Is the Philosophical Definition of Free Will Rational?

[Sculptor1]

That might be the mundane meaning of "free", but it is not the philosophical one of the term "free will".

I think not. The point is that many try to argue for "free will" despite the obvious difficulties. Those on the deterministic side of the fence, like you and I, need this in order that we can ridicule the others. LOL
David Hume attempts to reconcile the mundane understanding of "freedom" by saying that our will is compatible with determinism. Compatibilism stands between naive free will and the strawman of the freewill camp "fatalism", which they often accuse the determinists.
of.

However, I argue that free will is a deterministic event. Here's how it goes:

I know.
I agree with you, but...
People that argue for "free will" are not in support of a deterministic position.
You have to ask yourself; free from what?

1. We have perfectly reliable cause and effect up to the point where we must make a decision.
2. The process of choosing is deterministic, because the choice will be reliably caused by our purpose and our reasons, our beliefs and values, our genetic predispositions and life experiences, our thoughts and feelings, and anything else that makes us uniquely who and what we are at that point in time. The choice sets our intent (our will), which reliably determines our subsequent actions.
3. The result of our actions continues the chain of perfectly reliable cause and effect in the external world.

Note that (1) the causal chain is never broken and (2) the events in step 2 are what we routinely call "a choice of our own free will".

Universal causal necessity/inevitability is not a meaningful constraint, because what we will inevitably do is exactly identical to us being us, doing what we do, and choosing what we choose. Basically, what we inevitably do is what we would have done anyway.

Yes and if you could have a duplicate world where all the same conditions are st, it would run and continue to run in a completely reliably and identical way.
Were it NOT to do so, then our decisions and choices would have to be meaningless and capricious.
Free will, free of cause, is useless and meaningless.

[Terrapin Station]

So, one thing it's important to note here is that the options are not only determinism or "complete randomness." Another possibility is probabilistic freedom (or indeterminism), so that it we have two options for a consequent state, B and C, there could be an 90% probability of B obtaining and a 10% probability of C. In that situation, freedom obtains rather than determinism (per the explanations I presented above), but B is still a reasonably reliable outcome. It's not the same as a 50-50 outcome of B or C.

I find it makes things simpler to assume perfectly reliable cause and effect at all levels of causation (quantum, physical, biological, and rational). There will be some as yet unknown additional cause that makes B follow A 90% of the time and makes C follow A 10% of the time. Randomness and chaos would be issues of prediction rather than issues of causation.

What I'm talking about isn't assumptions that we're making but possibilities re what's going on ontologically. This is important in clarifying conceptual distinctions, too.

Once we realize what the different possibilities are, it's then a matter of whether we have good reasons to believe that one possibility or the other is the case. It seems like maybe you're making a decision based on aesthetic preferences or just intuition or something like that. I don't consider those good reasons to pick one option over another.
If you're going to disagree with what I wrote above explaining why this isn't the case, you need to actually present an argument against what I explained.
This amounts to simply misunderstanding the distinction being made.

[Terrapin Station]

So, one thing it's important to note here is that the options are not only determinism or "complete randomness." Another possibility is probabilistic freedom (or indeterminism), so that it we have two options for a consequent state, B and C, there could be an 90% probability of B obtaining and a 10% probability of C. In that situation, freedom obtains rather than determinism (per the explanations I presented above), but B is still a reasonably reliable outcome. It's not the same as a 50-50 outcome of B or C.

I find it makes things simpler to assume perfectly reliable cause and effect at all levels of causation (quantum, physical, biological, and rational). There will be some as yet unknown additional cause that makes B follow A 90% of the time and makes C follow A 10% of the time. Randomness and chaos would be issues of prediction rather than issues of causation.

What I'm talking about isn't assumptions that we're making but possibilities re what's going on ontologically. This is important in clarifying conceptual distinctions, too.

Once we realize what the different possibilities are, it's then a matter of whether we have good reasons to believe that one possibility or the other is the case. It seems like maybe you're making a decision based on aesthetic preferences or just intuition or something like that. I don't consider those good reasons to pick one option over another.

And freedom subsumes reliable causation,

If you're going to disagree with what I wrote above explaining why this isn't the case, you need to actually present an argument against what I explained.

making freedom deterministic.

This amounts to simply misunderstanding the distinction being made.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Yes and if you could have a duplicate world where all the same conditions are st, it would run and continue to run in a completely reliably and identical way.
Were it NOT to do so, then our decisions and choices would have to be meaningless and capricious.
Free will, free of cause, is useless and meaningless.

Right, two duplicate worlds would operate identically. And if our choices were not caused by reasoning they would be unreasonable.

And philosophical free will (a choice free of causal necessity) is meaningless, of course.

However, operational free will (a choice free of coercion and undue influence) is both meaningful and relevant (and, deterministic).

