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early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Discuss any topics related to metaphysics (the philosophical study of the principles of reality) or epistemology (the philosophical study of knowledge) in this forum.
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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 23rd, 2019, 12:38 pm

Arjen:
It does prove my point though:
It does? How?
Thought is lingual, so the linguistic turn is about thought.
There is no turn. The connection between thought and language is fundamental to the Tractatus. The problem is stated in the preface and addressed throughout the work.
Logic is an attempt at making thought scientific. Which Wittgenstein calls transcendental, but in his early work he only found truth in analytic philosophy, which is founded on empiricism.
What he says is that when logic is properly understood the bounds of propositions with a sense are properly established. Propositions with a sense say something about the world, they are the propositions of natural science. Whether they are true or false can only be determined by comparing them with reality, that is, the facts, what is the case.

But toward the end of the Tractatus he says:
6.52
We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched.
In case it is not clear, the problems of life are what concerned him most.
Fooloso4 wrote:
The connection between mind and logic is related to the rejection of “psychologism” and idealism. But there has been a renewed interest in the self and criticisms of realism.
What do you mean exactly?
You might start here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/
Many authors use the term ‘psychologism’ for what they perceive as the mistake of identifying non-psychological with psychological entities. For instance, philosophers who think that logical laws are not psychological laws would view it as psychologism to identify the two.
And here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idea ... tIdeTweCen, section 9 “The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century”
Both epistemological and ontological idealism came under massive attack in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century by George Edward Moore (1873–1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) … they think of idealism as a position which is characterized by the claim that the universe (Moore) or whatever exists or whatever can be known to exist (Russell) is spiritual (Moore) or in some sense mental (Russell).
Arjen:
I think the philosophy of language IS the philosophy of mind. And his philosophical Investigations are just that.
An interesting claim. What support do you have for it?
Do you suppose he somehow thought that all minds were connected? And that this is why he called it transcendental?
Transcendental, as he uses the term, follows Kant. It means the conditions for the possibility of knowledge or experience. Logic for Wittgenstein is independent of mind, it is the form or structure that underlies both the facts of the world and language. Facts and propositions have the same logical form.
The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity (Tractatus 5.1362)
Arjen:
If that is the case, surely in denying private language, we must conclude to it because we do not know the thoughts of others; it is shielded somehow?
The denial of private language has to do with the way language actually works. What would be the function of a private language? What is being communicated and to whom? Since it is private there would be no communication from one person to another. One would be communicating with himself. But what would he be communicating? His thoughts? His feelings? Wouldn’t he already have to be aware of them in order to communicate them? In that case such communication would be redundant. Perhaps thinking is a way of talking to oneself. But here the meaning of the words would only be known by me. If it is truly a private language then it cannot be translated into a public language and would not simply be my own secret code for words that have meaning in a public language.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 23rd, 2019, 6:14 pm

I think I will not quote, nor speculate for a moment. I am happy that you are currently reading Wittgenstein. Direct quotes are great. However, there is a time for quoting and following a philosopher's thoughts and a time to take a step back and see how this fits in the grand total of thoughts. Aristotle did not name 'metaphysics' as the prima philosophia for nothing, after all. All philosophies find their origin in human thought, after all. And all human thought is lingual. It has a syntax and thought objects. So, all philosophies are derived from the philosophy of language, because the way the mind grasps and expresses things is lingual. That, in turn, is because the brain's a priori function is to grasp whatever acts on us in a logical schema of space and time.

The philosophy of language is still separated by some from the philosophy of mind, but commonly, it is not really separated anymore. Then again, Logic for philosophers is also often separated from philosophy of language. So, it depends on where we separate things, I guess. When we look at the whole body of philosophy, all branches of philosophy are connected, many philosophers speak about similar things from different perspectives. One of them is our Ludwig.

Concerning private language: Ludwig might not have found it to exist, but at least we can argue for it's existence. What I exactly mean when I call my son naughty, you will never know. You will know most of it, because you know what naughty means. But my specific intent and meaning with it will always elude you. A more correct explanation is that, you can not know my thoughts. And my thoughts are lingual. Although all humans can understand what most things are TO me, like a wife, or water, or a son, it is impossible to know my personal experiences, or my personal connotations with these things.Therefore there is a part that is private.

