Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

[Marvin_Edwards]

To accept free will as physics, requires to explain objects as consisting of the laws of nature. Then as being laws unto themselves, objects exhibit freedom.

So basically you would describe an object with mathematics, and then construe objects as computing their own next state by the laws which they consist of.

Construed this way, a future of alternatives comes out of the object, which future the object anticipates. So the object does not have a model of what alternative futures may be available, it only has the actual alternative futures available. So for instance an object may have the alternative futures available of velocity 2 and 3, at time now + 1.

When the object is an intelligent living organism it can imagine alternate futures, evaluate their likely outcomes, and choose which one to actualize. So, you're perfectly correct to say that "a future of alternatives comes out of the object".

There are three distinct classes of causal mechanisms: physical, biological, and rational. All three run upon a physical infrastructure, of course, but physics by itself lacks the ability to explain the behavior of living organisms, much less intelligent species. That's why we have the Life sciences and the Social sciences to fill the explanatory gap.

Inanimate objects behave passively in response to physical forces. A bowling ball placed on a slope will always roll downhill.

Living organisms have biological drives to survive, thrive, and reproduce so they exhibit purposeful behavior. Place a squirrel on the same slope and he will go up, down, or any other direction that he expects will lead to the next acorn. His behavior is controlled by his need for food, more than by the effects of gravity.

Intelligent species have an evolved neurology enabling imagination, evaluation, and choosing. This is where free will appears.

[Marvin_Edwards]

They are clearly different. In (1) B will happen if A happens.
In (2) Either B or C will happen if A happens, but we don't know which one will happen.

In case (2) if we get to choose whether B or C will happen, then at the beginning of the choosing operation "B can happen" is true and "C can happen" is also true. But only one of them will happen.

Sure, so re them being clearly different, (1) is conventionally called "determinism," (2) is conventionally called "freedom" (in the context of freedom vs determinism as an ontological issue). That's what the debate is about broadly--not just in terms of free will. The debate is between people who think that for all phenomena, (1) is the case, versus people who think that for at least some phenomena, (2) is the case.

There is no freedom without reliable causation. Reliable causation entails determinism. Therefore freedom entails determinism. If freedom entails determinism then freedom cannot contradict or oppose it.

Determinism applies to both cases, where (1) if A happens then B will happen, and it applies equally to (2) if A happens and I choose to make B happen and (3) if A happens and I choose to make C happen.

Determinism asserts that all events are the reliable result of prior events. Every event is always causally necessary and inevitably must happen. It is a trivial logical fact with no practical implications. It makes no distinction between any two events, thus it provides no useful information.

[Terrapin Station]

Sure, so re them being clearly different, (1) is conventionally called "determinism," (2) is conventionally called "freedom" (in the context of freedom vs determinism as an ontological issue). That's what the debate is about broadly--not just in terms of free will. The debate is between people who think that for all phenomena, (1) is the case, versus people who think that for at least some phenomena, (2) is the case.

There is no freedom without reliable causation.

There is if the definition of freedom that we're talking about has nothing to do with reliable causation.

[Marvin_Edwards]

There is no freedom without reliable causation.

There is if the definition of freedom that we're talking about has nothing to do with reliable causation.

Do you have an example of a freedom that does not involve reliable causation?

[Terrapin Station]

There is if the definition of freedom that we're talking about has nothing to do with reliable causation.

Do you have an example of a freedom that does not involve reliable causation?

An example has nothing to do with the definitional distinction being made.

There's little utility to suggesting an example only for you to say that there must be a hidden cause behind it. The point has nothing to do with examples. It has to do with whether you are capable of understanding different definitions and conversations in the context of those definitions.

[Syamsu]

In some science the distinction is made between "strong anticipation", anticipation coming from the laws of nature in the object (like a planet) , and "weak anticipation", anticipation coming from a prediction by a mind.

