Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

[Marvin_Edwards]

The notion of freedom subsumes reliable causation. Without reliable cause and effect, we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus, a deterministic universe is a prerequisite of freedom.

Because of this, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” contains a contradiction. Causal necessity is the chain of causation. The chain of causation is the set of pairs of causes and effects, from one event to the next, where each new event is the effect of prior events.

Free will, as defined in philosophy, requires that our choice be free of causal necessity.

Because every freedom we have requires reliable cause and effect, and causal necessity is the logical implication of reliable causation, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” presents as an oxymoron. Freedom cannot be free of what freedom requires to be freedom. The philosophical definition creates a paradox.

A choice that exists outside of reliable cause and effect never happens in a universe of reliable cause and effect. So, to adopt the philosophical definition means to abandon free will.

Outside of philosophy, in the real world, free will has an operational definition that is distinctly different from the philosophical definition. Operational free will is a choice that is free from coercion and other forms of undue influence, such as mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc. The operational definition is used in our court system to assess legal responsibility for ones actions. And it is the commonly understood notion used to assess moral responsibility as well. Operational free will makes no claim to being uncaused.

It would seem reasonable then for philosophy to abandon its paradoxical definition in favor of the operational definition.

[LuckyR]

The notion of freedom subsumes reliable causation. Without reliable cause and effect, we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus, a deterministic universe is a prerequisite of freedom.

Because of this, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” contains a contradiction. Causal necessity is the chain of causation. The chain of causation is the set of pairs of causes and effects, from one event to the next, where each new event is the effect of prior events.

Free will, as defined in philosophy, requires that our choice be free of causal necessity.

Because every freedom we have requires reliable cause and effect, and causal necessity is the logical implication of reliable causation, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” presents as an oxymoron. Freedom cannot be free of what freedom requires to be freedom. The philosophical definition creates a paradox.

A choice that exists outside of reliable cause and effect never happens in a universe of reliable cause and effect. So, to adopt the philosophical definition means to abandon free will.

Outside of philosophy, in the real world, free will has an operational definition that is distinctly different from the philosophical definition. Operational free will is a choice that is free from coercion and other forms of undue influence, such as mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc. The operational definition is used in our court system to assess legal responsibility for ones actions. And it is the commonly understood notion used to assess moral responsibility as well. Operational free will makes no claim to being uncaused.

It would seem reasonable then for philosophy to abandon its paradoxical definition in favor of the operational definition.

To me, you are describing two semi related concepts that are nowhere near synonymous and therefore shouldn't be substituted one for the other.

In addition, again IMO, Free Will is more accurately described by what it is not, rather than what it is. Meaning, it is NOT Pre-determination.

[Marvin_Edwards]

To me, you are describing two semi related concepts that are nowhere near synonymous and therefore shouldn't be substituted one for the other.

In addition, again IMO, Free Will is more accurately described by what it is not, rather than what it is. Meaning, it is NOT Pre-determination.

I agree that the two are nowhere near synonymous. Unfortunately, they both go by the same name, "free will". When philosophers rightfully dismiss the irrational notion, they end up dismissing the operational notion as well. This leads to assertions that attack both simple autonomy and personal responsibility. And that, to me, is a moral harm.

I also agree that there is no causal pre-determinism. An event may be predicted in advance, but it cannot be caused in advance. The event is never fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. Also, the most meaningful and relevant prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

[Terrapin Station]

It's important with stuff like this to tackle it one small piece at a time.

One core distinction we need to understand is the distinction between ontological determinism and ontological freedom--forget about will, free will, etc. for a moment.

Ontological determinism would obtain if from an antecedent state, A, an immediately following state B is determined to happen, because of physical laws that causally result in B and only B following A.

Ontological freedom would obtain if from an antecedent state A, at least (in other words, we could have more, but this is a minimum requirement) either consequent state B or C can immediately follow, where B and C are different. This could be the case of there aren't real (extramental) physical laws, or if real physical laws are such that at least in some circumstances, causality doesn't occur so that the outcome is predetermined by antecedent states--for example, if there were real probabilistic (with a probability less than 1, greater than 0) phenomena in at least some situations.

We need to understand that distinction first, and then we can work our way up to merging this with will phenomena.