Anyway, Wittgenstein takes language as very defined and unchangeable, almost like eidos or logoi. To me, that is right out. But, that might be my personal opinion only.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 23rd, 2019, 7:47 pm

Arjen:
Direct quotes are great. However, there is a time for quoting and following a philosopher's thoughts and a time to take a step back and see how this fits in the grand total of thoughts.
There are two ways to look at this depending on your intentions. Reading a philosopher may stimulate your thoughts and lead in different directions, possibly connecting it with other things you have read. One question that concerns me is whether or not I have understood what I have read. Now there are some who reject the idea that we can read a text in order to understand what the author meant. According to them, by reading we are writing the text in our own terms. While I do not think that we can approach a text without certain assumptions and concerns, I do think that the thoughts of an author must remain veiled and hidden from us if he intended that at least a few of us would understand him. We may not be able to arrive at a final, definitive interpretation but that does not mean that all interpretations are thereby equally valid or invalid.

As to the grand total of thoughts: whose thoughts? One’s own? Some group that you identify as the “the philosophers” or the history of philosophy? With regard to the former, in my opinion, the ongoing effort to understand the work of a philosopher expands rather than limits what is thought. There is no philosopher with whom I agree on every point but in general the assumption that they have seen more clearly and widely and deeply than I have has held true. I put myself in the position of the student who has something to learn from them. Of course not everyone who fancies himself a philosopher is, and not everyone who is a “philosopher” by training or profession is worthy of the title.

If you are talking about some indeterminate larger sphere of thought, then it is possible that my misunderstanding of Plato combined with my misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, for example, may yield some interesting ideas but it may also be far less interesting than what I might discover based on a more solid understanding of them.
Aristotle did not name 'metaphysics' as the prima philosophia for nothing, after all.
First philosophy gets its name from what is primary, both first and last, beginning and end, that from which and to which one strives to understand the whole. For Aristotle it was based on both what has been said and what is seen, things in the world.
So, all philosophies are derived from the philosophy of language, because the way the mind grasps and expresses things is lingual.
Some regard all of philosophy as part of the philosophy of language but certainly not all philosophers have. And, of those who treat it as primary, their approach and conclusions may be very different. Compare for example, Heidegger and analytic approaches.
That, in turn, is because the brain's a priori function is to grasp whatever acts on us in a logical schema of space and time.
That is your assumption, but you should not assume that the philosophers you read share that assumption. I think Kant’s transcendental philosophy is correct insofar as it points to the fact that experience and knowledge are mediated, but wrong in the assumption that the mind operates according to fixed a priori categories of the understanding. Hegel’s emphasis on history is an important corrective.
The philosophy of language is still separated by some from the philosophy of mind, but commonly, it is not really separated anymore.
I do not know who you might have in mind, but I would say first, that Wittgenstein was more interesting in seeing than in saying and situated both within “a form of life”. Second, many are now turning away from language to neuroscience.
What I exactly mean when I call my son naughty, you will never know. You will know most of it, because you know what naughty means. But my specific intent and meaning with it will always elude you.
Does he know? Will he ever know? If so, it is not a private language. If its intent and meaning eludes everyone but you then what is its function in your private language? Does you private language consist of just this one term that you have given a private meaning?
A more correct explanation is that, you can not know my thoughts. And my thoughts are lingual.
Could I know them if you told me what you are thinking? If they are lingual then they are already in the form of words. Must you first translate the words in your private language into public language? Don’t answer before considering what you are doing when you answer.

The idea that thinking is lingual is questionable. When the squirrel figures out how to get at the bird feeder this is a form of thinking, but it has no language. When I pack the car I do not use words, it is about spatial relations. In On Certainty Wittgenstein quotes Goethe: “In the beginning was the act (deed)”. Thinking is a form of acting.
Therefore there is a part that is private.
Yes, there are parts of our lives that are private but it does not follow that there is a private language that goes along with it.
Anyway, Wittgenstein takes language as very defined and unchangeable …
According to the Tractatus, logic underlies language and it is fixed and unchangeable. But in the Philosophical Investigations he says that the rules (grammar/logic) of language are arbitrary. They are determined by the activity. The meaning of words are largely determined by use and it should be quite clear that the meaning of words change over time. The languages that developed along with the development of our society is not suitable as the language of physics, which is not lingual.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 24th, 2019, 5:22 pm

