This comment is too multi-faceted for simple discussion. It includes metaphysical (I mean 'systematic' here), logical, semantic, translational, and interpretive issues before the specifics can be clearly investigated. As of today, none of these are resolved by commentators, and some of them are not open to resolution. Then there is the issue of Plato's invention and understanding of the then-existent philosophy and of his own developing and changing philosophy, which of course he could not complete for lack of logical and linguistic resources.ChanceIsChange wrote: ↑December 16th, 2018, 8:43 am In Plato's dialogues, it is sometimes stated that that every Form is itself. For example, the Form of Justice is said to be just. I am wondering whether some characters in Plato's dialogues commit linguistic errors regarding this self-predication of Forms. Specifically, I stumbled over the following two.
a) ... Evenness. This is the property of being divisible by 2. Obviously, only numbers can have this property. But Evenness itself is a Form and not a number. Therefore, it can't possibly be even, i.e. divisible by 2. But of course, Evenness is obviously itself in that it is identical itself.
As far as I can see, there are (at least) four distinct meanings of the word "is":
1. Existence;
2. ... essence;
3. ... has-as-a-property
3.5. ... belongs-to
4. ... identity
... Do Plato's characters mix up these last two meanings of the word "is" when they say that every Form is identical to itself? Obviously, every Form is identical to itself, but, as is shown by the Form of Evenness, not every Form characterizes itself. By realizing the latter, we can also solve the problem of the third man.
b) ... In my opinion, the fact that some Forms, such as Equality, are binary relations and not unary ones proves that not every Form characterizes itself.
Analytic philosophers attempted to unravel the complexities of language, but the complexities of metaphysics await the arrival of newer 21th Century philosophy [should it ever happen].
While it would seem easy to dismiss Plato's Forms as unnecessary castles in the sky and to stick to what is real, as some Aristotelian philosophies would wish, this leads to a philosophical disaster. However, as Aristotle noted, if this were done, the possibility of rational thought and language would be gone [from systematic philosophy].
Plato's Forms, what he called 'really, really real' are quite different from what I called 'stick to what is real'.
For Plato, 'is' also means 'having being' and being 'real',
where these terms have meaning in his attempt to connect the Forms to his Particulars. It is in this sense that Forms are necessary for rational thought and language. Forms impose discrete bounds to the continuous world (which calls entirely unreal) which then can be labeled through the names of the Forms.