[Wossname]

Marvin_Edwards » Today, 12:49 pm

LuckyR wrote: ↑Today, 9:08 am

To me, you are describing two semi related concepts that are nowhere near synonymous and therefore shouldn't be substituted one for the other.

In addition, again IMO, Free Will is more accurately described by what it is not, rather than what it is. Meaning, it is NOT Pre-determination.
I agree that the two are nowhere near synonymous. Unfortunately, they both go by the same name, "free will". When philosophers rightfully dismiss the irrational notion, they end up dismissing the operational notion as well. This leads to assertions that attack both simple autonomy and personal responsibility. And that, to me, is a moral harm.

I also agree that there is no causal pre-determinism. An event may be predicted in advance, but it cannot be caused in advance. The event is never fully caused until its final prior causes have played themselves out. Also, the most meaningful and relevant prior cause of a deliberate act is the act of deliberation that precedes it.

Marvin I think you have summed up the issue nicely. The philosophical approach to free will seems to me to be something of a mess. I make choices based on who I am (which includes my personality, ability to reason, personal prejudices etc.). Who I am is a consequence of the interplay of biology and the environment. So these things caused me to be who I am and in turn influence the choices I make. And this is what I want. If my behaviour were not a consequence of these things it would be random behaviour and I would not be free but mad. To continually display random behaviour cannot be viewed as rational and if it is free you can keep it.

I think the issue is all in the choosing. Can I exercise my will and make a choice according to my own lights? I believe I can. Did I have to make the choice I did? I don’t believe so. I think I can choose differently, (else no real choosing is going on). Others disagree and say this choosing is all illusion. I disagree with that. The argument seems sometimes to have been set up so that nothing counts as free will and all is determined. But I say my will is mine, and I exercise it according to my own lights and that is all it ever needs to be. The notion of it being “free” makes little sense. I agree with LuckyR that the two are not synonymous but adopting the operational definition you suggest seems to me to have practical merit since the alternative seems to be philosophical confusion.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Marvin I think you have summed up the issue nicely. The philosophical approach to free will seems to me to be something of a mess. I make choices based on who I am (which includes my personality, ability to reason, personal prejudices etc.). Who I am is a consequence of the interplay of biology and the environment. So these things caused me to be who I am and in turn influence the choices I make. And this is what I want. If my behaviour were not a consequence of these things it would be random behaviour and I would not be free but mad. To continually display random behaviour cannot be viewed as rational and if it is free you can keep it.

I think the issue is all in the choosing. Can I exercise my will and make a choice according to my own lights? I believe I can. Did I have to make the choice I did? I don’t believe so. I think I can choose differently, (else no real choosing is going on). Others disagree and say this choosing is all illusion. I disagree with that. The argument seems sometimes to have been set up so that nothing counts as free will and all is determined. But I say my will is mine, and I exercise it according to my own lights and that is all it ever needs to be. The notion of it being “free” makes little sense. I agree with LuckyR that the two are not synonymous but adopting the operational definition you suggest seems to me to have practical merit since the alternative seems to be philosophical confusion.

Right. And if choosing is an illusion, then are we having an illusion when we watch people walk into a restaurant, browse the menu, and place an order? Choosing is an operation that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and outputs a single choice. It happens in empirical reality all the time. So, it cannot reasonably be called an illusion.

[Marvin_Edwards]

It's important with stuff like this to tackle it one small piece at a time.

One core distinction we need to understand is the distinction between ontological determinism and ontological freedom--forget about will, free will, etc. for a moment.

Ontological determinism would obtain if from an antecedent state, A, an immediately following state B is determined to happen, because of physical laws that causally result in B and only B following A.

Ontological freedom would obtain if from an antecedent state A, at least (in other words, we could have more, but this is a minimum requirement) either consequent state B or C can immediately follow, where B and C are different. This could be the case of there aren't real (extramental) physical laws, or if real physical laws are such that at least in some circumstances, causality doesn't occur so that the outcome is predetermined by antecedent states--for example, if there were real probabilistic (with a probability less than 1, greater than 0) phenomena in at least some situations.

We need to understand that distinction first, and then we can work our way up to merging this with will phenomena.

