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Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by RJG » December 30th, 2018, 11:44 am

Tamminen wrote:...and by means of those experiences we are conscious of real objects, not perceptions. For example, if I see a tree, I am conscious of the existence of the tree.
Well, technically you are only conscious of your 'experience' (the vision; the mental impression) of the tree, not the tree itself.

We can only be conscious of our bodily reactions (aka experiences). That's it. And then hope that the source of our bodily reactions are from real things themselves.

Tamminen wrote:By means of reflection, which can be seen as an experience if you like, we are conscious of experiences like perceptions and feelings…
Reflections/introspections are type #2 experiences (referring to 'thoughts' in Consul's categorization). Perceptions (sensory experiences) are type #1, and feelings are type #3.

Tamminen wrote: ...ie. we are conscious of their existence as independent phenomena of consciousness.
The 'knowing' (consciousness) of these, and all experiences (type #1, #2, #3) is via the separate and singular experience (type #4?) of 'recognition', made possible by memory.

Tamminen wrote:They are what you call the 'x' that we are conscious of.
Yes, there is 'X', the non-conscious bodily reaction, and then there is the 'Consciousness-of-X' which is the 'recognition' of said bodily reaction. For it is 'recognition' that converts the non-conscious to the conscious.

Tamminen wrote:Of course that 'x' as part of the content of a reflective experience, as a reference, is not a conscious experience…
If by "reflective experience" you mean "conscious/knowing experience", then yes, the 'X' that which you are conscious of, is merely the experiential 'content', of the knowing, or simply the 'X' component in the 'knowing-of-X'. This 'X' component can only be a non-conscious physical bodily reaction, aka bodily 'experience'.

Tamminen wrote:This means that all experiences are conscious by definition, at the time they occur. I see nothing wrong in this logic.
Not exactly. It only means that all CONSCIOUS experiences are conscious by definition. There are plenty of non-conscious experiences (bodily reactions) that occur that we are not conscious/knowing of.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Consul » December 30th, 2018, 11:57 am

Tamminen wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 4:17 am
There is a logical problem here. If we see experiencing as a series of successive singular experiences with singular contents, then each content is a whole of its own. Of course the whole can have different strucures depending on the nature of the experience, but to say that there are many experiences at the same time is problematic, as I see it. But perhaps you see the whole situation differently.
The unitary field of consciousness usually contains more than one experience (impression or image). For example, while writing this on my computer I have tactile, visual, and auditory sensations at the same time. I also have bodily sensations and feelings, e.g. muscular tension in my neck and I'm a bit tired. I also experience certain mental images by entertaining thoughts relating to our discussion.
Tamminen wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 4:17 am
We can assume, as you do, that introspection is an attitude, so that it does not change the content of experiencing itself. In this sense it can be compared to the "neutral" attitude of phenomenological reduction. But as Husserl writes, that means a change in the positional characteristics of the noema. So something is different now. And for each noema there is the corresponding noesis, the act of experiencing. But perhaps I am trying to go too deep now.
No, introspection isn't a (propositional) attitude like belief. (An introspective belief certainly is.) Of course, there is a psychological difference between simply experiencing an experience and introspecting (innerly perceiving/observing) it, because the latter involves cognitive awareness of the experience and the former doesn't. But my contention is that my introspective awareness of an experience doesn't superimpose a second-order experience over the introspected first-order one. There is no distinct phenomenology of introspection per se, but only the one of the introspected experience, which may be modified by the act of introspection. So there may be phenomenal differences between experiencing an experience and experiencing an introspected experience; but if introspection alters the phenomenal character of its objects, it doesn't do so by adding a phenomenal character of its own to the one of the introspected experiences. That is to say, phenomenological differences between experiencing a non-introspected experience and experiencing an introspected experience are not due to a phenomenology of introspection but to introspection-caused modifications of the phenomenology of the introspected experience.

"The 'organ' of introspection is attention[.]"

