A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

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Mosesquine
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Mosesquine »

ThomasHobbes wrote: October 12th, 2018, 2:28 am
Mosesquine wrote: October 11th, 2018, 9:10 pm



I answered the question. Reality is constructed by our conceptual scheme. I gave an example of consciousness without epiphenomenon. Any statement can be held true come what may. I show an example of statement that consciousness is not an epiphenomenon. So, that's enough.
On the contrary. Continually denying that it is an epiphenomenon is not the same as showing it to be something else.


The example that I gave previously is read as: It is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon. The negation ("it is not the case that") is wider than the description ("consciousness"), and the description is narrower than the negation. It's Russellian second occurrence of definite description. I didn't mean 'something else', but I meant 'nothing else'. They are different.
Syamsu
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Syamsu »

Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 12:42 am Both choicers and choiced are material beings. Materialism is better than real dualism of spirit and matter.
You cannot facilitate either choice, or subjective opinion on materialist terms.

There are alternative futures A and B, B is made the present, meaning B is chosen. Then there is the question of what made the choice turn out B. You can only answer this question by making a new choice, choose between X and Y, choose X, then your subjective opinion is that X made the choice turn out B.

That is a division material and spiritual. The existence of the agency of the choice being a matter of choice, disqualifies it as being material.

Now try to explain the choice on materialist terms. There is a material X which made the choice turn out B. Then X being a definite material thing, we obtain the logic that X forced B, and that the choice could not have turned out A. So making agency a material thing, then we get a logic error of contradiction between a choice being free and it being forced. This contradiction is why materialists generally deny free will as an illusion.

Although with some materialists choice is redefined in terms of sorting out an optimum. Like a chesscomputer calculating a result automatically. The chesscomputer could not do move A, as it calculates move B to with a higher chance of winning. It is allbforced, yet this is what is called choice by compatibilist materialists.
Syamsu
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Syamsu »

F you burning ghost. You forget that I can turn almost any topic on the forum into discussing creationism, because as creationism is fundamental, it is ubiquitous.
Steve3007
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Steve3007 »

The lock-down wasn't quick enough. The infection has spread.
Steve3007 wrote:I have discovered in the past that he will tell you that you're doing that even if you repeat his own words back to him in a slightly different form.
As an alternative to "Creationism" I recommend "Recognition of the existence of Choice and its role in creating alternative possible futures"-ism. But it's not as succinct.
Syamsu wrote:An alternative future is made the present. After telling you 300 times, you stil get it wrong.
See what I mean? Obviously talking about "choice creating alternative possible futures" is the same as saying that "choice makes alternative futures the present" (due to the fact that the future soon becomes the present), but the slight rewording is vehemently objected to. If that wording had been changed, another wording would be objected to. That's how it always goes.

(It's 473 time actually. Search "alternative" in your past posts.)
Eduk wrote:Oh is this whole thing simply about materialism saying there is no free will?
Yes.
Steve3007
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Steve3007 »

Anyway, Syamsu: Always fun. Same time next year?
Steve3007 wrote:Syamsu: Always fun. Same time next year?
viewtopic.php?p=263280#p263280
Eduk
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Eduk »

Eduk wrote:
Oh is this whole thing simply about materialism saying there is no free will?
Yes.
Just to be clear (for those who haven't read the other thread). I am saying that materialism doesn't explicitly rule out free will. Only that some people say that it does.
Unknown means unknown.
Steve3007
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Steve3007 »

Eduk wrote:I am saying that materialism doesn't explicitly rule out free will. Only that some people say that it does.
Yes, that's clear. And I agree.
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Hereandnow
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Hereandnow »

Consul
According to epiphenomenalism, the thought that consciousness is an epiphenomenon is produced by neural processes but doesn't itself produce or cause anything.
Yes, I see. But the very idea of talk about consciousness is an event inside consciousness. Even Rorty understood this: we do not discover truth, the world, we make it. You can never get "behind" consciousness, as Hubert Dreyfus put it, as you can, say, a baloney sandwich, of which you can speak at length about the baloney, the processes that produced it, the wheat ground for the bread and so on.
It is like the baloney sandwich speaking about what a baloney sandwich is: all you get is baloney. (That actually works.)
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Consul
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Consul »

Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 3:27 am
ThomasHobbes wrote: October 12th, 2018, 2:28 am On the contrary. Continually denying that it is an epiphenomenon is not the same as showing it to be something else.
The example that I gave previously is read as: It is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon. The negation ("it is not the case that") is wider than the description ("consciousness"), and the description is narrower than the negation. It's Russellian second occurrence of definite description. I didn't mean 'something else', but I meant 'nothing else'. They are different.
:?:
Epiphenomenalists are realists about mental/experiential events. They just deny that they are causes; or if they are causes, they are causes in virtue of their physical properties rather than in virtue of their mental/experiential properties.

