No, not a "reference point," awareness transcends both the objective and the subjective. If you can disassociate (to use a clinical term) your consciousness from it's physical affects, That which is aware from the objects of awareness, even if only momentarily, the property of consciousness remains: That which is conscious, timeless in the stream of time. It's not a reference point, but rather That which references.Tamminen said: A complex or composite subject would have properties, but the metaphysical subject is just the reference point of consciousness of the world.
Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
The term 'reference point' is perhaps not so good, I just meant that all being whatsoever always refers to the subject as its ontological precondition. The subject transcends consciousness, because consciousness varies but the subject is the eternal present, the experiencer of all experiences. Therefore I call it the transcendental subject. Have you a different opinion about this?Felix wrote: ↑August 3rd, 2019, 3:54 pmNo, not a "reference point," awareness transcends both the objective and the subjective. If you can disassociate (to use a clinical term) your consciousness from it's physical affects, That which is aware from the objects of awareness, even if only momentarily, the property of consciousness remains: That which is conscious, timeless in the stream of time. It's not a reference point, but rather That which references.Tamminen said: A complex or composite subject would have properties, but the metaphysical subject is just the reference point of consciousness of the world.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Well, I wouldn't say the transcendental subject or Self transcends Consciousness, because consciousness is it's nature. But it does transcend awareness - temporal awareness. This comes and goes but Consciousness seems to be eternal. I would not say it is the "the experiencer of all experiences" because I consider experience to be a derivative of temporal awareness.Tamminen: The subject transcends consciousness, because consciousness varies but the subject is the eternal present, the experiencer of all experiences. Therefore I call it the transcendental subject. Have you a different opinion about this?
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
You are very close the middle of the fray. If Heidegger is right, and temporal awareness exempts any possibility of encountering the world, oneself as present, and so we are therefore in time to even imagine what anything really is, and so we are confined to interpretation, the taking up of something "as" something else (a symbol in language, a symbolic gesture, any "stand-in-place-of symbol--Derrida said symbols do not stand for things, they stand IN for things, the difference lying with division between thing and symbol being far more radical, as I read it-- when trying to understand the world even at the level of basic questions) which carries the meaning via the recollection. this means we are stuck in an arc of interpretation and never make sense of the given, the present which would be something that is absolute. There can be no absolutes when experience itself is always an interpretation through culture and language that issues from one's past (personal, historical) and "makes" the future. Parmenides is out, Heraclitus is in.Felix
because I consider experience to be a derivative of temporal awareness.
BUT, Tamminen says there is something notwithstanding that is abiding. I think he's right, but my arguments are off the beaten path. Suffice it to say that if all utterances, thoughts are at best interpretations, then this pronouncement/thought, too, is interpretative. As such, it is held to no higher standard confirmation, for if all is interpretation, then it is one interpretation subsuming another. This places the matter squarely in Levinas' hands. All things that are within world are equally metaphysical. It is the spurious temptation to say things, and in the saying itself there is the self fulfilling prophesy that all can be said which is meaningful, and we are tempted by this because it is usually right, when you want to buy a house or choose a college major. It is because we live so deeply in language' pragmatic world (human dasein) that we forget there even IS something else.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
I am wondering if my metaphysics can illuminate the very erudite conversations that are transpiring in this forum.Hereandnow wrote: ↑August 3rd, 2019, 7:30 pmYou are very close the middle of the fray. If Heidegger is right, and temporal awareness exempts any possibility of encountering the world, oneself as present, and so we are therefore in time to even imagine what anything really is, and so we are confined to interpretation, the taking up of something "as" something else (a symbol in language, a symbolic gesture, any "stand-in-place-of symbol--Derrida said symbols do not stand for things, they stand IN for things, the difference lying with division between thing and symbol being far more radical, as I read it-- when trying to understand the world even at the level of basic questions) which carries the meaning via the recollection. this means we are stuck in an arc of interpretation and never make sense of the given, the present which would be something that is absolute. There can be no absolutes when experience itself is always an interpretation through culture and language that issues from one's past (personal, historical) and "makes" the future. Parmenides is out, Heraclitus is in.Felix
because I consider experience to be a derivative of temporal awareness.