I use the notion of "reliability" a lot when discussing determinism. In a deterministic world we have reliable cause and effect (A will always cause B). The opposite of this would be an indetermistic world of unreliable cause and effect, where when A happens, what happens next (B, C, A, ...) is unpredictable. I've used the example where I reach into an apple tree and pick an apple and now have an apple in my hand. That's deterministic (reliable causation). But if I pick an apple and find a pair or slippers in my hand one time, and the next time I find a quart of milk, ... etc. then that would be indeterministic, and much worse than Alice in Wonderland.

About the physical laws...I'll create a separate post for that.

[Sculptor1]

The notion of freedom subsumes reliable causation. Without reliable cause and effect, we cannot reliably cause any effect, and would have no freedom to do anything at all. Thus, a deterministic universe is a prerequisite of freedom.

Because of this, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” contains a contradiction. Causal necessity is the chain of causation. The chain of causation is the set of pairs of causes and effects, from one event to the next, where each new event is the effect of prior events.

Free will, as defined in philosophy, requires that our choice be free of causal necessity.

Because every freedom we have requires reliable cause and effect, and causal necessity is the logical implication of reliable causation, the notion of “freedom from causal necessity” presents as an oxymoron. Freedom cannot be free of what freedom requires to be freedom. The philosophical definition creates a paradox.

A choice that exists outside of reliable cause and effect never happens in a universe of reliable cause and effect. So, to adopt the philosophical definition means to abandon free will.

Outside of philosophy, in the real world, free will has an operational definition that is distinctly different from the philosophical definition. Operational free will is a choice that is free from coercion and other forms of undue influence, such as mental illness, hypnosis, manipulation, authoritative command, etc. The operational definition is used in our court system to assess legal responsibility for ones actions. And it is the commonly understood notion used to assess moral responsibility as well. Operational free will makes no claim to being uncaused.

It would seem reasonable then for philosophy to abandon its paradoxical definition in favor of the operational definition.

You have the case exactly.
What use would my motivations, education, and learning be if I could simply act despite their causalities.
We certainly do have the will to act. But for that to be "free" is absurd. Schopenhauer summed it up by saying we can act as we will but we cannot will as we will.

[Marvin_Edwards]

You have the case exactly.
What use would my motivations, education, and learning be if I could simply act despite their causalities.
We certainly do have the will to act. But for that to be "free" is absurd. Schopenhauer summed it up by saying we can act as we will but we cannot will as we will.

There is a "biological will" that we do not choose. Biological drives motivate us to act, in a goal-directed fashion, to survive, thrive, and reproduce. We don't get to choose that.

But we do get to choose the means by which we achieve those goals. This is the "deliberate will". A problem or issue comes up that requires to decide what we will do. "Will I have pancakes for breakfast or will I have eggs?" Note that we are choosing between two "I will's". We make our choice, "I will have pancakes!"

Since no one held a gun to our head or otherwise imposed a different choice upon us, we call "I will have pancakes" a freely chosen "I will". And that is what the "free" in "free will" means in operation.

The freely chosen "I will" sets our intent upon having pancakes, which then motivates and directs our subsequent actions (fixing and eating the pancakes).

The philosophical notion of "free will" is different of course. It means that in choosing our will we were free from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity). That's not a productive way of looking at things, because the notion of freedom subsumes the notion of reliable causation. Because freedom subsumes reliable causation, the notion of being "free from reliable causation" creates a paradox. And that's why philosophy needs to change its definition of free will.

[hegel]

You have the case exactly.
What use would my motivations, education, and learning be if I could simply act despite their causalities.
We certainly do have the will to act. But for that to be "free" is absurd. Schopenhauer summed it up by saying we can act as we will but we cannot will as we will.

There is a "biological will" that we do not choose. Biological drives motivate us to act, in a goal-directed fashion, to survive, thrive, and reproduce. We don't get to choose that.

But we do get to choose the means by which we achieve those goals. This is the "deliberate will". A problem or issue comes up that requires to decide what we will do. "Will I have pancakes for breakfast or will I have eggs?" Note that we are choosing between two "I will's". We make our choice, "I will have pancakes!"

Since no one held a gun to our head or otherwise imposed a different choice upon us, we call "I will have pancakes" a freely chosen "I will". And that is what the "free" in "free will" means in operation.

The freely chosen "I will" sets our intent upon having pancakes, which then motivates and directs our subsequent actions (fixing and eating the pancakes).

