Determinism and the Laws of Nature

[Marvin_Edwards]

So, whether you want to acknowledge it or not, there's a long history in philosophy of a debate between freedom and determinism in general ontological terms, where we're not specifically talking about free will.

And we have been discussing several things outside of free will, such as the ontology of the laws of nature, and the distinctions between necessities and possibilities.

What, exactly, is being discussed there, traditionally, is not up for debate.

So, you believe that philosophy is something that one reads about, but not something that one would dare to engage in?

You can think that the traditional dilemma, the traditional distinctions are misguided, or that they're uninteresting or unimportant, etc., but nevertheless, it's a historical fact that there's such a debate, and if we talk about something else instead, if we change the distinction, we're simply changing the topic with respect to that traditional debate. We're not settling anything about the debate in that case; we're rather changing the subject.

It is the nature of a dilemma that it challenges us to resolve it.

Free will, in the context of the traditional debate, is a subset of free ontological phenomena. In order to posit free will, we have to accept that free phenomena are possible with respect to the traditional distinction, and then the issue is just how willed/intentional phenomena work within that context. Just how can it be that we can control free phenomena? To what extent do we do so? And so on.

I'd be happy to address those issues, but that's not the topic here. The topic here is determinism and the laws of nature. For example, are the laws of nature ontological realities or simply a metaphor? Do they in fact determine events or do they only describe how the ontological objects and forces reliably bring about events.

Semantics, by the way, is theory or philosophy of meaning. It studies just what meaning, qua meaning is, how it works, etc. It's not about "correct definitions." Semantics is a subset of semiotics, theory or philosophy of signs, a la signifiers and signifieds, etc.

[Terrapin Station]

So, you believe that philosophy is something that one reads about, but not something that one would dare to engage in?

If that were what I wanted to say, I would have written that.

Rather, I believe that "What, exactly, is being discussed there, traditionally, is not up for debate." You can talk about something else, but it's changing the topic relative to the traditional discussion.

It is the nature of a dilemma that it challenges us to resolve it.

That can't be done if we change the topic.

I'd be happy to address those issues, but that's not the topic here. The topic here is determinism and the laws of nature. For example, are the laws of nature ontological realities or simply a metaphor? Do they in fact determine events or do they only describe how the ontological objects and forces reliably bring about events.

I brought this up a week or two ago with respect to it being harder to argue for determinism if we assert realism for physical laws. That wouldn't be impossible, but it would be more difficult to account for determinism if physical laws are simply ways of thinking about regularities.

[Count Lucanor]

It reminds me of Heraclitus and never being able to step in the same river twice. I do not see why blind chance cannot have a role to play at times. Some element of randomness could just be part of the way the universe works. If it is the case I don't know how we could prove it though. Well controlled experimentation is designed to eliminate extraneous variables and so if done properly should provide replicable results. When it doesn't, we tend to blame it on a lack of rigour. The wider universe of course is not a laboratory experiment (?) and it may be that this interplay between huge numbers of variables might increase the odds of occasional random outcomes.

Anyway, thanks for your reply, - I think I understand you better now.

You know what they say: randomness is just a measurement of our ignorance.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Rather, I believe that "What, exactly, is being discussed there, traditionally, is not up for debate." You can talk about something else, but it's changing the topic relative to the traditional discussion.

It is the nature of a dilemma that it challenges us to resolve it.

That can't be done if we change the topic.

Well, that's a bit frustrating. You insist upon have the traditional discussion, because otherwise I would be off topic. But the traditional discussion is an interminable debate, that never resolves any dilemma.

To resolve the dilemma requires notions that are explored in the traditional discussion.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, that's a bit frustrating. You insist upon have the traditional discussion, because otherwise I would be off topic.

That's not what I'm saying, actually. I'm just pointing out that we are changing the topic relative to the traditional discussion. I'm not forwarding a normative about that. I'm not saying we need to have one discussion versus another. It's just that compatibilism doesn't work unless we change the topic, because we're changing definitions, from the traditional debate about this issue.