[Marvin_Edwards]

I find it makes things simpler to assume perfectly reliable cause and effect at all levels of causation (quantum, physical, biological, and rational). There will be some as yet unknown additional cause that makes B follow A 90% of the time and makes C follow A 10% of the time. Randomness and chaos would be issues of prediction rather than issues of causation.

What I'm talking about isn't assumptions that we're making but possibilities re what's going on ontologically. This is important in clarifying conceptual distinctions, too.

Once we realize what the different possibilities are, it's then a matter of whether we have good reasons to believe that one possibility or the other is the case. It seems like maybe you're making a decision based on aesthetic preferences or just intuition or something like that. I don't consider those good reasons to pick one option over another.

And freedom subsumes reliable causation,

If you're going to disagree with what I wrote above explaining why this isn't the case, you need to actually present an argument against what I explained.

making freedom deterministic.

This amounts to simply misunderstanding the distinction being made.

You're right. It is an aesthetic preference on my part. Any element of causal indeterminism reduces our operational freedom, because we cannot control what we cannot predict. The point of freedom, ironically, is to exercise some control over events. Our causal agency is enhanced by having a world in which we can understand the causes of events, predict them, and perhaps prevent a bad event, or bring about a good one. A random or chaotic event is more difficult to control than one that is reliably caused and predictable. So, a universe of perfectly reliable causation presents a more optimistic scenario than one in which events are beyond our understanding. And I think that our minds first reaction to an unfamiliar and bad event is to ask the question, "Why did this happen?", which intuitively asserts that there must be a cause, and we might discover it.

Indeterminism, from my perspective, is not a good thing. But you are right of course that it is valid to posit the possibility of a world where 90% of the events are deterministic and 10% are random.

I expected that "freedom is deterministic" would raise some eyebrows. But my underlying principle is pragmatism, deriving the meaning of words from the part they play in real life operations. There is a glass half-full view of reliable causation where it enables us to reliably cause things in our world. There is a glass half-empty view where it is the prior cause of us, and some people assume this means it controls us. But, causation never causes anything and determinism never determines anything. They are descriptions of the way that objects and forces interact to bring about events, but they are neither objects nor forces. We are real objects and we cause things for our own purpose and reasons.

[Sculptor1]

Yes and if you could have a duplicate world where all the same conditions are st, it would run and continue to run in a completely reliably and identical way.
Were it NOT to do so, then our decisions and choices would have to be meaningless and capricious.
Free will, free of cause, is useless and meaningless.

Right, two duplicate worlds would operate identically. And if our choices were not caused by reasoning they would be unreasonable.

And philosophical free will (a choice free of causal necessity) is meaningless, of course.

However, operational free will (a choice free of coercion and undue influence) is both meaningful and relevant (and, deterministic).

Agreed.

[Sculptor1]

Yes and if you could have a duplicate world where all the same conditions are st, it would run and continue to run in a completely reliably and identical way.
Were it NOT to do so, then our decisions and choices would have to be meaningless and capricious.
Free will, free of cause, is useless and meaningless.

Right, two duplicate worlds would operate identically. And if our choices were not caused by reasoning they would be unreasonable.

And philosophical free will (a choice free of causal necessity) is meaningless, of course.

However, operational free will (a choice free of coercion and undue influence) is both meaningful and relevant (and, deterministic).

Agreed. But try changing people's use of words! To my way of thinking, fewer words, used more precisely are better than more words used less discriminately.
On another thread I declared that I do not believe in anything because belief to the result of faith and has no basis. "Belief" can be used indiscriminately to mean anything from a belief in god to i believe there is a computer keyboard under my fingers.
For myself, I prefer to restrict my beliefs to things I am sure of. Since this is the case I am perfectly able to remove all use of the word belief to mean something based on faith and use "knowledge" instead.
Believe nothing.
Seek to know.
sapere aude
I only use belief for aspirations. Thus I believe in equality of opportunity. I know it exists no where on earth, but I think it would be a wise political policy. I believe in human rights. Again this is not a thing I believe exists in an empirical way.
But I do not think I'd use the phrase I believe in gravity. I know there is such a thing. We might argue about its nature, but I can show you what I mean by throwing an apple at you!!

People don't like this and Terrapin Station has insisted that I used the term "justified true belief". I see no need.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Agreed. But try changing people's use of words! To my way of thinking, fewer words, used more precisely are better than more words used less discriminately.

Amen to that.

[Sculptor1]

Agreed. But try changing people's use of words! To my way of thinking, fewer words, used more precisely are better than more words used less discriminately.

Amen to that.

" Amen" - another word I'd never use!!

[Terrapin Station]

You're right. It is an aesthetic preference on my part. Any element of causal indeterminism reduces our operational freedom, because we cannot control what we cannot predict.

