Could this be an incisive definition for consciousness?

[Consul]

First-order consciousness (= experience) is one thing, and second-order consciousness (= introspective/reflective knowledge or awareness) of first-order consciousness is another; and the former doesn't entail the latter.

Why not just keep it simple and just say --

Experiences (bodily reactions) are one thing, and Consciousness (the “knowing” of said experience) is another.

Well, it depends on the definition of "consciousness". This word is ambiguous, but one central meaning is in fact "subjective experience" (aka "phenomenal consciousness"), and that's why I reject the general semantic equation of "consciousness" with "(introspective/reflective) awareness of one's mental/experiential states" or "perception/cognition of one's mind/experience".

"One simple way to draw a connection between consciousness and experience is this: a creature is conscious at time t if and only if it is undergoing one or more experiences at t.

Not quite. These are two different events that occur at two different times.

Again, “experience” is one thing and the “consciousness” (of this experience) is another, -- one naturally 'follows’ the other (...is AFTER the other). It is one thing to 'experience' something, and then it is quite another to 'know' you experience this something.

That which happens in reality (in real-time), and that which happens in the conscious mind of the observer (in conscious-time) are two different events, happening at two different times.

The time lag between these two associated events is called our CTD (Conscious Time Delay).

You're right insofar as simply undergoing an experience is not the same as being (cognitively: introspectively or reflectively) conscious/aware of one's experience or that one is undergoing it. Experience qua first-order consciousness doesn't require and depend on second-order consciousness (awareness) of first-order consciousness.

As for the temporal relationship between an experience and (cognitive) awareness/consciousness of it, there is a difference between saying that they do not begin at the same time, with the latter beginning after the former, and saying that they do not temporally overlap at all, in the sense that awareness of experience is always awareness of (completely) past experience and never awareness of present or current experience—in which case introspection would always be retrospection. But we can become (introspectively) aware of experiences we (now) have.

Further and relatedly, a mental state is conscious if and only if it is an experience. Assuming that an experience is a mental state such that there is something it is like to undergo it, it follows that a mental state is conscious if and only if there is something it is like for the subject of the state to undergo it.

To clarify (and simplify):
Experiences are NOT “mental states”, ...experiences are “bodily reactions”.

The mental 'recognitions’ of these bodily reactions are our (conscious) “mental states”.

No, experiences are experiential states (or events), and as such they are a kind of mental states called conscious mental states (or simply conscious states) by Tye (and many others). He uses "conscious (mental) state" synonymously with "experiential state", such that being in a conscious state doesn't necessarily mean being conscious or aware of (being in) that state (in the higher-order transitive sense of "conscious").

By the way, quite a few philosophers (including Descartes) think that conscious/experiential states are the only kind of (genuinely and distinctively) mental states, such that mind = consciousness/experience.

One objection "is that the Simple view is inconsistent. Some experiences are unconscious.

ALL experiences are unconscious.

We are only conscious of the resulting ‘recognition’ (mental interpretation/representation) of-the-experience.

‘Recognition’ is our means (brain process) of converting the 'unconscious’-to-the-’conscious’.

I'm not sure I can follow you here, but I really don't think that we cannot become conscious/aware of our experiences themselves but only of mental representations of them. Introspective awareness (as inner perception, not as thought) is direct, i.e. representationally unmediated, awareness of experiences.

Take, for example, the visual experiences of the distracted driver as she drives her car down the road. She is concentrating hard on other matters (the phone call she is answering about the overdue rent, the coffee in her right hand, etc.), so her visual experiences are unconscious. But her experiences exist alright. How else does she keep the car on the road? An unconscious experience is impossible, however, on the Simple View, for such an experience is an experience that is not an experience!

You seem to imply that we humans can consciously “do” things, like drive cars and move our bodies about, ...we don’t, we can't.

We can't consciously ‘do’ anything! We can’t do the impossible.

1- Do we consciously move our body about? Or…
2- Are we just conscious of our body moving about?

2 is the only possible answer.

Consciously ‘doing’ anything is logically impossible, for EVERYTHING that we are conscious of, has already happened! ...via CTD.

If by "conscious doing" you mean intentional action, then we are capable of that.