But the traditional discussion is an interminable debate, that never resolves any dilemma.

To resolve the dilemma requires notions that are explored in the traditional discussion.

Personally, I don't really see it as something that needs to be resolved for any reason. Re legal culpability, for example, it doesn't really matter whether we're determinists in the traditional sense or not. We can still say that someone is responsible for their actions just in case they did the actions in question and especially if they had the intention to do them. That they maybe had no (real) choice in the matter wouldn't change this fact. And we can point out that whether they have a (real) choice in the matter doesn't change the fact that people who commit violent crimes--rapes, murders, etc.--tend to be a significant risk to commit those sorts of crimes again, which is what we're trying to avoid.

[Marvin_Edwards]

Well, that's a bit frustrating. You insist upon have the traditional discussion, because otherwise I would be off topic.

That's not what I'm saying, actually. I'm just pointing out that we are changing the topic relative to the traditional discussion. I'm not forwarding a normative about that. I'm not saying we need to have one discussion versus another. It's just that compatibilism doesn't work unless we change the topic, because we're changing definitions, from the traditional debate about this issue.

But the traditional discussion is an interminable debate, that never resolves any dilemma.

To resolve the dilemma requires notions that are explored in the traditional discussion.

Personally, I don't really see it as something that needs to be resolved for any reason. Re legal culpability, for example, it doesn't really matter whether we're determinists in the traditional sense or not. We can still say that someone is responsible for their actions just in case they did the actions in question and especially if they had the intention to do them. That they maybe had no (real) choice in the matter wouldn't change this fact. And we can point out that whether they have a (real) choice in the matter doesn't change the fact that people who commit violent crimes--rapes, murders, etc.--tend to be a significant risk to commit those sorts of crimes again, which is what we're trying to avoid.

There are practical moral consequences of instilling the belief that no one has free will and no one can be held responsible for their acts. Several studies documented here support this:
http://eddynahmias.com/wp-content/uploa ... eister.pdf

[Terrapin Station]

That's not what I'm saying, actually. I'm just pointing out that we are changing the topic relative to the traditional discussion. I'm not forwarding a normative about that. I'm not saying we need to have one discussion versus another. It's just that compatibilism doesn't work unless we change the topic, because we're changing definitions, from the traditional debate about this issue.



Personally, I don't really see it as something that needs to be resolved for any reason. Re legal culpability, for example, it doesn't really matter whether we're determinists in the traditional sense or not. We can still say that someone is responsible for their actions just in case they did the actions in question and especially if they had the intention to do them. That they maybe had no (real) choice in the matter wouldn't change this fact. And we can point out that whether they have a (real) choice in the matter doesn't change the fact that people who commit violent crimes--rapes, murders, etc.--tend to be a significant risk to commit those sorts of crimes again, which is what we're trying to avoid.

There are practical moral consequences of instilling the belief that no one has free will and no one can be held responsible for their acts. Several studies documented here support this:
http://eddynahmias.com/wp-content/uploa ... eister.pdf

I know that's a common view, but I don't agree with it, primarily for the two reasons I listed.

One, even if you're forced to make a particular decision (by impersonal physical forces), you still whatever action you did. That's kind of like if you're hiking under a cliff and a rock falls on your head. You curse the rock for falling on your head, because that was the object in motion that caused the problem you care about. You don't curse the various causal factors prior to the rock falling on your head, going all the way back to the Big Bang. If we were to always intuitively go back to the initial source in the causal chain, then for any natural occurrence that we're concerned with--hurricanes, floods, mudslides, whatever--we'd have to blame the Big Bang (as long as we buy causal determinism). But we don't do that. No one would blame the Big Bang for an earthquake.

