Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
- Terrapin Station
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
Compatibilism is incoherent. No one has been able to yet make it coherent. The best attempts simply change the subject and talk about something else. This is what Dennett does, for example.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
A. If there is an inevitable choice, then clearly (a) there is a choice, and (b) it is inevitable. That's true by definition.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 18th, 2020, 4:22 pm... if there's an "inevitable choice" (there's not actually a choice if only one option is inevitable), and if God or whatever could predict in advance what you'll choose, because it was causally necessary from a prior point), then you do NOT have two real possibilities. You only have one. The belief or appearance that you have two would be mistaken.Marvin_Edwards wrote: ↑April 18th, 2020, 4:03 pm ...
So I have two real possibilities, pancakes and eggs. A "real possibility" is an option that, should I choose it, I will be able to actualize it. I have the eggs. I have the pancake mix. I can fix the eggs. I can fix the pancakes. Both are real possibilities.
B. And, just like you say, I will make that choice. However, at the beginning of the choosing operation I have no clue what that inevitable choice for breakfast will be! All I know at the beginning is that I have two options, eggs and pancakes. And both are real possibilities, because I have the ingredients, and I know how to prepare both.
So, the question is this: How will I go about getting from the point of uncertainty to that inevitable choice? This is an important question, because if there is no answer then I will have no breakfast at all. And probably no lunch. And I may eventually starve to death.
Here is the conundrum you've created by saying that only the inevitable choice is a real possibility. If pancakes are not a real possibility than I cannot consider fixing pancakes. If the eggs are not a real possibility then I cannot consider fixing eggs. If I cannot consider fixing the pancakes and I cannot consider fixing the eggs, then I'm out of options for breakfast. Do you see the problem?
Another way to express this thought problem is like this:
Waiter (a hard determinist): "What will you have for dinner tonight, sir?"
Customer (hungry): "I don't know. What are my possibilities?"
Waiter: "There is only one possibility, sir."
Customer (disappointed): "Oh. Okay. Then what is that possibility?"
Waiter: "How should I know, I can't read your mind!"
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
When someone types quotation marks in that context, you can't just ignore them. I wrote, "When there's an 'inevitable choice'," putting "inevitable choice" into quotation marks, for a reason. The reason wasn't that I was literally quoting you, as if that term needed to be quoted rather than simply used, and it wasn't that I thought the quotation marks looked attractive or something like that.Marvin_Edwards wrote: ↑April 18th, 2020, 6:07 pm A. If there is an inevitable choice, then clearly (a) there is a choice, and (b) it is inevitable. That's true by definition.
Again, it's NOT a choice if only one option is possible. You can call it that if you like, of course, but then you're really just changing the topic.B. And, just like you say, I will make that choice.
So again, compatibilism is incoherent . . . at least aside from changing the topic and simply using the terms to refer to different things, different ideas.
Which is an epistemological issue. But what's at issue here isn't epistemology. It's ontology.However, at the beginning of the choosing operation I have no clue what that inevitable choice for breakfast will be!
And now you're conflating epistemology and ontology. They're not both real possibilities unless it's not the case that one outcome is inevitable. What it refers to (aside from changing the topic by using the terms like we might say that God exists because by "God" I mean "my socks") conventionally to have a real choice is that both outcomes are a non-zero, non-one ontological possibility.All I know at the beginning is that I have two options, eggs and pancakes. And both are real possibilities,
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
I'm confused by this because your definition here:Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 19th, 2020, 9:12 amWhich is an epistemological issue. But what's at issue here isn't epistemology. It's ontology.However, at the beginning of the choosing operation I have no clue what that inevitable choice for breakfast will be!
And now you're conflating epistemology and ontology. They're not both real possibilities unless it's not the case that one outcome is inevitable. What it refers to (aside from changing the topic by using the terms like we might say that God exists because by "God" I mean "my socks") conventionally to have a real choice is that both outcomes are a non-zero, non-one ontological possibility.All I know at the beginning is that I have two options, eggs and pancakes. And both are real possibilities,
at least in my reading, contains an embedded epistemology - 'determined', so it seems you're defining ontology in epistemological terms. Isn't 'determined' a form of knowledge about the state? To determine means to know sufficiently as to be able to predict, correct? I don't see how it could then be an ontological category, a property of the state, because something can't be said to determined without a 'determiner', in other words an observer having that knowledge. It's like saying some object is 'visible', which doesn't meaningfully describe the object independent of a given observer's or class of observers' ability to see it.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 17th, 2020, 10:39 am Ontological determinism would obtain if from an antecedent state, A, an immediately following state B is determined to happen, because of physical laws that causally result in B and only B following A.