As far as the sensory perception of external and more or less distant objects or events is concerned, it takes some time for light or sound waves to travel from them to our eyes or ears, and further for neural signals to travel from the eyes or ears to the brain, so that we never perceive them exactly as they are now but only as they were some time ago.
But introspection, the inner perception of (the content of) one's mind/consciousness is unlike outer (sensory) perception, because there is no spatial distance between the mental act/event of introspecting and the introspected mental event and there are no physical intermediaries involved such as light or sound waves. Inner perception is immediate perception, so it's not impossible for subjects to become aware of their experiences as they are now.

-- Updated October 7th, 2017, 6:54 am to add the following --

More questions need to be addressed about consciousness to have an incisive definition for it: If I get a cut, does my immune system become conscious of it or not? If my immune system is unconscious of it, how can it react against the infection? Is my immune system simply reacting to an infection in the sense that what sets it in motion and controls it is the adverse agent? So, the knife is conscious of the immune system?

The immune system is a mere physiological stimulus-response system, whose workings have nothing to do with consciousness.

Experiencing something and being conscious of something are expressions of similar meaning. Essentially, experiencing means to go through whatever. But you can be conscious of something without experiencing it. I am conscious of the presence of the spacecraft Voyager but I'm not experiencing that presence. A bullet going through a wall is experiencing the wall. Is the bullet conscious of the wall as well when it experiences it? Is the conscience of the bullet being affected by the wall? The bullet modifies it's speed and shape as it goes through the wall. Isn't this evidence of some degree of consciousness within the bullet? Why not? The experiencing of the wall has nothing to do with how the bullet is affected by the wall. The experiencing of the wall simply informs us of a passage of the bullet through a wall.

First of all, as I already mentioned in a previous post, there is a relevant distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness:

"An intuitive way to talk about consciousness is to say that a mental state is conscious when we are conscious of it. But this intuitive formulation utilizes two different uses of the word 'conscious.' The first use is called intransitive, because this form of consciousness has no object. State consciousness is an intransitive form of consciousness. The second use is called transitive, because this form of consciousness takes an object; transitive consciousness is consciousness of something. Introspective consciousness is a transitive form of consciousness, because it takes mental states as objects."

(IEP entry on Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness)

It should be understood that the relevant concept of experience is the psychological one, viz. the concept of mental experience or subjective experience (which is used synonymously with the concept of phenomenal consciousness). Bullets going through walls are thereby physically affected somehow, but they subjectively experience (or perceive) nothing, since bullets aren't subjects of (phenomenal) consciousness.

* Experiencing something is the same as being intransitively conscious.

* Perceiving something is the same as being transitively conscious of something.

(However, perceiving is not the only way of being conscious of something: "When one thinks of a thing as being present to one, that does suffice for one to be conscious of that thing, even when one doesn't sense or perceive that thing." [Source])

* Experiencing is not the same as perceiving. To hallucinate is to have a sensory experience, but it is not to perceive anything (through the experience).

* Strictly speaking, subjects never experience anything but their experiences, which is certainly not to say that they never perceive anything but their experiences. We (sensorily) perceive things by experiencing appearances of them.

[RJG]

If by "conscious doing" you mean intentional action, then we are capable of that.

Consul, we are NOT "capable" of doing the impossible. An “intentional action” is self-contradictory (i.e. non-sensical). It is not logically possible to “intend” anything.

For how does one actually “intend” anything (i.e. commit an “intentional act”)? Mustn’t one first have a pre-requisite ‘intention’ to do this “intending” in the first place? ...otherwise, then why do it? And for this “intentional act” to be a true “intentional act”, mustn’t one first ‘intend’ this pre-requisite ‘intention’ to do this “intending” of the “intentional act”?

As you can see “intentionality” is self-contradictory. One cannot “intend” anything without there existing the prior “intention” to do so. This prior “intention” defeats any viability of true 'intentionality', making the term itself self-contradictory.

We can only consciously experience the feeling of 'intention', ...that’s it! “Consciously doing” or “intentionally doing”, is not logically possible.

But we can become (introspectively) aware of experiences we (now) have.

Not so. Everything that we are aware of has already happened!

“Instantaneous” awareness (detection/sensing) is not possible. Even the world’s fastest computer cannot process “instantaneously”. Science tells us that the average human takes 150-200 milliseconds to process awareness/recognition.