"Epiphenomenalism asserts nothing positive about the qualities and relations of mental events, and it denies only one thing about them. It simply says that mental events either (a) do not function at all as cause-factors; or (b) that, if they do, they do so in virtue of their physiological characteristics and not in virtue of their mental characteristics."

(Broad, C. D. The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Kegan Paul, 1925. p. 473)

So we have two versions of epiphenomenalism:

1. Token or Event/State (Process/Fact) Epiphenomenalism

2. Type or Property/Quality Epiphenomenalism


"If particular mental events are physiological events with causal effects, then mental events are causes. However, the question still remains whether mental events are causes in virtue of their mental characteristics. As we noted, neurophysiology appears to be able to explain neurophysiological occurrences without postulating mental characteristics. This prompts the concern that even if mental events are causes, they may be causes in virtue of their physiological characteristics, but not in virtue of their mental characteristics. (...)
Invoking the distinction between event types and event tokens, and using the term 'physical', rather than the more specific term 'physiological', we can, following Broad, distinguish two kinds of epiphenomenalism:

TOKEN EPIPHENOMENALISM: Mental events cannot cause anything.

TYPE EPIPHENOMENALISM: No event can cause anything in virtue of falling under a mental type.

(Property epiphenomenalism is the thesis that no event can cause anything in virtue of having a mental property.) The conjunction of token epiphenomenalism and the claim that physical events cause mental events is, of course, the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism, as characterized earlier. Token epiphenomenalism implies type epiphenomenalism: for if an event could cause something in virtue of falling under a mental event type, then an event could be both a mental event and a cause, and so token epiphenomenalism would be false. Thus if mental events cannot be causes, then events cannot be causes in virtue of falling under mental types. The denial of token epiphenomenalism does not, however, imply the denial of type epiphenomenalism, if a mental event can be a physical event that has causal effects. For, if so, then token epiphenomenalism is false. But type epiphenomenalism may still be true. For it may be that events cannot be causes in virtue of falling under mental types. Mental events may be causes in virtue of falling under physical types, but not in virtue of falling under mental types. Thus, even if token epiphenomenalism is false, the question remains whether type epiphenomenalism is."


(McLaughlin, Brian. "Epiphenomenalism." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel Guttenplan, 277-288. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. p. 279)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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ThomasHobbes
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by ThomasHobbes »

Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 3:27 am
ThomasHobbes wrote: October 12th, 2018, 2:28 am

On the contrary. Continually denying that it is an epiphenomenon is not the same as showing it to be something else.


The example that I gave previously is read as: It is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon. The negation ("it is not the case that") is wider than the description ("consciousness"), and the description is narrower than the negation. It's Russellian second occurrence of definite description. I didn't mean 'something else', but I meant 'nothing else'. They are different.
LOL
I'm sure you find that convincing. But you are doing nothing more than repeating yourself. There is no argument here; just logical repetition of an empty unsupported assertion.
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Mosesquine
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Mosesquine »

ThomasHobbes wrote: October 12th, 2018, 12:30 pm
Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 3:27 am



The example that I gave previously is read as: It is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon. The negation ("it is not the case that") is wider than the description ("consciousness"), and the description is narrower than the negation. It's Russellian second occurrence of definite description. I didn't mean 'something else', but I meant 'nothing else'. They are different.
LOL
I'm sure you find that convincing. But you are doing nothing more than repeating yourself. There is no argument here; just logical repetition of an empty unsupported assertion.

There is an argument as follows:

If there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon, then it is not the case that there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.
There exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon.
Therefore, it is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.

It's a simple modus ponens (if p, then q, and p, then q). The proof of the argument above goes as follows:

1. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx) → ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
2. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx)
∴ ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
3. asm: (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) 1, 2, MP
∴ 5. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) from 3; 3 contradicts 4.
Q.E.D.

It's a valid argument.
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Mosesquine
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Mosesquine »

Consul wrote: October 12th, 2018, 10:59 am
Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 3:27 am
The example that I gave previously is read as: It is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon. The negation ("it is not the case that") is wider than the description ("consciousness"), and the description is narrower than the negation. It's Russellian second occurrence of definite description. I didn't mean 'something else', but I meant 'nothing else'. They are different.
:?:
Epiphenomenalists are realists about mental/experiential events. They just deny that they are causes; or if they are causes, they are causes in virtue of their physical properties rather than in virtue of their mental/experiential properties.

