Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Marvin_Edwards »

LuckyR wrote: April 24th, 2020, 12:44 pm
Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 24th, 2020, 10:42 am

There's nothing wrong with reading through the SEP articles. But academic philosophy collects and catalogs everyone's opinions, without necessarily guiding us to any specific truths. It provides instead a menu of truths and opinions to choose from. And it is certainly worthwhile to consider multiple options when thinking through to your own philosophy.

But I found all three of the SEP articles to be biased against compatibilism. So I tried to shed some light on the matters of determinism, free will, and why they happen to be compatible. They are a bit long for this forums format. But I do have a nutshell version:

In a Nutshell

“Free will” is when we decide for ourselves what we will do, free of coercion or other undue influence.

“Determinism” asserts that the behavior of objects and forces in our universe provides perfectly reliable cause and effect, and thus, at least in theory, is perfectly predictable.

Because reliable cause and effect is neither coercive nor undue, it poses no threat to free will. A meaningful constraint would be a man holding a gun to our head, forcing us to do his will. But reliable causation is not such a force. It is simply how we operate as we go about being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose.

Because our decisions are reliably caused by our own purpose, our own reasons, and our own interests, our deliberate choosing poses no threat to determinism. Choosing is a deterministic process. And this process is authentically performed by us, according to our own purpose, reasons, and interests.

As it turns out, every choice we make for ourselves is both freely chosen and reliably caused. Thus, the concepts of free will and determinism are naturally compatible.

The illusion of conflict is created by a logic error called the “reification fallacy“. This happens when we mistakenly treat the concept of “reliable cause and effect” as if it were an external force controlling our choices, as if it were not actually us, simply being us and doing what we do.

But concepts are not “things” that cause. Only the actual objects themselves, and the forces they naturally exert upon other objects, can cause events to happen.

When empirically observed, we find that we exist in reality as physical objects, living organisms, and an intelligent species. As living organisms, we act purposefully to survive, thrive, and reproduce. As an intelligent species, we act deliberately by imagination, evaluation, and choosing. And, when we act upon our choices, we are forces of nature.

Reliable cause and effect is not an external force. It is us, and the rest of the physical universe, just doing what we do. Those who try to turn it into a boogeyman robbing us of our choices are empirically mistaken.
I agree with your concept but have problems with your wording.

If human decision making was perfectly predictable, cause and effect and determinism would be proven. However, if you think about it, our understanding of cause and effect, is by definition a retrospective process. We observe the action and go looking retrospectively for the conditions that caused the action. We apply this analysis to the next case and we are successful in predicting the outcome better than pure chance, ie we have some understanding, but nowhere near 100% accuracy. Since we never get to 100% accuracy, there is always a bit of understanding that is, for practical purposes, unknowable. Thus what separates our "understanding" of cause and effect from say, rationalization?
Right. From a practical viewpoint, human decision making can be one of the least predictable events. We each believe that our own reasoning is logical but it is subject to idiosyncratic fallacies, biases, false beliefs, etc. The rational causal mechanism can still be deterministic and theoretically predictable when we consider those fallacies, biases, and beliefs as reliable causes that are taken into account when trying to predict what someone else will choose. Some omniscient being with all of that knowledge, like God, or Laplace's Daemon, or the guy's wife could still predict his choice.

The "retrospective view" reminds me of Gazzaniga's "interpreter", that part of the brain that has to explain our behavior to ourselves and others. As long as it has good data it can do a reasonable job. But if a subject is given a post-hypnotic suggestion to take off his shoe when he hears the word "walrus", he will confabulate an explanation to rationalize his behavior.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 24th, 2020, 2:52 pm
LuckyR wrote: April 24th, 2020, 12:44 pm

I agree with your concept but have problems with your wording.

If human decision making was perfectly predictable, cause and effect and determinism would be proven. However, if you think about it, our understanding of cause and effect, is by definition a retrospective process. We observe the action and go looking retrospectively for the conditions that caused the action. We apply this analysis to the next case and we are successful in predicting the outcome better than pure chance, ie we have some understanding, but nowhere near 100% accuracy. Since we never get to 100% accuracy, there is always a bit of understanding that is, for practical purposes, unknowable. Thus what separates our "understanding" of cause and effect from say, rationalization?
Right. From a practical viewpoint, human decision making can be one of the least predictable events. We each believe that our own reasoning is logical but it is subject to idiosyncratic fallacies, biases, false beliefs, etc. The rational causal mechanism can still be deterministic and theoretically predictable when we consider those fallacies, biases, and beliefs as reliable causes that are taken into account when trying to predict what someone else will choose. Some omniscient being with all of that knowledge, like God, or Laplace's Daemon, or the guy's wife could still predict his choice.