BUT, Tamminen says there is something notwithstanding that is abiding. I think he's right, but my arguments are off the beaten path. Suffice it to say that if all utterances, thoughts are at best interpretations, then this pronouncement/thought, too, is interpretative. As such, it is held to no higher standard confirmation, for if all is interpretation, then it is one interpretation subsuming another. This places the matter squarely in Levinas' hands. All things that are within world are equally metaphysical. It is the spurious temptation to say things, and in the saying itself there is the self fulfilling prophesy that all can be said which is meaningful, and we are tempted by this because it is usually right, when you want to buy a house or choose a college major. It is because we live so deeply in language' pragmatic world (human dasein) that we forget there even IS something else.
When a world collapses and Big Bangs there are three components. The galactic centers become visible matter, the living ecosystems are what we call dark matter and the leftover mass just becomes part of the nature of space or dark energy.
When those living ecosystems instantiate themselves in the "goldilocks" planets of their collapsed world then we have "our" consciousness simply as an artifact of the consciousness of all worlds of all living ecosystems that preceded us. The difference between these hierarchical levels of consciousness are the "material objects" that they have any casual efficacy over. Each level of consciousness or awareness has its level of objectiveness that it can have any power over. "Experience itself is always an interpretation through culture and language" because consciousness is always about the "objects" that is in its realm of causal relevance.
- Consul
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
By "subjectless processes" Rescher doesn't only mean processes lacking conscious objects/substances as substrata but ones lacking any (conscious or nonconscious) objects/substances as substrata.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
A galactic center of world? Do you mean a universe? Dark matter is a living ecosystem?BigBango
I am wondering if my metaphysics can illuminate the very erudite conversations that are transpiring in this forum.
When a world collapses and Big Bangs there are three components. The galactic centers become visible matter, the living ecosystems are what we call dark matter and the leftover mass just becomes part of the nature of space or dark energy.
When those living ecosystems instantiate themselves in the "goldilocks" planets of their collapsed world then we have "our" consciousness simply as an artifact of the consciousness of all worlds of all living ecosystems that preceded us. The difference between these hierarchical levels of consciousness are the "material objects" that they have any casual efficacy over. Each level of consciousness or awareness has its level of objectiveness that it can have any power over. "Experience itself is always an interpretation through culture and language" because consciousness is always about the "objects" that is in its realm of causal relevance.
Anyway, it's not exactly metaphysics, is it? 'Big bang" is an empirical concept. As are goldilocks planets, galactic centers, dark energy. Consciousness comes up, "as an artifact of consciousness of all worlds that preceded us." I must admit, I am mystified by this? What do you mean? And how is that you conflate culture and language with causality?
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Hereandnow, I apologize for confusing you and leading you to believe that I am conflating culture and language with causality, I am not. The ambiguities that my thesis, as stated, come from an honest attempt on my part to enhance your and Tamminem's assertions with a deeper metaphysical understanding. An understanding that avoids what I judge to be your premature slide into a simply epistemological account of our world/universe. I am not a materialist of any strip. I am a dual aspect, physical/mental, theorist that is here to caution you to not just skip over metaphysical details that science could explore. Let us not rush to God, spirit, transcendence, imminent transcendence or Buddhist' thinking that may be true but fails to uncover the metaphysically discoverable steps that get us there.Hereandnow wrote: ↑August 4th, 2019, 12:33 pmA galactic center of world? Do you mean a universe? Dark matter is a living ecosystem?BigBango
I am wondering if my metaphysics can illuminate the very erudite conversations that are transpiring in this forum.
When a world collapses and Big Bangs there are three components. The galactic centers become visible matter, the living ecosystems are what we call dark matter and the leftover mass just becomes part of the nature of space or dark energy.