Yeah, I think the main issue in our conversation is that you do not seem to grasp what I mean when I say thought is lingual. I explained and it still isn't klicking. So, I think I will make it come to a stop here and return to the OP's question:
hertz wrote:
November 17th, 2018, 1:32 pm
Can wittgenstein's tractatus logico-philosophicus 2.021-2.0212 be considered as an argument for metaphysics and if so ,why?
2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite.
2.0211 If they world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true.
2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)
It utterly refutes metaphysics, because the early Wittgenstein (of the Wiener Kreis that refutes metaphysics!)doesn't believe the brain can add something new (or subjective); only real observations can make the brain work and create thoughts. But, at the same time, the functioning of the brain used to be a topic for metaphysics. Nowadays maybe for psychoanalysis, or psychology or logic. Are those part of your metaphysics? If so, there is an argument for it in that quote.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 24th, 2019, 6:31 pm

Arjen:
Yeah, I think the main issue in our conversation is that you do not seem to grasp what I mean when I say thought is lingual. I explained and it still isn't klicking.
I am well aware of the linguistic turn in philosophy as it is ordinary used in the profession, but it may be that you have your own private use to go along with your own meaning of private language. So perhaps it is best that you do bring it to a stop.
It utterly refutes metaphysics, because the early Wittgenstein (of the Wiener Kreis that refutes metaphysics!)doesn't believe the brain can add something new (or subjective); only real observations can make the brain work and create thoughts.
First of all, you cannot ascribe to Wittgenstein anything anyone else involved with the Vienna Circle might have claimed. Second, there is no one clearly defined definition of metaphysics. The logical relations, including that or knowledge, that make up the Tractatus are independent of a mind or brain but that does not mean it refutes metaphysics, only a metaphysics of mind. If Wittgenstein refutes metaphysics then what does he mean by the “metaphysical subject” (5.633, 5.641)?

If ontology is the study of what is most basic and the study of what is most basic is metaphysics then Wittgenstein’s simple objects that make up the substance of the world can be regarded as an ontology and hence metaphysics. Whether Wittgenstein intended this to be an ontology is a more complex problem that it might appear to be. In addition, the metaphysical subject has nothing to do with the substance of the world.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 25th, 2019, 4:21 pm

Fooloso4 wrote:
January 24th, 2019, 6:31 pm
I am well aware of the linguistic turn in philosophy as it is ordinary used in the profession, but it may be that you have your own private use to go along with your own meaning of private language. So perhaps it is best that you do bring it to a stop.
You missed it again.
First of all, you cannot ascribe to Wittgenstein anything anyone else involved with the Vienna Circle might have claimed.
Yes,everyone has a private language..
Second, there is no one clearly defined definition of metaphysics. The logical relations, including that or knowledge, that make up the Tractatus are independent of a mind or brain but that does not mean it refutes metaphysics, only a metaphysics of mind. If Wittgenstein refutes metaphysics then what does he mean by the “metaphysical subject” (5.633, 5.641)?
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophics wrote: 1 The world is everything that is the case.
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world.
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted? ==cut==
Since the world is everything that is the case and the metaphysical subject is not part of the world, it does not exist, but it can be talked about.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophics wrote: 5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I. ==cut==
In the sense of Solipsism.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Tractatus Logico-Philosophics wrote: 5.464 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with realism.
So, the metaphysical subject is the world.
That is why he said that.
Which refutes metaphysics.

Which was my point earlier:
Arjen wrote:
January 23rd, 2019, 8:32 am
Do you suppose he somehow thought that all minds were connected? And that this is why he called it transcendental?

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 25th, 2019, 5:15 pm

Yes,everyone has a private language..
That is not W.’s take on it. But since this is not a thread on private language I will leave it there. If you would like to talk about your notion of a private language then you should start a new topic. I would be interested to hear what you have to say.
Since the world is everything that is the case and the metaphysical subject is not part of the world, it does not exist, but it can be talked about.
That the metaphysical subject is not part of the world does not mean it does not exist, it means that it does not exist as part of the world. It is, as you quoted, a limit of the world. It is like the eye that sees but is not within the limit of what is seen (T 5.6331). The metaphysical self is the “I” that experiences, the “I” of “my world” and “my language”. The "I" of solipsism (T 5.62, 5.64)
So, the metaphysical subject is the world.
The world is the world of the metaphysical subject, that is why he refers to it as “my world”. (T 5,62, 5.641)
Which refutes metaphysics.
He denies that there can be a metaphysical science, but it is not a denial of the central importance for him of metaphysical questions - God, soul, will, eternity. He sets the limits of what can be said in order to allow the mystical to manifest itself.