The "retrospective view" reminds me of Gazzaniga's "interpreter", that part of the brain that has to explain our behavior to ourselves and others. As long as it has good data it can do a reasonable job. But if a subject is given a post-hypnotic suggestion to take off his shoe when he hears the word "walrus", he will confabulate an explanation to rationalize his behavior.
"Predictable" is different than "deterministic" in a freedom vs. determinism context.

If there's a 99% chance of A happening and a 1% chance of B, then in the vast majority of cases we'll successfully predict that A will happen, but that doesn't imply determinism.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Marvin_Edwards »

Terrapin Station wrote: April 25th, 2020, 10:07 am
"Predictable" is different than "deterministic" in a freedom vs. determinism context.
There is no "freedom versus determinism" context. Freedom is deterministic. Without reliable cause and effect (and its corollary "causal necessity") there is no freedom to reliably cause any effect (that is, to reliably do something). If we can't do anything, then we have no freedom. All of our freedoms require a deterministic universe.

(Some other philosopher also made this point, but I can't recall which one).
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 25th, 2020, 11:01 am
Terrapin Station wrote: April 25th, 2020, 10:07 am
"Predictable" is different than "deterministic" in a freedom vs. determinism context.
There is no "freedom versus determinism" context. Freedom is deterministic.
Are these two things different?

(1) From antecedent state A, only immediately consequent state B is possible.

(2) From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B and C are possible, where B is not identical to C.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Marvin_Edwards »

Terrapin Station wrote: April 25th, 2020, 11:34 am
Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 25th, 2020, 11:01 am There is no "freedom versus determinism" context. Freedom is deterministic.
Are these two things different?

(1) From antecedent state A, only immediately consequent state B is possible.

(2) From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B and C are possible, where B is not identical to C.
They are both statements using the possibility modality. Converting to empirical modality, the first statement asserts that in all cases A will be followed by B. The second statement asserts that whenever A happens, either B will happen, or C will happen, or B and C will happen. The second statement logically implies some additional factors X and Y will happen along with A to bring about the various results (A is not the sufficient cause in at least two of those three cases).
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 25th, 2020, 12:25 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: April 25th, 2020, 11:34 am

Are these two things different?

(1) From antecedent state A, only immediately consequent state B is possible.

(2) From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B and C are possible, where B is not identical to C.
They are both statements using the possibility modality. Converting to empirical modality, the first statement asserts that in all cases A will be followed by B. The second statement asserts that whenever A happens, either B will happen, or C will happen, or B and C will happen. The second statement logically implies some additional factors X and Y will happen along with A to bring about the various results (A is not the sufficient cause in at least two of those three cases).
Actually I should have written (2) as "From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B or C are possible, where B is not identical to C." (Where that's usually taken to be an exclusive or, but I suppose we could see it as an inclusive or, too)

At any rate, so are you saying that those two things are different, or are they the same?
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Marvin_Edwards »

Terrapin Station wrote: Terrapin Station wrote:
Are these two things different?
(1) From antecedent state A, only immediately consequent state B is possible.
(2) From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B and C are possible, where B is not identical to C.
They are clearly different. In (1) B will happen if A happens.
In (2) Either B or C will happen if A happens, but we don't know which one will happen.

In case (2) if we get to choose whether B or C will happen, then at the beginning of the choosing operation "B can happen" is true and "C can happen" is also true. But only one of them will happen.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 25th, 2020, 6:10 pm
Terrapin Station wrote: Terrapin Station wrote:
Are these two things different?
(1) From antecedent state A, only immediately consequent state B is possible.
(2) From antecedent state A, at least immediately consequent states B and C are possible, where B is not identical to C.
They are clearly different. In (1) B will happen if A happens.
In (2) Either B or C will happen if A happens, but we don't know which one will happen.

In case (2) if we get to choose whether B or C will happen, then at the beginning of the choosing operation "B can happen" is true and "C can happen" is also true. But only one of them will happen.
Sure, so re them being clearly different, (1) is conventionally called "determinism," (2) is conventionally called "freedom" (in the context of freedom vs determinism as an ontological issue). That's what the debate is about broadly--not just in terms of free will. The debate is between people who think that for all phenomena, (1) is the case, versus people who think that for at least some phenomena, (2) is the case.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

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Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 23rd, 2020, 9:49 pm
h_k_s wrote: April 23rd, 2020, 8:58 pm

Do you happen to have a source cite for "the philosophical definition of free will"?
There are two dictionary definitions of free will. Here are three dictionaries that list them both:
Free Will
Mirriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

Short Oxford English Dictionary:
1 Spontaneous will, inclination to act without suggestion from others.
2 The power of directing one's own actions unconstrained by necessity or fate.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.
2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.
I could have looked that up on an online dictionary myself.