When those living ecosystems instantiate themselves in the "goldilocks" planets of their collapsed world then we have "our" consciousness simply as an artifact of the consciousness of all worlds of all living ecosystems that preceded us. The difference between these hierarchical levels of consciousness are the "material objects" that they have any casual efficacy over. Each level of consciousness or awareness has its level of objectiveness that it can have any power over. "Experience itself is always an interpretation through culture and language" because consciousness is always about the "objects" that is in its realm of causal relevance.
Anyway, it's not exactly metaphysics, is it? 'Big bang" is an empirical concept. As are goldilocks planets, galactic centers, dark energy. Consciousness comes up, "as an artifact of consciousness of all worlds that preceded us." I must admit, I am mystified by this? What do you mean? And how is that you conflate culture and language with causality?
I use the term "world" to be descriptive of any segment of the entire universe that encompasses its own set of rules that have little or no connection to other worlds. I am proposing a metaphysics that is similar to Penrose's understanding. That is, a world that vertically evolves into another fractal world that preserves its form rather than the completely isolated parallel worlds of quantum mechanics.
The "world" before the Big Crunch, BB was like the world we know, a world of galaxies that collapsed into three parts. Part one was the smashing together of all the galaxies black hole centers, which turned into a mixture of "singularities" and plasma. Part two were the ecosystems that used their advanced technology to escape the focal point of the Big Crunch BB and we now understand to be Dark Matter. Part three was the non living objects that were not obliterated by the BC/BB and became the flotsam or dark energy of the new world that was born.
The world we are now familiar with is not clearly understood except for the "visible mass" which is science's sweetheart and the dark matter which all we know about is that it is the other 90 percent of the mass of our world and dark energy which constitutes the nature of "space".
Our metaphysical task is now to explicate the relationship between the "consciousness" of the world that collapsed and how it is now embedded in our "goldilocks" planets. This is a metaphysical task even though it does not encompass a full accounting of the nature of "consciousness/subject" in the primordial universe. I leave that to you and Tamminen and your excellent accounting of it as a necessarily epistemologically ontic enterprise.
Just do not skip the metaphysical details as in the devil is in those details.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
That is a more difficult question. It is not something I have given a lot of thought to until your very recent explication of H, W and K. Culture and its language is necessarily an artifact or attribute of the "subjects" incarnation in a particular level of the world. The language of that culture is the subject's only way to characterize the nature of objects at that level of existence. Without that characterization, in language, the subject cannot marshal the energy of his inner subjectivity to accomplish any of his newly acquired attachments to the world as only he can intend. The acquisition of "language" by the subject is an engagement with his level of the world that supervenes the attachments of his soul. So "language" is what enables the subject to evolve as a "causal" player in his new world.Hereandnow wrote: And how is that you conflate culture and language with causality?
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
The hypothesis of linguistic relativity, part of relativism, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism is a principle claiming that the structure of a language affects its speakers' world view or cognition, and thus people's perceptions are relative to their spoken language. During World War II this claimed principle was used to advance nationalistic views by Nazi Germany, claiming their intellectual superiority over others[1], but has been reexamined by scholars since the late 1980's and on, aiming to avoid the context of racism, nationalism, or a hierarchy of intellectual capabilities which had previously surrounded the theory.[2]
The principle is often defined in one of two versions: the strong hypothesis, which was held by some of the early linguists before WWII[3], and the weak hypothesis, mostly held by some of the modern linguists[3]
The strong version says that language determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories.
The weak version says that linguistic categories and usage only influence thought and decisions.
The principle had been accepted and then abandoned by linguists during the early 20th century following the changing perceptions of social acceptance for the other especially after World War II.[3] The origin of formulated arguments against the acceptance of linguistic relativity are attributed to Noam Chomsky.[3]
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Thanks Belindi for a very relevant post about linguistics. In addition to your references I might add Umberto Eco, "Kant and the Platypus". In his Essay he makes it very clear that what we see in the world is dependent on the categories we have for seeing things. South American natives saw incoming Spanish ships as clouds because they had no experience with such big ships with sails. We see things through templates that are either genetically given or learned through experience.Belindi wrote: ↑August 5th, 2019, 4:46 am May I suggest that the following in connection with culture, language, and causality?