6.4312
The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.

6.432
How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world.
6.4321
The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution.
6.44
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.

6.522
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put
into words. They make themselves manifest.
They are what is mystical.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 25th, 2019, 6:16 pm

Solipsism means that the subject is the whole of creation. The whole of the world. and the only thing that exists is the world, therefore, metaphysics does not exist. The I is physically all that there is. Based on precisely the quotes that you are using. Are you sure that you know what solipsism means?

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 25th, 2019, 6:37 pm

Arjen:
Solipsism means that the subject is the whole of creation.
Wittgenstein said:
Philosophers use a language that is already deformed as though by shoes that are too tight. (Culture and Value)
That is not what Wittgenstein means by solipsism. You are hobbling his meaning if you insist the term he uses means something he does not mean.

Here is what he says within the larger context of the Tractatus:
5.6
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

What is the significance of his shift from language and the world to “my language” and “my world”? The self cannot be found in the world. It can play no part in logical relationships, and propositions about it are nonsense. My world and my language do not connote a relationship between facts or objects.

My language means not simply English or German but the way in which I represent reality.

5.61
Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, ‘The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

The logical relationships within the world are not the only relationships. There is also a relationship between the “I” and the world.
5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
In what way does the limits of language show that the world is my world? Suppose someone were to reject W.’s claim saying: “There must be more to my world”, to which the response would be: “What more is there”? And of course no answer could be given. If an answer could be given, whatever is said would be within that limit. I take this to be a form of skepticism. He is not denying that there may be more than I can say or think but that it is nonsense to say this because it does not point to anything. It does not mark a limit to the world or to language but to my world and the language I understand. But the same is true for all of us.

Solipsism - solus "alone" and ipse "self”. That language which alone I understand, is that language which solus ipse is understood. If there is a language I do not understand then even though the propositions are in proper logical order to picture reality, they are for me without sense (sinnlos) because I do not know what state of affairs they represent. They cannot represent if they cannot be understood.
5.621
The world and life are one.
5.63
I am my world. (The microcosm.)

The world is all that is the case (1). The facts that make up the world are not independent of the subject who perceives and represents those facts. This is the point of the cube having two facts. Facts are not independent of their representation. A picture is a fact. (2.141)The facts of the world include the representation of facts.

5.631
There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.
If I wrote a book called The World as I found it, I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—

5.632
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world.


“It alone could not be mentioned”, solus ipse. The I (ipse) alone (solus) that writes the book is not something that is found in the book.



5.633
Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found?
You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. But really you do not see the eye.
And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.
That which sees is not something seen. Just as the eye is not in visual space, the subject is not in logical space. The subject that represents is not something represented.
5.634
This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori.
Everything we see could also be otherwise.
Everything we describe at all could also be otherwise.
There is no order of things a priori.

What is the connection between the metaphysical subject and the contingency of facts?
5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

The I alone which sees the world, that experiences, that describes, has no logical connection to the world. We can only say how things are, not how they must be or will be.
5.641
There is therefore really a sense in which the philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
The I occurs in philosophy through the fact that the “world is my world”.
The philosophical I is not the man, not the human body or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject,
the limit—not a part of the world.
My world is the world I see, the world I experience, the life I lead. My limits are its limits.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 26th, 2019, 3:21 am

I sincerely think that you have it wrong.
Solipsism is an extreme, but it is why he doesn't believe in private language
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 5.62
This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest.
The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
He doesn't believe in private language, remember?
That is because it is all-one according to him. That is what he needs solipsism for: to come to the conclusion of a world that is the same for everyone (only the subject makes it phenomenal). With which he shies away from it and discards the extreme of solipsism and leaves only the physical world as noumenon. Which is really really close to the extreme of solipsism. Logical Positivism is almost exactly that.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

I see you making the mistake where you make the nuance more important than the initial proposition. That means that at times you use x.x+1 to change the meaning of x.x. I don't think that you are doing this on purpose, but that it simply is a lot to remember and grasp. He is not an easy to understand guy.

