Mary's Room thought experiment

[Steve3007]

You are looking for a noun, and 'objective' is an adjective. Try 'noumena'.

Yes I was looking for a noun. The noun I was looking for was (to use object oriented software speak) the base class of all nouns. It was the word "object". I had hoped that would have been obvious to Terrapin Station from the words in my earlier post.

[Steve3007]

Well, the word "object," like "thing," covers a lot of ground.

Yes, some English language words have different standard meanings in different contexts. I think that is probably even more true of "thing" than it is of "object". I guess it's the reason why fallacies of ambiguity appear to be quite common in this language. But I think the use of the word "object" to mean "the things that nouns refer" to is relatively unambiguous. I don't think anyone could object to that. (The context shows the way in which I used the word there.)

We do tend to say, with some justification, that the grammatical objects of true objective propositions "objectively exist." That is usually harmless enough.

Yes, and the grammatical objects of any objective propositions, whether or not they turn out to be true, are proposed to "objectively exist". i.e they are proposed to be objects. So if I say "there is a unicorn" I am making an objective proposition; proposing the existence of an object. If Macbeth says: "Is this a dagger I see before me?" he's posing an objective question as a result of a single subjective experience. He later asks another objective question based on another subjective experience which seems not to fit into a pattern with the first one.

It is objective because its truth conditions are public. I.e., anyone can observe the location ("here") mentioned and verify that the proposition is true

Yes, same thing I think. A key part of the definition of the concept of an "object" (things that nouns refer to) is that it is proposed to be publicly available.

That one is odd because it is a tautology. It is implicit in every objective proposition that the utterer experienced some subjective event (a thought, sensation, intention, etc.).

I guess you could call it a tautology. Or you could just say that I'm unpacking (as they say) the implicit statements that are packed up in the objective proposition: "there is a table here".

But his subjective impression is not the subject of the proposition he asserts (he is not saying anything about that). Note that "I see a table" is not equivalent to, "There is a table here." The former on its face is subjective, though sometimes it may be asserted to mean the latter, which is objective.

As I said, I think the subjective proposition "I see a table" is implicit in the objective proposition "there is a table here". Sometimes the former may be asserted to mean the latter because we're so used to trusting the idea that our subjective sensations of things like tables indicate the objective presence of a table. They say: "see is believing" don't they?

[Steve3007]

I meant "seeing is believing". As many others have noted, the lack of an edit feature is annoying.

[Consul]

Yes, some English language words have different standard meanings in different contexts. I think that is probably even more true of "thing" than it is of "object". I guess it's the reason why fallacies of ambiguity appear to be quite common in this language. But I think the use of the word "object" to mean "the things that nouns refer" to is relatively unambiguous. I don't think anyone could object to that.

I can and do!

1. nouns
1.1 proper
1.2 common
1.2.1 count
1.2.1.1 concrete (e.g. bun, pig)
1.2.1.2 abstract (e.g. difficulty, remark)
1.2.2 noncount
1.2.2.1 concrete (e.g. butter, gold)
1.2.2.2 abstract (e.g. music, laziness)

Proper nouns can refer to objects in the ontological sense of the term, but the only common nouns referring to objects in the ontological sense of the term are those belonging to 1.2.1.1—concrete-count-common nouns. (As opposed to e.g. butter and gold, a piece of butter or gold may be called an object.)

It should be mentioned that the grammatical distinction between abstract nouns and concrete nouns doesn't correspond to the ontological distinction between abstract objects and concrete objects. For example, "number" and "proposition" are grammatically concrete nouns referring to ontologically abstract objects.

[Steve3007]

I don't think anyone could object to that.

I can and do!...

Fair enough. The main reason I added the ill-advised challenge "I don't think anyone could object to that" was as a ham-fisted attempt to illustrate a different usage of the word "object".

Thank you for the contribution.

[GE Morton]

But it's not at all the same thing. Propositions can't be objective.

Why not?

Perhaps you share the view, expressed by others on this forum from time to time, that all propositions are necessarily subjective because they are uttered by humans, each of whom has only a subjective, idiosyncratic impression of "the world as it is." As I've argued on those occasions that view mystifies objectivity and robs the "objective/subjective" distinction of all descriptive utility.

The only utility the phrase "the world as it is" has is to denote those facts about the world which can be expressed in propositions whose truth conditions are public. Imputing some sort of transcendental meaning or import to that phrase, or to the term "objective," leads to idle excursions into mysticism.

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions. The former denotes those whose truth conditions are public, confirmable or disconfirmable by all suitably situated observers. The latter denotes propositions whose truth conditions are private, accessible only to the utterer. The world, and its features and contents, are "objective" only to the extent they are described by true objective propositions.

[GE Morton]

The standard distinction is that objective refers to things independent of persons--or more specifically, things that are mind-independent, and subjective refers to things mental phenomena.

Nothing perceived (or proposed) can possibly be "independent of persons" in the sense assumed by transcendentalists. But it can be independent in the sense that a state of affairs asserted can be confirmed by anyone suitably situated; its existence is not dependent on a single mind.