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
The hypothesis of linguistic relativity, part of relativism, also known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, or Whorfianism is a principle claiming that the structure of a language affects its speakers' world view or cognition, and thus people's perceptions are relative to their spoken language. During World War II this claimed principle was used to advance nationalistic views by Nazi Germany, claiming their intellectual superiority over others[1], but has been reexamined by scholars since the late 1980's and on, aiming to avoid the context of racism, nationalism, or a hierarchy of intellectual capabilities which had previously surrounded the theory.[2]
The principle is often defined in one of two versions: the strong hypothesis, which was held by some of the early linguists before WWII[3], and the weak hypothesis, mostly held by some of the modern linguists[3]
The strong version says that language determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories.
The weak version says that linguistic categories and usage only influence thought and decisions.
The principle had been accepted and then abandoned by linguists during the early 20th century following the changing perceptions of social acceptance for the other especially after World War II.[3] The origin of formulated arguments against the acceptance of linguistic relativity are attributed to Noam Chomsky.[3]
Of course all these issues are very relevant to our Presidents way of characterizing immigrants, blacks or simply brown people as "others".
In my posts I have not been addressing those issues that mistakenly categorize cultural groups as all of a kind.
I am trying to address a deeper metaphysical distinction between the "language" assimilated as appropriate in one level of the world to what may be appropriate to a deeper world.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
II am trying to address a deeper metaphysical distinction between the "language" assimilated as appropriate in one level of the world to what may be appropriate to a deeper world.
My thinking about ontology is stuck at the concept of theories of existence. These are theories about the notion of ontic substance(s). Is there some other ontological frame of reference?
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Ontology—conceived as what Christian Wolff calls "general metaphysics", what Edmund Husserl calls "formal ontology", and what Donald Williams calls "analytic ontology"—is categoriology or category theory (there's also a different, mathematical category theory).
<Substance> is only one ontological category among others. Moreover, there are alternatives to the traditional substance ontology (according to which <substance> is a fundamental and irreducible category) such as process ontology and trope ontology.
"Ontology is concerned above all with the categorial structure of reality – the division of reality into fundamental types of entity and their ontological relations with one another."
(Lowe, E. J. Forms of Thought: A Study in Philosophical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. p. 51)
"Ontology is the most general science or study of Being, Existence, or Reality. An informal use of the term signifies what, in general terms, a philosopher considers the world to contain. Thus it is said that Descartes proposed a dualist ontology, or that there were no gods in d’Holbach’s ontology. But in its more formal meaning, ontology is the aspect of metaphysics aiming to characterize Reality by identifying all its essential categories and setting forth the relations among them."
(Campbell, Keith. "Ontology." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 7, 2nd ed., edited by Donald M. Borchert, 21-27. Detroit: Thomson Gale/Macmillan Reference USA, 2006. pp. 21-2)
"Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that govern these categories? In chemistry, for comparison, we search for the chemical elements and the laws of chemistry; in physics, for elementary particles and their laws. Categories are for ontology what these basic building blocks of the universe are for the natural sciences. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is vastly larger than that of any science. And its point of view is totally different from that of the sciences."
(Grossmann, Reinhardt. The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. New York: Routledge, 1992. p. 1)
- Consul
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Well, his final statement is misleading. Of course, ontology is not itself an empirical science; but theories in empirical science and their ontological commitments and implications need to be taken into consideration by ontologists, because an ontological category scheme must be plausible in the light of our scientific knowledge of the (nature and structure of the) world.Consul wrote: ↑August 6th, 2019, 9:42 am"Ontology asks and tries to answer two related questions. What are the categories of the world? And what are the laws that govern these categories? In chemistry, for comparison, we search for the chemical elements and the laws of chemistry; in physics, for elementary particles and their laws. Categories are for ontology what these basic building blocks of the universe are for the natural sciences. But ontology is not a science among sciences. Its scope is vastly larger than that of any science. And its point of view is totally different from that of the sciences."