Shall we just discuss what we think his thought process is and leave out the quotes for a moment?
The conversation becomes so fragmented because of it.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 26th, 2019, 11:11 am

Arjen:
Solipsism is an extreme …
W. says that it coincides with “pure realism”. He does not see it as an extreme. You need to see what he means by the term. He makes none of the claims that are typically associated with solipsism. He is not talking about the problem of other minds or whether anything exists outside his mind.
He doesn't believe in private language, remember?
That is because it is all-one according to him. That is what he needs solipsism for: to come to the conclusion of a world that is the same for everyone (only the subject makes it phenomenal).
Language, according to the Tractatus, is dependent on logic. The world and language have the same logical structure. It is this logical structure, which he calls transcendental (6.13), that makes possible propositional representation. This has nothing to do with solipsism.
With which he shies away from it and discards the extreme of solipsism and leaves only the physical world as noumenon.
Where does he call the physical world noumenal? Where does he even make the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal? You are attributing things to him without warrant.
Logical Positivism is almost exactly that.
Here again, instead of reading Wittgenstein you make him guilty by association, attributing things to him without any support.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote:
5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
I see you making the mistake where you make the nuance more important than the initial proposition.
What are you talking about? What mistake? What initial proposition? This is a quote from the text.
Shall we just discuss what we think his thought process is and leave out the quotes for a moment?
How are you to know his "thought processes" if you ignore what he actually says. I see nothing of his “thought processes” in what you say, only your own unsupported claims based on things that you attempt to connect with and attribute to Wittgenstein.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 26th, 2019, 12:02 pm

I see you making the mistake where you make the nuance more important than the initial proposition. That means that at times you use x.x+1 to change the meaning of x.x. I don't think that you are doing this on purpose, but that it simply is a lot to remember and grasp. He is not an easy to understand guy. AND you seem to want to contradict all the time.
Fooloso4 wrote: He does not see it as an extreme
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs ... 884607.ch9

Solipsism is an extreme position. Ludwig Wittgenstein addressed this position several times over more than 20 years. Wittgenstein first became familiar with solipsism under the title of “theoretical egoism” when reading Schopenhauer at the tender age of 16.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 6.4312
The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
Which is transcendental. Outside of the phenomenal world... Therefore it is the noumenon. He says this all the time:
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 1 The world is everything that is the case.
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world, but is a limit of the world.
5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be noted?
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 5.64
Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote: 5.641 There is therefore really a sense in which in philosophy we can talk of a non-psychological I.
Look, the best idea is simply to discuss a thought; a reading of his ideas. If I need sources, I'll ask. The thing is that you seem to take every sentence as a proposition on it's own, but there are only 6 propositions in the Tractatus. The rest are only to nuance them. I hope that you understand what I am saying, because it is hard to reach you. You hide behind short quotes, that are fragments of his ideas only. That is why I wanted to move away from quotes for a moment.

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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 26th, 2019, 2:02 pm

Arjen:
I see you making the mistake where you make the nuance more important than the initial proposition.
Yes, you already said this already, but what does it mean? What is initial proposition and what is the mistake?
Solipsism is an extreme position. Ludwig Wittgenstein addressed this position several times over more than 20 years. Wittgenstein first became familiar with solipsism under the title of “theoretical egoism” when reading Schopenhauer at the tender age of 16.
Saying that solipsism is an extreme position tells us nothing about what Wittgenstein meant by solipsism. It is an opening statement on a subject that will be discussed in a paper that has not been provided in what you cited. If you are going to cite something it should at least address the issue. The summary (more precisely that part of it that is made public) is setting the problem: as stated, Frege's conceptual realism liberated W. from Schopenhauer’s idea of the world as will. In opposition to Schopenhauer’s organic philosophy, stands Frege's systematic philosophy, which argues sequentially “in the form of a chain” of propositions starting from one fundamental principle. The Tractatus is systematic. Wittgenstein says that in a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain (2.03). When he says that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism, he is denying, pace Schopenhauer, that the world is will. He makes it quite clear that the world is independent of the will (6.373). If the world is independent of my will and solipsism “strictly carried out” coincides with pure realism, then solipsism as Wittgenstein understood it, is not the claim that the world is the product of my will. Just the opposite. It is, when “strictly carried out”, that is, thought of correctly, a rejection of the claim that the world is will. Solipsism when strictly carried out is not about the world but the subject.
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus wrote:
6.4312
The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time.
Which is transcendental. Outside of the phenomenal world... Therefore it is the noumenon.
Transcendental and transcendent are not the same. Transcendental refers, as defined by Kant, to the conditions of the possibility of experience. Logic and ethics/aesthetics are said to be transcendental in the Tractatus. They are also transcendent because they are not part of the world, but that does not mean that they are noumenon. They are the transcendental conditions that with logic make possible the world (the facts), language (propositions, pictures of the facts), and with ethics/aesthetics,ethical aesthetic experience (the world of the happy man, the mystical).