Or is this actually your point, which was mine also - that determinism and freedom are separate and incompatible categories because they reference separate states: one in which the observer - the determiner - is an assumed part of the state described; and one in which we are excluding such an observer, i.e. a state in which a determination has not or cannot be made? Am I on the right track at all?
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
No. There's an ontological sense of the term, where it simply refers to what I defined--that from an antecedent state A, only B can happen, because of causality (presumably courtesy of physical laws). "B is determined to happen" is another way of saying that. That's an ontological sense of the term, about what would be the case even if there were no people at all in existence.
The "determiner" in this case is causality via physical law.something can't be said to determined without a 'determiner',
Standardly, in the sciences, "observer" does NOT imply a person witnessing something. It simply refers to interaction with other things. "Visible" need not refer to persons, either. It can simply refer to the fact that something emits electromagnetic radiation that could be picked up by an appropriate instrument, for example.in other words an observer having that knowledge. It's like saying some object is 'visible', which doesn't meaningfully describe the object independent of a given observer's or class of observers' ability to see it.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
- Thomyum2
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
I didn't mean to imply that an observer needed to be a person. But even if we're speaking of an instrument, the attribute 'visible' could not be made to the object itself, but only to the relationship between the object and the instrument, e.g. being 'visible' would depend not just on the nature of the object, but on the sensitivity of the instrument, their relative positions, any intervening interference, etc. So a ontological state of being visible would only obtain if all of those conditions were met, wouldn't it? An object can't just be 'visible', but only 'visible by' something else.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 19th, 2020, 11:47 amNo. There's an ontological sense of the term, where it simply refers to what I defined--that from an antecedent state A, only B can happen, because of causality (presumably courtesy of physical laws). "B is determined to happen" is another way of saying that. That's an ontological sense of the term, about what would be the case even if there were no people at all in existence.
The "determiner" in this case is causality via physical law.something can't be said to determined without a 'determiner',
Standardly, in the sciences, "observer" does NOT imply a person witnessing something. It simply refers to interaction with other things. "Visible" need not refer to persons, either. It can simply refer to the fact that something emits electromagnetic radiation that could be picked up by an appropriate instrument, for example.in other words an observer having that knowledge. It's like saying some object is 'visible', which doesn't meaningfully describe the object independent of a given observer's or class of observers' ability to see it.
So I think the same would apply a state being 'determined'. Physical laws alone cannot observe a state of affairs, nor determine a subsequent state, they can only be used by an observer (person, computer, whatever) to predict the state based on observation of the initial state. 'Determined' doesn't exist in the state, but emerges through observation and application of knowledge.
Actually this is all beginning to remind me a bit of the 'if a tree falls in the woods' argument.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
Imagine if we had a word "shplutakflak" and we defined it this way:
Shplutakflak obtains when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law).
If we defined shplutakflak that way, would you have any confusion about what shplutakflak refers to in this context? You wouldn't think that shplutakflak need to be anything else, would you?
You need to think of "determinism" in this context the same way. It's just a sound for "when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law)," which is why it was explicitly defined that way, so that there wouldn't be any confusion.
You need to stop think of the term with respect to other connotations just because the sound (and text string) is the same. It's simply a name for "when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law)."
I don't know how to make that any clearer.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
- Thomyum2
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
Shpultakflak! I love it - sounds like it could be a Klingon word.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 19th, 2020, 4:47 pm Imagine if we had a word "shplutakflak" and we defined it this way:
Shplutakflak obtains when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law).
If we defined shplutakflak that way, would you have any confusion about what shplutakflak refers to in this context? You wouldn't think that shplutakflak need to be anything else, would you?
You need to think of "determinism" in this context the same way. It's just a sound for "when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law)," which is why it was explicitly defined that way, so that there wouldn't be any confusion.
You need to stop think of the term with respect to other connotations just because the sound (and text string) is the same. It's simply a name for "when from an antecedent state, A, only immediately consequent state, B, can follow, due to causality (with the mechanism presumably being physical law)."
I don't know how to make that any clearer.
Yes, this helps, I think you've made it pretty clear. So would it be fair to say that you're arguing a given state is ontologically determinate or not by its very nature (perhaps we could say "determinate an sich"?) and since these two are mutually exclusive, the idea of compatibilism would not make sense? I think I could agree with that.