(Grossmann, Reinhardt. The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology. New York: Routledge, 1992. p. 1)
"Ontological theses are assayed not by measuring them directly against reality, but by considering their relative power. One thesis bests another when it proves more adept at making sense of our experiences of the universe in light of our most promising scientific theories."
(Heil, John. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 97)
"Ontology sets out an even more abstract model of how the world is than theoretical physics, a model that has placeholders for scientific results and excluders for tempting confusions. Ontology and theoretical science can help one another along, we hope, with minimal harm."
(Martin, C. B. The Mind in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 42)
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
The devil would be in the details, wouldn't it. It hangs on the distinction between 'determine' and 'influence'.Belindi
The strong version says that language determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine cognitive categories.
The weak version says that linguistic categories and usage only influence thought and decisions.
Perhaps the way to go is to look to method, and not definition. Here is an idea:
One should not discard the idea of "actuality", which is just as puzzling, one might argue, but is at least not cluttered with theory, philosophical or otherwise. Consider: you are there, doing "the usual" of some form, using your computer, drinking tea, whatever, and something goes wrong; say, the cursor is not responsive. You stop what you are doing, look for the cause and the solution, and so forth. This, I would propose, is a very important event in human understanding, for you were there, in a working conceptual scheme, and then it all had to stop for review and what was assumed is called into question: conditions for what is a fact of the world, what IS the case, are now in abeyance, and their suspension brings forth a corrective. I would argue that this kind of thing that happens all the time is the essence of human freedom. Forget, I contend, all of the arguments about metaphysical free will, a kind of absolute freedom that transcends the principle of efficient cause. Rather, acts are free when conditions for actualizing no longer dictate, or, hold one bound to "the usual". For a moment, when the cursor failure first arises and there has not yet kicked in the subroutines that apply, one is free of the flux of events. It is in the space of transition, the "doubt" that undoes the fixation that binds consciousness; this is freedom.
Of course, if you're still reading, you will wonder what freedom has to do with ontology. You will note that all of those definitions laid out by Consul make no reference to actuality. They talk about theses and structures of reality. Not that they are so wrong, in fact you can argue that there is no getting around describing any idea whatever in terms of other ideas: you want to know what ontology is, look in a dictionary or encyclopedia. Same with 'actuality'. Heidegger thought along these lines.
But if ontology is theory, some wordy string of ideas, where does this leave actuality? When the matter before you breaks down, the cursor doesn't work, it is the question that puts ideas to the test. The question can lead to solution, and it is obviously pragmatically significant, but, in truly unsettled matters, ones that do not have readily available answers, like those about the foundational meaning of all that is, inquiry gets "lost" in the interposition, between the inquirer and the inquired, between the idea and the ideatum, of silence. This silence is actuality, or, the disclosure of actuality, that is, it is what remains before one when interpretative circuits are closed and there is nothing that steps in, for language cannot fill the void, for when it does it puts you on a path, and what is sought is not a path. Language may be essential for any kind of disclosure at all, and it is clear that it is, and it may always already stand there, in the waiting behind even the least hampered apprehensions of the world, but this is does not mean that that an encounter with actuality is defined conceptually. Actuality is a very different part of awareness, but it is occluded by talk, endless talk, streaming forth.
Ontology is the wordy business of leading, the method I spoke of, the inquirer to a place where the words run out. It will not be spoken; it can be spoken about, however. Definitions are preonological, or better, all ontology is best understood as preontological, or preactual, or pragmatically leading, as it is, in whatever form, a process that takes one to a liberation from the language strictures that bind the understanding.
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