[GE Morton]

The terms "objective" and "subjective" are picking out an ontological distinction, by the way, not an epistemological distinction.

Ontology is an artifact of epistemology.

[Terrapin Station]

The terms "objective" and "subjective" are picking out an ontological distinction, by the way, not an epistemological distinction.

Ontology is an artifact of epistemology.

I'm saying "an ontological distinction" in the sense of "an existence distinction" of the sort that would obtain whether there were any persons or not. Epistemological facts wouldn't obtain whether there were any persons or not. Ontological facts, in the sense I'm using that term, would exist if there were no persons. So no, ontological facts are not an artifact of epistemology. Epistemology addresses how persons know those ontological facts.

[Terrapin Station]

The standard distinction is that objective refers to things independent of persons--or more specifically, things that are mind-independent, and subjective refers to things mental phenomena.

Nothing perceived (or proposed) can possibly be "independent of persons" in the sense assumed by transcendentalists. But it can be independent in the sense that a state of affairs asserted can be confirmed by anyone suitably situated; its existence is not dependent on a single mind.

Nothing "transcendental" about it. Everything perceived is independent of persons (at least as perceived--for example, you perceive a person's expression via lightwaves, soundwaves, etc. that are independent of persons)--that's wrapped up in what perceptions are.

The perceptions qua perceptions are not independent of persons, or course, but what they're perceptions of are independent of persons.

[Terrapin Station]

But it's not at all the same thing. Propositions can't be objective.

Why not?

Because propositions are the meanings of sentences that can have truth values. Meanings are not objective (they're not extramental). They're subjective (they're mental phenomena).

Perhaps you share the view, expressed by others on this forum from time to time, that all propositions are necessarily subjective because they are uttered by humans,

Propositions aren't literally uttered. Sentences correlating to propositions are uttered. Propositions are meanings, not particular sentences themselves. "Snow is white" and "Schnee ist weist" are the same proposition (at least normally). They're not the same sentence or utterance.

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions.

Nope. The world was full of objective things moments after the big bang. It had no subjective things, and no propositions at that point. That's simply a way of saying that the world was full of non-mental things moments after the big bang, and there were no mental things yet.

The former denotes those whose truth conditions are public, confirmable or disconfirmable by all suitably situated observers.

That's fine as a characteristic of objective things when it's the case that there are observers, when they think of propositions, assign truth values and so on, but it's not coextensive with what objectivity is. Objectivity is simply The fact of not being mental phenomena.

[GE Morton]

I'm saying "an ontological distinction" in the sense of "an existence distinction" of the sort that would obtain whether there were any persons or not.

Whatever we claim would exist in the absence of any persons or other perceivers depends upon what we know, or think we know.

Ontological facts, in the sense I'm using that term, would exist if there were no persons. So no, ontological facts are not an artifact of epistemology. Epistemology addresses how persons know those ontological facts.

Our knowledge defines what we count as "facts." Knowledge is logically prior to any alleged "fact."

I agree, of course, that we (reasonably) assume that something exists independently of any minds. When a purported existent is asserted by some proposition whose truth can be confirmed by any suitably situated observer we count it among those independent existents, as "objective." If the proposition asserting it cannot be so confirmed we do not so count it; that proposition does not assert a "fact."

[GE Morton]

The perceptions qua perceptions are not independent of persons, or course, but what they're perceptions of are independent of persons.

That is a reasonably theoretical position (and can never be more than that), but the only grounds we have of asserting that of any particular thing is that propositions asserting its existence are confirmable by other observers. That fact tells us its existence does not depend upon my perception of it, or that of any other particular person. From there we make a theoretical leap --- that its existence does not depend upon any observer.

[GE Morton]

Why not?

Because propositions are the meanings of sentences that can have truth values. Meanings are not objective (they're not extramental). They're subjective (they're mental phenomena).

Well, first, "objective" does not mean "extramental." You may be interested in this definition (the relevant one) from Merriam-Webster:

"2a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind."

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective

"Having reality independent of the mind" cannot mean "extramental," since that would contradict the previous clause, which says, "in the realm of sensible experience" and "perceptible by all observers." Sensible experience and perception are obviously mental phenomena. You can only take that 2nd clause to mean, "Independent of any particular mind."

Secondly, with respect to the objectivity of propositions, you're mistaken in claiming that "meanings are not objective." If they were not communication via speech would be impossible. To be sure, "meaning" is itself ambiguous; it is commonly used to denote not only the state of affairs asserted by a proposition (the denotative meaning), but also the import or affective response of the speaker or hearers to those words (the connotative meaning). That the denotative is objective is what makes it possible for others to assess the truth value of the proposition. That the connotative meaning is subjective is irrelevant.

[Felix]

Felix: In the thousands of studies that have been conducted, that rarely if ever occurs - it is easy to determine if someone is misidentifying colors.

Terrapin Station: It's not a "misidentification," it's the matter of it being different to the person experientially. How would we determine if anyone is experiencing "blue" differently than other people?

Simple enough, if you show many people charts of a wide range of colors, including many different hues of the color blue, it will become obvious who is seeing the color that corresponds to the wavelength of blue (shades of blue) and who is not.