I would say it is both free will, and then call decisions by weak anticipation a conscious decision, and a decision by strong anticipation a decision.

Objectively decisions appear as randomness, including decisionmaking of a squirrel. A distinction must be made between sorting algorithms, and organization of decisionmaking processes. Supposedly the squirrel uses some sorting algorithms for it's behavior, which is not choosing but works automatically. Although the squirrel may choose what sorting algorithm to use, the sorting algorithm itself is not choosing anything.

The sorting algorithm may presents options left or righ, and excludes other options like forward and back, or may force the squirrel to go left without any option. In any case it must always be construed that a decision is free, and that the identity of the agency of a decision is a matter of chosen opinion.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Do you have an example of a freedom that does not involve reliable causation?

An example has nothing to do with the definitional distinction being made.

There's little utility to suggesting an example only for you to say that there must be a hidden cause behind it.

I'm not talking about the cause behind it. I'm talking about the subsequent causation required to carry out whatever it is that you are free to do. Without reliable cause and effect we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus freedom requires reliable cause and effect.

The point has nothing to do with examples. It has to do with whether you are capable of understanding different definitions and conversations in the context of those definitions.

The conversation in this topic is explicitly about the definitions (see the title).

[Terrapin Station]

I'm not talking about the cause behind it. I'm talking about the subsequent causation required to carry out whatever it is that you are free to do. Without reliable cause and effect we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus freedom requires reliable cause and effect.

The "freedom" part is the "decision" part, not the "carrying out the decision" part. I'm putting "decision" in quotation marks because I wasn't talking only about people making decisions, but freedom that obtains in phenomena in general (such as radioactive decay, for example).

[Marvin_Edwards]

In some science the distinction is made between "strong anticipation", anticipation coming from the laws of nature in the object (like a planet) , and "weak anticipation", anticipation coming from a prediction by a mind.

I would say it is both free will, and then call decisions by weak anticipation a conscious decision, and a decision by strong anticipation a decision.

Objectively decisions appear as randomness, including decisionmaking of a squirrel. A distinction must be made between sorting algorithms, and organization of decisionmaking processes. Supposedly the squirrel uses some sorting algorithms for it's behavior, which is not choosing but works automatically. Although the squirrel may choose what sorting algorithm to use, the sorting algorithm itself is not choosing anything.

The sorting algorithm may presents options left or righ, and excludes other options like forward and back, or may force the squirrel to go left without any option. In any case it must always be construed that a decision is free, and that the identity of the agency of a decision is a matter of chosen opinion.

I think that causal necessity implies that everything is "automatic". Both our conscious experience and the underlying neurology are behaving automatically. The key insight is that our control is both automatic and our own. In the case of free will there is no other object making our choice but us.

Problem solving is often referred to as "sorting things out", but from my computer experience "sorting" is a specific operation that places things in a specific sequence. The sorting operation may be involved in thinking, such as when we rank priorities, but a lot of other algorithms doing other things are also involved. The squirrel, forexample, may consider where he looked for an acorn last, without performing a sort.

[Marvin_Edwards]

I'm not talking about the cause behind it. I'm talking about the subsequent causation required to carry out whatever it is that you are free to do. Without reliable cause and effect we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus freedom requires reliable cause and effect.

The "freedom" part is the "decision" part, not the "carrying out the decision" part. I'm putting "decision" in quotation marks because I wasn't talking only about people making decisions, but freedom that obtains in phenomena in general (such as radioactive decay, for example).

Right. The choosing is either free of coercion and undue influence or it is not. With the radioactive decay, there is no choosing operation. Any reference to "freedom" in an inanimate object or inanimate process would be metaphorical.

[Syamsu]

I think that causal necessity implies that everything is "automatic". Both our conscious experience and the underlying neurology are behaving automatically. The key insight is that our control is both automatic and our own. In the case of free will there is no other object making our choice but us.

