call snow is what we call white - which is effectively a tautology - a purely linguistic affair.
To say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
Of course you are correct. Holmes is back, and he's far from Sherlock. :lol: He still hasn't worked out the difference between a proposition and that which a proposition signifies.
Sweet - this confidence that the existence and nature of propositions is a settled matter. For example, is a proposition what a statement states, an assertion asserts, a claim claims - and so on? Is it (see Stanford) 'the primary bearer of truth-value'? Is it the ghost inside or behind a token declarative? Or is it the declarative itself, so that there's a 'difference between a proposition and that which a proposition signifies'?

If token declaratives (real things) and the propositions they supposedly express are different things - so that propositions are abstract (unreal) things - then what and where are propositions, and what's the connection between them and their tokens? And if propositions are not these fictional abstract things, then why talk about them at all? Ah - because - that's what we've always done in philosophy.

Truth is, this is a tired old conceptual mess - like the supposed existence and nature of concepts and other fictional abstract things - that still mires us in confusion. But hey, why bother with genuine critical thinking?
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 4:52 pm
Peter Holmes wrote: June 27th, 2022, 5:30 am
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 1:50 amTo say that "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white isn't "a purely linguistic affair", because snow's being white isn't a linguistic affair.
Have a really good think about what you say. 'Snow is white' is true because real snow really is white. Truth-maker/truth-bearer theory is just correspondence theory in another form. That we don't recognise the tautology demonstrates the way we confuse what we say about things for the way things are.
"A logical combination of sentences that is always true, regardless of the truth or falsity of the constituent sentences, is known as a 'tautology'."

(Rucker, Rudy. Mind Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality. London: Penguin, 1988. p. 211)

Thus defined, T<p> <—> p is a logical tautology, because every sentential substitution for p results in a true biconditional, no matter whether p is true or false. For example, it is false that Joe Biden is the president of Canada; but it is still true that the sentence "Joe Biden is the president of Canada" is true if and only if Joe Biden is the president of Canada.

Despite being tautological, the right side of T<p> <—> p is world-involving, which means that truth depends or supervenes on how the world is or isn't.
Good grief. This is to rehash Saussure's mistake - sign = signifier + (magically) signified - and its absurd but inevitable consequences, in Derrida and others.

There's nothing canine about the word dog, or the word canine. Who could think there is? Ah - a correspondence theorist.

Let's see. The assertion 'snow is white' is true iff snow is white. 'Despite being tautological' (saying the same thing twice), this 'is world-involving'. Let's just keep on mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Swot we've always done.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Peter Holmes »

Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 10:42 pm "[T]ruth should hinge on reality, and it does. No sentence is true but reality but makes it so."

"Truth hinges on reality; but to object, on this score, to calling sentences true, is a confusion. Where the truth predicate has its utility is in just those places where, though still concerned with reality, we are impelled by certain technical complications to mention sentences. Here the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality; it serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole point."


(Quine, W. V. Philosophy of Logic. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. pp. 10+11)
Quine was brilliantly and entertainingly wrong about this. And this passage shows it wonderfully. The 'truth-predicate' - p is true - is useful in that it 'serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to the reality'. So the sentence 'p is true' somehow, 'as it were' - (as it were what - not a metaphor - not a linguistic expression?) gets to the reality that p asserts. For the rest of the time, we can just use sentences and forget that they're sentences.

Quine remains my almost-favourite philosopher.
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Consul »

Peter Holmes wrote: June 28th, 2022, 5:12 am
Consul wrote: June 27th, 2022, 4:52 pm"A logical combination of sentences that is always true, regardless of the truth or falsity of the constituent sentences, is known as a 'tautology'."

(Rucker, Rudy. Mind Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality. London: Penguin, 1988. p. 211)

Thus defined, T<p> <—> p is a logical tautology, because every sentential substitution for p results in a true biconditional, no matter whether p is true or false. For example, it is false that Joe Biden is the president of Canada; but it is still true that the sentence "Joe Biden is the president of Canada" is true if and only if Joe Biden is the president of Canada.

Despite being tautological, the right side of T<p> <—> p is world-involving, which means that truth depends or supervenes on how the world is or isn't.
Good grief. This is to rehash Saussure's mistake - sign = signifier + (magically) signified - and its absurd but inevitable consequences, in Derrida and others.

There's nothing canine about the word dog, or the word canine. Who could think there is? Ah - a correspondence theorist.

Let's see. The assertion 'snow is white' is true iff snow is white. 'Despite being tautological' (saying the same thing twice), this 'is world-involving'. Let's just keep on mistaking what we say about things for the way things are. Swot we've always done.
You're not using "tautology" in the logical sense (as defined above), in which it doesn't mean "the repetition (esp. in the immediate context) of the same word or phrase, or of the same idea or statement in other words" (OED). In "Snow is white" is true iff snow is white we have a metalinguistic sentence about the sentence "Snow is white" on the left side and an object-linguistic sentence about the worldly state of affairs of snow's being white, which is the truth-condition of the sentence "Snow is white".
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Re: JTB: the myth of propositions and the Gettier problem

Post by Consul »

Consul wrote: June 28th, 2022, 1:41 pm …and an object-linguistic sentence about the worldly state of affairs of snow's being white, which is the truth-condition of the sentence "Snow is white".
Note that the truth-condition is the worldly state of affairs of snow's being white rather than the sentence "Snow is white"!
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The Not So Great American Novel

The Not So Great American Novel
by James E Doucette
September 2022

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches

Mary Jane Whiteley Coggeshall, Hicksite Quaker, Iowa/National Suffragette And Her Speeches
by John N. (Jake) Ferris
October 2022

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All

In It Together: The Beautiful Struggle Uniting Us All
by Eckhart Aurelius Hughes
November 2022

The Smartest Person in the Room: The Root Cause and New Solution for Cybersecurity

The Smartest Person in the Room
by Christian Espinosa
December 2022

2021 Philosophy Books of the Month

The Biblical Clock: The Untold Secrets Linking the Universe and Humanity with God's Plan

The Biblical Clock
by Daniel Friedmann
March 2021

Wilderness Cry: A Scientific and Philosophical Approach to Understanding God and the Universe

Wilderness Cry
by Dr. Hilary L Hunt M.D.
April 2021

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute: Tools To Spark Your Dream And Ignite Your Follow-Through

Fear Not, Dream Big, & Execute
by Jeff Meyer
May 2021

Surviving the Business of Healthcare: Knowledge is Power

Surviving the Business of Healthcare
by Barbara Galutia Regis M.S. PA-C
June 2021

Winning the War on Cancer: The Epic Journey Towards a Natural Cure

Winning the War on Cancer
by Sylvie Beljanski
July 2021

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream

Defining Moments of a Free Man from a Black Stream
by Dr Frank L Douglas
August 2021

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts

If Life Stinks, Get Your Head Outta Your Buts
by Mark L. Wdowiak
September 2021

The Preppers Medical Handbook

The Preppers Medical Handbook
by Dr. William W Forgey M.D.
October 2021

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress: A Practical Guide

Natural Relief for Anxiety and Stress
by Dr. Gustavo Kinrys, MD
November 2021

Dream For Peace: An Ambassador Memoir

Dream For Peace
by Dr. Ghoulem Berrah
December 2021