I guess the question that would follow for me, though, is that this far, we're just talking about two hypothetical states. So I don't see how to disentangle the epistemology from the ontology here. In order to address the original question of whether or not there is freedom or choice, and to establish if, in fact, one or the other of these actually does obtain, we are still confronted with the need for an observer and back into the situation where the position of the observer itself plays a role in the outcome. It seems to me that a determinate state can only be identified when the observer is external to that state. If I try to consider the situation of the observer a part of the state which they are evaluating, I find myself faced with a recursive situation that reminds me of an Escher drawing.
I’ll quote from ‘Minority Report’, which I referenced a few posts back:
So the problem is exactly this – a state is predictable when we can observe and measure that state with sufficient accuracy and apply an understanding of the laws of nature, to determine the subsequent state. But if the observer is within the state observed, then the act of observing – and the consequent fact of knowing – actually alters the state that was just observed such that a new set of conditions now exists which invalidates the conclusion and would require beginning the observation anew. In other words, the epistemological act alters the ontological state in a similar way as, in Quantum Mechanics, the observation of the momentum of a particle makes the knowledge of its position unknown, and vice versa.[T]here can be no valid knowledge about the future. As soon as precognitive information is obtained, it cancels itself out. The assertion that this man will commit a future crime is paradoxical. The very act of possessing this data renders it spurious.
I think Marvin is correct in his OP that the very definitions here create a paradox. The only way I can think of to resolve the paradox is with the understanding that the determinate/indeterminate dichotomy is coherent only when applied to descriptions of a state under observation, whereas the idea of ‘freedom’ of will or of choice applies to descriptions of a state in which we participate.
Thoughts?
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
Well, the way we investigate anything is going to involve epistemology, of course, but what we're investigating won't necessarily hinge on epistemology in any manner.Thomyum2 wrote: ↑April 20th, 2020, 1:19 pm I guess the question that would follow for me, though, is that this far, we're just talking about two hypothetical states. So I don't see how to disentangle the epistemology from the ontology here. In order to address the original question of whether or not there is freedom or choice, and to establish if, in fact, one or the other of these actually does obtain, we are still confronted with the need for an observer and back into the situation where the position of the observer itself plays a role in the outcome. It seems to me that a determinate state can only be identified when the observer is external to that state. If I try to consider the situation of the observer a part of the state which they are evaluating, I find myself faced with a recursive situation that reminds me of an Escher drawing.
Re "the observer playing a role in the outcome," I'd say that's only pertinent to a subset of what we might be looking at. With determinism (that is, if we're assuming determinism), it would just be a matter of whether we're looking at phenomena that involve ourselves or not. If determinism is the case, then obviously we can't really play a role in the outcome of anything that isn't ourselves doing things (for example, we could say that we play a role in the outcome of us eating breakfast, but we wouldn't play any sort of role in whether a star light-years away goes supernova), but even then, even for the phenomena that involve us, if determinism is the case we'd be "just along for the ride," really.
With determinism, I wouldn't say that the problem with establishing whether it's the case is specific to any sort of epistemic/ontic divide. The problem is rather that aside from it needing to be an inductive conclusion--the conclusion that all phenomena work via strict, "one-path-only" causality, we can't literally observe strict, "one-path-only" causality for any phenomenon. The notion that any arbitrary phenomenon that we've observed unfolded by strict, "one-path-only" causality is really a theoretical conclusion that we're arriving at abductively, and largely because it has practical utility, including for doing science.
Insofar as I'm understanding everything there, I don't agree with it (especially logically). That's probably partially because I don't buy a lot of the standard qm ideas, but that would be better for another thread. I've got into that a bit in the past on the board--Steve and I had a long discussion about twin slit experiments, for example, where I'm skeptical that we can know that we're doing experiments with one particle at a time, and if we can't know that, on my view, the normal conclusions we're reaching (about quantum "weirdness" etc.) aren't justified.I’ll quote from ‘Minority Report’, which I referenced a few posts back:So the problem is exactly this – a state is predictable when we can observe and measure that state with sufficient accuracy and apply an understanding of the laws of nature, to determine the subsequent state. But if the observer is within the state observed, then the act of observing – and the consequent fact of knowing – actually alters the state that was just observed such that a new set of conditions now exists which invalidates the conclusion and would require beginning the observation anew. In other words, the epistemological act alters the ontological state in a similar way as, in Quantum Mechanics, the observation of the momentum of a particle makes the knowledge of its position unknown, and vice versa.[T]here can be no valid knowledge about the future. As soon as precognitive information is obtained, it cancels itself out. The assertion that this man will commit a future crime is paradoxical. The very act of possessing this data renders it spurious.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
What really reifies this for me and removes the issue of complexity - we exist in time and have certain ideas, certain feelings, etc., and if you have a person in a perfectly identical state (I mean in *every* sense) then there's no reason to believe that they'd do something else unless they knew they were being tested in which case they may very well even attempt the same irrational act that many times over.
