Qualia as bare difference

[Belindi]

Gertie wrote:

I'm not seeing how this contradicts what you quoted, except in that we can never directly know what another person's private experiential states are (hence the problem of absent and inverted qualia).

If your brain and afferent nerve was to be neurally linked to my leg, you would feel a pain in my leg. Similarly if your brain was linked to my brain you would feel what I feel. Similarly if your brain were neurally linked to a robotic leg with sensory attachments you could feel the irritation that the robot felt when it approached a signficantly corrosive substance or a burning heat.

There's a part or parts of f Gertie's brain that deal in what Gertie calls "I" and makes what Gertie calls "decisions".

[Gertie]

Felix

Gertie: I'm simply saying here that it makes sense that a physically identical Gertie or Greta in this universe subject to this universe's laws, would have identical experiential states to the original Gertie and Greta. Because we know humans with brains have experiential states, and if a Greta-shaped physically identical copy replaced you, there would be no difference. It doesn't follow that a copy made of a different substrate with exactly the same moving parts (including neurons) would have experiential states tho, that remains an open question.

You contradicted yourself: if your physical make-up alone determines your experiental states, then it must also engender them.

What we know is observation of correlation only. Hence it's a fair assumption that an identical physical copy would have identical experience in the same circumstances.

If you change the substrate but keep the patterns (of eg silicon interactions in Robot Felix), we don't know if this would make a difference, because we don't know the necessary and sufficient conditions for experiential states - whether these necessary and sufficient conditions include certain features of an organic substrate such as human brains, for example.

[Gertie]

Gertie wrote:

I'm not seeing how this contradicts what you quoted, except in that we can never directly know what another person's private experiential states are (hence the problem of absent and inverted qualia).

If your brain and afferent nerve was to be neurally linked to my leg, you would feel a pain in my leg. Similarly if your brain was linked to my brain you would feel what I feel. Similarly if your brain were neurally linked to a robotic leg with sensory attachments you could feel the irritation that the robot felt when it approached a signficantly corrosive substance or a burning heat.

Linking nervous systems would be fascinating.

Your 3 examples raise different issues tho.

I think you're probably right about the first.

Linking two brains, is more difficult - would there then be one unified 'field of consciousness', one sense of self we could call Bel-Gert? Or what?

The final bolded claim needs justifying, how do you know?

[Belindi]

Gertie wrote:



If your brain and afferent nerve was to be neurally linked to my leg, you would feel a pain in my leg. Similarly if your brain was linked to my brain you would feel what I feel. Similarly if your brain were neurally linked to a robotic leg with sensory attachments you could feel the irritation that the robot felt when it approached a signficantly corrosive substance or a burning heat.

Linking nervous systems would be fascinating.

Your 3 examples raise different issues tho.

I think you're probably right about the first.

Linking two brains, is more difficult - would there then be one unified 'field of consciousness', one sense of self we could call Bel-Gert? Or what?

The final bolded claim needs justifying, how do you know?

Linking two brains: I'm not a neurologist. I guess that the result would be either internal warfare between to two self bits, or there might be a complete double nervous breakdown, or the two self bits might find their selves mightily enriched. Let's go for the latter eh?

My final claim: I bet that there are robotic prostheses that can act like guide dogs and which neurologically convey information to the person's brain-mind.
I'd bet £20.

[Tamminen]

I'm not seeing how this contradicts what you quoted, except in that we can never directly know what another person's private experiential states are (hence the problem of absent and inverted qualia).

The point I tried to make was that there is no meaning for 'identical experiential states' outside of language. Even if our structures of consciousness were identical, having the same "color spaces" for instance, so that we see as many colors, there is no concept of 'similarity' before we communicate with each other using some sort of language. The possibility of language among us constitutes the "sameness" of the qualia. Matching our "color spaces" in understanding and communicating creates the "sameness" or 'red' for instance. Physically identical bodies do not make the concept of 'identical qualia' meaningful. So qualities are not private if we want to speak about them.

[Felix]

Gertie: Hence it's a fair assumption that an identical physical copy would have identical experience in the same circumstances.

The contradiction still stands: you're saying that physical make-up determines experience, i.e., two beings with the same make up would have the same experiences, but you said before when you spoke of the "mind-body problem" that physical makeup alone does not account for our subjective experience. So which is it?

JamesOfSeattle: I think of it as a pattern. I can talk about, say, the number 473, without referring to any physical thing.

And what is the pattern of the number 473 if it has no reference to any physical thing? The fact is that the reference will define the pattern rather than the reverse as you claim. That is, 473 can form a large number of different patterns because its integers can be arranged in any number of ways.

[Gertie]

Belinda

My final claim: I bet that there are robotic prostheses that can act like guide dogs and which neurologically convey information to the person's brain-mind.
I'd bet £20.

This computer 'conveys information to my mind', so does reading a book, opening my eyes does, artificially stimulating neural systems does (a surgeon can poke about in my brain and cause a pain in my leg).