Problem solving is often referred to as "sorting things out", but from my computer experience "sorting" is a specific operation that places things in a specific sequence. The sorting operation may be involved in thinking, such as when we rank priorities, but a lot of other algorithms doing other things are also involved. The squirrel, forexample, may consider where he looked for an acorn last, without performing a sort.

The squirrel must have free will, because otherwise it's going to be in big trouble. Only actual choosing, with actual alternative futures available, any of which can be made the present, provides the squirrel with surprise in attack and escape. Automatic algorithms make the squirrell predictable, and therefore dead to a predator.

The squirrel chooses in escape and attack, and then with subjective opinion we can choose to call the agency of the squirrel's choices "courage", "cowardice", "fear", "recklessnes", or something. The thing that makes a decision turn out the way it does, must be subjective. Logic dictates that.

There is no other subjectivity besides this. All subjectivity is about the agency of a choice. Beauty, good and evil, etc. it is all by definition in reference to the agency of a choice.

You should consider what you are going to do about subjectivity, because your idea destroys it.

[Marvin_Edwards]

I think that causal necessity implies that everything is "automatic". Both our conscious experience and the underlying neurology are behaving automatically. The key insight is that our control is both automatic and our own. In the case of free will there is no other object making our choice but us.

Problem solving is often referred to as "sorting things out", but from my computer experience "sorting" is a specific operation that places things in a specific sequence. The sorting operation may be involved in thinking, such as when we rank priorities, but a lot of other algorithms doing other things are also involved. The squirrel, forexample, may consider where he looked for an acorn last, without performing a sort.

The squirrel must have free will, because otherwise it's going to be in big trouble. Only actual choosing, with actual alternative futures available, any of which can be made the present, provides the squirrel with surprise in attack and escape. Automatic algorithms make the squirrell predictable, and therefore dead to a predator.

The squirrel chooses in escape and attack, and then with subjective opinion we can choose to call the agency of the squirrel's choices "courage", "cowardice", "fear", "recklessnes", or something. The thing that makes a decision turn out the way it does, must be subjective. Logic dictates that.

There is no other subjectivity besides this. All subjectivity is about the agency of a choice. Beauty, good and evil, etc. it is all by definition in reference to the agency of a choice.

You should consider what you are going to do about subjectivity, because your idea destroys it.

I have no problem with subjectivity. It is the viewpoint from within the object. The subject has causal agency because it is also an object. It must be an object in order to affect other objects, such as climbing a tree to escape the predator. It is not enough to merely think about climbing the tree, it must also have the ability to do so, and that requires being an object constructed with muscles, claws, a heart, a brain and skills.

[Terrapin Station]

The "freedom" part is the "decision" part, not the "carrying out the decision" part. I'm putting "decision" in quotation marks because I wasn't talking only about people making decisions, but freedom that obtains in phenomena in general (such as radioactive decay, for example).

Right. The choosing is either free of coercion and undue influence or it is not. With the radioactive decay, there is no choosing operation. Any reference to "freedom" in an inanimate object or inanimate process would be metaphorical.

It's not at all metaphorical with respect to the traditional definition of what we're talking about re freedom vs determinism, as I've explained to you many, many times already. (And which is a reason that I suspect you might be creation. No matter how many times you explain some things to creation, he's apparently not able to get it.)

[Marvin_Edwards]

Right. The choosing is either free of coercion and undue influence or it is not. With the radioactive decay, there is no choosing operation. Any reference to "freedom" in an inanimate object or inanimate process would be metaphorical.

It's not at all metaphorical with respect to the traditional definition of what we're talking about re freedom vs determinism, as I've explained to you many, many times already. (And which is a reason that I suspect you might be creation. No matter how many times you explain some things to creation, he's apparently not able to get it.)

I don't know who "creation" is. But I can assure you that there are a great many of us who, no matter how many times you explain some things to us, we will not be able to get it. Oh, and by the way, welcome to our club.