If I am a body or organism, I can be aware or conscious of myself in the sense of being able to perceive myself both externally and internally.
Bodily awareness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodily-awareness/
If I am a body or organism, I can be aware or conscious of myself in the sense of being able to perceive myself both externally and internally.
I disagree, or rather I think you are confusing two different types of consciousness. To perceive/feel/experience is one type, and to think/understand is another type. We have subconscious processing, subconscious intelligent operations are carried out the same as an artificial intelligence would do. In fact there is no difference really between intelligence and artificial intelligence. But the tricky thing is that every intelligent operation in our brain could occur subconsciously, we can clearly tell the difference between being conscious and subconscious, and an observed difference is essentially empirical evidence. Since our brain could do everything that it does with no consciousness, just like a robot, yet the perception/experience type consciousness is different from it means that there is something other than just logic and neurons within us.Zelebg wrote: ↑November 3rd, 2019, 8:23 pm Let me try...
To be conscious is to have experience.
To experience is to feel extern senses or inner emotions.
Any experience is a feeling: taste, vision, joy, desire...
Any experience is necessarily subjective experience.
Subjective experience requires the subject, that is "self".
Consciousness requires, or is, self-awareness.
To be self aware requires, or is, to have thoughts
Thoughts require intelligence.
Consciousness requires, or is, intelligence.
To feel requires intelligence, i.e. thoughts, i.e. consciousness, i.e. self-awareness.
The division between psychological and philosophical worlds is metaphysical. How I feel or what I experience cannot be well enough expressed in words to bridge the gap from the subjective to the objective to create a realist philosophy of the subjective world. The subjective world therefore must remain largely unknowable, even if it is certain and indubitable.H. Schwyzer wrote:whereas Descartes, initially, disallows inference from the inner [subjective] to the outer [objective], Kant insists on it. What the Kant of this picture shares with Descartes is the view that consciousness per se delineates a world of objects complete unto itself, inner objects to be sure, objects (of awareness) none the less. The only question is whether that needs the support of another world.
... there is for Kant no such inner world of objects initially (or 'directly') apprehended by us, as there is for Descartes. There is no such inner world from which an objective outer world is to be inferred or out of which an allegedly objective world is to be constructed or 'constituted'. Moreover, ... Kant has a powerful argument against the possibility of taking one's inner states as any sort of starting-point for metaphysical theorizing. (H. Schwyzer, Subjectivity in Descartes and Kant, 1997.)
Consul wrote: ↑November 9th, 2019, 8:51 pmThere's a difference between physiological sensitivity (reactivity/responsivity to physical or chemical stimuli) and psychological sentience in the form of subjective sensations. Bacteria, fungi, plants, and brainless animals are physiologically sensitive organisms but not psychologically sentient ones.
And you know this how? Where is your evidence?
In those scientific books and papers which strongly confirm the assumption that the brain is the natural organ of consciousness, such that having a brain is necessary for an organism's being a subject of experience.Gee wrote: ↑November 11th, 2019, 12:31 amAnd you know this how? Where is your evidence?Consul wrote: ↑November 9th, 2019, 8:51 pmThere's a difference between physiological sensitivity (reactivity/responsivity to physical or chemical stimuli) and psychological sentience in the form of subjective sensations. Bacteria, fungi, plants, and brainless animals are physiologically sensitive organisms but not psychologically sentient ones.
Blindsight is an example of objective awareness without subjective awareness.
Bacteria, fungi, plants, and brainless animals don't have any parts which can plausibly be considered as alternative organs of consciousness.
That is one of my conclusions in the opening post. But there is a problem: if the pain doesn't hurt until you understand it in some way, then what is the reference to "hurting" and how will you ever learn what is it you need to understand.
Also some people continue to play piano or drive a car as if nothing happened while having an epileptic seizure. They of course don't remember anything, but can function almost normally - stop at red light, make correct turns, drive home safely. They only fail to react when something novel or surprising happens, they loose ability to act creatively. Which is funny, it means we are driving our cars on "automatic", so why do we need a car that drives itself when someone else inside us is driving for us already?!
Yes, I think it is. This is often how we discern lies, by feeling the truth. Sometimes, things just don't feel right, so we don't want to accept them. It may be because they are not true, but it also may be because we are unfamiliar with that truth. Familiarity is much more important than many people suppose, because when we become familiar with an idea, we are actually attaching emotion to it -- it becomes comfortable and a belief.
Probably true. Remember that sapience and sentience are not the same thing. All life is sentient, but computers are sapient.
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