The philosophical notion of "free will" is different of course. It means that in choosing our will we were free from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity). That's not a productive way of looking at things, because the notion of freedom subsumes the notion of reliable causation. Because freedom subsumes reliable causation, the notion of being "free from reliable causation" creates a paradox. And that's why philosophy needs to change its definition of free will.

One minor point of contention. There is no such thing as "the philosophical notion of 'free will.'"

[Terrapin Station]

It's important with stuff like this to tackle it one small piece at a time.

One core distinction we need to understand is the distinction between ontological determinism and ontological freedom--forget about will, free will, etc. for a moment.

Ontological determinism would obtain if from an antecedent state, A, an immediately following state B is determined to happen, because of physical laws that causally result in B and only B following A.

Ontological freedom would obtain if from an antecedent state A, at least (in other words, we could have more, but this is a minimum requirement) either consequent state B or C can immediately follow, where B and C are different. This could be the case of there aren't real (extramental) physical laws, or if real physical laws are such that at least in some circumstances, causality doesn't occur so that the outcome is predetermined by antecedent states--for example, if there were real probabilistic (with a probability less than 1, greater than 0) phenomena in at least some situations.

We need to understand that distinction first, and then we can work our way up to merging this with will phenomena.

I use the notion of "reliability" a lot when discussing determinism. In a deterministic world we have reliable cause and effect (A will always cause B). The opposite of this would be an indetermistic world of unreliable cause and effect, where when A happens, what happens next (B, C, A, ...) is unpredictable. I've used the example where I reach into an apple tree and pick an apple and now have an apple in my hand. That's deterministic (reliable causation). But if I pick an apple and find a pair or slippers in my hand one time, and the next time I find a quart of milk, ... etc. then that would be indeterministic, and much worse than Alice in Wonderland.

About the physical laws...I'll create a separate post for that.

So, one thing it's important to note here is that the options are not only determinism or "complete randomness." Another possibility is probabilistic freedom (or indeterminism), so that it we have two options for a consequent state, B and C, there could be an 90% probability of B obtaining and a 10% probability of C. In that situation, freedom obtains rather than determinism (per the explanations I presented above), but B is still a reasonably reliable outcome. It's not the same as a 50-50 outcome of B or C.

[Sculptor1]

You have the case exactly.
What use would my motivations, education, and learning be if I could simply act despite their causalities.
We certainly do have the will to act. But for that to be "free" is absurd. Schopenhauer summed it up by saying we can act as we will but we cannot will as we will.

There is a "biological will" that we do not choose. Biological drives motivate us to act, in a goal-directed fashion, to survive, thrive, and reproduce. We don't get to choose that.

But we do get to choose the means by which we achieve those goals. This is the "deliberate will". A problem or issue comes up that requires to decide what we will do. "Will I have pancakes for breakfast or will I have eggs?" Note that we are choosing between two "I will's". We make our choice, "I will have pancakes!"

Since I had no control over my biological determinism; my choice of parents; the world I live in and the influences that impressed me from the earliest times; those choices that I actually made were fully determined by all antecedent causailities.

Since no one held a gun to our head or otherwise imposed a different choice upon us, we call "I will have pancakes" a freely chosen "I will". And that is what the "free" in "free will" means in operation.

That might be the mundane meaning of "free", but it is not the philosophical one of the term "free will".

The freely chosen "I will" sets our intent upon having pancakes, which then motivates and directs our subsequent actions (fixing and eating the pancakes).

The philosophical notion of "free will" is different of course. It means that in choosing our will we were free from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity). That's not a productive way of looking at things, because the notion of freedom subsumes the notion of reliable causation. Because freedom subsumes reliable causation, the notion of being "free from reliable causation" creates a paradox. And that's why philosophy needs to change its definition of free will.

I think not. The point is that many try to argue for "free will" despite the obvious difficulties. Those on the deterministic side of the fence, like you and I, need this in order that we can ridicule the others. LOL
David Hume attempts to reconcile the mundane understanding of "freedom" by saying that our will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilism stands between naive free will and the strawman of the freewill camp "fatalism", which they often accuse the determinists.
of.