(Goldman, Alvin I. Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 244)

"…I have now drawn on Carrasco’s work and an example from Tse to suggest different phenomenal consequences of attention in vision. This includes visual phenomenology in respect of perceived size, contrast, brightness, and color. If the work is correct, then the deployment of attention, both top-down and bottom-up, can lead to different effects in visual phenomenology. These results, however, do not support a phenomenal conception of attention that holds that attention has disparate phenomenology. Recall that the phenomenal conception of attention takes attention to be a distinctive mode of consciousness and so to have a distinctive phenomenal character. The phenomenal conception construes the phenomenology to be a property of the state of attention, just as visual phenomenology is a property of visual experience. It is, after all, a conception of the phenomenology of attention. Yet the empirical data indicate that the relevant phenomenology concerns changes in visual phenomenology that is caused by attention. This suggests a weaker conception of conscious attention: attention is conscious in that it brings about (possibly distinctive) phenomenology in other mental states but attention does not have its own phenomenal character, a phenomenal feature of the state of attention. This weaker conception points to a disanalogy with vision, for where a visual experience might have disparate phenomenology (say for color, texture, shape, etc.), that phenomenology is a property of the experience and not a property brought about in other states. Attention is different, for the disparate phenomenology it is tied to is brought about in other states such as visual experience. It is not clear then why one should speak of the resulting phenomenology as specifically attentional since it involves changes in visual phenomenology such as alterations in apparent contrast, size, and saturation. Couldn’t such changes occur in visual experience without attention? Moreover, it is hard to see that such phenomenology is of attention’s essence or that it is a necessary aspect of what it is like to attend. The appeal to empirical work to explain attentional phenomenology does not, then, aid a phenomenal conception of attention. Attention is not revealed to be a distinctive mode of consciousness, but rather, at best, to affect other forms of consciousness in disparate ways. As we do not as yet have good reason to think that the phenomenology of attention is disparate, I suggest that we pursue a characterization of that phenomenology as being uniform."

(Wu, Wayne. Attention. New York: Routledge, 2014. pp. 122-3)
"We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize." – Wilfrid Sellars

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Tamminen » December 30th, 2018, 2:16 pm

RJG wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:44 am
Well, technically you are only conscious of your 'experience' (the vision; the mental impression) of the tree, not the tree itself.

We can only be conscious of our bodily reactions (aka experiences). That's it. And then hope that the source of our bodily reactions are from real things themselves.
A perception is a positing experience. When I see something, I posit the existence of what I see. I never posit the existence of the perception itself. Only by reflecting on my perception I can posit the existence of it. Of course I can see hallucinations, which means that I can make false positings.
Yes, there is 'X', the non-conscious bodily reaction, and then there is the 'Consciousness-of-X' which is the 'recognition' of said bodily reaction. For it is 'recognition' that converts the non-conscious to the conscious.
If by "reflective experience" you mean "conscious/knowing experience", then yes, the 'X' that which you are conscious of, is merely the experiential 'content', of the knowing, or simply the 'X' component in the 'knowing-of-X'. This 'X' component can only be a non-conscious physical bodily reaction, aka bodily 'experience'.
Here you missed my point. The 'x' is a conscious experience, but not simultaneous with my reflecting on it. As the content of my reflecting experience it is only a reference, pointing to a conscious experience. As I said, I do not think there can be non-conscious experiences.
It only means that all CONSCIOUS experiences are conscious by definition. There are plenty of non-conscious experiences (bodily reactions) that occur that we are not conscious/knowing of.
As I said, here I disagree.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Tamminen » December 30th, 2018, 2:47 pm