Noumenon refers to the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) as opposed to how something is experienced by and known by us phenomenally.
Look, the best idea is simply to discuss a thought; a reading of his ideas. If I need sources, I'll ask.
Look, there are others who are reading this. If they are not to be confused it is necessary to reference the source. If what you say runs contrary to the text then it is either simply wrong or in need of explanation. What we know of Wittgenstein’s thought is based on what he actually says. If you have some notion of thought via connected minds then you are no longer discussing Wittgenstein. Failure to keep the two distinct can only lead to confusion.
The thing is that you seem to take every sentence as a proposition on it's own, but there are only 6 propositions in the Tractatus.
Actually I do just the opposite, but I have not provided a discussion of the whole. They are all connected, as he says, like the links in a chain. They form a systematic whole. The ability to see them as a whole, however, also requires the ability to understand the details of each of them in order to see how they fit together in the whole.
The rest are only to nuance them. I hope that you understand what I am saying, because it is hard to reach you.
I understand you only all too well. In order not to run afoul of the forum rules though I will say no more and caution you to do the same.

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Arjen
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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Arjen » January 26th, 2019, 5:29 pm

If I said something inappropriate, I apologize. I appreciate the conversation and your effort and your quotes of Wittgenstein. However, I can find quotes of Nietzsche saying the priest cast is always right (for example). That doesn't mean that this is what he meant. I absolutely agree that a short quote is not sufficient, but it is not reasonable to completely discard it either. I wanted to quote Zizek here for a moment. I will post this Zizek movie. Unfortunately there is a whole group of people repeating him. The original is just him telling this story. Anyway, here it is.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GfPqxLp2XDw
My point is this: we can talk about Wittgenstein in our own words. We can discuss what we think his general thought is, even if he never used the words that we will use. A lot of explanations are done by comparing thoughts. And that is actually also what Wittgenstein is doing: It is solipsism, but not solipsism. If you take these 2 sentences and respond to them individually, it will look like a contradiction, but it is really an addition. If you take the second sentence as more important, it is still not the same message as when you read it together, as a nuance.

What I want, is a normal conversation, not a conversation where things are taken so much apart that the complete message falls in between the cracks. I hope that you understand what I am talking about.

Fooloso4
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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Post by Fooloso4 » January 26th, 2019, 7:32 pm

Arjen:
If I said something inappropriate, I apologize.
No need to apologize to me. No offence taken. It is just that the forum rules are fairly strict in some ways and it is better to stay safely within their bounds.
However, I can find quotes of Nietzsche saying the priest cast is always right (for example). That doesn't mean that this is what he meant.
Agreed, but if that is not what he meant then you need to show that by providing the proper context. That is why Nietzsche says he hates idle readers and should be learned by heart.

If you are claiming that I have misrepresented Wittgenstein then you need to support that claim.
What I want, is a normal conversation, not a conversation where things are taken so much apart that the complete message falls in between the cracks. I hope that you understand what I am talking about.
I am in agreement with the idea that there is no complete transparency of thought, that there is always what Derrida calls, if I understand him correctly, differance. There is always something more, something other, something left open that defies closure. But this should not be a reason to not read a text closely. Derrida was, after all, a very careful reader.

One of the most important writers on Plato in the 20th century was Jacob Klein, who was, for a while, a student of Heidegger. He once said:
But what preoccupied me mostly during those years was this: whatever thought I might have, and whatever interest I might have in anything, seemed to me to be located completely within me, so that I always felt that I could not really understand anything outside me, could not understand anything uttered or written by another person. I felt that I was in a kind of vicious circle, out of which I could find no escape …

… When I heard him [Heidegger] lecture, I was struck by one thing: that he was the first man who made me understand something written by another man; namely Aristotle. It broke my vicious circle. I felt that I could understand. Then I began studying seriously, for myself, seriously, not superficially.
Klein and a few others taught me how to read. We can never know completely, fully, and precisely what another might mean but we can still learn a great deal. It is not a matter of gathering information about their thoughts, it is to begin to think along with them. Don't close the book before you open it.

From an early draft of a foreword to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Remarks:
The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. For if a book has been written for just a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the foreword is written just for those who understand the book.

Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)

If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it, unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!

The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only by those who can open it, not by the rest.
(Culture and Value, 7-8)

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