Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

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Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by wise43 » November 24th, 2019, 10:04 am

Cognition is not only structurally limited to sensations, but no subject can go beyond itself to convince not only that matter exists but even that there are other subjects. Solipsism thus understood seems impassable, assuming the existence of other subjects, we could also assume the existence of something beyond the experience, this is the strongest argument against Berkeley's theory, an argument from solipsism that is more consistent than Berkeley's. Such a solipsistic limitation of knowledge seems unbearable, and on this basis, since we accept the existence of subjects, we have the FULL RIGHT to accept the existence of beyond phenomenal reality.
However, one moment seems important here, although we cannot go beyond our own experiences, we can verify some facts based on other subjects, that there are, also data about reality; however, in the case of beyond phenomenal reality such verification is not possible. The existence of subjects seems to be confirmed by some verification possibilities, but the existence of beyond phenomenal reality is not confirmed by them; hence the presumption that it does not exist. The existence of other subjects can be verified and out of mind matter can not, this logical situation can lead to the rejection of the existence of matter.
When someone is thinking about the essence of things, have only a) sensory data b) names, conclusion whether the sensory data relate to something beyond the mental or not, is antinomial and is one of those questions that is not answered for reasons essential. Whether the subject goes beyond itself, not - and yet we accept the existence of other subjects, in a similar way we can accept the existence of something outside the minds. The contradition idealism-realism resembles the subject-object antinomy, and in fact the question of whether there is something beyond this or that specific subject seems to exceed the capabilities of this or that particular subject, and yet we accept the existence of other subjects.
Asking the problem whether reality exists outside of minds or not seems to exceed the possibilities of minds, because they are not able to check what is beyond their borders. A single mind can only check what remains within it and cannot access what is beyond it; it is not wise to ask minds a question that they cannot solve; why such a question - this is an example of a paradox issue, aporia from which seems there is no way out, as in the tic-tac-toe game, the same history of philosophy tends to understand that with good play on both sides (idealists and realists), gameplay MUST remain unresolved.
How to solve the paradox under consideration, is it possible to adopt a third position next to idealism and realism? Is it even possible to formulate such a position, for example in such a way that it combines the features of idealism and realism? It turns out that there is a theory that makes it possible to get out of this antinomy, and it was created in the ancient period. To solve the discussed aporia one can recall the theory of Gorgias whose main thesis is: nothing exists. So there is no mind and there is no matter.

Gregory Podgorniak, Poland (2019)

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Pantagruel » December 2nd, 2019, 3:53 pm

wise43 wrote:
November 24th, 2019, 10:04 am
Cognition is not only structurally limited to sensations, but no subject can go beyond itself to convince not only that matter exists but even that there are other subjects.
Gregory Podgorniak, Poland (2019)
Cognition may operate upon sensations, but how does that entail that it is limited to sensations?

The human body interacts with its environment in many different dimensions, which can all be considered part of the cognitive framework, broadly speaking. Based on these interactions, we discern regularities in the external world (whose boundary varies, depending on which system is interactive, digestive, endocrine, etc.) based upon which we regulate our behaviours. So based upon the successes and failures of our behavioural interactions with the environment we can draw conclusions about the nature of external reality which our own existence validates.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by wise43 » December 19th, 2019, 5:31 am

In this regard, I refer to the first pages of the Berkeley's A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by LuckyR » December 20th, 2019, 12:05 pm

wise43 wrote:
December 19th, 2019, 5:31 am
In this regard, I refer to the first pages of the Berkeley's A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Kindly summarize what you consider to be the relevant passages.
"As usual... it depends."

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Hereandnow » December 22nd, 2019, 8:57 pm

wise43

Cognition is not only structurally limited to sensations, but no subject can go beyond itself to convince not only that matter exists but even that there are other subjects. Solipsism thus understood seems impassable, assuming the existence of other subjects, we could also assume the existence of something beyond the experience, this is the strongest argument against Berkeley's theory, an argument from solipsism that is more consistent than Berkeley's. Such a solipsistic limitation of knowledge seems unbearable, and on this basis, since we accept the existence of subjects, we have the FULL RIGHT to accept the existence of beyond phenomenal reality.
However, one moment seems important here, although we cannot go beyond our own experiences, we can verify some facts based on other subjects, that there are, also data about reality; however, in the case of beyond phenomenal reality such verification is not possible. The existence of subjects seems to be confirmed by some verification possibilities, but the existence of beyond phenomenal reality is not confirmed by them; hence the presumption that it does not exist. The existence of other subjects can be verified and out of mind matter can not, this logical situation can lead to the rejection of the existence of matter.
When someone is thinking about the essence of things, have only a) sensory data b) names, conclusion whether the sensory data relate to something beyond the mental or not, is antinomial and is one of those questions that is not answered for reasons essential. Whether the subject goes beyond itself, not - and yet we accept the existence of other subjects, in a similar way we can accept the existence of something outside the minds. The contradition idealism-realism resembles the subject-object antinomy, and in fact the question of whether there is something beyond this or that specific subject seems to exceed the capabilities of this or that particular subject, and yet we accept the existence of other subjects.
Asking the problem whether reality exists outside of minds or not seems to exceed the possibilities of minds, because they are not able to check what is beyond their borders. A single mind can only check what remains within it and cannot access what is beyond it; it is not wise to ask minds a question that they cannot solve; why such a question - this is an example of a paradox issue, aporia from which seems there is no way out, as in the tic-tac-toe game, the same history of philosophy tends to understand that with good play on both sides (idealists and realists), gameplay MUST remain unresolved.
How to solve the paradox under consideration, is it possible to adopt a third position next to idealism and realism? Is it even possible to formulate such a position, for example in such a way that it combines the features of idealism and realism? It turns out that there is a theory that makes it possible to get out of this antinomy, and it was created in the ancient period. To solve the discussed aporia one can recall the theory of Gorgias whose main thesis is: nothing exists. So there is no mind and there is no matter.
Not quite the way it goes. Idealism, or its contemporary name, phenomenology, does not deny that there are things that can go beyond the self. Rather, it is that the "going beyond" is contained within phenomena. Nothing changes as far as one's daily goings and comings in the everyday world. But the concepts that would separate things and give then ontological independence are taken up as phenomena, not as such independently real things. A thing is an idea, but other things still maintain their otherness, only as ideas. Another is still another as s/he always was, to me. Beyond the idea, there is only transcendence.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Terrapin Station » December 22nd, 2019, 9:02 pm