“The important thing to understand about the moment NOW is that it is actually the moment THEN. You can only experience something that has already happened so essentially you're living in the wake of your own past.” -- Obvious Leo

As far as the sensory perception of external and more or less distant objects or events is concerned, it takes some time for light or sound waves to travel from them to our eyes or ears, and further for neural signals to travel from the eyes or ears to the brain, so that we never perceive them exactly as they are now but only as they were some time ago.

Agreed. This is called “Transmission” delay. But there are two other delays that contribute to our overall CTD (Conscious Time Delay); that being “Translation” (converting these light/sound waves into electrical signals/patterns that the brain can understand), and “Recognition” (the matching of these signals/patterns to corresponding memory patterns so as to “know” what one experiences).

But introspection, the inner perception of (the content of) one's mind/consciousness is unlike outer (sensory) perception, because there is no spatial distance between the mental act/event of introspecting and the introspected mental event and there are no physical intermediaries involved such as light or sound waves. Inner perception is immediate perception, so it's not impossible for subjects to become aware of their experiences as they are now.

Not so. Nothing can happen "instantaneously" or "immediately". Instantaneous or immediate awareness/detecting/sensing, or any brain processing of any kind is not possible. Also, you are forgetting about Translation and Recognition delays.

[Consul]

Nonconscious AI robots can control themselves (their behavior) too.

No they can't. They just run based on mechanical and electrical laws. They don't do anything. The program runs, that's all.

I'm talking about advanced AI robots which aren't mere program-executors but autonomous agents, and there is no scientific reason for denying the possibility of intelligent agents which are nonconscious (in the sense of not being subjects of experience). The robots in the Terminator movies are fictional examples.

See: Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: 
A Taxonomy for Autonomous Agents

No, I'm not "making up a bunch of stuff." Dreams/dreamings are doubtless conscious events in the sense of being experiential events. You do experience your dreams subjectively, so dreaming is a way of being conscious (irrespective of its being an "altered state of consciousness").

Experiencing things does not imply consciousness. Only awareness.

It would be very helpful if you presented explicit definitions of your concepts of consciousness and awareness.

Nobody considers a person conscious while they're asleep. Your definition flies in the face of common sense.

Sleeping dreamlessly is a nonconscious/nonexperiential state indeed, but dreaming is not.

One of the leading neuroscientific experts in dream research writes that …

"…the dreaming brain brings about a phenomenal world-for-me during sleep. … [P]henomenal consciousness in all its glory comes about in the sleeping brain. It is a normal, typical feature of the sleeping brain, especially in the REM stage. The form and content of phenomenal consciousness during dreaming closely resembles the form and content of phenomenal consciousness during wakefulness. Hence, the dreaming brain can be regarded as an incomparable model system for the science of consciousness."

(Revonsuo, Antti. Inner Presence: Consciousness as a Biological Phenomenon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. p. 84)

Yes, there is some difference, even though it is very hard to define. My point is that you're wrong in supposing that only conscious beings can do something. Brainless animals (e.g. sponges and jellyfish), AI robots, and (philosophical) zombies, all of which lack consciousness, are arguably able to do something, to exhibit behavior.

Sure, just like a man in a coma, completely unconscious, might move his arm due to a neurological "tick". Or a man sleeping might unconsciously move his arm. Something moving does not imply consciousness.

Right, but although both comatose people and non-comatose brainless animals lack consciousness, only the latter exhibit behavior (which, put simply, is what organisms do).

Anyway, to repeat myself, the capacity for behavior or action is not a necessary condition of the capacity for consciousness, so the latter cannot adequately be defined in terms of the former.

The ability to do is definitely a condition for consciousness. If one is merely reacting to external forces, being pushed and pulled around by them, like a tree bending from the wind, or a boulder rolling down a hill, then one is not conscious. In fact, not being able to do is exactly what defines a machine, the antithesis of a conscious entity.

Why should an inherently totally passive or inert being be incapable of consciousness? Consider Galen Strawson's Weather Watchers:

"The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. They are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted to the ground, profoundly interested in the local weather. They have sensations, thoughts, emotions, beliefs, desires. They possess a conception of an objective, spatial world. But they are constitutionally incapable of any sort of behavior, as this is ordinarily understood. They lack the necessary physiology. Their mental lives have no other-observable effects. They are not even disposed to behave in any way. Are the Weather Watchers impossible?"

(Strawson, Galen. Mental Reality. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. p. 251)

Strawson and I answer this question in the negative. The capacity for behavior and the capacity for consciousness are mutually independent.