That is not what I asked you.

Apparently you misunderstood my question. So I will restate it.

Do you have a source either online or in print from a philosophy website or a philosophy book that describes "the philosophical definition of free will?"

If so, what does it say, and who is the author?

If not then, thank you, I guess you are just quoting the dictionary, in which case it is NOT a PHILOSOPHICAL definition.

Be careful what you say.

Make sure the words you use for what you say are appropriate.

Thanks.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Marvin_Edwards »

h_k_s wrote: April 25th, 2020, 8:56 pm
Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 23rd, 2020, 9:49 pm

There are two dictionary definitions of free will. Here are three dictionaries that list them both:
Free Will
Mirriam-Webster on-line:
1: voluntary choice or decision 'I do this of my own free will'
2: freedom of humans to make choices that are not determined by prior causes or by divine intervention

Short Oxford English Dictionary:
1 Spontaneous will, inclination to act without suggestion from others.
2 The power of directing one's own actions unconstrained by necessity or fate.

Wiktionary:
1. A person's natural inclination; unforced choice.
2. (philosophy) The ability to choose one's actions, or determine what reasons are acceptable motivation for actions, without predestination, fate etc.
I could have looked that up on an online dictionary myself.

That is not what I asked you.

Apparently you misunderstood my question. So I will restate it.

Do you have a source either online or in print from a philosophy website or a philosophy book that describes "the philosophical definition of free will?"

If so, what does it say, and who is the author?

If not then, thank you, I guess you are just quoting the dictionary, in which case it is NOT a PHILOSOPHICAL definition.

Be careful what you say.

Make sure the words you use for what you say are appropriate.

Thanks.
The philosophical definition of free will is a choice we make that is free of causal necessity.

A description of free will from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins like this, "The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions." The full article is here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Enjoy.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Syamsu »

To accept free will as physics, requires to explain objects as consisting of the laws of nature. Then as being laws unto themselves, objects exhibit freedom.

So basically you would describe an object with mathematics, and then construe objects as computing their own next state by the laws which they consist of.

Construed this way, a future of alternatives comes out of the object, which future the object anticipates. So the object does not have a model of what alternative futures may be available, it only has the actual alternative futures available. So for instance an object may have the alternative futures available of velocity 2 and 3, at time now + 1.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Syamsu wrote: April 26th, 2020, 6:00 am To accept free will as physics, requires to explain objects as consisting of the laws of nature. Then as being laws unto themselves, objects exhibit freedom.

So basically you would describe an object with mathematics, and then construe objects as computing their own next state by the laws which they consist of.

Construed this way, a future of alternatives comes out of the object, which future the object anticipates. So the object does not have a model of what alternative futures may be available, it only has the actual alternative futures available. So for instance an object may have the alternative futures available of velocity 2 and 3, at time now + 1.
Is part of the idea there that if we don't posit physical laws, we don't have physics?

Even at that, why couldn't we posit overarching (rather than specific object-located) physical laws that aren't deterministic in the sense of there being only one immediately following consequent state from any antecedent state?
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Syamsu »

Obviously it is a bit incoherent to posit laws outside of the object, because it surmises that objects consult a lawbook on what to do.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by Terrapin Station »

Syamsu wrote: April 26th, 2020, 7:03 am Obviously it is a bit incoherent to posit laws outside of the object, because it surmises that objects consult a lawbook on what to do.
I'm not a realist on physical laws, so I don't think it really makes sense to "posit laws inside an object" either.
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Re: Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

Post by h_k_s »

Marvin_Edwards wrote: April 25th, 2020, 9:37 pm
h_k_s wrote: April 25th, 2020, 8:56 pm
I could have looked that up on an online dictionary myself.

That is not what I asked you.

Apparently you misunderstood my question. So I will restate it.

Do you have a source either online or in print from a philosophy website or a philosophy book that describes "the philosophical definition of free will?"

If so, what does it say, and who is the author?

If not then, thank you, I guess you are just quoting the dictionary, in which case it is NOT a PHILOSOPHICAL definition.

Be careful what you say.

Make sure the words you use for what you say are appropriate.

Thanks.
The philosophical definition of free will is a choice we make that is free of causal necessity.

A description of free will from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begins like this, "The term “free will” has emerged over the past two millennia as the canonical designator for a significant kind of control over one’s actions." The full article is here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Enjoy.
Perfect, thank you.
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