Consul wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:57 am
The unitary field of consciousness usually contains more than one experience (impression or image). For example, while writing this on my computer I have tactile, visual, and auditory sensations at the same time. I also have bodily sensations and feelings, e.g. muscular tension in my neck and I'm a bit tired. I also experience certain mental images by entertaining thoughts relating to our discussion.
Okay, I think we have come to a point where we can agree.
Consul wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:57 am
No, introspection isn't a (propositional) attitude like belief. (An introspective belief certainly is.) Of course, there is a psychological difference between simply experiencing an experience and introspecting (innerly perceiving/observing) it, because the latter involves cognitive awareness of the experience and the former doesn't. But my contention is that my introspective awareness of an experience doesn't superimpose a second-order experience over the introspected first-order one. There is no distinct phenomenology of introspection per se, but only the one of the introspected experience, which may be modified by the act of introspection. So there may be phenomenal differences between experiencing an experience and experiencing an introspected experience; but if introspection alters the phenomenal character of its objects, it doesn't do so by adding a phenomenal character of its own to the one of the introspected experiences. That is to say, phenomenological differences between experiencing a non-introspected experience and experiencing an introspected experience are not due to a phenomenology of introspection but to introspection-caused modifications of the phenomenology of the introspected experience.
I have no strong counterarguments on this, especially as your view seems to be based on empirical research, but I think there are still many questions concerning what introspection is and what makes it possible.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Consul » December 30th, 2018, 4:01 pm

RJG wrote:
December 29th, 2018, 3:42 pm
Consul wrote:1+2 are (the only) genuine, real kinds of transitive consciousness, whereas 3 is just nominally a kind of it, because it's pseudotransitive. In senses 1+2 there is a difference between the act of perception or introspection/reflection and its object; but in sense 3 there is no such act-object difference, because when you sense a sensation (sensing) or experience an experience (experiencing), the sensing is identical to what is sensed, and the experiencing is identical to what is experienced. So there's nothing more to being conscious of a sensation or experience in sense 3 than simply being subjectively affected by it: the consciousness of the sensation = the sensation.
Although #3 is different than #1 and #2, they ALL are still just 'experiences'.
* Sense 1: A sensation is an experience; and if it is an appearance or impression of something (real), it is a perceptual experience.

* Sense 2:
– An introspective thought about an experience is an experience itself.
– Introspective awareness of an experience (which is not constituted by an introspective thought) is not an experience itself (in addition to the introspected experience)

* Sense 3: Of course, experiencing an experience, sensing a sensation, and feeling a feeling are all experiences.
RJG wrote:
December 29th, 2018, 3:42 pm
Hallucinations are thoughts (#2). And thoughts are 'sensory' experiences (#1) e.g. the hearing of a talking voice, the seeing of visions/images, etc.
No, hallucinations aren't thoughts but sensations.

There's a difference between having an auditory or visual sensation and imagining (the having of) one; and you cannot hear a mental image of a sound or see one of a color.
RJG wrote:
December 29th, 2018, 3:42 pm
Consul wrote:"There are "two senses of 'aware of', which I will call respectively the 'aware of' of intentionality and the 'aware of' of constitution. You can see the difference if you contrast two common-sense claims. First, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of the table. And second, when I push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

(a) I am aware of the table.
(b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.

Both of these are true and though they look similar, they are radically different. (a) describes an intentional relation between me and the table. I had a sensation where the table was its intentional object. The presence and features of the table are the conditions of satisfaction of the sensation. But in (b) the only thing I am aware of is the painful sensation itself. Here the 'aware of' is the 'aware of' of identity or the constitution of the experience. The object I am aware of and the sensation are identical. I had only one sensation: a painful sensation of the table. I was aware of (in the sense of identity or constitution) the sensation, but I was also aware of (in the sense of intentionality) the table.
In both cases, the "knowing", or the "consciousness", of these different experiences is the same. In the case of (a) you are conscious-of-experience type #1, and in case (b) you are conscious-of-experience type #3.
Right, but what Searle doesn't mention is that (b) can alternatively be interpreted as a case of type #2.
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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Consul » December 30th, 2018, 4:16 pm

RJG wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:44 am
Tamminen wrote:...and by means of those experiences we are conscious of real objects, not perceptions. For example, if I see a tree, I am conscious of the existence of the tree.
Well, technically you are only conscious of your 'experience' (the vision; the mental impression) of the tree, not the tree itself.
No, "technically" you are perceptually conscious of the tree itself, because the sensory content of a perceptual experience is not its object.
RJG wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:44 am
We can only be conscious of our bodily reactions (aka experiences). That's it. And then hope that the source of our bodily reactions are from real things themselves.
Mere bodily reactions aren't experiences. The reactive neural processes taking place after the stimulation of a sense organ and before the production of a sensation are all non-/pre-experiential ones and thus non-experiences.
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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Felix » December 30th, 2018, 6:30 pm

Comsul: If introspection alters the phenomenal character of its objects, it doesn't do so by adding a phenomenal character of its own to the one of the introspected experiences.

