This is applicable to RJG's confusion.Tamminen wrote: ↑December 23rd, 2018, 4:14 amRight. Another quote from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:I can know what someone else is thinking, not what I am thinking.
It is correct to say "I know what you are thinking", and wrong to
say "I know what I am thinking."
(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar.)
Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
For us to assume that he has thoughts is just an ASSUMPTION, an educated 'guess' at best.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
You are an other to me. You are not an object like a stone. I know you have thoughts, you have just given some of them to us. An other is by definition someone who thinks and feels like me. That is what otherness is. An other is an other 'me'. An other is a subject for me. This is part of our primary, certain knowledge of the world around us, along with the knowledge that stones do not think.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
You have got it backwards. It does not become a matter of something assumed until the problem of doubt is raised. It is only something you think must be assumed after you have assumed that it could be otherwise.
When did you first make this assumption? When did you first accept it as a matter of faith? Have you always thoughts from the first time you encountered another person that the people you meet might be automatons?
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
My point is that there is no rational logic that validates your assertion (your blind faith assumption).Fooloso4 wrote:You have got it backwards. It does not become a matter of something assumed until the problem of doubt is raised. It is only something you think must be assumed after you have assumed that it could be otherwise.
When did you first make this assumption? When did you first accept it as a matter of faith? Have you always thoughts from the first time you encountered another person that the people you meet might be automatons?
P1. JFK was a great president who was born in Brookline MA
P2. I was born in Brookline MA
C. Therefore I would be a great president.
P1. I am a person that experiences thoughts.
P2. My neighbor is a person (that looks and acts like me).
C1. Therefore, my neighbor experience thoughts.
These are NOT VALID, NOR SOUND arguments, and therefore not rational, (...unless of course you think I would be a great president, then I am willing to agree to your irrationality )
Tam, there is no logic that validates your assertion. You only see my words, not my thoughts.Tamminen wrote:You are an other to me. You are not an object like a stone. I know you have thoughts, you have just given some of them to us. An other is by definition someone who thinks and feels like me. That is what otherness is. An other is an other 'me'. An other is a subject for me. This is part of our primary, certain knowledge of the world around us, along with the knowledge that stones do not think.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
My point is that there is no need for rational logic to validate that your neighbor has thoughts and subjective experience. If automatons were common then it might be reasonable to question the assumption, but unless there is good reason to think your neighbor is an automaton there is no reason to think it is reasonable to require rational logic to validate that he is human with ordinary human mental states.My point is that there is no rational logic that validates your assertion (your blind faith assumption).
Now if the premise is that there are automatons that are indistinguishable from humans then the question of whether your neighbor has thoughts and subjective experiences may be a reasonable one. Here the question is whether your neighbor is human.
If you agree that he is human then the question becomes whether there are humans without thoughts and subjective experience. This may be the case if your neighbor is in a permanent vegetative state, but there are objective measures to determine this. At a minimum if your neighbor is in a permanent vegetative state he would not respond to you and would not be able to talk to you. So then, the question is whether there are human beings who are indistinguishable from other human beings except they are zombies. If such a thing were possible, and it is highly questionable that it is possible, then whether or not that is the case with your neighbor depends on having plausible evidence that it might be. Otherwise there is no reason to assume it is. It is just idle speculation, unless there is some other point that this thought experiment is aimed at.
It should be noted that Descartes' method of doubt was reserved for the occasion when he was alone and safe. He is quite clear that the method is not applicable to everyday life.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Yes, his method was like Husserl's "bracketing" of the world to get to basics.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
Just for clarity ... Wittgenstein uses the term “thought” in respect to “worded thought”.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
RJG wrote:My point is that there is no rational logic that validates your assertion...
It seems that you are trying to assert/claim -- 'beliefs' should be considered as 'truths' ...correct?Fooloso4 wrote:My point is that there is no need for rational logic to validate that your neighbor has thoughts and subjective experience. If automatons were common then it might be reasonable to question the assumption, but unless there is good reason to think your neighbor is an automaton there is no reason to think it is reasonable to require rational logic to validate that he is human with ordinary human mental states.