"Epiphenomenalism asserts nothing positive about the qualities and relations of mental events, and it denies only one thing about them. It simply says that mental events either (a) do not function at all as cause-factors; or (b) that, if they do, they do so in virtue of their physiological characteristics and not in virtue of their mental characteristics."

(Broad, C. D. The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Kegan Paul, 1925. p. 473)

So we have two versions of epiphenomenalism:

1. Token or Event/State (Process/Fact) Epiphenomenalism

2. Type or Property/Quality Epiphenomenalism


"If particular mental events are physiological events with causal effects, then mental events are causes. However, the question still remains whether mental events are causes in virtue of their mental characteristics. As we noted, neurophysiology appears to be able to explain neurophysiological occurrences without postulating mental characteristics. This prompts the concern that even if mental events are causes, they may be causes in virtue of their physiological characteristics, but not in virtue of their mental characteristics. (...)
Invoking the distinction between event types and event tokens, and using the term 'physical', rather than the more specific term 'physiological', we can, following Broad, distinguish two kinds of epiphenomenalism:

TOKEN EPIPHENOMENALISM: Mental events cannot cause anything.

TYPE EPIPHENOMENALISM: No event can cause anything in virtue of falling under a mental type.

(Property epiphenomenalism is the thesis that no event can cause anything in virtue of having a mental property.) The conjunction of token epiphenomenalism and the claim that physical events cause mental events is, of course, the traditional doctrine of epiphenomenalism, as characterized earlier. Token epiphenomenalism implies type epiphenomenalism: for if an event could cause something in virtue of falling under a mental event type, then an event could be both a mental event and a cause, and so token epiphenomenalism would be false. Thus if mental events cannot be causes, then events cannot be causes in virtue of falling under mental types. The denial of token epiphenomenalism does not, however, imply the denial of type epiphenomenalism, if a mental event can be a physical event that has causal effects. For, if so, then token epiphenomenalism is false. But type epiphenomenalism may still be true. For it may be that events cannot be causes in virtue of falling under mental types. Mental events may be causes in virtue of falling under physical types, but not in virtue of falling under mental types. Thus, even if token epiphenomenalism is false, the question remains whether type epiphenomenalism is."


(McLaughlin, Brian. "Epiphenomenalism." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel Guttenplan, 277-288. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995. p. 279)


What you quoted above is a set of important information about theories of epiphenomenalisms in the philosophy of mind, but it's not any evidence of epiphenomenalism to be right.
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ThomasHobbes
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by ThomasHobbes »

Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 9:59 pm
ThomasHobbes wrote: October 12th, 2018, 12:30 pm

LOL
I'm sure you find that convincing. But you are doing nothing more than repeating yourself. There is no argument here; just logical repetition of an empty unsupported assertion.

There is an argument as follows:

If there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon, then it is not the case that there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.
There exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon.
Therefore, it is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.

It's a simple modus ponens (if p, then q, and p, then q). The proof of the argument above goes as follows:

1. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx) → ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
2. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx)
∴ ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
3. asm: (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) 1, 2, MP
∴ 5. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) from 3; 3 contradicts 4.
Q.E.D.

It's a valid argument.
Little things please little minds.
This says nothing about consciousness in any way.
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Consul
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Consul »

Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 10:02 pmWhat you quoted above is a set of important information about theories of epiphenomenalisms in the philosophy of mind, but it's not any evidence of epiphenomenalism to be right.
I didn't say it is.
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars
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Mosesquine
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Re: A Pragmatist Argument against Substance Dualism

Post by Mosesquine »

ThomasHobbes wrote: October 13th, 2018, 12:59 pm
Mosesquine wrote: October 12th, 2018, 9:59 pm


There is an argument as follows:

If there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon, then it is not the case that there exist some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.
There exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and it is not the case that x is an epiphenomenon.
Therefore, it is not the case that there exists some x such that x is consciousness, and it is not the case that there exists some y such that y is consciousness, and it is not the case that x is identical to y; and x is an epiphenomenon.

It's a simple modus ponens (if p, then q, and p, then q). The proof of the argument above goes as follows:

1. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx) → ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
2. (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & ~Gx)
∴ ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
3. asm: (∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx)
4. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) 1, 2, MP
∴ 5. ~(∃x)(Fx & ~(∃y)(Fy & x ≠ y) & Gx) from 3; 3 contradicts 4.
Q.E.D.

It's a valid argument.
Little things please little minds.
This says nothing about consciousness in any way.

Again, to be is to be the value of a variable. Every existing thing including consciousness is reduced to be the value of a variable. This says something about consciousness in any way. It's because every saying about is reduced to saying in quantified logic.
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