[Empiricist-Bruno]

RJG,
What you claim about the bullet knowing or not knowing anything, do you claim it because you know what it is to be a bullet?
As a bullet, I could exude the impression that the type of marks I got on my body during my experiencing of the wall form my memory of my passage there. Those marks are a bullet's way of memorizing, aren't they?

Consul,
I looked up the definition of transitive and it applies to verbs. Consciousness is a noun. Are you conscious of that? This use of an adjective that applies to verbs suggest to me you see consciousness as a verb, perhaps the verb minding?

Atreyu,
If you are asleep and dreaming, do you not consider yourself conscious? If you do, then there is at least one person that considers a person asleep as conscious. Right? Are you conscious of that?

[Consul]

Consul, I looked up the definition of transitive and it applies to verbs. Consciousness is a noun. Are you conscious of that? This use of an adjective that applies to verbs suggest to me you see consciousness as a verb, perhaps the verb minding?

Linguists speak of transitive/intransitive verbs, and the word "verb" is a noun too. The phrase "transitive/intransitive consciousness" is a technical term in the philosophy of mind.

"consciousness, transitive, being aware of something. Transitive consciousness is marked by there being something of which one is conscious, as in being conscious of the feeling of one’s clothing. In contrast, intransitive consciousness involves being conscious without there necessarily being anything of which one is conscious. Many philosophers of mind see transitive consciousness as being closely related to intentionality and mental representation: being conscious of something requires having a mental representation of that something, as in when one has a thought about that something.
One controversy surrounding transitive consciousness is whether it is a requirement on state consciousness. Some philosophers hold that a state is conscious only if one is conscious of that state. This is a view closely associated with the higher-order theory of consciousness. Other philosophers hold that a state can be conscious without one being conscious of that state."

(Mandik, Pete. Key Terms in Philosophy of Mind. London: Continuum, 2010. p. 31)

(I belong to those "other philosophers".)

[RJG]

What you claim about the bullet knowing or not knowing anything, do you claim it because you know what it is to be a bullet?

No, I don't know what it is to be a bullet. I claim it because I don't believe a bullet has the hardware to be able to ‘know’.

As a bullet, I could exude the impression that the type of marks I got on my body during my experiencing of the wall form my memory of my passage there. Those marks are a bullet's way of memorizing, aren't they?

What memory? A bullet does not have memory. If it did, then it would be possible for it to ‘know’.

[Empiricist-Bruno]

Consul wrote:

Linguists speak of transitive/intransitive verbs, and the word "verb" is a noun too. The phrase "transitive/intransitive consciousness" is a technical term in the philosophy of mind.

Ho! I see. Because we can speak of transitive/intransitive verbs and verbs is a noun we now have serious evidence that the advectives transitive/intransitive do not apply only to verbs but to other nouns as well?

So, it's impossible to tell the truth when you say that the adjectives transitive/intransitive apply only to verbs because transitive/intransitive verbs as an expression does exist and verbs is a noun?

But are you conscious of the fact that in this case the transitive/intransitive adjectives do not modify the noun verb the way these adjectives normally modify the word they are associated with? Verbs in this context represent a category and each or any element of this category is the intended target of the adjectives transitive/intransitive, and not the noun verbs.

-- Updated October 7th, 2017, 5:47 pm to add the following --

RJG, a bullet does not have memory? It does not remember the shape in which it was formed? Every bullet remembers that don't they? If it did not, how would you know the shape in which it was formed? It is informing you of at least of this much isn't it? If it did not remember, then how would it be able to stay in its original shape?

[RJG]

RJG, a bullet does not have memory? It does not remember the shape in which it was formed? Every bullet remembers that don't they?

No. Bullets can’t “remember”, they can't recall/replay their experiences.

[Burning ghost]

RJG -

Some may argue that we don't "experience" sensations at all, but only meanings. I can "experience" a rock as a chair, table or as an object to hide behind.

Understanding things plays into what they may or may not mean to you.

When I see a rainbow it is because it means something, I do not have to consciously relate it to a previous experience. Explicit and implicit memories are quite different.

[Sy Borg]

A question, RJG. You say that experience is basically the crux of consciousness, but it feels like you are replacing one word with another. What actually is experience? Your responses feel to me like the claim that the universe consists of energy, and the same regression issue crops up - what actually is energy?