Two, as I mentioned, whatever the case re free will/determinism, it's an undeniable fact that people who commit serious and violent crimes, at least where we're not talking about crimes of passion, are much more of a risk for committing further similar serious and violent crimes. Again, this is similar to if a particular hiking spot under a cliff is a place where rocks above have a tendency to fall. We don't say, "Oh, well, they're not choosing to fall, so therefore we're not justified in taking any action to prevent them from falling on people's heads." We instead put up netting, or we change the hiking path below the rocks, or something else--clear all of the rocks on the cliff out or whatever--to prevent further injuries. Likewise, we're justified in separating serious/violent criminals from the general population. It's not as if we're not justified in doing that just in case they didn't actually choose to murder, rape etc.

So I don't agree that moral/legal culpability hinges on whether there's really free will.

[Terrapin Station]

Oops, in the second sentence, that should be "you still DID whatever action you did."

[Marvin_Edwards]

There are practical moral consequences of instilling the belief that no one has free will and no one can be held responsible for their acts. Several studies documented here support this:
http://eddynahmias.com/wp-content/uploa ... eister.pdf

I know that's a common view, but I don't agree with it, primarily for the two reasons I listed.

The paper is not a viewpoint. It is scientific evidence of the effect of certain beliefs upon behavior.

One, even if you're forced to make a particular decision (by impersonal physical forces), you still whatever action you did. That's kind of like if you're hiking under a cliff and a rock falls on your head. You curse the rock for falling on your head, because that was the object in motion that caused the problem you care about. You don't curse the various causal factors prior to the rock falling on your head, going all the way back to the Big Bang. If we were to always intuitively go back to the initial source in the causal chain, then for any natural occurrence that we're concerned with--hurricanes, floods, mudslides, whatever--we'd have to blame the Big Bang (as long as we buy causal determinism). But we don't do that. No one would blame the Big Bang for an earthquake.

Correct. Blame is only effective when attempting to modify a choosing operation. Rocks don't make choices. Neither did the Big Bang.

But the human choosing process can be influenced and modified. One such influence is the disapproval of others. In William Bowers' 1964 study of "Student Dishonesty and its Control in College" he found that the most significant deterrent to cheating was "perceived peer disapproval". It even had a higher correlation that personal disapproval. Blame can be an effective tool of behavior modification as it communicates social disapproval.

Two, as I mentioned, whatever the case re free will/determinism, it's an undeniable fact that people who commit serious and violent crimes, at least where we're not talking about crimes of passion, are much more of a risk for committing further similar serious and violent crimes. Again, this is similar to if a particular hiking spot under a cliff is a place where rocks above have a tendency to fall. We don't say, "Oh, well, they're not choosing to fall, so therefore we're not justified in taking any action to prevent them from falling on people's heads." We instead put up netting, or we change the hiking path below the rocks, or something else--clear all of the rocks on the cliff out or whatever--to prevent further injuries. Likewise, we're justified in separating serious/violent criminals from the general population. It's not as if we're not justified in doing that just in case they didn't actually choose to murder, rape etc.

So I don't agree that moral/legal culpability hinges on whether there's really free will.

Yes, we're justified in taking appropriate action to prevent further harm. But the appropriate action when the cause is a relevant mental illness is psychiatric treatment, and the appropriate action for a deliberate act of a rational mind is corrective punishment and rehabilitation. The notion of free will makes this distinction. Causal necessity makes no distinctions, and would treat everyone like a rock.

[Belindi]

Marvin Edwards wrote:

There are practical moral consequences of instilling the belief that no one has free will and no one can be held responsible for their acts. Several studies documented here support this:

Your notion of free will is freedom of choice. You yourself are more free than another who is illiterate. Human freedom relates to power of choice; the greater variety and number of choices the more the freedom.
Your notion of free will is not Free Will which is uncaused and lacks not only space- time coordinates but hasn't any attributes at all. The Free Will (that not set into the causal network )is a religious mystery the purpose of which is to justify blaming and punishing wrongdoers.