Please define "phenomenal character," is it the "thing in itself"? If so, your perception of the object, and your introspection based on that perception, is all that you have. What is the phenomenal character of an object apart from your perception of it? If you cannot answer that question, you cannot say whether it's nature is affected by or even dependent on your perception and introspection of it.
"We do not see things as they are; we see things as we are." - Anaïs Nin

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Intellectual_Savnot » December 31st, 2018, 3:44 am

RJG wrote:
December 29th, 2018, 3:42 pm
The point is that knowledge comes to us through our (experience of) thoughts. We are 'knowing' of these thoughts (this knowledge) because we 'consciously' experience them.
Yeah my bad I was tired I totally understand that. I took it wrong I gotta be more careful later

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Tamminen » December 31st, 2018, 5:55 am

Consul wrote:
December 30th, 2018, 11:57 am
The unitary field of consciousness usually contains more than one experience (impression or image).
So, when you say introspection consists of selective scanning of the field of consciousness, part of the field must change due to the directing of attention. It must get some extra charecteristics into the noema, and a corresponding change into the noesis. I am not sure if this conflicts with your view, but what do you think of it?

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by RJG » December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am

Consul wrote:The unitary field of consciousness usually contains more than one experience (impression or image). For example, while writing this on my computer I have tactile, visual, and auditory sensations at the same time. I also have bodily sensations and feelings, e.g. muscular tension in my neck and I'm a bit tired. I also experience certain mental images by entertaining thoughts relating to our discussion.
The "unitary field of consciousness" is more like walking on a path in absolute pitch darkness with the beam of an old bulb-type flashlight as our only means of seeing (knowing). The center of the beam shines brightest, giving a clear knowable view. The outer bands of light progressively shine less giving a less clear/knowable view.

There are many bodily experiences (bodily reactions) occurring simultaneously right now, some of which we can see/know more clearly than others, and some which we cannot see/know at all. For example, as I am writing and concentrating which word to type next on this computer, I am slightly aware of the sensation of my finger tips sitting on top of the keys, not yet deciding which keys to push, And I am momentarily forgetful of my throbbing left foot, and the uncomfortable position I am sitting. All these, and many more, bodily experiences are still there, are still happening, it is just that my flashlight (my knowing) is not shining on them at this particular moment.

RJG wrote:Yes, there is 'X', the non-conscious bodily reaction, and then there is the 'Consciousness-of-X' which is the 'recognition' of said bodily reaction. For it is 'recognition' that converts the non-conscious to the conscious.
Tamminen wrote:Here you missed my point. The 'x' is a conscious experience, but not simultaneous with my reflecting on it. As the content of my reflecting experience it is only a reference, pointing to a conscious experience.
Firstly, a "conscious experience" is the consciousness-of-something, it is NOT the something (the X) itself, nor is it the consciousness itself. The 'consciousness-of-X' is the "conscious experience". And the 'X' is the "experience" (bodily experience/reaction). Maybe refer back to the flashlight analogy above to help better understand this important point (i.e. shining a light upon an object/experience so as to then be able to see/know it).

Secondly, it is the "reflecting"-on-X that gives you your "conscious experience". Until you "reflect" (shine a light) upon your experience, you can't know (see) your experience.

Tamminen wrote:As I said, I do not think there can be non-conscious experiences.
The non-conscious experience is that experience (X) that you come to know (be conscious of). It is that object that you see with the flashlight beam. The object exists(!) but is not yet 'known' until the flashlight shines upon it (i.e. until 'recognition' occurs). The flashlight beam is our means of 'recognition', it is our ONLY means to 'know' (to see) the object (the bodily experience). For it is this 'recognition' (light beam) that converts this non-conscious experience into a conscious experience. Without this recognition, (which is made possible by memory), we could not 'know' what we (our bodies) experience.