[RJG]

Some may argue that we don't "experience" sensations at all, but only meanings.

Possibly, but aren't “meanings” themselves composed and formed by sensations?

For example, hearing the sounds “ca”-”aa”-”tt” causes the brain to form the mental imagery resulting in one's “meaning” of “cat”.

I can "experience" a rock as a chair, table or as an object to hide behind. Understanding things plays into what they may or may not mean to you.

Agreed. The 'words’ that we use are just short-cut ‘labels’ for our individual meanings. And our individual meanings, and resulting understandings of a particular word may differ from one another.

When I see a rainbow it is because it means something, I do not have to consciously relate it to a previous experience.

Maybe I don't follow what you are getting at. But when you say “it means something”, then what is this “something”? Isn't this “something”, something?

It seems that meanings must be composed of something (sensations) or else it would be ‘blank’ (nothing), ...right?

You say that experience is basically the crux of consciousness, but it feels like you are replacing one word with another. What actually is experience?

Experience = bodily reaction

The reactions that occur within or upon any entity within this universe, seemingly dictate its subsequent movements/behavior/actions. As an inhabitant of this universe, the ‘human body’ entity is no different. It experiences many bodily reactions and likewise auto-reacts accordingly.

Many entities (including billiard balls, and worms, and plants) experience bodily reactions, but not many “know" it. Those that “know” it are the ones that are considered “conscious”.

Consciousness = the 'recognition’ (knowing) of said bodily reaction, made possible by 'memory'.

[Burning ghost]

RJG -

I was trying to point out that the "meaning" happens in the conscious "moment". I am not conscious of some external "meaning." Reducing all that consciousness is to measureable items and thinking that is all there is like treating a rock ONLY as a chair, and not even being able to see it as any other item.

[Consul]

But we can become (introspectively) aware of experiences we (now) have.

Not so. Everything that we are aware of has already happened!

“Instantaneous” awareness (detection/sensing) is not possible. Even the world’s fastest computer cannot process “instantaneously”. Science tells us that the average human takes 150-200 milliseconds to process awareness/recognition.

My point is that my (introspective) awareness of an experience can be simultaneous with it, so that I can become aware of present, currently happening experiences and not only of (completely) past ones. For example, while looking at my computer display I have certain visual impressions and am aware of (having) them at the same time. And I can also become (perceptually) aware of currently happening external, nonmental events or ongoing processes.

However, your point seems to be that being able to be aware of current processes doesn't mean being able to be aware of now-slices of them, but only being able to be aware of (immediately) past phases of them. Well, this seems to depend on the temporal extension of the now or the present: Is it really a temporally unextended instant, with now-slices of processes having a duration of 0s, or is it a short interval, with processual now-slices having a duration >0s?

All this raises very complicated questions in the philosophy of time and the philosophy of mind (concerning temporal consciousness), and I have no simple ready-made answers to them.

But introspection, the inner perception of (the content of) one's mind/consciousness is unlike outer (sensory) perception, because there is no spatial distance between the mental act/event of introspecting and the introspected mental event and there are no physical intermediaries involved such as light or sound waves. Inner perception is immediate perception, so it's not impossible for subjects to become aware of their experiences as they are now.

Not so. Nothing can happen "instantaneously" or "immediately". Instantaneous or immediate awareness/detecting/sensing, or any brain processing of any kind is not possible. Also, you are forgetting about Translation and Recognition delays.

Again, I'm not saying that my awareness of an experience can begin instantaneously with the beginning of the experience, but only that once both the experience and my awareness of it have begun, the latter can be simultaneous with the former.

The objects of introspection are experiences I have, ones which are still there, not ones I had, ones which are no longer there—there being a difference between introspection and retrospection. (I know there are philosophers and psychologists who claim that introspection is the same as retrospection, but I disagree with them.)

To call introspection immediate inner perception of one's mental states is to say that—as opposed to outer, sensory perception—it doesn't involve any appearances or impressions of the introspected mental states. There is no additional phenomenology of introspection constituting a perceptual intermediary between the introspecting and what is introspected. It follows that the appearance/reality or seeming/being distinction is not applicable to the introspection of one's mind. There can be perceptual/phenomenal illusions of outer, sensory perception, but there cannot be perceptual/phenomenal illusions of inner perception/introspection, because here the appearance is the reality, the seeming is the being.