[Sculptor1]

I use the notion of "reliability" a lot when discussing determinism. In a deterministic world we have reliable cause and effect (A will always cause B). The opposite of this would be an indetermistic world of unreliable cause and effect, where when A happens, what happens next (B, C, A, ...) is unpredictable.

How do you take your fudge?

I've used the example where I reach into an apple tree and pick an apple and now have an apple in my hand. That's deterministic (reliable causation). But if I pick an apple and find a pair or slippers in my hand one time, and the next time I find a quart of milk, ... etc. then that would be indeterministic, and much worse than Alice in Wonderland.

About the physical laws...I'll create a separate post for that.

So, one thing it's important to note here is that the options are not only determinism or "complete randomness." Another possibility is probabilistic freedom (or indeterminism), so that it we have two options for a consequent state, B and C, there could be an 90% probability of B obtaining and a 10% probability of C. In that situation, freedom obtains rather than determinism (per the explanations I presented above), but B is still a reasonably reliable outcome. It's not the same as a 50-50 outcome of B or C.

[Marvin_Edwards]

I use the notion of "reliability" a lot when discussing determinism. In a deterministic world we have reliable cause and effect (A will always cause B). The opposite of this would be an indetermistic world of unreliable cause and effect, where when A happens, what happens next (B, C, A, ...) is unpredictable. I've used the example where I reach into an apple tree and pick an apple and now have an apple in my hand. That's deterministic (reliable causation). But if I pick an apple and find a pair or slippers in my hand one time, and the next time I find a quart of milk, ... etc. then that would be indeterministic, and much worse than Alice in Wonderland.

So, one thing it's important to note here is that the options are not only determinism or "complete randomness." Another possibility is probabilistic freedom (or indeterminism), so that it we have two options for a consequent state, B and C, there could be an 90% probability of B obtaining and a 10% probability of C. In that situation, freedom obtains rather than determinism (per the explanations I presented above), but B is still a reasonably reliable outcome. It's not the same as a 50-50 outcome of B or C.

I find it makes things simpler to assume perfectly reliable cause and effect at all levels of causation (quantum, physical, biological, and rational). There will be some as yet unknown additional cause that makes B follow A 90% of the time and makes C follow A 10% of the time. Randomness and chaos would be issues of prediction rather than issues of causation.

And freedom subsumes reliable causation, making freedom deterministic. I suspect that all human concepts, having evolved within a deterministic universe, will already subsume a world of reliable cause and effect. If freedom is the ability to do what we want, then whatever we want to do will require reliable causation to get it done.

So, I guess I would not buy into ontological freedom, but just operational freedom.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Since no one held a gun to our head or otherwise imposed a different choice upon us, we call "I will have pancakes" a freely chosen "I will". And that is what the "free" in "free will" means in operation.

That might be the mundane meaning of "free", but it is not the philosophical one of the term "free will".

The freely chosen "I will" sets our intent upon having pancakes, which then motivates and directs our subsequent actions (fixing and eating the pancakes).
The philosophical notion of "free will" is different of course. It means that in choosing our will we were free from reliable cause and effect (causal necessity). That's not a productive way of looking at things, because the notion of freedom subsumes the notion of reliable causation. Because freedom subsumes reliable causation, the notion of being "free from reliable causation" creates a paradox. And that's why philosophy needs to change its definition of free will.

I think not. The point is that many try to argue for "free will" despite the obvious difficulties. Those on the deterministic side of the fence, like you and I, need this in order that we can ridicule the others. LOL
David Hume attempts to reconcile the mundane understanding of "freedom" by saying that our will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilism stands between naive free will and the strawman of the freewill camp "fatalism", which they often accuse the determinists.
of.

However, I argue that free will is a deterministic event. Here's how it goes:
1. We have perfectly reliable cause and effect up to the point where we must make a decision.
2. The process of choosing is deterministic, because the choice will be reliably caused by our purpose and our reasons, our beliefs and values, our genetic predispositions and life experiences, our thoughts and feelings, and anything else that makes us uniquely who and what we are at that point in time. The choice sets our intent (our will), which reliably determines our subsequent actions.
3. The result of our actions continues the chain of perfectly reliable cause and effect in the external world.

Note that (1) the causal chain is never broken and (2) the events in step 2 are what we routinely call "a choice of our own free will".

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is not a meaningful constraint, because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose. Basically, what we inevitably do is what we would have done anyway.