What I do find interesting are the points in my life where I felt like the narratives around me and the narratives subconsciously offered to me were railroading me in some way toward a place I'd never want to go or toward being a type of person that I wouldn't want to be. To the degree that I was able to say 'f--- that' and at worst sit on my hands doesn't, in my line of thinking, say that I had the free will not to be railroaded or to fall into some garish social archetypal story. My grasp on that sort of situation is that I had, through a lot of what I've endured, enough self-awareness and a sophisticated enough network of self-reference that my priorities overrode external suggestion. Is it possible that there are certain circumstances that I could go through where I could come out someone completely different on the other side? Possible but with 40 years lived not nearly as likely as it would have been if such things had been done to me at 5. At the same time, that being the case, the more experience I gather, the better I know myself, and the better I feel like I know the world sure - I may change in certain ways but I increasingly become less likely to change in any profound way as the rather enormous ball of facts that I've gathered and the quality of their relationship to one other grows.
So that's maybe where we do get the gut-level intuition that something's wrong with determinism or anything that would virtualize free will. I think it's less properly a rebellion against determinism itself than an understanding that would suggest that we were completely ruled by external circumstance where the older we get, and rather quickly (even by our late teens or early 20's) it's very much the other way around.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
You seem to be missing an understanding/appreciation/respect for the hard break between subjects and objects. An object is bound by the 'rules', but a subject is only bound by them to the extent their choices rely upon objects. Objects would be dangerous instead of useful if I could not predict their responses to inputs. I know what to expect from my motorcycle when I send inputs through the controls, and I need to know this to have a chance to survive my commute.Marvin_Edwards wrote: ↑April 16th, 2020, 8:50 pm The notion of freedom subsumes reliable causation. Without reliable cause and effect, we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus, a deterministic universe is a prerequisite of freedom.
Because of this, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” contains a contradiction. Causal necessity is the chain of causation. The chain of causation is the set of pairs of causes and effects, from one event to the next, where each new event is the effect of prior events.
Free will, as defined in philosophy, requires that our choice be free of causal necessity.
Because every freedom we have requires reliable cause and effect, and causal necessity is the logical implication of reliable causation, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” presents as an oxymoron. Freedom cannot be free of what freedom requires to be freedom. The philosophical definition creates a paradox.
A choice that exists outside of reliable cause and effect never happens in a universe of reliable cause and effect. So, to adopt the philosophical definition means to abandon free will.
Outside of philosophy, in the real world, free will has an operational definition that is distinctly different from the philosophical definition. Operational free will is a choice that is free from coercion and other forms of undue influence, such as mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc. The operational definition is used in our court system to assess legal responsibility for ones actions. And it is the commonly understood notion used to assess moral responsibility as well. Operational free will makes no claim to being uncaused.
It would seem reasonable then for philosophy to abandon its paradoxical definition in favor of the operational definition.
But, I don't know what to expect from people when I interact with them. As a result, people can be dangerous or unreasonably kind. I can guess at their responses to my actions, but results will vary. I may get the opposite of the intended result, despite the best of intentions, or I may see my hate returned to me as love.
So why can't it be, why do you think it isn't, the case that objects follow the rules of cause and effect and subjects do not? You can verify the rules of cause and effects with all sorts of experiments that will tell you that you are on to something, in terms of objects. But, your results will never approach the level of proof when you try with people, will they? You have only a theory to rely upon for your confidence that the rules must apply to me as well as my motorcycle. My motorcycle is silent on the matter, but I will tell you that I have freedom.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
I think we're both objects and subjects. Drop me and a bowling ball off the leaning tower of Pisa and we'll hit the ground at the same time (but please don't do that). So, I am a physical object in addition to being an intelligent species with a subjective experience. And I am free to make choices for myself, to decide for myself what I will do. Causal necessity doesn't cause me to do anything. I am the causal agent.chewybrian wrote: ↑April 22nd, 2020, 3:50 pm
You seem to be missing an understanding/appreciation/respect for the hard break between subjects and objects. An object is bound by the 'rules', but a subject is only bound by them to the extent their choices rely upon objects. Objects would be dangerous instead of useful if I could not predict their responses to inputs. I know what to expect from my motorcycle when I send inputs through the controls, and I need to know this to have a chance to survive my commute.