[Empiricist-Bruno]

RGJ,

Experience= bodily reaction

Consciousness = the 'recognition’ (knowing) of said bodily reaction, made possible by 'memory'.

So,

Consciousness= Experience unknown + Same Experience known.

My question is if you have an unknown experience, can you know that your knowledge of that unknown experience will be cognizant?

-- Updated October 8th, 2017, 12:39 pm to add the following --

RGJ,

Do you define remembering as the ability to recall, replay one's experience? Is world culture my experience? Can I remember the crucifixion of Jesus? Or can I just remember the story of the crucifixion of Jesus? Memories can't be shared through communication?

[RJG]

I was trying to point out that the "meaning" happens in the conscious "moment". I am not conscious of some external "meaning." Reducing all that consciousness is to measureable items and thinking that is all there is like treating a rock ONLY as a chair, and not even being able to see it as any other item.

I don’t really follow what you are getting at. Every-’thing’ (and/or meaning) that is in our ‘present’ conscious (“now”) moment, is of a ‘past’ event/experience/meaning. The “meaning” does not have any relevance in the present/past relationship.

My point is that my (introspective) awareness of an experience can be simultaneous with it, so that I can become aware of present, currently happening experiences and not only of (completely) past ones.

It only seems like it is “simultaneous”. ALL processes consume time (including the brain process of “becoming aware”).

The content of your ‘present’ awareness can only be filled with ‘past’ experiences.

For example, while looking at my computer display I have certain visual impressions and am aware of (having) them at the same time. And I can also become (perceptually) aware of currently happening external, nonmental events or ongoing processes.

First of all, time has passed (albeit a very small amount of time) from the light waves emitted from the computer display into your eyes (transmission delay), and more time passes from the conversion of these light waves into the signals/patterns that the brain can understand (translation delay), and finally more time passes before you can actually become aware of that which you are detecting/sensing (recognition delay). Transmission, translation, and recognition contribute to our overall CTD (Conscious Time Delay).

Secondly, if there are additional processes as you allude, then these can only ‘add’ to the overall CTD.

However, your point seems to be that being able to be aware of current processes doesn't mean being able to be aware of now-slices of them, but only being able to be aware of (immediately) past phases of them. Well, this seems to depend on the temporal extension of the now or the present: Is it really a temporally unextended instant, with now-slices of processes having a duration of 0s, or is it a short interval, with processual now-slices having a duration >0s?

All this raises very complicated questions in the philosophy of time and the philosophy of mind (concerning temporal consciousness), and I have no simple ready-made answers to them.

Consul, I think you are over-complicating the matter. CTD is just a time ‘lag’, or a time ‘shift’. Things happening in reality (in ‘real-time’), and things happening in the conscious mind of the observer (in ‘conscious-time’) are the same, but just ‘out of sync’. The conscious view of reality is just a “delayed view” of reality, typically from 250 ms to possibly 1 full second (or more), dependent on many variables (i.e internal or external experience and type of experience, experiential conditions, etc.)

To help better understand -- Imagine watching a “live-broadcasted” sporting event on TV. We believe that what we see (on the tv) is actually happening in ‘real-time’, but due to “network transmission delays” of up to 7 seconds, our ‘present’ view actually consists of ‘past’ events. While we may see the batter on TV going through his warm-up swings, but back at Fenway Park, in so-called ‘real-time’, he has already hit a home run, ...we just don’t know it yet!

And likewise, EVERYTHING that we are conscious (or aware) of, has already happened!

We view live sporting events through the ‘time-delayed’ view of our TV. And likewise, we view reality through the ‘time-delayed’ window of consciousness. ...this is our ‘only’ view of reality.

So, Consciousness= Experience unknown + Same Experience known. My question is if you have an unknown experience, can you know that your knowledge of that unknown experience will be cognizant?

Not sure I follow. But an “unknown experience” can’t be “known” until it is 'recognized', which requires ‘memory’.

Do you define remembering as the ability to recall, replay one's experience? Is world culture my experience? Can I remember the crucifixion of Jesus? Or can I just remember the story of the crucifixion of Jesus? Memories can't be shared through communication?

Again, I don’t think I follow. Memories consist of experiences. Whatever you experience is what you experience. If you experienced the actual crucifixion then you did, or if you only experienced the stories about it, then that’s what you experienced. You telling others about your experiences is an experience to them. Sorry if I missed the gist of what you are asking.