[Sculptor1]

It is my view that a full acknowledgement of determinism would mean a great boost to the penal system.
Rather than pretend that criminals should be taken off the streets because they are simply and willfully committing crime for reasons purely their own; a system, that on the contrary, recognises the causal nature of crime and the fact that new causes can create new effects, would steer towards understanding the caused of crime and of instituting corrective and rehabilitation methods for prisoners.
The country that has the most criminals in gaol is beset by problems of overcrowding; a complete failure of rehabilitation; and only offers a cruel, violent and dangerous environment.
The result is high residivism and alienation from society.

[Terrapin Station]

Correct. Blame is only effective when attempting to modify a choosing operation. Rocks don't make choices. Neither did the Big Bang.

??? Not what I'm saying. I wrote "You curse the rock for falling on your head." That is blaming the rock. It fell on your head! It doesn't matter that the rock didn't choose to fall on your head. You don't say, "No problem, rock. You didn't make a choice to fall on my head. So I don't blame you for falling on my head. It wasn't your fault. Fall away."

It was the rock's fault. The rock is what fell on your head. Nothing else fell on your head.

Yes, we're justified in taking appropriate action to prevent further harm. But the appropriate action when the cause is a relevant mental illness is psychiatric treatment, and the appropriate action for a deliberate act of a rational mind is corrective punishment and rehabilitation. The notion of free will makes this distinction. Causal necessity makes no distinctions, and would treat everyone like a rock.

I don't at all agree with the conventional wisdom there on many angles. I often don't agree with it re determining a presence or lack of mental illness, I don't agree that the conventional view of mental illness versus no mental illness correlates at all with free will versus a lack of the same, and I don't agree at all with the way our prison systems are structured or function. I wouldn't have anything like our present prisons systems if I were king. I also don't agree with many laws we currently have, but all of this is another issue that would be better served with different threads.

So none of that is the point. You're not at all commenting on the point. The point was that regardless of whether free will obtains or not in the traditional distinction, we're justified in separating people who commit violent crimes, because they're far more likely than the average Joe to commit that crime in the future. Whether they're more likely to commit that crime has nothing to do with whether free will is the case.

[Marvin_Edwards]

So none of that is the point. You're not at all commenting on the point. The point was that regardless of whether free will obtains or not in the traditional distinction, we're justified in separating people who commit violent crimes, because they're far more likely than the average Joe to commit that crime in the future. Whether they're more likely to commit that crime has nothing to do with whether free will is the case.

Oh. Perhaps I should have started with, "I agree with your point that we're justified in taking some appropriate action to prevent further criminal acts".

Then I would go on to explain how the notion of free will plays a role in causally determining what the appropriate action should be.

[Pattern-chaser]

[W]e must avoid viewing the laws of nature as some external causal agent that necessitates events.

Exactly. The laws of nature are descriptive formulations humans have created. Nature is the master, or reference, and these 'laws' describe how nature works, but do not in any way proscribe nature's behaviour. Human laws, though, are binding. They are binding because we say they are binding ... and because we punish those who break them. So even these laws aren't really binding in themselves, they simply express our position that any one of our members who does this will suffer this penalty.

But doesn't that deal with this whole topic? Isn't that it?

[Marvin_Edwards]

[W]e must avoid viewing the laws of nature as some external causal agent that necessitates events.

Exactly. The laws of nature are descriptive formulations humans have created. Nature is the master, or reference, and these 'laws' describe how nature works, but do not in any way proscribe nature's behaviour. Human laws, though, are binding. They are binding because we say they are binding ... and because we punish those who break them. So even these laws aren't really binding in themselves, they simply express our position that any one of our members who does this will suffer this penalty.

But doesn't that deal with this whole topic? Isn't that it?

Well, with one exception. "Nature" as the "master" would be another metaphor. Nature does not (IMO) behave as an entity with a will of its own. Only the real objects and forces that make up the universe can be said to "cause" things to happen. The point of making this distinction is to return causal agency to natural objects, one of which is us. The metaphors, when taken literally, abscond with our causal agency.