It's possible that a prosthetic leg could be designed to eg stimulate the exposed leg nerve endings or my brain neurons in such a way as to mimic sensations 'located' in the prosthetic leg.

But that doesn't necessarily mean we could create a prosthetic leg out of a different substrate which would itself be part of our body's sensory system, rather than an external stimulus acting on it. Or create an identically functioning Gertie out of a different substrate which would have experiential states. We don't know if it would have them. Because we don't know if that (eg silicon) replica Gertie would have the necessary and sufficient conditions for experiential states.

Because - we don't know what those conditions are, and we don't know if human cells have some key ingredient which eg silicon doesn't have.

[Gertie]

Tam

I'm not seeing how this contradicts what you quoted, except in that we can never directly know what another person's private experiential states are (hence the problem of absent and inverted qualia).

The point I tried to make was that there is no meaning for 'identical experiential states' outside of language. Even if our structures of consciousness were identical, having the same "color spaces" for instance, so that we see as many colors, there is no concept of 'similarity' before we communicate with each other using some sort of language. The possibility of language among us constitutes the "sameness" of the qualia. Matching our "color spaces" in understanding and communicating creates the "sameness" or 'red' for instance. Physically identical bodies do not make the concept of 'identical qualia' meaningful. So qualities are not private if we want to speak about them.

Disagree.

States of affairs can exist without us describing them to each other. The evidence is overwhelming that the universe existed before there were people around to communicate about it. I can experience right now seeing a white door, regardless of whether I tell you about it, or even form the thought-words 'white door' in my own head. I can tell there's a difference between a white door and a red door without language too, recognising similarities and differences. Language is a red herring, the experience underlying 'propositional attitudes' (beliefs and desires) is independent of its being formulated in language.




Tho it's true that experiencing beings such as humans experience the universe in particular ways which don't fully or accurately describe the universe (for example our brains manifest an experience of colour which only exists in our heads, a table 'feels solid' tho it's mostly empty space, etc). We can communicate about 'red apples' coherently, because we can both point to an object and agree to call what we experience an ''apple'' and call it ''red''. Tho the experience remains private in the sense that only I directly know what my experience of a red apple is like, and your experience of red might be what I call blue, what I call an apple you might call a pear.

[Gertie]

Felix

Gertie: Hence it's a fair assumption that an identical physical copy would have identical experience in the same circumstances.

The contradiction still stands: you're saying that physical make-up determines experience, i.e., two beings with the same make up would have the same experiences, but you said before when you spoke of the "mind-body problem" that physical makeup alone does not account for our subjective experience. So which is it?

I said a purely physical description of a conscious person would miss conscious experience. Which is correct imo. The above assumption you quote is also a fair one based on our current knowledge.


Both seem to be correct, but what's missing is the explanation of how - the mind-body question.

[Tamminen]

States of affairs can exist without us describing them to each other. The evidence is overwhelming that the universe existed before there were people around to communicate about it.

Sorry, but this has nothing to do with what I tried to say. Maybe in my next post I can say it more clearly.

I can tell there's a difference between a white door and a red door without language too, recognising similarities and differences.

Yes, you can do that, but only that. You cannot say that other people's 'red doors' have the same quality 'red' as your 'red doors' until you have a common language, ie. until your structures of consciousness are isomorphic enough to enable understanding. As I said, similarity of qualia are established in language. So perhaps we are speaking of a bit different things.

We can communicate about 'red apples' coherently, because we can both point to an object and agree to call what we experience an ''apple'' and call it ''red''.

Right.

Tho the experience remains private in the sense that only I directly know what my experience of a red apple is like, and your experience of red might be what I call blue, what I call an apple you might call a pear.

It is exactly here that I disagree. There is no inherent essence or quality of a "quale". Its "private" essence is only something in relation to the "quale space" it belongs to. For instance the quale 'red' has no inherent "redness", it has a quality only in relation to other colors. Only in language it can be said to have a public "essence" or quality.

But I'll come back to this, hopefully, in my next post.

[Tamminen]

What follows is a simplified theory of consciousness, using qualia.

As an introduction, a paragraph from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:

293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know
what the word "pain" means—must I not say the same of other people
too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?
Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own
case!——Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it
a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says
he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would
be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.
One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.—But
suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If
so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box
has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something:
for the box might even be empty.—No, one can 'divide through' by
the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of
sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops
out of consideration as irrelevant.

We have 3 individuals:

A: Greta, whose consciousness consists of 3 possible qualia (a,b,c)
B: Gertie, whose consciousness consists of 3 possible qualia (x,y,z)
C: a female cat, whose consciousness consists of 2 possible qualia (1,2).

A, B and C live in the world and get information from it, each having only her own private world of qualia where the information “resides”. In this phase we cannot say there is any correspondence between any of those qualia between any of those 3 individuals. There is no internal “essence” or “quality” of the qualia in any of the individual's private worlds, ie. consciousnesses. There is only a relative essence: a in relation to b and c for instance. For Greta (a,b,c) is her “qualia space”, an internal private world with relative qualities like “red in relation to the other two colors”, although we have not yet the concept 'red'.