But, I don't know what to expect from people when I interact with them. As a result, people can be dangerous or unreasonably kind. I can guess at their responses to my actions, but results will vary. I may get the opposite of the intended result, despite the best of intentions, or I may see my hate returned to me as love.
So why can't it be, why do you think it isn't, the case that objects follow the rules of cause and effect and subjects do not? You can verify the rules of cause and effects with all sorts of experiments that will tell you that you are on to something, in terms of objects. But, your results will never approach the level of proof when you try with people, will they? You have only a theory to rely upon for your confidence that the rules must apply to me as well as my motorcycle. My motorcycle is silent on the matter, but I will tell you that I have freedom.
Causal necessity simply points out that I do things for a reason, and that reason is part of what causes my choice to be what it is. The reason that I have those reasons, rather than others, also has a history of causes, all of which involved me in some fashion. Every parent who has been awakened at 2AM by a newborn, crying to be fed, knows that even from our earliest history, we have been an active participant in negotiating with our physical and social environment for control.
And these experiences continue into the present. The fact that every choice I make has a trail of reliable prior causes does not compromise my autonomy. My autonomy and all of my freedoms require a world of reliable cause and effect. Without that, I could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all.
The notion of freedom requires the notion of reliable causation. They cannot contradict each other without creating a paradox.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?
There is no paradox to saying that "alive" and "not alive" are different states of existence. One has an essence, one is mere existence. If I have no power to try to be what *I* wish (even though I may not succeed in the effort), then life has no meaning. You are not asking me to give up fanciful notions of an afterlife, but actual life. This is Pascal's wager on steroids. You expect me to give up my autonomy for the possibility of the smug satisfaction of saying "I told you so" if it turns out that all subjective existence is merely an illusion? You are asking me to wager everything to gain nothing, and the odds are impossibly huge in the other direction, which is the only sane way to go.Marvin_Edwards wrote: ↑April 22nd, 2020, 5:21 pmI think we're both objects and subjects. Drop me and a bowling ball off the leaning tower of Pisa and we'll hit the ground at the same time (but please don't do that). So, I am a physical object in addition to being an intelligent species with a subjective experience. And I am free to make choices for myself, to decide for myself what I will do. Causal necessity doesn't cause me to do anything. I am the causal agent.chewybrian wrote: ↑April 22nd, 2020, 3:50 pm
You seem to be missing an understanding/appreciation/respect for the hard break between subjects and objects. An object is bound by the 'rules', but a subject is only bound by them to the extent their choices rely upon objects. Objects would be dangerous instead of useful if I could not predict their responses to inputs. I know what to expect from my motorcycle when I send inputs through the controls, and I need to know this to have a chance to survive my commute.
But, I don't know what to expect from people when I interact with them. As a result, people can be dangerous or unreasonably kind. I can guess at their responses to my actions, but results will vary. I may get the opposite of the intended result, despite the best of intentions, or I may see my hate returned to me as love.
So why can't it be, why do you think it isn't, the case that objects follow the rules of cause and effect and subjects do not? You can verify the rules of cause and effects with all sorts of experiments that will tell you that you are on to something, in terms of objects. But, your results will never approach the level of proof when you try with people, will they? You have only a theory to rely upon for your confidence that the rules must apply to me as well as my motorcycle. My motorcycle is silent on the matter, but I will tell you that I have freedom.
Causal necessity simply points out that I do things for a reason, and that reason is part of what causes my choice to be what it is. The reason that I have those reasons, rather than others, also has a history of causes, all of which involved me in some fashion. Every parent who has been awakened at 2AM by a newborn, crying to be fed, knows that even from our earliest history, we have been an active participant in negotiating with our physical and social environment for control.
And these experiences continue into the present. The fact that every choice I make has a trail of reliable prior causes does not compromise my autonomy. My autonomy and all of my freedoms require a world of reliable cause and effect. Without that, I could never reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all.
The notion of freedom requires the notion of reliable causation. They cannot contradict each other without creating a paradox.
I won't concede, and I think there is a danger in encouraging others to share your lack of belief in the self. If I am as determined as the tides and the sun and the oceans, then why put forth the slightest effort toward anything? If I choose to drink hemlock, then my doing so will prove, under your terms, that such a choice must have been unavoidable and inevitable. Isn't that a paradox? Your belief system, if I accepted it, would turn my whole existence into contradiction. I am forced to choose at every turn, yet each choice, as I take it, was unavoidable, not a choice at all, as soon as I took it.
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