RJG wrote:We can only be conscious of our bodily reactions (aka experiences). That's it. And then hope that the source of our bodily reactions are from real things themselves.
Consul wrote:Mere bodily reactions aren't experiences. The reactive neural processes taking place after the stimulation of a sense organ and before the production of a sensation are all non-/pre-experiential ones and thus non-experiences.
Not so. These are not "non-/pre-experiential", but instead these are all "non-conscious experiences". All these experiences are certainly still occurring/reacting/happening, it is just that we are not yet conscious/knowing of these, at this particular moment. Until our consciousness/knowing/flashlight shines upon these, we don't 'know' them.

And again, it does not matter the 'type' of experience that we experience (see/know). If we see/know one 'type' of object (experience) as opposed to another 'type', it does not affect our seeing/knowing of them.

Intellectual_Savnot wrote:Yeah my bad I was tired I totally understand that. I took it wrong I gotta be more careful later.
No worries, ...part of the game here.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Tamminen » December 31st, 2018, 10:21 am

RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
a "conscious experience" is the consciousness-of-something
As I said, and in line with what Consul says:

In 'consciousness of x' the x can be
(1) a real object in the real world in perception
(2) a conscious experience in reflection

In (2) the conscious experience x can be a perception, feeling, reflection etc. - any kind of experience.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Tamminen » December 31st, 2018, 11:31 am

RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
The non-conscious experience is that experience (X) that you come to know (be conscious of).
The x can be a non-consious reaction or a conscious experience. We can be conscious of both. I think we should not misuse our language and say that our bodily reactions are experiences.

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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Consul » December 31st, 2018, 11:59 am

Tamminen wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 10:21 am
RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
a "conscious experience" is the consciousness-of-something
As I said, and in line with what Consul says:

In 'consciousness of x' the x can be
(1) a real object in the real world in perception
(2) a conscious experience in reflection

In (2) the conscious experience x can be a perception, feeling, reflection etc. - any kind of experience.
Again:

* A conscious experience is either (1) simply an experience (with the adjective "conscious" being redundant), (2) an experience with which its subject is (perceptually) conscious of something (else), or (3) an experience of which its subject is (introspectively/reflectively) conscious.

* It is not the case that all experiences are perceptual ones with which its subject is conscious or aware of something. Hallucinatory experiences are nonperceptual ones and so are certain emotions (feelings and moods).
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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by Consul » December 31st, 2018, 12:21 pm

RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
The "unitary field of consciousness" is more like walking on a path in absolute pitch darkness with the beam of an old bulb-type flashlight as our only means of seeing (knowing). The center of the beam shines brightest, giving a clear knowable view. The outer bands of light progressively shine less giving a less clear/knowable view.
Yes, psychologists distinguish between the center and the periphery, or the foreground and the background of the field of consciousness.
RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
There are many bodily experiences (bodily reactions) occurring simultaneously right now, some of which we can see/know more clearly than others, and some which we cannot see/know at all. For example, as I am writing and concentrating which word to type next on this computer, I am slightly aware of the sensation of my finger tips sitting on top of the keys, not yet deciding which keys to push, And I am momentarily forgetful of my throbbing left foot, and the uncomfortable position I am sitting. All these, and many more, bodily experiences are still there, are still happening, it is just that my flashlight (my knowing) is not shining on them at this particular moment.
There's a difference between "weak" experiences which occur at the periphery or in the background of the field of consciousness, not being spotlighted by attention (or only by a low degree of attention), and nonexperiences which aren't part of it at all (such as purely physiological or neurological processes).
RJG wrote:
December 31st, 2018, 9:22 am
Not so. These are not "non-/pre-experiential", but instead these are all "non-conscious experiences". All these experiences are certainly still occurring/reacting/happening, it is just that we are not yet conscious/knowing of these, at this particular moment. Until our consciousness/knowing/flashlight shines upon these, we don't 'know' them.
In the higher-order sense, a nonconscious experience is one of which its subject is not cognitively (introspectively/reflectively) conscious or aware.