Now it happens that each time Greta sees a, she behaves in the same way as Gertie behaves when she sees x, and the same happens in the case of seeing b/y and c/z. This makes it possible to establish understanding and language between Greta and Gertie, and from now on we can say that they have identical or similar qualia. So, it is not so that identical or similar qualia make understanding possible, but on the contrary, only if the internal structure of consciousness of a group of people is isomorphic enough to make understanding and language possible, only then we can say to have similar or identical qualia, or the same kind of consciousness among the members of the group.

But it is possible that the internal structure of C's consciousness is so different from A's and B's that understanding and language between her and the others is impossible. Perhaps this is why we do not understand what cats talk to other cats.

[Belindi]

Belinda

My final claim: I bet that there are robotic prostheses that can act like guide dogs and which neurologically convey information to the person's brain-mind.
I'd bet £20.

This computer 'conveys information to my mind', so does reading a book, opening my eyes does, artificially stimulating neural systems does (a surgeon can poke about in my brain and cause a pain in my leg).


It's possible that a prosthetic leg could be designed to eg stimulate the exposed leg nerve endings or my brain neurons in such a way as to mimic sensations 'located' in the prosthetic leg.

But that doesn't necessarily mean we could create a prosthetic leg out of a different substrate which would itself be part of our body's sensory system, rather than an external stimulus acting on it. Or create an identically functioning Gertie out of a different substrate which would have experiential states. We don't know if it would have them. Because we don't know if that (eg silicon) replica Gertie would have the necessary and sufficient conditions for experiential states.

Because - we don't know what those conditions are, and we don't know if human cells have some key ingredient which eg silicon doesn't have.

I agree that we don't know. However there is muscle tissue made in laboratories and soon to be marketed for human consumption. Nerve tissue could be made by similar methods I presume. I may be at fault for sliding between tissues (muscle and nerve)and molecules(silicones) and I think that it would be in this difference that "some key ingredient" would lie. I am determined to resist any suggestion that "some key ingredient" is a spiritual one, as I guess are you, Gertie, not so?

[Gertie]

Tam

We can presumably agree on the relatively straightforward point about how language helps us categorise and create shared 'good enough' working models to be useful.

Beyond that, you seem to be suggesting that language itself somehow shapes the experience of eg 'seeing a red apple', rather than the experience generating and shaping the language?

If so, I'd say language plays a role as one of the multitude of elements in a 'field of consciousness experiential event', but the experience of what we call 'seeing a red apple' was happening long before language was invented. There IS a state of affairs which is the experience I call ''seeing a red apple'' or ''feeling a pain in my leg'' whether I/we have a name for it or not.

And if physical-experiential correlation holds true, then it's a fair assumption that an identical physical replica of you in identical circs would have identical experiential states.

We can't know for sure, because we can't examine private subjective experience in the way we can public 'stuff'. I can't point to my experience of what we both call the experience of 'a pain in the leg' and ask if you see it or feel it, I can only point to my leg.

[Gertie]

Belinda




This computer 'conveys information to my mind', so does reading a book, opening my eyes does, artificially stimulating neural systems does (a surgeon can poke about in my brain and cause a pain in my leg).


It's possible that a prosthetic leg could be designed to eg stimulate the exposed leg nerve endings or my brain neurons in such a way as to mimic sensations 'located' in the prosthetic leg.

But that doesn't necessarily mean we could create a prosthetic leg out of a different substrate which would itself be part of our body's sensory system, rather than an external stimulus acting on it. Or create an identically functioning Gertie out of a different substrate which would have experiential states. We don't know if it would have them. Because we don't know if that (eg silicon) replica Gertie would have the necessary and sufficient conditions for experiential states.

Because - we don't know what those conditions are, and we don't know if human cells have some key ingredient which eg silicon doesn't have.

I agree that we don't know. However there is muscle tissue made in laboratories and soon to be marketed for human consumption. Nerve tissue could be made by similar methods I presume. I may be at fault for sliding between tissues (muscle and nerve)and molecules(silicones) and I think that it would be in this difference that "some key ingredient" would lie. I am determined to resist any suggestion that "some key ingredient" is a spiritual one, as I guess are you, Gertie, not so?

The details of the biology is beyond me, but your point was clear.

Personally I try to avoid terms like 'soul' and 'spirit' because they carry a lot of vague baggage. I was thinking more about hypotheses like neuronal microtubules collapsing the wave function there, as a possible key factor which other substrates might not have. 'Spirit' just doesn't seem like the right word for that!

But I don't rule out substanve dualism, I don't think we know enough to do that.

[Felix]

Regarding the discernment of colors, studies do not support the idea that our physical neurons dictate how colors appear to us, but instead that our subjective perception of color develops during our formative years and is influenced by our assumptions about the world and the way we think about what we are seeing. Therefore the physically identical clone of Gertie is unlikely to experience the world in the same way as the genuine Gertie does. I would think that language plays a big part in this, as Tam suggested.