It does? How?It does prove my point though:
There is no turn. The connection between thought and language is fundamental to the Tractatus. The problem is stated in the preface and addressed throughout the work.Thought is lingual, so the linguistic turn is about thought.
What he says is that when logic is properly understood the bounds of propositions with a sense are properly established. Propositions with a sense say something about the world, they are the propositions of natural science. Whether they are true or false can only be determined by comparing them with reality, that is, the facts, what is the case.Logic is an attempt at making thought scientific. Which Wittgenstein calls transcendental, but in his early work he only found truth in analytic philosophy, which is founded on empiricism.
But toward the end of the Tractatus he says:
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched.
In case it is not clear, the problems of life are what concerned him most.
You might start here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/What do you mean exactly?Fooloso4 wrote:
The connection between mind and logic is related to the rejection of “psychologism” and idealism. But there has been a renewed interest in the self and criticisms of realism.
And here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idea ... tIdeTweCen, section 9 “The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century”Many authors use the term ‘psychologism’ for what they perceive as the mistake of identifying non-psychological with psychological entities. For instance, philosophers who think that logical laws are not psychological laws would view it as psychologism to identify the two.
Arjen:Both epistemological and ontological idealism came under massive attack in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century by George Edward Moore (1873–1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) … they think of idealism as a position which is characterized by the claim that the universe (Moore) or whatever exists or whatever can be known to exist (Russell) is spiritual (Moore) or in some sense mental (Russell).
An interesting claim. What support do you have for it?I think the philosophy of language IS the philosophy of mind. And his philosophical Investigations are just that.
Transcendental, as he uses the term, follows Kant. It means the conditions for the possibility of knowledge or experience. Logic for Wittgenstein is independent of mind, it is the form or structure that underlies both the facts of the world and language. Facts and propositions have the same logical form.Do you suppose he somehow thought that all minds were connected? And that this is why he called it transcendental?
Arjen:The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity (Tractatus 5.1362)
The denial of private language has to do with the way language actually works. What would be the function of a private language? What is being communicated and to whom? Since it is private there would be no communication from one person to another. One would be communicating with himself. But what would he be communicating? His thoughts? His feelings? Wouldn’t he already have to be aware of them in order to communicate them? In that case such communication would be redundant. Perhaps thinking is a way of talking to oneself. But here the meaning of the words would only be known by me. If it is truly a private language then it cannot be translated into a public language and would not simply be my own secret code for words that have meaning in a public language.If that is the case, surely in denying private language, we must conclude to it because we do not know the thoughts of others; it is shielded somehow?