According to higher-order theories of consciousness, there are no nonconscious experiences in this sense, because cognitive consciousness or awareness of an experience is constitutive of and essential to an experience, such that it depends for its occurrence on being an object of attention/introspection/reflection.

According to first-order theories of consciousness, it is not the case that cognitive consciousness or awareness of an experience is constitutive of and essential to an experience. An experience can but needn't be an object of attention/introspection/reflection. Experiences are independent of attention/introspection/reflection, so a nonconscious experience isn't a nonexperience by definition.
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Re: Evidence that Consciousness Survives Bodily Death?

Post by RJG » December 31st, 2018, 2:51 pm

RJG wrote:The non-conscious experience is that experience (X) that you come to know (be conscious of).
Tamminen wrote:The x can be a non-conscious reaction or a conscious experience. We can be conscious of both. I think we should not misuse our language and say that our bodily reactions are experiences.
I think the misuse of language is in claiming that one can be "conscious of a conscious experience". For if experience = conscious experience, then one can never be conscious of an 'experience', because then every experience within "conscious experience", is yet another "conscious experience". At what point does one ever become conscious of the experience itself?

Conscious of a conscious experience = conscious of a conscious (conscious (conscious (conscious (...[for-ev-ver] )))), ...i.e. never-ever knowing (being conscious of) the experience itself!

Saying that one is "conscious of an experience" does NOT mean that one is "conscious of a conscious experience". This is the actual "misuse" of language (and logic).

Consul wrote:* A conscious experience is either (1) simply an experience (with the adjective "conscious" being redundant), (2) an experience with which its subject is (perceptually) conscious of something (else), or (3) an experience of which its subject is (introspectively/reflectively) conscious.
I don't necessarily disagree with (2) and (3), but (1) is non-sensical. If there are no non-conscious experiences, then there can be no 'known' experiences. At some point, you gotta be conscious of 'something' (a non-conscious something), elsewise, you will only be conscious of 'nothing'!

Consul wrote:* It is not the case that all experiences are perceptual ones with which its subject is conscious or aware of something. Hallucinatory experiences are nonperceptual ones and so are certain emotions (feelings and moods).
True, we are not conscious of all of our experiences. But all of our experiences that we are conscious of, are 'experiences'.

We may, in fact, be experiencing moods/emotions/feelings that we are not yet conscious of (...just ask your wife, she will know and can confirm/tell you of your mood/emotion/feeling before you even recognize/be conscious of it yourself!). This non-consciousness of our mood/emotion/feeling does not mean that we did not 'experience' these mood/emotions/feelings, it just means that we were not conscious of these experiences (bodily reactions).

Also, if we are conscious of our hallucination, then we consciously (knowingly) experience them. If not, then we don't.

RJG wrote:...these are all "non-conscious experiences". All these experiences are certainly still occurring/reacting/happening, it is just that we are not yet conscious/knowing of these, at this particular moment. Until our consciousness/knowing/flashlight shines upon these, we don't 'know' them.
Consul wrote:In the higher-order sense, a nonconscious experience is one of which its subject is not cognitively (introspectively/reflectively) conscious or aware.
This statement above seems to contradict the statement below. The above seems to claim non-conscious experiences exist (are possible), whereas the below seems to claim otherwise.
Consul wrote:According to higher-order theories of consciousness, there are no nonconscious experiences in this sense, because cognitive consciousness or awareness of an experience is constitutive of and essential to an experience, such that it depends for its occurrence on being an object of attention/introspection/reflection.

Consul wrote:According to first-order theories of consciousness, it is not the case that cognitive consciousness or awareness of an experience is constitutive of and essential to an experience. An experience can but needn't be an object of attention/introspection/reflection. Experiences are independent of attention/introspection/reflection, so a nonconscious experience isn't a nonexperience by definition.
This I agree with. For it is not logically possible to consciously (knowingly) experience a conscious experience, but only a non-conscious experience. We can only be "conscious-of-X", with 'X' (itself) being a non-conscious experience (aka "bodily reaction")

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