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Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 30th, 2019, 5:54 am
by Tamminen
Fooloso4 wrote: January 29th, 2019, 6:33 pm My opinion is that subjectivity requires consciousness and consciousness is an emergent property of some entities in the universe, and so, there was a time, a “temporal slice” when there was not a subjective perspective. It was out of this universe without a subjective perspective that a subject perspective emerged. They are not interdependent, the latter is dependent on the former.
My opinion is that the subject is original, and the essence of the universe is the subject's consciousness of the world it lives in. This view presupposes a final cause, a cosmic teleology. Matter is the functional basis of consciousness, but it must be seen as an instrument rather than an ontological basis for the subject's existence. Ontologically, the subject is the primus motor of everything, and its being does not need an explanation. It is a causa sui, and its necessity can be seen immediately through a simple intuition.
...no subjects no problem. Who would it be a problem for?
For us, to think about that possibility. The universe without subjects does not belong to the group of possible worlds. Remember that we have only one universe, and this can be seen as the definition of 'universe'.
...it is you assumption that a world without subjects means nothingness.
Nothingness for the subject means nothingness. Nonexistence. What else can nothingness mean? The world is a totality of subjective perspectives, a totality of subject-object relationships, or to go a step deeper, a totality of subject-subject relationships. The universe is a community of subjects.
Arjen wrote: January 29th, 2019, 5:55 pm Isn't that solipsism again?
Removing the subjects and then ending up with nothing?
Here we are in front of a paradox: death means nothingness, and still we know that the world goes on. A task for philosophers.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 30th, 2019, 9:12 am
by Arjen
Tamminen wrote: January 30th, 2019, 5:54 am Here we are in front of a paradox: death means nothingness, and still we know that the world goes on. A task for philosophers.
I remember reading that, now that you mention it.
It does point to Fooloso4's idea that 'the world' is metaphysical and that it is in the form of logic.
And therefore not a noumenon, as I thought.
I think a reason for the confusion is that he uses it ambiguously, creating a paradox.

In the above sentence alone we see 'the world' posited not as logic, but as surviving after death, while suggesting it is in the mind (therefore it should end up as nothingness). So, it is in the mind, but it isn't.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 30th, 2019, 10:35 am
by Tamminen
Fooloso4:

To return to Wittgenstein: If the world is what the totality of true propositions denotes, and if possible worlds are what the totality of meaningful propositions denotes, then 'meaningful' is not something only connected to a subjective perspective if a possible world does not necessarily contain subjects. So one of the godheads of Wittgenstein, the subject, does not participate in all possible worlds, if we accept your interpretation. Is this what you think? The metaphysical subject itself would be something accidental, not anything "god-like".

In a possible world I do not exist.
In a possible world no one exists, only something.

Paradoxical sentences. Something very strange in them, don't you think?

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 30th, 2019, 12:12 pm
by Fooloso4
Tamminen:
To return to Wittgenstein: If the world is what the totality of true propositions denotes, and if possible worlds are what the totality of meaningful propositions denotes, then 'meaningful' is not something only connected to a subjective perspective if a possible world does not necessarily contain subjects.
The world and propositions or pictures of the world are two different things. What makes the picture possible is logical form. The meaning of a name is not some subjective state:
A name means an object. The object is its meaning. (3.203)

The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign. (3.21)
Tamminen:
So one of the godheads of Wittgenstein, the subject, does not participate in all possible worlds, if we accept your interpretation.
If you are asking whether it is logically possible that the world could be without subjects then yes, but it would be a world without propositions.
The metaphysical subject itself would be something accidental, not anything "god-like".
The only necessity according to W. is logical necessity. The subject stands outside the logical relations of the world. Outside the determinations necessary and accidental.
In a possible world I do not exist.
In a possible world no one exists, only something.

Paradoxical sentences. Something very strange in them, don't you think?
Nope. In the actual world you did not exist some nine months before your birth and will not exist after you die.
In the actual world sentient creatures did not exist until habitable conditions existed and sufficient time for biological development took place. At some time in the future conditions may once again be such that will not allow for sentient creatures to exist.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 30th, 2019, 1:27 pm
by Tamminen
Fooloso4 wrote: January 30th, 2019, 12:12 pm Nope. In the actual world you did not exist some nine months before your birth and will not exist after you die.
In the actual world sentient creatures did not exist until habitable conditions existed and sufficient time for biological development took place. At some time in the future conditions may once again be such that will not allow for sentient creatures to exist.
As I have said, I see the world as an instrument for the existence of the original subjectivity. In this scenario physical places and times with no subjective perspective belong to the instrument and do not make any difference to the subject's existence. Being does not depend on time so that now the subject would exist and then it would not. Time is an internal constituent of the subject's existence. But there are metaphysical consequences of this way of seeing things.