wise43 wrote:
November 24th, 2019, 10:04 am
Cognition is not only structurally limited to sensations, but no subject can go beyond itself to convince not only that matter exists but even that there are other subjects.
The sensations in question are of matter, of other subjects, etc.

To conclude that those sensations of matter, other subjects and so on are actually just one's own mind, so that the sensations may just as well be some sort of illusion, you have to add theoretical constructs to the sensations, and those theoretical constructs need to be justified over simply accepting the sensations at face value.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Hereandnow » December 22nd, 2019, 11:44 pm

Terrapin Station
To conclude that those sensations of matter, other subjects and so on are actually just one's own mind, so that the sensations may just as well be some sort of illusion, you have to add theoretical constructs to the sensations, and those theoretical constructs need to be justified over simply accepting the sensations at face value.
What theoretical constructs are apparent in the understanding that "other subjects and so on are just in one own mind" belongs to a singular all-of-a-piece reality, ignoring ontological dichotomies altogether?

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Terrapin Station » December 22nd, 2019, 11:54 pm

Hereandnow wrote:
December 22nd, 2019, 11:44 pm
Terrapin Station
To conclude that those sensations of matter, other subjects and so on are actually just one's own mind, so that the sensations may just as well be some sort of illusion, you have to add theoretical constructs to the sensations, and those theoretical constructs need to be justified over simply accepting the sensations at face value.
What theoretical constructs are apparent in the understanding that "other subjects and so on are just in one own mind" belongs to a singular all-of-a-piece reality, ignoring ontological dichotomies altogether?
Again, the sensation is simply of another person, say. The sensation isn't that one has or is a mind that's just imagining other people. You have to construct those ideas to come to that conclusion.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Hereandnow » December 23rd, 2019, 12:33 pm

Hereandnow
Again, the sensation is simply of another person, say. The sensation isn't that one has or is a mind that's just imagining other people. You have to construct those ideas to come to that conclusion.
You mean, as a person thinks about dualism, this thinking says that this empirical world is imagined, and there is a Reality beyond this that Really is Absolute Being, BUT, this dualism is itself a construct that belongs to an original unity which cannot be named, for to name this unity is to reduce it to a concept possessed within the unity.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Terrapin Station » December 24th, 2019, 11:40 am

Hereandnow wrote:
December 23rd, 2019, 12:33 pm
Hereandnow
Again, the sensation is simply of another person, say. The sensation isn't that one has or is a mind that's just imagining other people. You have to construct those ideas to come to that conclusion.
You mean, as a person thinks about dualism, this thinking says that this empirical world is imagined, and there is a Reality beyond this that Really is Absolute Being, BUT, this dualism is itself a construct that belongs to an original unity which cannot be named, for to name this unity is to reduce it to a concept possessed within the unity.
I'm not sure what you're saying there.

Let's go one step at a time. In the initial post of the thread, wise43 seemed to forward that there are sensations--for example, sensations of various people. I have no problem with saying that. Do you have a problem with saying that there are sensations of people?

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Hereandnow » December 24th, 2019, 11:49 am

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I'm not sure what you're saying there.

Let's go one step at a time. In the initial post of the thread, wise43 seemed to forward that there are sensations--for example, sensations of various people. I have no problem with saying that. Do you have a problem with saying that there are sensations of people?
I have no problem saying the are sensations interpreted AS people. The sensations themselves do not announce being a person.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by username_ok » January 19th, 2020, 7:40 am

>
>seems to exceed the possibilities of minds
>
>
>
<Mind> - if it is a capability of Man
to percieve the movemens of Energy that flows through the daily life's environment
and which always does express itself via the events of a specific resource scarcity.
- then so
<the resource scarcity> - a thing that is assumed here as a param that affects this our's such a natural ability <to perceive> when we do have to be confronted by a certain unaccustomed (out of mind) stuff

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Terrapin Station » January 19th, 2020, 7:26 pm

Hereandnow wrote:
December 24th, 2019, 11:49 am
Terrapin Station
I'm not sure what you're saying there.

Let's go one step at a time. In the initial post of the thread, wise43 seemed to forward that there are sensations--for example, sensations of various people. I have no problem with saying that. Do you have a problem with saying that there are sensations of people?
I have no problem saying the are sensations interpreted AS people. The sensations themselves do not announce being a person.
I just saw your reply now. So what would you say the sensations are of?

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Hereandnow » January 20th, 2020, 3:06 pm

Terrapin Station

I just saw your reply now. So what would you say the sensations are of?
As sensations, they are not of anything. Something else is required to make them OF something. This ofness would need examination.

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Re: Solipsism, Berkeley, impressions, resolution of dispute idealism - realism

Post by Terrapin Station » January 20th, 2020, 7:31 pm

Hereandnow wrote:
January 20th, 2020, 3:06 pm
Terrapin Station

I just saw your reply now. So what would you say the sensations are of?
As sensations, they are not of anything. Something else is required to make them OF something. This ofness would need examination.
What's the something else required?

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