Including "reasonableness" in your argument as a qualifier is seemingly non-sensical and redundant. Firstly, "reasonableness" is determined by the beholder (the believer) himself, not by some outside independent party. Secondly, "reasonableness" is already implied in one's belief (or assumption). If one thought their belief "unreasonable", then their belief would not be a belief. In other words, EVERYBODY believes their beliefs are "reasonable"!
One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that the moon is made of cheese, does not necessarily mean that it is 'true', ...right?
One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that ghosts and demons invisibly fly around, does not necessarily mean it is 'true', ...right?
One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that one's neighbor is/is not a zombie, does not necessarily mean that it is/is not 'true', ...right?
So why is it that so many of us continually and insistently assert/claim our 'beliefs' as 'truths'??
Why can't we just leave 'beliefs' as 'beliefs', ...and leave the 'truths' (and falses) to 'logic'???
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
No, that is not correct.It seems that you are trying to assert/claim -- 'beliefs' should be considered as 'truths' ...correct?
You might believe it is reasonable to doubt that your neighbor has thoughts, but if that is the case I don’t think the gap will be closed through this discussion.Firstly, "reasonableness" is determined by the beholder (the believer) himself, not by some outside independent party.
Do you think it is reasonable to believe that your neighbor is a zombie? What is it about your neighbor that would lead you to believe such a thing? What are your reasons for believing your neighbor is or might be a zombie?Secondly, "reasonableness" is already implied in one's belief.
You begin with a hypothetical and since the hypothetical cannot be proven wrong you conclude that your neighbor might be a zombie. You treat the belief that your neighbor is a zombie as equivalent to the belief that your neighbor is not a zombie, as if both require the same degree of evidence or that both rather than only one needs any evidence at all to be "believed".One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that one's neighbor is/is not a zombie, does not necessarily mean that it is/is not 'true', ...right?
The plea to leave ‘beliefs’ as ‘beliefs’ indicates that you are unaware of the problem of belief and the incommensurate ways in which the term is used.Why can't we just leave 'beliefs' as 'beliefs', ...and leave the 'truths' (and falses) to 'logic'???
Logical “truths” are formal, without content. They tell us nothing true about the world.
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Re: Whatever Consciousness is, it's Not Physical (or reducible to physical).
RJG wrote:It seems that you are trying to assert/claim -- 'beliefs' should be considered as 'truths' ...correct?
Your words seemingly indicate otherwise.Fooloso4 wrote:No, that is not correct.
RJG wrote: Firstly, "reasonableness" is determined by the beholder (the believer) himself, not by some outside independent party.
Non-sequitur. How is this relevant to what I've said?Fooloso4 wrote:You might believe it is reasonable to doubt that your neighbor has thoughts, but if that is the case I don’t think the gap will be closed through this discussion.
RJG wrote:Secondly, "reasonableness" is already implied in one's belief.
Again, non relevance here. Your response doesn't follow my comment.Fooloso4 wrote:Do you think it is reasonable to believe that your neighbor is a zombie? What is it about your neighbor that would lead you to believe such a thing? What are your reasons for believing your neighbor is or might be a zombie?
RJG wrote:One's (reasonably held) 'belief' that one's neighbor is/is not a zombie, does not necessarily mean that it is/is not 'true', ...right?
Is this a "YES" or a "NO"?Fooloso4 wrote:You begin with a hypothetical and since the hypothetical cannot be proven wrong you conclude that your neighbor might be a zombie. You treat the belief that your neighbor is a zombie as equivalent to the belief that your neighbor is not a zombie, as if both require the same degree of evidence or that both rather than only one needs any evidence at all to be "believed".
RJG wrote:Why can't we just leave 'beliefs' as 'beliefs', ...and leave the 'truths' (and falses) to 'logic'???
So then are you trying to assert that "beliefs" should be considered as "truths"?Fooloso4 wrote:The plea to leave ‘beliefs’ as ‘beliefs’ indicates that you are unaware of the problem of belief and the incommensurate ways in which the term is used.
2023/2024 Philosophy Books of the Month
Mark Victor Hansen, Relentless: Wisdom Behind the Incomparable Chicken Soup for the Soul
by Mitzi Perdue
February 2023
Rediscovering the Wisdom of Human Nature: How Civilization Destroys Happiness
by Chet Shupe
March 2023