Amazing how differently we can see reality. Some of us see paradoxes where others see no such things.

It seems that we approach reality from opposite directions.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: January 31st, 2019, 6:46 pm
by Arjen
Tamminen wrote: January 30th, 2019, 1:27 pm Amazing how differently we can see reality. Some of us see paradoxes where others see no such things.

It seems that we approach reality from opposite directions.
Will you explain to me how you see that?
And how you think Wittgenstein sees that?

Thanks.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: February 1st, 2019, 3:59 am
by Tamminen
Arjen wrote: January 31st, 2019, 6:46 pm
Tamminen wrote: January 30th, 2019, 1:27 pm Amazing how differently we can see reality. Some of us see paradoxes where others see no such things.

It seems that we approach reality from opposite directions.
Will you explain to me how you see that?
And how you think Wittgenstein sees that?

Thanks.
Shortly: is the universe without a subjective perspective a possible world? I think no, Fooloso4 says Wittgenstein thinks yes, I am not sure.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: February 1st, 2019, 6:06 pm
by Arjen
Tamminen wrote: February 1st, 2019, 3:59 am
Arjen wrote: January 31st, 2019, 6:46 pm
Will you explain to me how you see that?
And how you think Wittgenstein sees that?

Thanks.
Shortly: is the universe without a subjective perspective a possible world? I think no, Fooloso4 says Wittgenstein thinks yes, I am not sure.
If we look at this from a quantification perspective, the world does not exist until our mind quantifies it. Like Schrödingers cat. It is both alive and dead, until we open the box. If the quantum theory is really the way things work, that sentence you quoted is right on the money:
Here we are in front of a paradox: death means nothingness, and still we know that the world goes on. A task for philosophers.
It both disappears and stays.

Or am I rambling craziness again?

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: February 1st, 2019, 11:40 pm
by Consul
Tamminen wrote: January 30th, 2019, 5:54 am
Fooloso4 wrote: January 29th, 2019, 6:33 pm...no subjects no problem. Who would it be a problem for?
For us, to think about that possibility. The universe without subjects does not belong to the group of possible worlds. Remember that we have only one universe, and this can be seen as the definition of 'universe'.
But a nonactual world (or a past temporal part of the actual world) devoid of subjects is easily conceivable or imaginable (without contradiction), so your denial of its possibility is totally unjustified.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: February 2nd, 2019, 4:24 am
by Tamminen
Consul wrote: February 1st, 2019, 11:40 pm But a nonactual world (or a past temporal part of the actual world) devoid of subjects is easily conceivable or imaginable (without contradiction), so your denial of its possibility is totally unjustified.
I think conscioussness is the essence of the universe, and nothing can exist if its essence is removed. This presupposes cosmic teleology. We can imagine all kinds of abstractions, but as long as they are abstractions, there is no justification to posit their existence, or possibility of concrete existence. In fact, if we think of it thoroughly, the idea of the universe - the one and only universe - without some kind of a subjective perspective makes no sense: it becomes the self-contradictory idea of nothingness.
Arjen wrote: February 1st, 2019, 6:06 pm
Tamminen wrote: February 1st, 2019, 3:59 am
Shortly: is the universe without a subjective perspective a possible world? I think no, Fooloso4 says Wittgenstein thinks yes, I am not sure.
If we look at this from a quantification perspective, the world does not exist until our mind quantifies it. Like Schrödingers cat. It is both alive and dead, until we open the box. If the quantum theory is really the way things work, that sentence you quoted is right on the money:
Here we are in front of a paradox: death means nothingness, and still we know that the world goes on. A task for philosophers.
It both disappears and stays.

Or am I rambling craziness again?
An interesting metaphor, but I think just a metaphor. There must be a metaphysical solution to the paradox.

Re: early wittgenstein on metaphysics

Posted: February 2nd, 2019, 6:44 am
by Arjen
Tamminen wrote: February 2nd, 2019, 4:24 am An interesting metaphor, but I think just a metaphor. There must be a metaphysical solution to the paradox.
Is quantum mechanics not a scientific approach to metaphysics?
The quantum field could very well be closely related to consciousness: it being that thing that is acted on. Like a membrane that forms around that which acts on it.

It would fit into Kantian theory: the noumena being something else than the phenomena. The phenomena are just what human brains make of things. Creating the causal 'world' (as Witt calls it), which disappears into nothingness, while the quantum 'world' remains. And because each subject has a unique perspective, each subject quantifies a unique phenomenon.

Or is that just what I see there?