If there's no element of causal indeterminism in the world, then you can't control anything, because only consequent state B can immediately follow any antecedent state A. There is no ontological freedom in that case.

[Marvin_Edwards]

You're right. It is an aesthetic preference on my part. Any element of causal indeterminism reduces our operational freedom, because we cannot control what we cannot predict.

If there's no element of causal indeterminism in the world, then you can't control anything, because only consequent state B can immediately follow any antecedent state A. There is no ontological freedom in that case.

Two things: (1) What distinguishes "ontological freedom" from the ordinary freedom we're all familiar with? (For example, what would be an "ontological" squirrel?)

(2) If my choice was causally necessary, and inevitable from any prior point in eternity, then my choosing was also necessary and inevitable from all of those prior points. My choosing, among all the other prior events, is the most meaningful and relevant prior cause of my chosen "I will" (as in "I will have eggs for breakfast"). My chosen "I will" sets the intent that motivates and directs my subsequent action. And those actions initiate the subsequent events in that perfectly reliable chain of causation. Thus, the causal link that is "me" turns out to be a control link in the chain, because it decides what will happen next. It is as if my choice controls what becomes inevitable (but actually it simply controls what I do next).

[Passingthrough]

Hi, I'm not an academic but should the conscious and unconscious mind be taken into acount when contemplating this question, just trying to help

[Terrapin Station]

Two things: (1) What distinguishes "ontological freedom" from the ordinary freedom we're all familiar with?

Didn't you read the post where I defined ontological freedom? It's one of the very first posts I addressed to you.

(2) If my choice was causally necessary,

It can't both be a choice and be causally necessary. If only B can immediately follow A, then you have no choice. A choice requires at least two options.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Didn't you read the post where I defined ontological freedom? It's one of the very first posts I addressed to you.

Is it more productive to send me searching through prior posts rather than just restating your definition? I recall it being mentioned, but I don't recall it being defined.

It can't both be a choice and be causally necessary. If only B can immediately follow A, then you have no choice. A choice requires at least two options.

Yes a choice does require two options. And there will be two options, each of which will arrive in its time due to causal necessity. They too are inevitable from any prior point in eternity.

A choosing operation means that what follows A ("I'm hungry, what will I fix for breakfast?") is not yet decided. B may be pancakes or it may be eggs. While I know that whatever I choose will have been causally necessary from any prior point in history, I don't know yet what that inevitable choice will be until after I decide what I will eat. (Now, it may be the case that God, or Laplace's Daemon, or my wife can predict in advance what I will choose, but I don't have that information yet. If I did then I wouldn't bother initiating a choosing operation).

So I have two real possibilities, pancakes and eggs. A "real possibility" is an option that, should I choose it, I will be able to actualize it. I have the eggs. I have the pancake mix. I can fix the eggs. I can fix the pancakes. Both are real possibilities.

And, I can choose to fix the eggs. Or, I can choose to fix the pancakes. I have both of those abilities. If I were to believe that I cannot choose to fix the eggs, or that I cannot choose to fix the pancakes, then the operation of choosing would halt in its tracks. But we don't want that to happen, because the adaptive flexibility of choosing has assisted the survival our species.

If I choose to fix the pancakes, then it will have been causally necessary from any prior point that I would fix the pancakes. However, it will remain true that I could have fixed the eggs instead. What I can do is never limited by what I will do. They are two distinct concepts that have meaning only within their own contexts. The use of the terms "can" and "will" usually suggests the context that defines their meaning.

"Can" and "Could" refer to something that may or may not happen. "Will" and "Would" refers to something that is going to happen. Thus, under exactly the same conditions, "I would always choose to fix pancakes" is always true and "I could have chosen to fix eggs" is true as well.

[Terrapin Station]

A choosing operation means that what follows A ("I'm hungry, what will I fix for breakfast?") is not yet decided. B may be pancakes or it may be eggs. While I know that whatever I choose will have been causally necessary from any prior point in history, I don't know yet what that inevitable choice will be until after I decide what I will eat. (Now, it may be the case that God, or Laplace's Daemon, or my wife can predict in advance what I will choose, but I don't have that information yet. If I did then I wouldn't bother initiating a choosing operation).

So I have two real possibilities, pancakes and eggs. A "real possibility" is an option that, should I choose it, I will be able to actualize it. I have the eggs. I have the pancake mix. I can fix the eggs. I can fix the pancakes. Both are real possibilities.

So, the above, taken altogether, makes absolutely no sense, and I don't understand why you can't see that it makes no sense.

if there's an "inevitable choice" (there's not actually a choice if only one option is inevitable), and if God or whatever could predict in advance what you'll choose, because it was causally necessary from a prior point), then you do NOT have two real possibilities. You only have one. The belief or appearance that you have two would be mistaken.